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Fall 1970 





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This modern, complete encyclopedia gives you the assurance of 
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Mississippi Law Journal 







Boyce Holloman, President's Report 511 

Henry L. Pitts, Legal Ethics in the Courtroom 516 

Edward L. Wright, The New Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility 523 

Roger C. Landrum, Hugh Clayton, John C. Satterfield, and 
Francis Bofwling, Symposium on the New ABA Code of 

Professional Responsibility 527 

Tom Davis, Aviation Law Practice 532 

Bidwell Adam, The Case of Casey Jones 537 

William A. Bacon, Incoming President's Remarks 540 


Frank Crosthwait, ABA Convention Report 544 

Pat H. Scanlon, President's Report 545 

Joe Mullen, Young Lawyers* Challenge to the Bar 549 

Frank Crosthwait, Incoming President's Remarks 553 

William V. Alexander, Crisis in Rural America 555 


Dean Joel W. Bunkley, Jr., University of Mississippi Law 

School Report 560 


Trepassers, Licensees, and Invitees: Are the Distinctions 

Needed? 562 

Due Process of Law in Mississippi Courts: Implications of 
Erroneous Jurisdiction Under § 147 of the Constitu- 
tion of 1890 578 


Evidence — The Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs of 

Business Records 604 

Constitutional Law — Procedural Guidelines Involved in 

Municipal Control of Motion Pictures 611 

Constitutional Law — Welsh v. United States: Once Again 

— New Guidelines on Conscientious Objections 618 

Labor Law — The Policies and Decisional Processes in the 

Boys Markets Decision 626 




Entered as second class matter, November 25, 1936, at the Post Office at University, Mississippi. 

and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1879. 

Published in Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall 

$5.00 Per Annum $2.00 Per Current Number 


Mississippi Law Journal 








University University 


Jackson Jackson 


Ackerman Tupelo 


Ripley Batesville 


Clarksdale Hernando 



WILLIAM A. BACON of Jackson President 

LESTER F. SUMNERS of New Albany President-Elect 

PAT H. SCANLON of Jackson Second Vice-President 

GEORGE VAN ZANT of Jackson Executive Director 

and Secretary-Treasurer 


Fred Wicker Pontotoc Joe Clay Hamilton Meridian 

Kosta N. Vlahos ? . . Biloxi T. N. Gore, Sr Marks 

Thomas R. Ethridge Oxford James F. McKenzie Hattiesburg 

Fred Delong, Jr Greenville C. D. Pittman Raleigh 

Frank M. Deramus Louisville Harry O. Hoffman . . Hazlehurst 

Graham Hicks Natchez William E. Andrews, Jr. Purvis 

William Barbour, Jr. Yazoo City Taylor B. Smith Columbus 

Danny L. Hunter Forest John W. Written Sumner 

John W. Prewitt Vicksburg Jon A. Swartzfager Laurel 

William B. Jones Pascagoula 

Mississippi Law Journal 








Managing Editor Business Manager 


Article Editor JAMES S. ARMSTRONG 

Research Editors 


Comment Editor Index and Review Editor 


Note Editor Special Projects Editor 


Faculty Advisor 


Gregory Boyd Ina B. Leonard 

Arlen B. Coyle James S. McDonald 

Henderson S. Hall Richard T. Phillips 

Benjamin A. Hardy Thomas W. Tyner 

The JOURNAL seeks to print matter of merit and interest; being desirous of offering 
freedom to contributors, it assumes no responsibility for the views expressed herein. 


Retiring President of the 
Mississippi State Bar 



Held at Biloxi, Mississippi, on June 26 and 27, 1970 

The First General Session of the Mississippi State Bar was called 
to order at the Broadwater Beach Hotel, Biloxi, Mississippi, on June 
26, 1970, by Hon. William A. Bacon, President-elect of the Mississippi 
State Bar. 

The invocation was given by Mr. Ronnie Parker, Youth Director 
of the First Baptist Church, Gulfport, Mississippi. 

Mrs. Clare Hornsby, President of the Harrison County Bar Associ- 
ation, delivered the welcoming address. 

President-elect Bacon introduced Hon. Joe N. Pigott, who delivered 
the following address for Hon. Boyce Holloman, President of the Mis- 
sissippi State Bar, who was ill: 


Joe N. Pigott for Boyce Holloman 

Thank you, Mr. President. Distinguished guests, fellow members 
of the Mississippi State Bar Association and friends: Boyce Holloman, 
our president during the past year, has worked diligently for the pro- 
grams of the organized bar of this state during a most eventful year. He 
represented our state bar association at the meetings of several other 
state bar associations and at the annual meeting of the American Bar 

The year 1969-1970 saw many changes and unusual happenings in 
the legal profession. This administration started off, as do most admin- 
istrations, with the appointment of committees and lining out various 
work projects. Then came Hurricane Camille and the development of 
a whole new program. The hurricane disaster left many hundreds of 
families in the Gulf Coast area in a position of needing legal help, but 
unable to know where to find that legal assistance or the money to pay 

* This address has been abridged by the editor. 



for it. An emergency grant of $50,000 was obtained from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, and legal services offices were opened in Bay 
St. Louis, Biloxi and Gulfport. In addition, the bar associations in Jack- 
son County, Stone County, Pearl River County and Marion County vol- 
unteered their services in assisting the poor in those counties affected by 
the hurricane. In addition the South Central Bar Association, composed 
of Forrest, Lamar and Perry Counties, set up its own program to pro- 
vide legal services in those areas. 

To help provide this legal service, the Mississippi State Bar, 
through the Legal Services Program, leased a motorized mobile home 
which was utilized in reaching the poor in those counties and outlying 
areas. This motorized mobile unit and the Legal Services Offices in 
Biloxi and Gulfport were staffed in the beginning with volunteer attor- 
neys from across Mississippi. Over thirty lawyers volunteered to serve 
one week in this area at their own expense. This volunteer program 
was set up by the Junior Bar Section, and it was through this volunteer 
effort that the legal services program for the Hurricane Camille area 
was such a success. 

The thousands of cases handled by the legal aid program resulted 
in a net recovery to clients of over one million dollars on their insur- 
ance claims growing out of the disaster without the charge of a single 
legal fee. You have but to ask any one of thousands of persons who 
benefited from this program to find the tremendous esteem with which 
they regard the Mississippi State Bar because of our efforts following 
Hurricane Camille. 

Needless to say, the one single question most often repeated about 
the disaster program is, "How did legal services function so quickly, so 
well, and at so little cost?" The answer to that question is simply that 
it was under the control of the organized bar. We engaged in legal prac- 
tice for the poor and dealt with their problems. We did not create 
problems; we did not organize demonstrations; we did not print politi- 
cal literature; we did not encourage litigation in violation of our canons 
of ethics; we did not set race against race; we just practiced law for the 
poor — black and white. This is my concept of legal services to the poor. 
A real, vital program manned by legally trained professional persons 
and lay personnel and operated within the canons of ethics under the 
organized bar itself. Any other concept, in my opinion, does an injus- 
tice to the very profession we serve. 

I am sorry to report this is not the concept of those in authority 
in the Office of Economic Opportunity. We have offered to take over 
the legal aid program on a statewide basis. We have filed objections to 
North Mississippi Legal Services. I, together with President-elect Wil- 


liam Bacon, personally went to Washington, D. C, and met with Mr. 
Dick Chaney and Frank Jones of the Office of Economic Opportunity. 
Clark Reed, who rendered every valuable assistance that he could, also 
went in our behalf. We were courteously received and asked to file a 
report, which we did, and got a prompt notice overruling our objec- 
tions and funding a renewal of North Mississippi Legal Services. 

Although we were advised that no funds were available for our 
statewide program, there has now been filed and, I understand, is being 
approved, an application to fund the Lawyer's Committee for Civil 
Rights, a group organized by the President of the American Bar Associ- 
ation, Hon. Bernard Segal. This organization, we were advised, would 
be removed from our state as soon as the state organized bar was willing 
to assume the responsibility of legal services for the poor. 

We have demonstrated our willingness and ability to administer a 
legal aid program. The Legal Services to the Poor Committee, headed 
by Hon. Thomas Minniece of Meridian, developed a statewide corpora- 
tion known as Mississippi Legal Services, Inc., for the purpose of work- 
ing with local bar associations in establishing legal service offices 
throughout Mississippi. We filed application for funds on behalf of the 
organized bar, yet it was refused. I have filed an objection to this grant 
to the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, as has the Hinds County 
Bar Association. 

This program is not peculiar to Mississippi. The President of the 
Missouri Bar Association and dozens of lawyers from Missouri talked to 
Office of Economic Opportunity representatives about legal services 
being administered by the organized bar of their state. They, too, were 
received courteously, but their application for funds was denied. 

I realize this is an issue about which vast differences within our 
own bar association exist, but I cannot see why we cannot agree on one 
basic conclusion: that the practice of law within our state should be 
supervised by lawyers, just as the practice of medicine is supervised by 

The Criminal Law Committee, headed by Hon. Howard McDon- 
nell of Biloxi, staged a one day criminal law seminar which featured 
well known criminal defense attorneys, Grant Cooper of Los Angeles 
and Irving Dymond of New Orleans. In addition, the Admiralty and 
Maritime Actions Committee staged the first Admiralty Seminar that 
has been held by the Mississippi State Bar. 

The Law School Liaison Committee, headed by Hon. Sammy Smith 
of Corinth, met with students of the University of Mississippi Law 
School to discuss with them what the organized bar could do to help 


in preparing students for entering the legal profession. It was unani- 
mously agreed that the bar needed to cooperate with the school in 
developing an internship program. This September senior law students 
will go to work with prosecuting attorneys learning about criminal 
prosecution work. In September, 1971, it is anticipated that the law 
school will receive a grant from the Council on Legal Education and 
Professional Responsibility which will finance students interning in the 
law offices of general practitioners. The purpose of the program is to 
prepare senior law students to enter the practice of law. The students 
will spend approximately nine months in law offices and will handle 
cases from beginning to completion, including courtroom appearances 
with the attorney under whom they are interning. We believe this is 
a significant step in aiding law students to prepare themselves better 
to enter the legal profession and thereby shorten the time required 
before they can adequately represent clients in all courts of law. 

Study has been given by the bar association this year to the devel- 
opment of a para-professional training program which could be done 
through our junior colleges. This program will train lay personnel to 
work in law offices and to do much more than secretarial-type work. 
These persons, male or female, would be prepared to research the law, 
prepare briefs, and do all other things that take so much of the lawyers' 
time. The legal technicians would help the lawyer in all of the pre- 
trial preparation. This program has been successful in other parts of 
the country, and it is hoped that it can be developed in Mississippi on 
a very profitable scale for both the workers in the law offices and the 
lawyers themselves. The University of Denver has recently installed a 
full time course called "Career in the Law." I have directed this infor- 
mation to the presidents of the junior colleges in this area with the 
hope that such a program could be instituted in Mississippi. We are 
woefully short of trained legal personnel, and the organized bar must 
take steps to do something about it. 

In the area of economics of law practice we have developed an eco- 
nomic survey which was prepared and mailed to each member of the 
bar by the Economics of the Law Practice Committee, chaired by Lester 
Summers of New Albany. The results will be computerized and analyzed 
to determine what lawyers are making in various parts of the state from 
the practice of law and how they can increase their income. In addi- 
tion, we expect to develop a new suggested minimum fee schedule for 
the state bar from this survey. 

Other programs in which the state bar engaged during the past 
twelve months included the Memorial Service at the opening of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court for more than fifty lawyers who died during 
the preceding year. 


When the legislature met last January, it became apparent that a 
special effort was going to be needed to get the salaries of our trial 
court and appellate court judges increased. As a result, I appointed all 
living past presidents of the Mississippi State Bar to a special committee 
on judicial salaries, headed by Hon. Bidwell Adam of Gulfport, to 
work with the appropriate legislative committees in getting this bill 
passed. We were successful in obtaining a substantial increase in sal- 
aries for all of our judges. We feel that this will be one major step in 
keeping competent judges on the bench. 

Our Judicial Administration Committee, headed by Judge Lunsford 
Casey of Laurel, made several recommendations on studies to be done 
in the area of the administration of justice. One of these studies dealt 
with the development of pattern jury instructions. Another is to investi- 
gate the possibilities of changing the state laws to allow judges to run 
for election without political party designation. Other study was given 
to methods of serving process and related matters. 

We concluded the year with two quick projects which received sub- 
stantial notice. One was the Law Day program, headed by Hon. Joseph 
R. Meadows of Gulfport, in which more than 180 lawyers appeared in 
high schools throughout Mississippi to discuss law and justice with the 
students. In addition, a film was prepared through the assistance of 
the Mississippi Broadcaster's Association. It was shown on eight tele- 
vision stations in Mississippi. Its theme was "Law, the Bridge to Jus- 
tice." We are deeply indebted to Ray McGraf, Production Manager of 
WJTV in Jackson, for the development of this program. 

Last week a national meeting of reserve officers in the Judge Advo- 
cate General's Department opened a two-week school in Hattiesburg at 
the University of Southern Mississippi. The Mississippi State Bar co- 
sponsored a reception for these several hundred JAG officers who are 
visiting our state for the third straight year. 

A study was begun on the development of a new Canon of Ethics 
for the Mississippi State Bar to comply with the Canons of Ethics 
recently adopted by the American Bar Association. This afternoon 
there will be a complete discussion on the subject by the Hon. Edward 
L. Wright, President-elect of the American Bar Association, and a spe- 
cial committee to study the ABA canons, headed by the Hon. Gibson 
Witherspoon, has been established. 

I am deeply convinced that the first project of the Mississippi State 
Bar is to police our own ranks and to closely investigate those who 
seek admission to practice law within this state. After having served as 
President of the Mississippi State Bar for this year, I still have never 
had an opportunity to meet with the Bar Examiners who are admitting 


persons to practice law within our state. We have no adequate measure 
to investigate the moral turpitude and character of our applicants. 
Strangely enough, there is no connection between admission of practi- 
tioners to practice and the supervision of their conduct after admission. 
We are now imposing this duty on local lawyers who are often involved 
in litigation with their fellow attorneys. 

Disbarment proceedings are slow and cumbersome and require sub- 
stantial proof. I strongly recommend that the bar set about creating its 
own police body within the framework of the Complaint and Ethics 
Committee, but with the power and facilities to properly investigate, 
power to vindicate where needed. It should also furnish evidence for 
disbarment proceedings. 

The state bar has had some very complex problems confronting it 
during the past year, but through concerted efforts and cooperation by 
its members, officers, and commissioners, we were able to meet many of 
these problems and arrive at satisfactory solutions. It has been a plea- 
sure serving you as president of the state bar during this year, and I 
look forward to working with Billy Bacon and his administration dur- 
ing the next twelve months. I thank you. 

President-elect Bacon recognized Hon. Edward L. Wright, President- 
elect of the American Bar Association; Hon. Joe Henry, President of 
the Tennessee Bar Association; Hon. Bob Polack, President of the Lou- 
isiana Bar Association; Hon. Pat Richardson, President of the Alabama 
Bar Association; Hon. Burton Young, President of the Florida Bar 
Association; and Hon. Jack Deacon, President of the Arkansas Bar 

President-elect Bacon then introduced Hon. Henry L. Pitts, Presi- 
dent of the Illinois Bar Association and Fellow of the American Bar 
Foundation and American College of Probate Counsel, who delivered 
the following address: 


Henry L. Pitts 

One of the proudest accomplishments of our administration of the 
Illinois Bar Association during the past year has been an in-depth study 
by many committees of the new code of ethics. The Code has now been 

* This address has been abridged by the editor. 


adopted in Illinois with virtually no change with the exception that 
we added what was old Canon 16 as part of new Canon 7, which relates 
to the obligation of a lawyer to preserve decorum in the court and pre- 
vent his clients from doing those things in the court which he himself 
should not do. I commend the Code to you, and I hope that you will 
join us in approving it at your convention. 

In his message to the American Bar Association at the annual 
meeting in Dallas in 1969, President Nixon reminded us, as representa- 
tives of the law: "The sensitive balance between freedom and authority, 
which is a cornerstone of our democratic society, rests largely on the 
part you play in our courtrooms." As Mr. Justice Hugo Black recently 
said, our courts are the "palladiums of liberty." It, therefore, comes as 
a real shock to most of us, particularly those of us who have been 
trained in and revere the law, to witness the widespread and menacing 
attacks during recent months upon the holding of trials. 

It has not been limited to the so-called "Chicago 7," which occu- 
pied the headlines for four and a half months last fall and winter. It 
has erupted literally throughout the nation — in New York City, New 
Haven, California, and elsewhere. 

It is all the more menacing because it is only a part of the mount- 
ing tide of violent assault upon most of the institutions upon which 
ordered liberty in our representative democracy depends for survival. 
Witness, for example, the violence and destruction on our college cam- 
puses. Professor Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago Law 
School, described in a very forboding speech what is going on in the 
universities and what he called the "new university." He said the new 
university man is distinguished from his predecessor in that he rejects 
the life of the mind and the use of reason in seeking solutions to our 
social and political problems. 

Throughout history street demonstrations have been a favorite 
tactic of supporters of dictatorships and tyrants. I noted recently in a 
biography of one of Adolph Hitler's lieutenants, Dr. Goebbels, the fol- 
lowing quotation: 

Whoever can conquer the street will conquer the state one day, 
for every form of power politics and any dictatorially run state 
has its root in the street. We cannot have enough of public 
demonstrations, for that is far and away the most emphatic 
way of demonstrating one's will to govern. 

I spent the last year going to and from our new federal building 
in Chicago and the new civic center where the state courts are located. 
Throughout the year there have been demonstrations going on. One of 


the last was the demonstration demanding civil rights by the Women's 
Liberation Group. Another was held by the Gay Liberation Movement. 
We had scores of policemen out to protect the citizens. It makes you 
realize what a fragile thing the rule of law really is. 

Mr. Justice Black, in a case decided a number of years ago, 
addressed himself to this question of intimidating tactics in and about 
courtrooms. At that time he was in the minority. Justice Black said: 

The very purpose of a court system is to adjudicate controver- 
sies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of 
the courtroom according to legal procedures. Justice cannot be 
rightly administered, nor are the lives and safety of prisoners 
secure, where throngs of people clamor against the processes of 
justice right outside the courthouse or jailhouse doors. The 
streets are not now, and never have been, the proper place to 
administer justice. Use of the streets for such purposes has 
always proved disastrous to individual liberty in the long run, 
whatever fleeting benefits may have appeared to have been 
achieved. And minority groups, I venture to suggest, are the 
ones who always have suffered and always will suffer most when 
street multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for 
the less glamorous but more dependable and temperate pro- 
cesses of the law. 

The attorneys and, defendants in the "Chicago 7" trial were not 
the inventors of what the papers have called "guerrilla theatre" as a 
substitute for orderly and fair trial conduct. 

The May 15, 1970, issue of U.S.A. contains some interesting infor- 
mation on the subject of courtroom conduct excerpted from a 1933 
publication which was made at the direction of the Third Congress of 
the Communist International in 1921 advising Communists on trial as 

The worker must learn to carry into the courtroom the same 
determined militancy that brought him there. ... It is abso- 
lutely essential to remember that the policeman arresting you 
is a servant of the boss class. . . . He is your enemy. Give him 
no information of any kind whatsoever, either about yourself 
or your fellow workers, or any organization which you belong 
to, or in which you are interested. . . . Bring out the class 
issues at the trial. ... By the strength of your cause, make 
capitalism the defendant and yourself the prosecutor. . . . 
Demand a working class jury. ... At the time of sentence, the 
judge or clerk will ask 'What have you to say why sentence 
should not be pronounced upon you?' Take advantage of this 
opportunity to state why you should not be sentenced. ... A 
most important consideration, as already mentioned, is to use 
the capitalist court as a forum. ... On the date of the trial, 
there should take place a demonstration in front of the court 


house. . . . Similar demonstrations should be arranged for the 
date nearing the end of the trial. 

Now listen to these assertions of two of the "Chicago 7" defendants: 

Defendant Hoffman (attacking the "Establishment" and 
urging its destruction) : 

We need to expand our struggle to include a total attack on 
the courts. The court system is just another part of this rigged 
apparatus. . . . (Judicature, Jan. 1970) . 

Defendant Hoffman: It's going to be a party from now until 
the trial is over. (Look, Dec. 16, 1969). Jerry Rubin: Ac- 
cording to a west coast columnist, Rubin wrote for the Berke- 
ley Barb in 1968: We must attack the myths surrounding 
the courts as ferociously as we have attacked the myths of war, 
apple pie, your friendly neighborhood cop, and 'free elections.' 
. . . American courts are the nation's toilets. . . . To chal- 
lenge the courts to attack American society at its roots. [Chi- 
cago Tribune, Feb. 23, 1970; Liberty Under Law, Anarchy, 
Totalitarianism — This is the Choice, ABA, p. 33, July, 1969.] 

This practice of anarchy in the courtroom first was used most 
widely, I think, or more widely noted, in the Nazi Seditionists Trial be- 
fore Judge Edward C. Eicher (D.D.C., 1944). Judge Eicher tried to 
conduct the trial of the Nazi Seditionists, and after seven months of 
abuse and hell-raising by the counsel and the defendants, covering I 
think around 16,000 pages of mainly colloquy and precious little evi- 
dence, the judge died. The defendants were completely victorious, for 
they were never again brought to trial. 

Until recently, the most celebrated case in this area was the trial 
in New York of Eugene Dennis and ten other leaders of the Communist 
Party before Judge Harold Medina. For nine months Judge Medina 
was subjected to outrageous conduct by some of the attorneys as well 
as the defendants themselves — insults, delays based upon frivolous 
grounds, flagrant disregard of the proprieties of the courtroom — all 
of course aimed at goading the judge into committing error or breaking 
his health, and they came very close to doing the latter, certainly. 

The aftermath of that case before Judge Medina offers us precedent 
and guidance that should be helpful in the future. At least two of the 
most contemptuous lawyers in the case were involved in a series of 
subsequent actions in both federal and state courts. Those cases bring 
out the fact that we must not confuse the power of a court to punish 
for contempt with the power of the admitting authority to discipline 
any attorney licensed by it. 

One of the defendant's lawyers in the Medina trial was a New 


Jersey lawyer by the name of Abraham Isserman. Isserman was ad- 
judged guilty of criminal contempt before Judge Medina and was 
sentenced to six months in jail. The action was affirmed on appeal. In 
addition, he was suspended from practicing before the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and later he was 
disbarred from practice before the United States Supreme Court. 

Isserman, being a member of the New Jersey Bar, was also the 
respondent in disciplinary charges promptly commenced by the Ethics 
Committee of the Essex County Bar Association, although no order of 
disbarment was entered until the federal proceedings had been heard 
on review. 

On the basis of the record in the federal case, Isserman was dis- 
barred for violating ABA (and New Jersey) Canon 1 of Ethics. The 
opinion in the unanimous decision was written by Chief Justice Arthur 
T. Vanderbilt. He said that Isserman's conduct was in violation of 
Canon 1, which says: 

'It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a 
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent 
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme 
importance;' Canon 29 requiring a lawyer to 'strive at all 
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the 
profession and to improve not only the law but the adminis- 
tration of justice;' and Canon 32 admonishing every lawyer 
against rendering 'any service or advice involving disloyalty 
to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect to the judicial 
office, which we are bound to uphold' and warning that such 
improper service or advice 'invites and merits stern and just 

The new Code of Professional Responsibility contains nearly iden- 
tical provisions. For example, Canon 7 states that a lawyer should 
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. The more 
specific disciplinary rules expressly prohibit a lawyer from disregarding 
or advising his client to disregard any standing rule or a rule of a 
tribunal made during the course of a trial [DR 7-106 (A)]. The Dis- 
ciplinary Rules prohibit the trial attorney from engaging in discourte- 
ous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal and from intentionally 
or habitually violating any established rule of procedure or evidence. 
[DR 7-106 (C)]. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred Isserman, and the United 
States Supreme Court later denied a petition for certiorari. [9 N.T. 269, 
87 A.2d 903 (1952), 345 U.S. 927]. 

Justice Vanderbilt pointed out the distinction between contempt 
and disbarment proceedings. He said: 


The respondent [Isserman] is not now charged with contempt 
of court but with misbehavior in his office of attorney. ... A 
contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to 
vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the 
object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of 
the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and 
protect the court and the public from the official ministration 
of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. 

The flagrant and intentional disregard for the proprieties of 
the courtroom exhibited by the respondent constitutes miscon- 
duct so closely related to and so potentially destructive of the 
due administration of justice as to warrant the severest dis- 

It was also argued, both in the New Jersey and federal proceedings, 
that Isserman was working under trying circumstances because of the 
conduct of his clients and that he was only doing his best to defend 
them and fulfill his obligation to them. This plea was rejected, on the 
ground that no trial can be fair without order in the court and that a 
lawyer does a disservice to his client if he fails to conduct the defense 
in accordance with established rules of professional conduct. 

There is no conflict between this duty and the obligation of every 
lawyer to defend his client with fidelity and undivided loyalty, includ- 
ing vigor and courage in pressing his arguments, notwithstanding the 
real or apparent attitude of the trial judge. 

This was made abundantly clear by Justice Jackson, speaking for 
the United States Supreme Court, when he said: 

But that there may be no misunderstanding, we make clear that 
this Court, if its aid be needed, will unhesitatingly protect 
counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every 
duty pertaining to the office of the advocate on behalf of any 
person whatsoever. But it will not equate contempt with cour- 
age or insults with independence. It will also protect the pro- 
cesses of orderly trial, which is the supreme object of the 
lawyer's calling. 

The barrage of comments in the press and over the air waves 
following the "Chicago 7" trial, were mostly either pro-Kunstler or pro- 
Judge Hoffman. Even the most ardent adherents of Kunstler rarely 
denied that his conduct was unorthodox at best. They rejoined by 
saying it was judicially provoked. 

Since the appeals from the contempt sentences are pending, I shall 
not speak on this subject. But it is not inappropriate to point out that 
Kunstler has since been quoted as telling an audience at the University 
of Rhode Island that: 


Another judge would not have made a difference ... for the 
judge was someone whose power and status is invested in the 
system and therefore had to squelch anyone who threatened 
that system. [Freeport Journal-Standard, April 10, 1970]. 

In other words, it was the court system, not the judge personally, that 
he was flaunting. 

As he was quoted in the National Observer, he said that he realized 
during the course of that trial that he could not act as an officer of the 
court and do what he thought he should do. He said that he had been 
radicalized — those are his words — because his clients were being tried 
at all, and because of pickets around the courthouse with their signs 
chanting, "Stop the trial; stop the trial." The proceedings in the court- 
room were the lawyers' sophisticated version of that chant. 

Kunstler denied that he was an officer of the court. He has been 
quoted in the National Observer as saying that he realized that if he 
had acted as an officer of the court that he would be hurting his clients 
because "... they were using the courtroom to protest what was hap- 
pening to them. I would be cutting off their forum and possibly lose 
my credibility with them." 

There is heartening evidence that the judges do realize what is 
going on and are sensitive to it. In all of the torrent of comment about 
the shackling of Bobby Seale, there was virtually nothing said about 
the dilemma that the judge was confronted with. The judge either had 
to declare a mistrial with respect to Seale, or he had to gag and shackle 
him. He had to because the Court of Appeals in our own circuit a few 
months before had held that a criminal defendant could be bound and 
shackled, but that he could not be removed from the courtroom during 
the course of his trial because that would be a denial of his right to 
confront the witnesses protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. [Illinois v. Allen]. 

Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion in the Allen case, and he said 
that the flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards 
of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated, that one of the 
options open to the judge was not only shackling a man or sentencing 
him for contempt, but that he could also be removed from the court- 
room while the trial proceeded if his conduct prevented the trial from 
going ahead in any manner. 

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan went to the heart 
of the matter. He reminded us that the American dream of a society 
where all men are free and equal has not been an easy thing to realize 
and that it is under continuing challenge. He quoted from Lincoln's 


Gettysburg address about whether such a government so dedicated can 
long endure. Mr. Justice Brennan answered in these eloquent words: 

It cannot endure if the Nation falls short on the guarantees of 
liberty, justice, and equality embodied in our founding docu- 
ments. But it also cannot endure if we allow our precious 
heritage of ordered liberty to be ripped apart amid the sound 
and fury of our time. 

A nationally syndicated columnist recently stated it well in a 
challenge to us as members of the legal profession. Regarding the new 
phenomenon of disruptive tactics in the courts, William S. White had 
this to say: 

The plain, the incredible and frightening truth is that the 
central pillar of our whole free society, a system of justice that 
is the finest work of a thousand years of Anglo-American heri- 
tage, is in clear and imminent danger from a studied campaign 
to besmirch it and to smash it, and only the legal profession 
can save it. We have the means, we have the rules — let us 
have the will to do so. 

Hon. Gibson B. Witherspoon, moderator of the panel on the new 
Code of Professional Responsibility, then introduced Hon. Edward L. 
Wright of Little Rock, Arkansas, President-elect of the American Bar 
Association, who delivered the following address: 


Edward L. Wright 

The Committee that drafted the Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility was appointed in 1964 with a commission to study the existing 
Canons of Professional Ethics and to make recommendations for changes 
therein. The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in 1908 with 
piecemeal amendments over the years totaling forty-seven in number. 
The canons were little more than a rewrite of the very admirable canons 
of ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, adopted in 1887, and 
these in turn were a bodily lift of the lectures of Judge George Shars- 
wood of Philadelphia published in 1854, which were modeled on the 
David Hoffman lectures of 1814. 

In the latter part of the twentieth century we found that lawyers 
were guided, inspired, and disciplined, if at all, under a canonical system 
that was rooted in the practices, the customs, and the language of the 
mid-nineteenth century. The Canons of Professional Ethics, honorably 

*This address has been abridged by the editor. 


conceived as they were, had four principal deficiencies that four prior 
committees had recognized but had done nothing about. 

These deficiencies were, first, that many of the canons that were 
sound in substance had been awkwardly or deficiently stated and were 
in need of editorial revision. 

Second, the canons are not effective teaching instruments. My friends 
of the academic cloth assure me that the students of today are much 
brighter than the students of the day of the multiple of you and me, 
and that no longer do they accept our cherished fiats. They want a 
reason for the rule, or the rule will be ignored and assaulted. I am on 
record on many occasions in many places in condemnation of much of 
what occurs on campuses today under the guise of peaceful dissent and 
protest. But I am in complete sympathy with the student of today who 
no longer is willing to take a rule simply because it has been on the 
books forever if the rule cannot be justified in reason and in practice. 

Third, there is no inter-relationship of one canon to another. For 
example, trial conduct would be found scattered through seventeen 
separate canons, from four to thirty-seven. Acceptance and retention of 
employment is talked about in eleven different canons. 

Fourth, as perhaps a subheading under the lack of organization, is 
the fact that there is no clear delineation between the inspiring, the 
teaching, the guiding, the leading on the one hand, and the proscrip- 
tive on the other. 

Last, there is a change in society, of which lawyers are a part, that 
requires the statement of new principles of professional conduct in 
areas totally uncovered by the present Canons of Professional Ethics. 

With no firm feeling as to how revision might be adopted, we 
labored and struggled in our own sweat and tears for two years before 
a structure of the Code evolved. It is fundamental that an ethical cli- 
mate, whether for ministers, dentists, plumbers or tradesmen of any 
character, is maintained in advance by only two forces: one in the con- 
science of the morally aware profession, and the second is the disciplin- 
ary sanctions that must be invoked against those who step below the 
minimum standards. 

The Code consists of three separate, yet related, parts. First, there 
are nine canons which do not compress or distill the forty-seven canons 
of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, but which are totally different. 
Next come ethical considerations and last, disciplinary rules. 

The nine canons are single sentence, axiomatic statements of obli- 
gations of lawyers in the three areas in which we act— in relation to 


the system, in relation to the legal profession, and in relation to the 
public we serve. 

Grouped under each canon are ethical considerations and dis- 
ciplinary rules. Ethical considerations are not mandatory in character. 
They seek to set a higher level to which the aspiring may look for 
guidance and for encouragement. They state the higher levels of activi- 
ties of lawyers, which cannot be ordained except through appeal to 
reason and to conscience. The disciplinary rules are the "Thou Shalt 
Nots" of the Code, the black letter statute that sets with specificity 
the minimum standard to which every lawyer must adhere or else be 
subject to disciplinary action. 

The Code does not do three things: first, it does not endeavor to 
specify, suggest or require any particular disciplinary force. There is 
in existence a counterpart committee to the one that drafted the Code 
known as the "Special Committee for Evaluation of Disciplinary Stan- 
dards" headed by Mr. Justice Thomas C. Clark of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, retired. This committee will bring out a report 
for submission to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso- 
ciation this August, and this relates to the policing of our own ranks, 
about which all of us can generically hang our heads in shame up to 
the present time. It is a fact of history that lawyers, generally, have done 
an extremely poor job of cleaning their own houses. But more im- 
portant than ridding the profession of those in it who are undesirable 
is the maintenance of standards that will exclude on the front end 
those who are unworthy. 

Second, the Code does not purport to suggest or to set standards 
of civil liability against lawyers for their professional conduct. 

Third, the Code does not relate to judges as such. The Code does 
relate to all lawyers, regardless of the area in which they may operate, 
whether they are civil practitioners, criminal practitioners, law teachers, 
government employees, corporate employees or judges. But there is at 
work a concurrent committee of the American Bar Association known 
as the "Special Committee on the Evaluation of Judicial Ethics" headed 
by Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, 
retired, that is addressing itself to the subject of judicial ethics. 

The Code does many things that the Canons of Ethics do not 
purport to do. First, there is a new canon on competence. 

Until the adoption of the Code, the legal profession was the only 
learned group that had no standard of competence. I could have been 
licensed, as I was, in 1925, never opened a book from that day to this, 


and yet maintained my license in good form. I could be neglectful to 
the gross detriment of my client, to the depravation of his life, property 
or liberty and never be subject to disbarment because of that conscious, 
intentional, deliberate neglect. The new Code does cover that. It is the 
belief of those who drafted the Code that lawyers should be subject to 
discipline if they either incompetently undertake to handle business, 
or, being competent or incompetent, neglect business entrusted to them. 

The Code incorporated bodily that portion of the Reardon Report 
that dealt with pre-trial and trial publicity. 

There is a coverage on a minimum basis of group legal services. 
The Code does not authorize, sanction or permit group legal services 
beyond those constitutionally required by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 

The Code speaks in specific terms which, hopefully, will meet the 
tests of due process. One of the vices of the present Canons of Profes- 
sional Ethics is that there is overbreadth of statement, the result being 
that courts cannot uphold convictions in many cases because of a lack 
of a specific charge. 

The Code is now law in fifteen states. The Code was promulgated 
by the American Bar Association House of Delegates on August 12, 1969. 
Today it is binding law in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and West Virginia — a very impos- 
ing area of the nation. The Code has had an acceptance that has amazed 
all who have had any connection with it. 

The Code has been approved by the bar associations of twelve 
other states, each of which has a petition pending before the court of 
last resort of the respective jurisdiction asking for promulgation of the 
Code by that court. 

The Code is an imperfect document. It was composed by thirteen 
human beings who had an often difficult time in reconciling their own 
views. The Code is a compromise — not of principles — but of fashions, 
traditions, procedures, and customs under which lawyers practice. The 
Code represents, we humbly trust, the best distillation possible of the 
existing canons, decisions, statutes, and traditions. 

And so the Code has been submitted to the bar of public opinion 
and has been accepted, generally speaking, after intense scrutiny. We 
recommend it for adoption in Mississippi, not because it is our product, 
but because we feel that, with all of its shortcomings, it is better than 
what we have now. 


Hon. Gibson Witherspoon then introduced Hon. Roger C. Lan- 
drum, Hon. Hugh Clayton, Hon. John C. Satterfield, and Hon. Francis 
Bowling, who held a panel discussion: 


Roger C. Landrum 

The first two canons have been assigned to me. The first canon 
deals with the responsibilities of the lawyer to maintain the integrity 
and competence of the legal profession. 

The thrust of that canon and the thrust of most of the canons is 
set forth in the first paragraph of the first canon, which says: 

A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is 
that every person in our society should have ready access to the 
independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and 

There is one thing that is implicit in a reading of these canons — 
that this committee, in its efforts to be perfectly fair, has come up with 
an admonition to lawyers that they have not only the duty to see to it 
that incompetent lawyers are not allowed to practice, but also that if 
for any reason there is some condition which temporarily renders a 
lawyer incapable from practicing before the bar, and that situation 
corrects itself, that the other lawyers assist in every way in restoring 
that person to his rightful place in the practice of law. 

The second canon is "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession 
in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." 

It is perfectly permissible for a lawyer to advise people as to their 
rights and any claims he perceives they might have, if he does not do it 
for the purpose of procuring employment for himself. 

It is proper for a lawyer to advise his relatives, his close friends, 
his present clients or past clients if the claim he perceives them to have 
is related to any prior representation of his. 

Lawyers should not prevail on third parties to have them recom- 
mended for representation, and they should never compensate any third 
parties for this particular reason. 

Judges, public officials who are prohibited from practicing law, 
should see to it that their names are no longer used in the firm name 

*The remarks of those on the panel have been abridged by the 


and that there is no indication that they were previously a member of 
the firm. 

Lawyers are not to hold themselves out as specialists. Admiralty, 
Trademarks, and Patents are the only exceptions to that canon. 

The canons provide specifically, with regard to acceptance of em- 
ployment, that it is the duty of the bar to accept employment even in 
cases where the subject matter or the person is repulsive to the lawyer. 

A lawyer should not accept employment, however, if his feelings on 
the repugnance of the subject matter or the person involved are such 
that they would impair his effectiveness in a trial of that lawsuit. He 
should not accept if he thinks the case is being filed simply for harass- 

Once having accepted employment, a lawyer should not drop out 
of the case. He should carry it to completion. If he is compelled to 
withdraw, he should follow the applicable rules of the court; he should 
speedily inform his client; he should return to the client all of his 
papers; he should assist the client in getting new counsel; he should 
cooperate with the new counsel; if he has been paid a fee or a retainer 
of any nature, he should return any unearned portion. 

Hugh Clayton 

Canon No. 3 reads: "A lawyer should assist in preventing the 
unauthorized practice of law." The prohibition against the practice of 
law by a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity 
and competence of those who render legal services. A non-lawyer who 
undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed by the same rules 
that govern the conduct of a lawyer. 

What is practicing law? Fundamentally, the practice of law is the 
rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment 
of a lawyer. Ethical Consideration No. 3-6 reads: "A lawyer often dele- 
gates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation 
is proper ... if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, 
supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional respon- 
sibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render 
legal service more economically and efficiently." 

Ethical Consideration 3-8 says: "... a lawyer should not aid or 
encourage a layman to practice law; he should not practice law in asso- 
ciation with a layman or otherwise share legal fees with a layman." 

In this particular Canon not only do we call on the legal profes- 
sion to assist in the prevention of unauthorized practice of law, but we 


also do it for our own protection. We have seen the practice of law in 
many fields whittled away, and it is time for us to become active and 

Canon 4 says: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and 
secrets of a client." There are several fundamental statements under 
the title of Ethical Considerations with regard to this canon: 

(1) Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer 
and client and the proper functioning of the legal system 
require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and 
secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. 

(2) Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may disclose 
the affairs of his client to partners or associates of his firm. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal 
operation of a law office exposes confidential professional 
information to non-lawyer employees of the office, par- 
ticularly secretaries and those having access to the files; 
and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care in selecting 
and training his employees so that the sanctity of all con- 
fidences and secrets of his clients may be preserved. 

(3) Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for 
a lawyer to give limited information from his files to an 
outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, ac- 
counting, data processing, banking, printing, or other legiti- 
mate purposes, provided he exercises due care in the 
selection of the agency and warns the agency that the in- 
formation must be kept confidential. 

(4) The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences 
and secrets of his client continues after the termination 
of his employment. Thus a lawyer should not attempt to 
sell a law practice as a going business because, among other 
reasons, to do so would involve the disclosure of confi- 
dences and secrets. A lawyer should provide for the pro- 
tection of the confidences and secrets of his client fol- 
lowing the termination of the practice of the lawyer .... 

An exception to the rule of keeping inviolate what our clients tell 
us in Disciplinary Rule C-4. This is where we may break a confidence, 
or we may not be bound by the professional privilege. We have the 
right and privilege to reveal what we know as an attorney in order to 
collect a fee or defend ourselves, our associates, and our employees, 
against accusations of wrongful conduct. 

I hope that all of us as lawyers will be affected by this very ma- 
terially. I hope that Mississippi can adopt a coordinated Code of Pro- 
fessional Responsibility rather than having to rely on the thirty or forty 
canons which are now in existence. 


John C. Satterfield 

Canon 5 states: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Profes- 
sional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." For instance, an attorney may 
not accept employment if, in his professional judgment, work on behalf 
of his client may be adversely affected by his own financial business, 
property, or personal interest. 

Here is one that has raised a lot of problems for attorneys: a lawyer 
shall not accept employment — or shall resign after he has accepted that 
employment — if he knows, or it is obvious, that he or a lawyer in his 
firm ought to be called as a witness, except if the testimony is on an 
uncontested matter, a formality concerning the nature or value of the 
legal services, or if a resignation from the case would work a substantial 
hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or 
his firm as counsel in the particular case. 

Ethical Consideration 5-3 states: "A lawyer shall not acquire a 
proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation 
he is conducting for a client, except that he may acquire a lien granted 
by law to secure his fee or expenses; contract with a client for a reason- 
able contingent fee in a civil case." 

It is pointed out that when a lawyer has a proprietary interest, e.g., 
a fractional mineral interest, he is connected with the client's interest 
which should not be done if, under any reasonable construction, it 
would put the lawyer in a position which is adverse to that of his client. 
Otherwise, he may acquire such an interest. 

Regarding contingent fees, the Code says: "While representing a 
client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer 
shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except 
that a lawyer may advance or guarantee expenses of litigation, including 
court costs, expenses of investigation, expense of medical examination 
that calls for obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client 
remains ultimately liable for such expenses." That rules out loans to a 
client for matters other than these. It does, however, recognize the fact 
that when you represent an indigent plaintiff who has a right of re- 
covery for injuries received, but no funds with which to carry it on, it 
is proper to advance it, although under the agreement the client should 
remain liable. 

Practicing as a professional corporation is recognized as being 
proper, but it cannot and should not be done if a nonlawyer holds an 
interest in the corporation, is a corporate director or officer, or has a 
right to direct or control the professional judgment of the lawyer. The 


Code also states that no attorney should accept employment where he 
is recommended by, employed by, and/or paid by someone else to 
represent a client if he does not retain an independent position in which 
he can consider the interest of a client against the organization or the 
corporation who may have employed him for that purpose. As is stated 
in EC5-23: "A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to 
represent others possesses a potential power to exert strong pressures 
against the independent judgment of those lawyers . . . . " 

In Canon No. 6 there is a provision that lawyers should represent 
a client competently. No lawyer should accept representation to handle 
a matter in a field of law in which he is not competent unless he tells 
his client that he expects to associate an attorney who is competent, 
discloses the fact that he will do so, and it is agreeable with his client. 

I will close by saying that you must be competent; you must be 
prepared; you must handle it right. 

Francis Bowling 

In my opinion the first canon that I am to discuss, No. 7, is the 
most important one because it deals with advocacy and litigation be- 
tween the lawyer and his client. It is styled: "A Lawyer Should Repre- 
sent a Client Zealously within the Bounds of the Law." 

In representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly advance a 
claim or a defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that 
he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing 

Another heading reads: "A public prosecutor or other government 
lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for 
the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence 
of evidence known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the of- 
fense, or reduce the punishment." 

One of the most important areas is "Trial Conduct," and there 
are one or two things here that I do not question but would like to 
see further discussion on by members of the bar: (1) "in presenting a 
matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose . . . legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the 
position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel." 
(2) "In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a 
lawyer shall not: assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, 


except when testifying as a witness." The Code does not say whether 
this means to a jury, a court, a quasi administrative body, or otherwise. 

"Communication with or Investigation of Jurors" follows our 
procedure in Mississippi exactly. It is perfect as far as I can see, and I 
certainly recommend it to you heartily. It clears up one thing that I 
have heard differences of opinion on — whether or not an attorney should 
contact a juror after a trial: "After discharge of the jury from further 
consideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer 
shall not ask questions of, or make comments to, a member of that jury 
that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to in- 
fluence his actions in future jury service." It is all right to ask the 
juror about the case for your own personal education, but not in a 
manner to harass him or to indicate to him that you are condemning 
him in any way. 

Next is "Contact with Witnesses." The attorney has a perfect right 
to pay: (1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or 
testifying, (2) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of 
time in attending or testifying. 

I certainly recommend that everybody study these, and if you have 
any suggested changes be sure to write your commissioners because 
they are the ones who will implement them. 

Hon. Cliff Finch introduced Hon. Tom Davis of Austin, Texas, 
Chairman of the American Trial Lawyers Association on Aviation Law, 
who delivered the following address: 


Tom Davis 

What I hope to do here this afternoon is to briefly acquaint you 
with some of the possible causes of action, the various theories of lia- 
bility, the many problems that you can run into in the practice of avia- 
tion law. 

Let's start with the pilot and the pilot's estate. Of course you might 
run into guest statutes. Very seldom are people solely from one state 
involved in a crash, so you normally have problems with the laws of 
other states — what law is going to be used. Therefore, you have to con- 
sider the possibility of an aviation guest statute. 

*This address has been abridged by the editor. 


Most light aircraft have dual controls. Many times more than one 
person on board the plane has a pilot's license. Res ipsa loquitur may 
be applied when a crash occurs, but you must establish which person 
was in control when the crash took place. There are two lines of thought 
in the case law concerning the burden of proof. There is the "Proof 
Beyond the Possibility of Any Doubt" theory expoused by the Kansas 
Supreme Court. Most states, however, require only a preponderance of 
the evidence to establish who was in control. 

The new approach to the control problem is the "Pilot in Com- 
mand" theory. There is a federal air regulation stating that the pilot 
in command shall be responsible for the operation of the aircraft, just 
like the captain of a ship. Normally the owner, the one who has the 
most experience, or the one sitting in the left front seat is the pilot 
in command. 

Another problem that you will run into in light aircraft cases is 
insurance coverage. This is an area that is not regulated; the policies 
are written more or less on an individual basis. One area which you 
need to be concerned about regarding coverage is pilot warranty. Every 
aviation policy is going to have a pilot warranty clause. It may be 
so broad as to cover any pilot with an FAA certificate, or it may be so 
narrow as to cover only one named pilot. But unless you comply with 
your pilot warranty, you have no coverage. This coverage includes lia- 
bility and hull coverage. 

This can be particularly troublesome, depending upon where the 
burden of proof rests. Is it on the plaintiff or the defendant to prove 
that the pilot was under the pilot warranty? In Texas and a few other 
states if the insurance company raises a positive violation, then the 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove there was no violation. 

Use of the aircraft is another problem that comes up all of the 
time. Most private aircraft are stated to be used for "business and 
pleasure." Under one terminology or another, a flight for which a 
charge is made, directly or indirectly, may be excluded from that cate- 

The definition of a charge may become important. You may have 
a per hour estimate for maintenance and a per hour estimate for over- 
haul. These are very real operating costs. Every hour that is put on a 
plane is costing something in maintenance and is putting the engine 
that much closer to overhaul. These expenses can be estimated and are 
often expressed as a per hour reimbursement of expenses. The Fifth 
Circuit has held that where the per hour reimbursement was very close 
to the price of the oil and gas that went into the plane, the commercial 


rate for renting the aircraft was not approached. Thus, there was no 
"charge," and coverage did not exist. The case intimated that as long 
as there was no profit involved, there was no charge. This decision, 
however, did not decide whether reimbursement for fixed costs such 
as insurance, hangar fees, and depreciation would constitute a charge. 
I can only suggest to you that if you let someone use an airplane on a 
per hour basis, you should get written into your policy a clause stating 
that a reimbursement of $30 per hour shall not be considered a charge 
under the terms of this policy. 

Another problem area is exclusions. I think competition and owner 
awareness have driven most of those provisions out of the policies, but 
you still may find a provision that excludes coverage for any violation 
of a federal air regulation involving instrument flying, night flying, 
student instruction, and minimum altitude — which covers about ninety 
percent of all accidents. Generally speaking, though, exclusions now 
only involve exceptional circumstances such as an airplane that has 
lost its airworthiness certificate, an experimental airplane, crop dusting, 
or something of that kind. There have been attempts to go back to the 
old "any violation" provision by resort to the "unlawful purpose" 
terminology in all contracts. The argument is made that the violation 
of any federal air regulation or of any law of any kind makes the 
flight unlawful; and, therefore, under the unlawful purpose doctrine 
there is no coverage. I don't think that will stand up, but the attempt 
has been made. Also, other means have been used to find some viola- 
tion under other provisions. Generally, these have been unsuccessful. 

Maintenance is another problem area. Every plane must be in- 
spected annually, and a licensed mechanic must stamp and sign in the 
log book of the aircraft that he has inspected this aircraft in accordance 
with federal air regulations and hereby certifies that it is airworthy. 
So far there has not been much litigation on what airworthy means 
and whether it is an express representation or an express warranty 
that the aircraft is airworthy. 

How about the manufacturer? In the aircraft industry most manu- 
facturers are nothing but people who assemble parts of an airplane, 
seldom with their name on it. 

Under strict products liability in tort, you can go up or down the 
chain, from the man who sold it to you, to the man who sold it to 
him, to the manufacturer, to the engine manufacturer, to the carburetor 
manufacturer, back to the one who made the part they put in the 
carburetor. Normally you don't have to. Somewhere before you get 
there you can find financial responsibility. This can be a problem, but 


don't overlook the component manufacturer. The assembler, of course, 
is responsible for what the component man did, as though he had done 
it himself. 

Faulty design action against the manufacturer is the coming area. 
It may be possible to show that the design or the instructions were a 
cause of pilot error and litigate against the manufacturer. 

FAA controls the plane from the time you talk to ground control 
before takeoff until you talk to ground control during the landing. 
The federal government is responsible for any mistakes made by con- 
trol operators. 

Several cases have held that the government did not give the pilot 
sufficient weather information for him to make an intelligent decision 
on whether or not to take off. 

Vortac turbulence has brought a lot of litigation. It was found 
recently that an airplane, when the wing develops lift, sends off a 
little tornado from the wing tip, going backwards, spiraling air. This 
air turns so fast that an aircraft behind another may be uncontrollable. 
Large aircraft may cause damage to smaller aircraft. The government 
has been held responsible in many of those instances. 

Military pilots and personnel may sue the manufacturer in the 
same manner as other individuals. 

What happens when a crash occurs? If there is a fatality involved, 
it will be investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board. 
Many times where there is a non-fatal accident, the Board will delegate 
its authority to the FAA who will investigate for the NTSB, but the 
NTSB is the agency ultimately responsible for the investigation. 

After a crash an air investigator will be notified. He will ask the 
local authorities to keep everybody away until he can get there. He 
inspects the wreckage, makes a wreckage distribution chart to identify 
the pieces, makes photographs, takes statements, gets transcripts from 
any ATC records and tapes of communications that went back and 
forth. All of this information will be collected in an accident package 
and filed with the NTSB in Washington. Then it is available as a 
public document. Until then they won't be giving you much informa- 

You may take the depositions of the NTSB men or the FAA men. 
Under certain conditions you must get the permission of general coun- 
sel of the NTSB in Washington. Regulations provide that they will 


allow you to take the investigator's deposition if this information is 
not available from any other source, including stipulations by the 
opposing party. Another regulation says that he can testify only to 
facts, not opinions or conclusions. 

There will be more than one accident package. The FAA facility 
involved, the flight service station, or the Air Traffic Control will pre- 
pare an accident package. Many times this is turned over to the NTSB 
investigator and is included within his report; sometimes it is not. 
Sometimes not everything in the FAA package is turned over to the 

Tapes are only kept fifteen days. When an accident occurs, they 
will go back and pull the original tape. The man in charge will then 
go back about five minutes before the first communication with the 
aircraft involved and re-record the pertinent transmissions on that 
tape until five minutes after the last communication with the aircraft 
involved. They will keep this re-recorded part of the tape, and you can 
get copies of it. The original is then put back in, and the other com- 
munications are erased. So you are only getting what someone thought 
was the important part of those transmissions. 

The FAA office in Oklahoma City has records on all aircraft, altera- 
tion forms, annual inspection forms, the title of the aircraft, the history 
of it, and pilot record forms. A student certificate is only good for two 
years, and they keep records on student certificates for three years. 

As for the publications in the area, CCH publishes the aviation law 
reports. They are very good and very complete. Lee Kreindler has a 
two volume publication on aviation law that is excellent. 

Following this address the afternoon session was adjourned. 


Saturday, June 27, 1970 

The meeting was called to order by President-elect Bacon. 

Hon. Quitman Ross then introduced Hon. Bidwell Adam, a 
member of the Mississippi State Bar, who delivered the following ad- 



Bidwell Adam 

I want to talk to you about justice in our courts. We have able 
judges, able lawyers, able district attorneys, and able officials. But I 
want to tell you of a case that I tried over fifty years ago. It depicts 
just how hard it was to represent a man charged with a crime in this 
state at that time. 

Joe Mize, one of the ablest lawyers in the state at that time, called 
me into his office one day and asked me if I wanted to go to Hattiesburg 
to defend a man charged with a murder. I said, yes, I would go to 
Hattiesburg and defend him, "What's his name?" 

He said, "His name is Casey Jones." 

I said, "Has he got any money?" 

He said, "No, he don't have any money, but you can get some 
good experience." 

Then I said, "Well, Casey may get some good experience, too." 
And Casey did get some good experience. 

Casey was indicted by the Forrest County grand jury on a charge 
of murder. He was charged with killing a mail carrier's wife by the 
name of Mrs. Moseley. 

T. Webber Wilson was the district attorney. He was a fine, hand- 
some, gallant young man about six feet tall. He had plenty of hair on 
his head and was an eloquent speaker. He was later congressman from 
this district. Judge Robert Hall was the circuit judge, and Forrest 
Morris was the county attorney. A man named McKenzie was the 
sheriff. I went up to Hattiesburg and took my wife along with me. 

When we got to Hattiesburg, I went to the jail and saw Casey 
Jones. He was a little fellow just about my size. I said, "Jones, Mr. Joe 
Mize asked me to come up here to represent you because he couldn't 

He said, "Well, I am sorry he couldn't come." 

Then I said, "Well, I am sorry, too, but if you want me, I will 
do my best for you. I will try to save your life if I can." 

He said, "Well, I didn't kill Mrs. Moseley, but I have got to have 
some lawyer, and you may just as well try me as anybody else." And 
so we prepared to try Casey Jones. 

*This address has been abridged by the editor. 


We eliminated all of the preliminaries and had the arraignment. 
He pleaded not guilty. I then filed a motion for a change of venue, stat- 
ing that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial, that his case 
had been pre-judged, that the whole city of Hattiesburg and Forrest 
County was inflamed against Casey Jones, and that everybody in town 
said he was guilty. 

After I filed my motion, I went around Hattiesburg and inter- 
viewed about thirty or forty people in different parts of the city. They 
all said that they thought Casey Jones could get a fair trial, but they all 
thought he was guilty. They all thought that he should hang, and they 
proceeded to so testify on the examination that I conducted of each 
one of them. 

We proceeded to the trial. All of the witnesses testified about how 
Jones killed the lady, how he shot her, and what happened in the 
yard. We proceeded with the trial, and Webber Wilson stood in the 
jury box and said, "Brother Davis — Brother Davis, I would like for 
you to tell me now when you go home — when you go home tonight 
and after you have brought in your verdict of guilty in this case — 
when you go home tonight, and your good wife meets you at the front 
door, will you tell her that you had the moral courage and the guts 
to vote to hang ole Casey Jones for killing Mrs. Moseley?" And Brother 
Davis said he would. 

I immediately moved the court for a mistrial because of the mis- 
conduct of Webber Wilson, and Judge Hall said, "Well, now, Mr. 
Wilson, you won't do that anymore, and so let's go along with the trial 
of this case. We want to be fair, and we want to give this defendant 
justice, and we want to get through with this trial." 

So, Mr. Wilson got alongside Mr. Thomas, another juror. He put 
his arm around Thomas and reached over and had his arm around 
another juror. He was holding two jurors in his arms while he was 
talking to the jury. I noted all of these exceptions and made all the 
motions necessary to preserve the defendant's rights, and Mr. Wilson 
continued with that for about thirty or forty minutes. 

Well, as we went along in the trial, Mr. Wilson continued to make 
these very fine oratorical efforts and soared among the lofty crags like 
the eagle. He finally reached the point where he said that he wanted 
to see that the defendant got a fair trial, and he hoped that I would 
yield a moment so he could make another remark or two. I, of course, 
objected to it, and Judge Hall overruled my objection because he 
wanted to see justice done. Well, we found ourselves getting deeper 
and deeper in the clutches of the law, but where we knew that sooner 
or later something was going to happen — and it did. 


Now, before we reached that point when the court overruled my 
motion for a change of venue, the crowds stood up and applauded and 
cheered. I am telling you the truth. They cheered until it echoed, and 
I asked the court if he would give the right to dictate into the record 
the conduct of the crowd in the courtroom, the cheering and the ap- 
plauding that went on in the proceedings, and he said, "Yes, I want 
to be fair. I want to see whether or not the jury applauded when 
I overruled the motion for a change of venue because in deliver- 
ing the opinion that overruled that motion I paid tribute and compli- 
ment to the citizenry of Forrest County on their splendid manhood 
and womanhood, or whether they just applauded because I overruled 
the motion. All of you people that applauded because I overruled the 
motion and did so paying tribute and compliment to the people of 
Forrest County on the splendid manhood and womanhood, stand up 
and be counted. All right, let the record show that everybody in the 
courtroom stood up. Now all of you people who applauded just 
because I overruled the motion stand up. Let the record show that 
nobody stands up." 

The jury was given the case. I had about twenty-five or thirty 
instructions, and the state had three or four. They came back in about 
five minutes and said, "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as 

Casey Jones, before being sentenced by the Judge, was asked if he 
had anything to say why he shouldn't be sentenced. He didn't say any- 
thing. Then he said, "Mr. Adam, do you have anything to say?" 

I said, "Yes, sir. I will do my saying in the Supreme Court." 

Well, we played a few tricks that we had up our sleeve getting our 
record perfected and going to the supreme court on appeal, and here's 
what happened. Now remember, he had been tried, convicted and 
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. 

I got a letter from Casey Jones which said, "I want you to come 
up to see me." 

I went up to see him. I said, "What's the matter?" 

He said, "They are gonna hang me in Hattiesburg before you can 
perfect your appeal." 

And I said, "They aren't going to do that." 

He said, "I am getting it straight, I want you to get me moved out 
of Hattiesburg." 

I called Governor Lee M. Russell, and told him, "Governor Rus- 
sell, Casey Jones told me that they are going to hang him before he 


can perfect his appeal. I want you as a matter of safety and precaution 
to have him transferred to another jail." 

He told me he would call me back, and he did. He said, "I have 
talked to Bob Hall and Webber Wilson both, and they have assured 
me that there is nothing to those rumors and remarks. That's just a 
lot of street talk." 

I said, "Governor, you are governor of the state. Why don't you 
go on and move the man just as a means of safety anyhow?" 

He said, "Well, I would be moving people all over the state from 
one jail to another if I did that every time one of these letters came in. 
I don't think there's any danger. I will check it and let you know." 

About ten days later I got a big picture in the mail of Casey Jones 
hanging from one of the oak trees in the court yard at Hattiesburg. 
The man was executed by a mob that went into the jail with acetylene 
torches and burned the steel locks off of the cells. He had a hole in 
the top of his head big enough for you to put your fist in. 

That happened in Mississippi. 

Following this address, Hon. Joe Meadows presented the Silver 
Gavel Award to Mr. Ray McGraff of WJTV, Jackson, Mississippi, for 
work on the Law Day film. 

Committee reports were then made. The substance of these has 
been omitted because of space limitation. All resolutions passed by 
the bar appear in Appendix I. 

Incoming President William A. Bacon then made the following 


William A. Bacon 

I would like to say to you, my friends, that I am most deeply 
honored, and I am most humble at the honor that you have conferred 
upon me. I say to you, my friends, that no man is more honored than 
he who is called upon to serve the members of his own profession. I 
am most grateful to you for that opportunity. 

I say to you that we need to sponsor and to inculcate into our 
own hearts and souls a respect for the law and for the rule of law. I 

* These remarks have been abridged by the editor. 


say to you that we must somehow stem the tide against this new breed 
of lawyers who apparently attempt to win a case by any means, fair 
or foul. We must uphold right and reason — not might. We must live 
by the rule of law. We lawyers take an oath as members of a court and 
as officers of the court to uphold the law, and I say to you that it is 
time that we behoove ourselves to that oath that we take when we 
become members of this profession. We must seek to preserve, strengthen, 
and carry on the courts that have been given to us by a process of 
judicial administration. If we, as lawyers, do not preserve and carry 
on these courts, have respect for them, and play within the guidelines 
and rules that have been established down through the years, then it 
will not be long until we have no courts to practice in. 

I say to you, my friends, that I hope that this is going to be a good 
and fruitful year for the bar association. I am going to call upon many 
of you to serve on committees that will be appointed very shortly. I 
know that with your assistance we are going to have a good year in 
the bar association. 

Thank you very much for this high honor that you have bestowed 
upon me. 

President Bacon presented a plaque to Hon. Boyce Holloman for 
outstanding service as President of the Mississippi State Bar during the 
past year. Mrs. Holloman accepted the award for her husband. 

Hon. Hugh N. Clayton was then elected to a two-year term as the 
Mississippi delegate to the ABA House of Delegates. Hon. Pat H. Scan- 
Ion, retiring President of the Mississippi Junior Bar, was elected Second 
Vice-President of the Mississippi State Bar. 

Hon. Charles C. Finch of Batesville and Hon. Lester Sumners of 
New Albany were nominated for the position of president-elect. Mr. 
Sumners was elected. 

The following Commissioners were elected: 

District 1 — Fred Wicker, Pontotoc 

District 2 — Kosta Vlahos, Biloxi 

District 3 — Thomas Ethridge, Oxford 

District 4 — Fred deLong, Jr., Greenville 

District 5 — Frank Deramus, Louisville 

District 6 — Graham Hicks, Natchez 

District 7 — William Barbour, Jr., Yazoo City 

District 8 — Danny L. Hunter, Forrest 

District 9 — John Pruitt, Vicksburg 

District 10 — Joe Clay Hamilton, Meridian 


District 11 — T. N. Gore, Sr., Marks 
District 12 — James L. McKenzie, Hattiesburg 
District 13 — C. D. Pittman, Raleigh 
District 14 — Harry O. Hoffman, Hazlehurst 
District 15 — William Andrews, Jr., Purvis 
District 16 — Taylor Smith, Columbus 
District 17 — John Whitten, Sumner 
District 18 — Jon Swartzfager, Laurel 
District 19 — William Jones, Pascagoula. 

At this time the Sixty-fifth Annual Convention of the Mississippi 
State Bar Association was adjourned sine die. 

The following is a list of past presidents of the Mississippi State Bar: 

1905— G. H. Shands (deceased) 
1906 — Murray F. Smith (deceased) 
1907— C. H. Alexander (deceased) 
1908— J. S. Sexton (deceased) 
1909— T. H. Somerville (deceased) 
1910— W. H. Powell (deceased) 
1911— A. F. Fox (deceased) 
1912— R. N. Miller (deceased) 
1913— Robert B. Mayes (deceased) 
1914 — Sydney Smith (deceased) 
1915— R. B. Campbell (deceased) 
1916— A. T. Stovall (deceased) 
1917— A. A. Armistead (deceased) 
1918 — S. E. Travis (deceased) 
1919— J. B. Harris (deceased) 
1920 — Gabe Jacobson (deceased) 
1921 — Geo. J. Leftwich (deceased) 
1922— J. B. Holden (deceased) 
1923— R. H. Thompson (deceased) 
1924 — Stone Deavours (deceased) 
1925 — J. N. Flowers (deceased) 
1926— D. W. Houston (deceased) 
1927— R. E. Wilbourn (deceased)) 
1928— George W. Currie 
1929— T. C. Kimbrough (deceased) 
1930— George H. Butler (deceased) 
1931— W. W. Venable (deceased) 
1932— Jeff Truly (deceased) 
1933— J. H. Price (deceased) 
1934— W. Calvin Wells (deceased) 
1935 — Frank E. Everett (deceased) 
1936— David E. Crawley (deceased) 
1937— Marion W. Reily (deceased) 
1938— R. M. Kelly (deceased) 
1939— W. H. Watkins (deceased) 
1940— W. E. Morse 


1941 — Alexander Currie (deceased) 

1942— Charles F. Engle (deceased) 

1943— Ross R. Barnett 

1944— Bidwell Adam 

1945 — Earle L. Wingo (deceased) 

1946— R. C. Stovall 

1947— Stokes V. Robertson, Sr., (deceased) 

1948— Phil Stone (deceased) 

1949— Robert W. Thompson, Jr. 

1950 — Gibson W. Witherspoon 

1951 — Quitman Ross 

1952— Charles B. Snow (deceased) 

1953 — Jerome S. Hafter (deceased) 

1954— Robert J. Farley 

1955— John C. Satterfield 

1956— M. M. Roberts 

1957— W. S, Henley 

1958— Breed O. Mounger 

1959— Hugh N. Clayton 

1960— David Cottrell, Jr. 

1961— Sherwood W. Wise 

1962— C. Sidney Carlton (deceased) 

1963 — Edward J. Currie (deceased) 

1964— Earl T. Thomas 

1965— Orma R. Smith 

1966 — John T. Armstrong 

1967— N. W. Overstreet 

1968— Chester Curtis 

William J. Keady* 
1969 — Boyce Holloman 

* Elected but became Federal District Judge before term of office 


Held in Biloxi, Mississippi, June 25, 1970 

The General Assembly of the Junior Bar Section was called to 
order at 1:30 p.m. by Honorable Pat H. Scanlon, President. 

Honorable Robert G. Barnett gave the invocation. 

President Scanlon recognized Honorable Hugh N. Clayton, founder 
and first president of the Mississippi Junior Bar Association. 

President-elect Frank Crosthwait, delegate to the ABA Convention, 
gave the following report: 


Frank Crosthwait 

The thirty-fifth annual meeting of the Young Lawyers Section 
of the American Bar Association was held in Dallas, Texas, August 
7-11, 1969. Each state is allowed two voting delegates and two alter- 
nates, and each local junior bar affiliated with the Young Lawyers 
Section is permitted one voting delegate and one alternate. The Mis- 
sissippi delegation was the largest in our history. Representing the 
Mississippi Junior Bar were delegates Pat Scanlon and I, and the 
alternate was Richard Edmonson. 

Local bar associations represented were Jackson, delegate Thad 
Cochran, alternate Jim Becker; Meridian, delegate Richard Wilbourn, 
alternate Wink Glover; Jackson County, delegate Raymond Brown; 
Lee County, delegate Billy Ford; Gulfport, delegate Joe Meadows; 
Tri-county, delegate Wayne Sterling. Three new local Mississippi junior 
bar associations were approved as qualified affiliates of the ABA, Young 
Lawyers Section. These were the Warren County Junior Bar; the Jones 
County Junior Bar; and the Tri-county Junior Bar composed of 
Amite, Pike and Walthall Counties. With the addition of these three 
affiliates there are a total of ten junior bar associations in the Young 
Lawyers Section. The Mississippi Junior Bar was awarded first place 
in the special projects category for the Law Day 1969 program in the 

* This report has been abridged by the editor. 



category of smaller states. The Jackson Junior Bar was awarded second 
place in the comprehensive judging of junior bars in cities under 
500,000 population. 

Raymond Brown and his partner, Donald Maxwell of Scottsdale, 
Arizona, were the winners of the annual debate sponsored by the 
Conference of Personal Finance Law Section. 

The House of Delegates of the Young Lawyers Section voted 
against a movement to increase the age limit to thirty-nine years, 
registered its objection to certain proposed standards for law schools, 
recommended that the ABA promulgate a national plan to regulate 
specialization in the practice of law, and opposed the Keeton-O'Connell 
Plan. Officers elected were Tom Cochran of Independence, Missouri, 
chairman; Joe Mullen of New York, vice chairman and chairman-elect; 
Bob Murray of Lakeland, Florida, secretary; Harry Hathaway of Los 
Angeles, California, speaker; and Dan Rabbitt of St. Louis, Missouri, 
clerk. Committee appointments included Raymond Brown, co-chairman 
of the Awards and Achievements Committee replacing Bob Barnett; 
Pat Scanlon, vice-chairman of the Professional Education Committee. 

The Young Lawyers Section of the ABA will hold its annual con- 
vention this year in St. Louis on August 5, 1970. 

The Convention in 1971 will be held jointly in New York and 

In closing, let me assure you that the Mississippi Junior Bar is 
accorded a high position in the Young Lawyers Section of the ABA, 
and I urge each one of you to make every effort to try to at least attend 
the meeting this summer in St. Louis. 


Pat H. Scanlon 

The next item on the agenda is the President's Report. While 
it is termed the "President's Report" the work of the association is 
done primarily by the board of directors and officers. Frank Crosthwait 
is president-elect; secretary for this year has been Alex Alston of 
Jackson; past president was Raymond L, Brown of Pascagoula. Direc- 
tors from the Northern District for two-year-terms who will carry over 
for another year are Alex Gates of Indianola, Glenn Alderson of Oxford, 
Bob Upchurch of Tupelo. From the Central District serving a two-year 
term are Wink Glover of Meridian, Jim Herring of Canton, and Lee 

* This report has been abridged by the editor. 


Davis Thames of Vicksburg. From the Southern District on a two-year 
term are Leonard Blackwell of Gulfport, Tom Stennis of Gulfport, and 
Roy C. Williams of Pascagoula. Also on the Board of Directors are the 
local presidents of the ten local junior bar associations who are affiliated 
with the Young Lawyers Conference of the American Bar Association. 
They are Harry Allen, Gulfport; Joe Colingo, Pascagoula; Tommy 
Gardner, Tupelo; Carroll Ingram, Hattiesburg; Don Morrison, Jackson; 
Frank Thackston, Greenville; Richard Wilbourn, Meridian; Lee Davis 
Thames, Vicksburg; John Jeffries, Jones County; and J. D. Gordon, 
Jr., Tri-County Junior Bar. 

The Mississippi Junior Bar is now composed of approximately 
850 members, comprising about one-third of the bar association of 
this state. The association has been recognized by the American Bar 
Association as one of the leaders of the junior bar associations in the 
country. Two years ago, under Bob Barnett's leadership, we received 
the best comprehensive award, which meant in our category we were 
named the best junior bar association in the country. 

But to me the most outstanding feature of our association is the 
warm and excellent relationship we share with the senior bar associa- 
tion. I have talked with young lawyers from other parts of the country, 
and I find that in a number of areas the junior bar and senior bar are 
actually competing factions, politically, service-wise, any way you can 
name, and some of them are not even speaking to each other; but 
that's not true in our state. One of the best illustrations is that last 
year Frank, Wink, and I went before the Budget Committee and 
asked for a $1,000 increase in our budget; we presented our program 
for this year to them. Not only did they give us that $1,000, but they 
also gave us $1,500 and increased our budget to $5,000. 

This year, in order to try and serve the poor, the Bar Commis- 
sioners formed a non-profit corporation known as the Mississippi 
Legal Services, Inc. Under the by-laws of that association two-thirds 
of the members of the board of that group must be attorneys. Further, 
under the by-laws half of those attorneys must be junior bar members. 

Two major projects of the senior bar this year were the Emergency 
Legal Assistance Program to assist people who were financially unable 
to help themselves here on the coast, and Hal Miller will give us 
a full report on that later. 

The other was the Law Day U.S.A. Program 1970 of which Joe 
Meadows was chairman, and which had a thirty minute television tape 
jointly sponsored by the Mississippi State Bar and the Mississippi 


Junior Bar Association. We appreciate all the consideration the senior 
bar members showed us this year. 

This year we have tried to involve the association in some new 
projects. One of these is the Automobile Accident Reparations Pro- 
posals. There are a number of proposals now which seek to do away 
with the theory of liability due to fault and replace automobile acci- 
dents with something like a Workmen's Compensation Commission 
situation. The main of these proposals is the Keeton-O'Connell Plan. 
Tom Stennis of Gulfport served as chairman of that committee, and 
Scott Welch of Jackson was vice-chairman. They are going to prepare 
and produce a report which will at least tell us what these proposals 
are. Hopefully, this report will be made available to every member 
of the association, either through The Mississippi Lawyer or through 
a mail-out. 

Two years ago we created a History Committee. Lee Davis Thames 
of Vicksburg served as chairman of that committee. The purpose of 
the History Committee was not just to list the officers and directors 
for the various years, but also to see what this group has done during 
its thirty-four-year existence. 

One thing of import was that the county court system for our 
state was the brain child of the junior bar association. They passed a 
resolution; they took it to the legislature; they got it enacted. There 
are a number of other illustrations of constructive and worthwhile 
achievements fostered by the junior bar. 

This year we also created a Mental Health Committee. Harry 
Allen of Gulfport served as chairman, and Gerald Blessey was vice- 
chairman. They reviewed the procedures for voluntary and involuntary 
commitment. Our present situation is quite antiquated, and Harry and 
his committee have prepared a comprehensive bill which we will 
present to you later with a resolution proposing an act to be presented 
to the legislature. 

Last year the Moot Court Chairman of the Ole Miss School of 
Law came to the Board and asked for help in obtaining judges for 
the moot court trials. Glenn Alderson of Oxford served as chairman 
of the Moot Court Committee with Thad Cochran of Jackson as vice- 

Another problem area facing the bar is specialization. Charles L. 
Brocato of Jackson served as chairman of the Specialization Committee. 
This committee made an extensive study and has a resolution which 
will be presented later in the program. 


In addition to these new programs, we continued many of the 
programs which in the past have made us a leader among the junior 
bar associations. 

Not all of our plans for this year have been fulfilled. We had 
hoped to have a group trip to Washington, D.C., for admissions before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. We had set up plans for having it in March, 
but due to the trip of the bar association to Majorca we had to post- 
pone that. I think that there may be some plans for trying to have a 
group trip to the U.S. Supreme Court some time in the fall. 

There are a number of changes, corrections and modifications that 
need to be made in our laws and our systems. We need to up-date 
our court procedures; we need some type of discovery procedures so 
we will not be trying cases in the dark; we need to expedite hearings; 
we need to modernize our judicial selection methods so we can be 
assured of competent and capable men; we need to keep our judicial 
salaries high enough to attract such men, and we desperately need some 
type of retirement for our judges. 

We need to fulfill our duty to render service to the poor, and 
Legal Services, Inc., I believe, will be the answer if we can get it 
funded and on the road. We need to review our procedures for 
policing our own association; we need to look into some type of small 
court procedure — a small court where we would have a competent 
trained judge; we need to do a hundred and one other things and 
each of us know about them. If there is any group in the State of 
Mississippi that will do these things, it is going to have to be the 
Junior Bar Association of the State of Mississippi. We are young 
enough; we know what the problems are; we have the energy, the 
manpower and the competency to go to the legislature and get some 
of these things done. If we do these things, I think we will be reaching 
the highest objective — service to our state. And I think that under 
the leadership we have coming in, Frank Crosthwait and the two fine 
nominees for president-elect, we are going to accomplish a great many 

This year I think we have had a good year. I have enjoyed being 
your president. I consider it an honor and a privilege, and I thank you 
for the opportunity. 

At this time several committee reports were given. Resolutions 
were introduced and voted on. Those passed appear in Appendix I. 

Hon. Thomas D. Cochran of Independence, Mo., Chairman of 
the Young Lawyers Section of the ABA, and Hon. Joel Boydon of Grand 


Rapids, Mich., President of the Michigan Young Lawyers Section 
and a director of the ABA, were recognized. 

Hon. Raymond L. Brown then introduced Hon. Joe Mullen of 
New York, President-elect of the Young Lawyers Section of the ABA, 
who delivered the following address: 


Joe Mullen 

I am here this afternoon to report to you as president-elect of the 
Young Lawyers Section and to tell you about some of the concerns 
that young lawyers have expressed to me during the past year. 

First, let me tell you something about how our section functions. 
We have five national offices and an executive council. The officers are 
a part of the executive council, and the remainder consists of a 
representative from more or less each of the U. S. Judicial Circuits, 
plus a representative from the military. These men are elected by 
the young lawyers in their own districts, and they come to our annual 
meeting, our mid-year meeting, or whenever a special executive council 
session is called. 

The general policy making body of our section is the assembly. 
The assembly consists of all affiliates. In the assembly there are about 
180 affiliates, and they come annually to our meetings to conduct the 
affairs of the section. 

In addition, this year you have heard of some of the committees 
that we have given specific assignments to. Two of them are especially 
responsive to the needs of young lawyers. They are the Law and Clergy 
and the Drug Abuse and Campus Confrontation Committees. 

With that framework in mind I would like to tell you some- 
thing about what young lawyers are thinking. Broadly speaking, many 
young lawyers are saying that they feel and believe that there is a 
shirking of responsibility on the part of the legal profession in today's 
society. They say that leadership is needed more than ever right now. 
They hope for a reversal of this trend. This concern I have heard voiced 
at regional conferences, at our executive council sessions, and in many 
letters which I have received. 

To put the case in relevant frame-work, if you are looking for 
a short sentence to sum up what the bar is all about, I think you 

* This address has been abridged by the editor. 


might look far and wide before you would come upon better words than 
those of Winston Churchill, "It is better," said he, "to jaw, jaw than 
to war, war." 

But who can doubt that in America today the trend is away from 
jaw, jaw — talk — and in the direction of war, war — conflict. 

The Report of the ABA Committee on Campus Confrontation 
and Student Dissent which was just released last week found that 
within the past academic year alone an estimated one hundred forty- 
five institutions of higher learning were torn by violence. We are living 
in times of growing violence — in times in which more people than 
ever seek to gain their end by seizing, burning and even killing. 

It is a fast-growing trend. If anyone had said ten years ago that 
ten black students wearing bandolier belts over their shoulders were 
going to close down Cornell University until their demands were met, 
they would have been laughed out of court. I am asking you to project 
that trend from 1969 to 1979 — and who is laughing? I am asking who 
is going to stop it? 

Young lawyers say that the legal profession has what it takes to 
stop it. That's the general message that I bring you from the young 
lawyers of today. They don't think the legal profession is doing what 
it could and should to help correct matters. 

America was not imposed upon a sullen mass of people. America 
is something that sprouted and grew in a climate of passionate and 
peaceful debate. Young lawyers wonder whether it can continue to 
exist in any climate — in a climate of war, war instead of a climate of 
jaw, jaw. Some of them are beginning to doubt it. 

Historically, it has been lawyers who have taken the lead in 
American public debate. They have taken this lead before Congress 
and before even local assemblies. Lawyers have known more about 
how to discuss issues effectively. But many are now asking, "Where 
are the lawyers today, and why are they so much on the sidelines?" 

On March 23, 1970, Anthony Lewis, who writes for The New York 
Times, wrote a column, and the caption on that column was "The 
American Bar, A Failure in Responsibility." I would like to quote one 
passage from that column: 

In failing to fulfill its public function the organized bar is 
surely inflicting wounds upon itself. Bright young people 
already question the outlook of the legal profession. Big firms 
are having a difficult time in attracting the best graduates. If 
lawyers want to retain their traditional place of honor and 


influence in American life they will have to remember and live 
by those words of Justice Holmes, 'The law is the witness 
and the external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the 
history of the moral development of the race.' 

There is additional evidence supporting some of the criticism 
that we are receiving in the press and elsewhere. Just last month I 
mailed a letter to the fifty-one thousand members of our section. 
So far over six thousand have responded, and over one thousand have 
taken the time to personally write to me indicating support of the 
programs that the section is putting on. But at the same time they 
are urging that we become more involved in some of the pressing 
needs that are presenting themselves to local communities. 

They ask, in effect, for more responsible leadership on the part 
of the organized bar. This feeling was expressed by a young California 
lawyer who wrote that his bar association failed to offer assistance to 
the Berkeley officials during the riots at the University of California 
and that his young lawyers committee prepared a report indicating 
that they should do so. He noted that during the riots, when more than 
one thousand persons were arrested, the association had not even done 
so much as to condemn publicly the violence and the breaking of the 

Much the same kind of letter came from an attorney in my 
own state. He wrote that a small young group of lawyers in up-state 
New York were disappointed that their bar association had not at least 
offered assistance during the Cornell riots. In the future they believe 
that the bar association should offer to school authorities everywhere 
services of a panel of lawyers to help towards arbitrating some of the 

In addition, several of the letters that I have received have ex- 
pressed a great deal of concern specifically about the campus problems. 
I would like to quote from one of these particular letters: 

The young lawyers with whom I work and associate are won- 
dering about the future of the bar. They think the bar asso- 
ciation should become more involved in helping to solve the 
problems that have fallen on all of us. For example, in the 
area of campus dispute and local community disputes, why 
shouldn't the local bar association offer assistance? It could 
be in the form of a panel of lawyers seeking to resolve the 
dispute. After all, who is more qualified? To achieve com- 
promise is one of the hallmarks of the profession. 

I have also received letters and phone calls in which the individuals 
have suggested that we even perhaps are approaching anarchy; they 
say that if bar associations don't provide the leadership, who will. 


Because of the profession's alleged failure to become involved, many 
young lawyers feel that the profession's image has been hurt; many 
have said to me that they are determined to reverse this trend. 

The Young Lawyers Section of the Montana Bar Association has 
proposed that all judicial appointments be completely removed from 
the political arena. The young lawyers there have started to assist 
in writing editorials for local newspapers. They urge fellow-citizens 
to stand up and express their dissatisfaction with the present system 
and to advise their assemblymen of their dissatisfaction. In addition, 
they are trying to persuade the senior members of some of their bars 
to publicly denounce judicial political appointments. 

My own local city bar association — the bar association in the 
City of New York — conducted a survey that revealed some very inter- 
esting and unusual results. We found that young graduates of today, 
at least in our area, are not going into the traditional practice of law. 
Rather, they are seeking out a special, non-traditional practice, and 
many of the best law school graduates, at personal financial sacrifice, 
are now offering themselves to groups dealing with social causes that 
we hear so much about today. The study concluded that this new 
direction of law school graduates reflected their idealism, their aspira- 
tions, and the fact that apparently these young men want desperately 
to shape their profession into an instrument they think can raise the 
quality of American life. They want a career in which they can contri- 
bute directly to this transformation. The study concluded by saying 
that unless the profession can offer young lawyers an outlet for this 
idealism, it will not attract the most able and highly qualified students. 

In Michigan lawyers addressed themselves to the same problem. 
I quote: "Our power as the largest section of the profession is for 
the most part unexercised and dormant in terms of impact with the 
activities of the entire bar. The time has come when, for the very 
real benefit of the profession, we should attempt to flex some figurative 

Now what are all of these young lawyers saying? I don't think 
that they are saying that they are one hundred percent right and 
everyone else is one hundred percent wrong. What I think they are 
saying is that it is a new day and age and that the legal profession 
does have new problems, but at the same time it has some wonderful 
opportunities. A certain few are most respectfully urging that the 
hour for debate and discussion is late, and they don't offer their ideas 
in inflexible and fixed terms. I think they are offered as suggestions to 
be refined by the critical examination of other minds, such as yours, 


and that they will eventually be remolded with the shifting events 
of time. 

At this time President Scanlon presented the gavel to incoming 
President Frank Crosthwait, who made the following remarks: 


Frank Crosthwait 

As my first official act, I would like, on behalf of the association, 
to present Pat Scanlon with this expression of our appreciation for 
a job certainly well done. 

This plaque reads: "Pat H. Scanlon, President, Mississippi Junior 
Bar 1969-70." 


I deem it a distinct honor and privilege to be afforded the opport- 
unity to serve as your president for the ensuing year. 

The Junior Bar Section of the Mississippi State Bar was organized 
on September 4, 1936, during the 31st annual meeting of the Mississippi 
State Bar at Greenville. Today, after thirty-four years of leadership, 
our organization numbers over eight hundred members and is the 
strongest, best organized, best financed, and the most effective junior 
bar of its size anywhere in the nation. 

We intend this year to make our eight hundred members aware 
of the opportunities to participate in the activities and projects of the 
Mississippi State Bar. In the past, we have merely scratched the sur- 
face of manpower available to the Mississippi State Bar from our 
association. An all out effort will be made this year to marshal this 
untapped source of personnel for the betterment of the Mississippi 
State Bar. 

Billy Bacon, President-elect of the Mississippi State Bar, is com- 
mitted to the proposition that junior bar members from throughout 
the state will serve on the state bar committees and has invited Pat 
Scanlon and me to assist in the naming of these committees. 

In urging greater participation in the state bar, I quote from 
remarks made by Hugh Clayton, first president of the junior bar and 
president of the state bar for 1959-60, at the 1960 convention: 

There appears to be some thinking on the part of the mem- 
bers of the junior bar that it is separate and distinct from 

* These remarks have been abridged by the editor. 


the senior bar. This is not true. Please, in your thinking and 
in your attitude with regard to the parent organization, regard 
yourselves just as much a part of the parent organization as 
anybody else. Please participate in the assemblies we are 
having this week, tomorrow, or next week, and if something 
comes up, and you want to say something about it, don't just 
refer it to someone beyond the age of forty; get up and say 
something. You will be recognized and your youth respected. 
I think you should participate. The senior bar needs you just 
as much as the junior bar, separate section of the state bar, 
needs you. 

Pat Scanlon and I will sit as members of the officers and Board 
of Bar Commissioners of the state bar, and, as in the past, I am sure 
we will be encouraged to participate in the important decision-making 
processes of the Mississippi State Bar. 

As the junior bar — after today the young lawyers section — we will 
be continuing the committees and programs which were promulgated 
by my predecessors and adding some new committees. 

I hope we can continue with the excellent projects of our asso- 

The ABA continues to issue a challenge to all local young lawyers 
sections and state young lawyers sections to go forward with programs 
of "Youth and the Law" and "Law and the Clergy." We will also 
address ourselves this year to the crucial problems of drug abuse and 
youthful users. A Drug Abuse Committee is being named to work 
closely with the committee from the Young Lawyers Section of the 

Upon the appointment of a Budget Committee for the Mississippi 
State Bar, we will appear and request a $1,000 increase in our budget. 
I feel sure the Budget Committee will continue to evidence the sup- 
port and confidence the state bar has in the young lawyers section 
and will grant us their approval. When that approval is made, our 
budget will then total the sum of $6,500. I hope that will enable us 
during this next year to defray some of the expenses of our com- 
mittees that have been active in the past, but have been unable to 
fulfill all of their obligations and objectives because of the travel and 
incidental expenses involved. We will also publish our directory of 
officials and our organizational manual. 

I trust that our efforts this year will again reflect our leadership 
and service as young lawyers not only to our community but also to 
our state as well while improving the image of the attorney. 

I solicit your individual support and suggestions throughout the 


year. With your continued support and participation, our young lawyers 
section will again fulfill its objectives. 

Election of officers was held. Nominees for the office of president- 
elect were H. Wingfield Glover and Joseph R. Meadows. Joseph R. 
Meadows was elected. 

Brooke Ferris and Lee Davis Thames were nominated for the 
office of secretary. Brooke Ferris was elected. 

Hon. John H. Holloman, III, then introduced Hon. William V. 
Alexander, Jr., member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 
Arkansas, who delivered the following address: 


William V. Alexander 

We are now seeing a very dramatic change taking place in Ameri- 
can politics. For decades, the most valid claim that a candidate could 
make when running for political office was that, as back in Lincoln's 
day, he was born in a log cabin, he had walked miles to school that 
didn't have electric lights, he had walked behind a mule, or he had 
pulled a cotton sack. 

But with the dwindling rural population, however, there are few 
candidates entering the political field today who can make such a claim. 
Most Americans today think of the farmer in the context of a very 
small minority, and nonurban America — Mississippi, Arkansas, Lou- 
isiana, the South — is only a place for city-dwellers to escape to on 

During the past three decades, we have seen an exodus from the 
farm to the city that would make the Great Gold Rush of the 19th 
century look like a weekend outing. 

We have seen our economy shift more and more from agriculture 
to industry. We have seen the bandana replaced by the hardhat, over- 
alls by blue collared shirts, and tractors by air-conditioned automobiles 
commuting to the factory or to the city. As a further development, we 
have seen rural majorities in the South that our fathers and grand- 
fathers used to their political advantage transformed into highly popu- 
lated urban majorities. 

I want to discuss this development with you for the next few 

* This address has been abridged by the editor. 


minutes. I want to try to put it into perspective. I would like to suggest 
the meaning that it has for me, as a citizen of the State of Arkansas, and 
possibly what applicability it may have to you in the State of Missis- 
sippi; I would like to suggest what directions our national policy should 
take as we recognize the realities of the 70's and beyond. 

In the past twenty years we have seen agricultural employment in 
Arkansas decline from one-third of our total work force to less than 
nine percent of the total work force. Agricultural income, which used 
to constitute more than one-half of the state's personal income, now 
represents only about fifteen percent of the total personal income of 
the state. The Department of Commerce the other day declared that 
inasmuch as Arkansas now earned more from manufacturing than from 
agriculture, we are now classified as an industrial state, as distinguished 
from a non-industrial or agricultural state. 

Farms have become larger and more mechanized in recent years. 
Laborers forced off of the farm, often lacking education and training 
in other occupations, have looked in vain for job opportunities in their 
regions. Looking in desperation, they have seen what appeared to be 
greener pastures in places such as Chicago, St. Louis, New York, and 
Washington. All too often, however, these greener pastures have turned 
out to be barren wastelands for these unemployed, under-trained, and 
under-educated people. 

The result has been growing welfare rolls, deteriorating and over- 
crowded cities and, now, a national panic which is called the "Urban 

The mass exodus that we have seen from the farm to the town and 
from the town to the cities has not occurred because the people wanted 
it to occur. It has happened because economic circumstances have forced 
our people to leave our rural areas and go to the urban areas. 

Farm laborers displaced by machines had little choice but to move. 
Residents of small towns with insufficient job opportunities had little 
choice but to move where jobs are available. Young people with college 
and advanced training had little choice but to move where they could 
receive salaries commensurate with their abilities and with their skills. 

Our non-urban areas are losing their most valuable resources — 
human resources. And when we lose our brightest young people, we are 
losing the leadership potential that can provide us with direction on a 
state level, on a county level, and in our cities. There is no excuse for 
such a waste of manpower, talent, and potential. 

Some eight years ago it was revealed by the University of Arkansas 


that ninety percent of the graduates from that institution sought em- 
ployment outside the state. I was one of them. I was one of those 
people who left Arkansas because he worried about its future and its 
potential. But I came back. 

What does this mean to you, and what does it mean to me? As the 
song says, "No man is an island." We are a part of our state. We are a 
part of counties and towns where we live. If our states and towns pros- 
per, we prosper. If our states and our towns have a problem, then we 
have a problem. 

I want my children and the children of the people I represent to 
have adequate opportunities — educationally, socially, and profession- 
ally — within their home state. I want them to know and to love the 
area where I was raised — the open spaces, the clean air, the clean water, 
and the environment. For this dream to be a reality, however, we must 
begin the task of charting our course and planning our future. 

Efforts have been made in non-urban sections of our nation to 
reverse these disastrous trends. The leaders in our cities and states have 
made progress and are continuing to make progress. But I contend, and 
loudly, that we need more cooperation from our national government. 

I contend that our national government should recognize the value 
of keeping our farmers on the farm and the value of providing job 
opportunities that will have an effect on halting our population migra- 
tion from town to city. It should recognize the economic advantage of 
providing for orderly population growth throughout the entire country, 
from coast to coast and from border to border. 

From a purely economic standpoint, it is cheaper to provide ade- 
quate water in rural America than it is to clean up the water in the 
cities. Most cities have what they refer to as chemical mixtures, not 
water. It is cheaper to build adequate health and educational facilities 
in the spacious areas of rural America, or non-urban America, than it 
it is to rebuild the burned-out ghettos of urban America. It is cheaper 
to build and provide industrial parks in rural America than it is to 
continually expand and increase the urban sprawl and welfare pro- 
grams in urban America. It is cheaper to provide housing in rural 
America than it is to continue building buildings on top of one another 
at inflated prices in the city. 

In spite of these facts, however, which I have enumerated to you 
and with which you are no doubt familiar, it seems that our govern- 
ment continues the short-sighted policies of bailing water out of the 
boat instead of plugging up the leak. It is symptomatic of our entire 


approach that we have a Department of Housing and Urban Develop- 

I have talked to George Romney about this problem, and he recog- 
nizes it, but he says priorities must be in the urban areas. Our national 
government in my opinion has been captivated by an urban syndrome 
that has closed out the vision of our national policy-makers toward rural 

Does a Department of Housing and Urban Development suggest 
that these problems relate only to urban areas? I say, "No." Does a 
Department of Housing and Urban Development suggest that we have 
abandoned our rural areas and that we plan our country's development 
during the coming decades only in the urban sectors? I hope the 
answer is "no." 

What we need is a Department of National Development. Rural 
America has not indicated that it wants to be ignored. Rural America 
has not proposed that it be left out of future planning and development 
in the United States. 

What is the solution to the problems of the cities? Some say hous- 
ing. We have plenty of room to build housing in our areas. Some say 
jobs. We have the capacity and the people to fulfill them. Some say 
transportation. We have the open spaces to negate the problems that 
exist in the cities. Some say clean water and clean air. We have the 
opportunity to preserve these qualities. Some say health and educa- 
tional facilities. We have room for them. 

All we need to recognize our dream, to fulfill our destiny, in the 
South and in all non-urban areas, is to have recognition by the national 
government in proportion to our needs and our capabilities. 

This is the message that I have tried to share with my colleagues 
in the Congress. I have tried to emphasize that there are not just urban 
problems, and there are not just rural problems. We are one nation, and 
all of our problems are national problems. 

Our problems will not be solved by division. One of the first lessons 
that I learned in the Congress is that little progress is made when the 
members divide themselves — north, south, east, west, urban or rural. 
We make progress only when there is cooperation, when there is mutual 
respect, and when there is mutual understanding. 

The following named persons were elected to the Board of Direc- 



Alex Gates, Indianola, One Year. 
Gerald Jacks, Cleveland, Two Years. 
B. Briggs Smith, Batesville, One Year. 


H. Wingfield Glover, Meridian, One Year. 
Thad Cochran, Jackson, Two Years. 
Charles Ray Davis, Jackson, One Year. 


Tom S tennis, Gulf port, One Year. 
Roy Williams, Pascagoula, Two Years. 
Carrol Ingram, Hattiesburg, One Year. 

There was held a Moot Court final argument of the University of 
Mississippi School of Law: 
The Court: 

Chief Justice William N. Etheridge 
Presiding Justice Robert G. Gillespie 
Associate Justice Neville Patterson 

For Appellant: 

Michael S. Allred 
Kenneth A. Rutherford 

For Appellee: 

Earl Ford Fortenberry, Jr. 
John Howard Shows 

The annual convention of the Mississippi Junior Bar Association 
then adjourned. 

The following is a list of past presidents of the Junior Bar Section: 

1936— Hugh N. Clayton 

1937 — Jesse Graham (deceased) 

1938— John C. Satterfield 

1939— Charles A. Sisson 

1940 — George M. Ethridge, Jr. 

1941 — J. Morgan Stevens (deceased) 

1942— Frank Everett, Jr. 

1943— Richard E. Stratton, III 

1944 — Paul Parr (deceased) 

1945— John W. Wade 

1946— William N. Ethridge, Jr. 

1947— James S. Eaton 

1948— George Woodliff 

1949 — W. Arlington Jones 

1950 — E. Cage Brewer, Jr. (deceased) 


1951— Kenneth Franks 
1952— Robert G. Nichols, Jr. 
1953— Lampkin H. Butts 
1954 — Joshua Morse, III 
1955— Charles B. Henley 
1956 — George Morse 
1957— Jack Travis 
1958— K. Hayes Callicutt 
1959— James F. Noble, Jr. 
1960— Eaton A. Lang, Jr. 
1961— E. C. Ward 
1962— Frank A. Riley 
1963— George P. Hewes, III 
1964— Sherman Muths, Jr. 
1965— B. B. McClendon, Jr. 
1966— Edward P. Connell 
1967 — Robert Barnett 
1968 — Raymond Brown 
1969— Pat H. Scanlon 


Dean Joel W. Bunkley, Jr. 

We appreciate the interest and support we receive from our alumni. 

We want you to be fully apprised of what we are doing, what our 
plans are, and how we are attempting to fulfill our obligation to the 
State of Mississippi. 

I am sure that the big question on the mind of each of you is our 
accreditation problem. Through the co-operation of Chancellor Fortune, 
Vice-Chancellor Bryant, the members of the Board of Trustees and our 
faculty, our present position is very good. We have been recommended 
to be censured by the executive committee of the AALS. I have spent 
the whole year on this most perplexing problem, and we have tried our 
best to meet the remedies which are necessary. Accreditation is impera- 
tive for any first-rate law school. Graduation from an accredited school 
is necessary for further graduate work and is necessary for commissioning 
in the Judge Advocate General programs. 

Most library problems can be solved if you have a good librarian 
and money. We are extremely fortunate to have an intelligent and 
dedicated librarian, Bill Murray. We need more money. We must in- 
crease our annual library budget, and we must supplement the budget. 
Your gifts have been of immeasurable benefit to us. The corporate 

*This report, though not a part of the bar proceedings, has been 
included in abridged form by the editor. It was deemed appropriate 
for this issue. 


giving program of the alumni chapter has kept us on our feet, and we 
thank you for your efforts. 

We have made changes in our curriculum which we feel will help 
us reach that delicate balance between legal theory and the practical 
application of principles studied. In addition to the required first-year 
courses, our students are now required to take Moot Court, Mississippi 
Practice, Evidence, Legal Profession, and Criminal Procedure. 

In keeping with our obligation to provide quality legal education 
and graduate people who will be assets to the bar, we have increased 
our admission standards. At the present time we require an applicant 
to receive at least a 495 on the Law School Admission Test or a grade 
point average of at least 2.45 for his undergraduate work. In effect, this 
means that he has at least a "C+" average or is in the middle percentile 
on the admission test. 

We are now in the process of establishing an internship program 
through the Division of Law Enforcement Assistance. We have been 
most fortunate in receiving a fund of $36,000 per year for four years 
to aid in a limited program for students interning with prosecuting 
attorneys. We have applied for a grant with the Council on Legal 
Education for Professional Responsibilities to aid in a general intern- 
ship program in law offices. I feel the bar is interested in the program 
and that it will be a definite asset to our students. 

This year the Law Alumni Chapter, under the leadership of George 
Hewes, received gifts totaling over $14,000, most of which were ear- 
marked for scholarships and for strengthening the law library. 

We now have an established graduate program under the direction 
of Dr. Gorove. At present we have 21 students. This program is still in 
its infancy and will be subject to further development and planning. 

We do appreciate your interest in the law school. We are devoting 
our talents to the development of an even finer law school, and we are 
confident that with your support this goal shall be attained. 



I. Introduction 

It is a fundamental legal concept that a person who is negligent 
will be liable for the injuries which he has caused to others. A nine- 
teenth century English court defined the scope of duty as follows: 

[Wjhenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a 
position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense 
who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use 
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those 
circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to person or 
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and 
skill to avoid such danger. 1 

The possessor or occupier 2 of land owes a lesser duty to persons who 
are visiting his premises than that stated in the above formula. 3 The 
status classification of the visitors, who may be either a trespasser, a 
licensee, or an invitee is primarily the determinative factor in requiring 
a lesser duty. This classification system determines the duty owed by 
the possessor of the land to the visitor. 

The plaintiff in Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc. 4 challenged 
this classification, which was established as early as 1866, 5 as arbitrary 
and unjustified in this age of social awareness. The plaintiff appealed 
to the Mississippi Supreme Court, seeking a reversal of a directed verdict 
which was based solely upon the classification of the plaintiff as a 
licensee rather than an invitee. 6 Though the Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court's directed verdict, Justice Inzer, writing for 
the court, stated: 

It is the thinking of this writer, but not necessarily that of the 
Court, that this area of law merits further study in the light of 

1 Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883) . 

2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328 E (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restate- 
ment] states: 

A possessor of land is 

(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or 

(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, 
if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control 
it, or 

(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other 
person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b) . 

8 2 F. Harper and F. James, Law of Torts § 27.1, at 1430 (1956) [hereinafter cited 
as Harper and James]. 

4 233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970) . 

5 Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867). 

8 Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970) . 



present day conditions, and it may well be that this Court will in 
the future abandon the traditional distinction between trespas- 
sers, licensees and invitees, or at least draw a distinction between 
active and passive negligence insofar as a licensee is concerned. 7 

Since the classification of visitors as either trespassers, licensees, or 
invitees originated, there has been a slow process of erosion. The excep- 
tions to the immunity doctrine for the landowner have grown, and the 
erosion trend has, in fact, become one of abolition. It is submitted that 
the Astleford case demands an analysis of the historical development of 
these classifications, an examination of the Mississippi cases which 
support the landowner immunity rule, and a critical discussion of the 
abolition trend. This comment will attempt to meet these demands. 

II. Historical Development 

The immunity from liability for the possessor of land developed 
during the nineteenth century. Since the prevailing jurisprudential 
theories and the social objectives of the nineteenth century differ from 
those of the twentieth century, the development of liability could be 
expected to differ from what might have developed if courts were faced 
with deciding liability for the first time today. Freedom of contract, 
free enterprise, and unrestricted uses of property took precedent over 
human welfare. "This was an age which had not overthrown the feudal 
principle that an owner is sovereign on his own property." 8 One of the 
first cases exemplifying this philosophy was Southcote v. Stanley. 9 The 
defendant was the owner of a hotel into which he had invited the 
plaintiff to come as a visitor. In order for the plaintiff to leave, he had 
to open a large glass door from which a piece of glass fell and injured 
him. The court held that the plaintiff was a social guest, or, in other 
words, a licensee. Commenting upon Indermaur v. Dames, 10 a case 
which came nearly ten years after Southcote, Professor Norman Marsh 

At that time the privileged position of the landowner was 
taken for granted, whereas the principle that a man should be 
_____ __ _____ ______ 

8 Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. 
L. Rev. 186, 187 (1957) . 

9 1 H. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856) . 

10 L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867). The defendant, a sugar 
refiner, kept a hole or shoot on a level with the floor so that sugar could be raised 
or lowered to different stories. It was often kept open for ventilation purposes. No 
rail surrounded the shoot. The plaintiff, a journeyman gasfitter, was on the defen- 
dant's premises to check several gas burners in order to test a new gas regulator. The 
plaintiff fell through the hole and was injured. The court held that there had been 
a breach of duty and held the defendant liable for the plaintiff's injury. 


responsible for damage which he ought reasonably to have fore- 
seen was, as a general principle, inconceivable, and only hesi- 
tantly recognized in a limited number of cases. 11 

The sanctity of property was not the sole reason for the develop- 
ment of the distinction between trespassers, licensees, and invitees. 
Judges, who were identified with the English landholding class, were 
hesitant to allow a jury which was composed of potential visitors to 
property rather than landowners to decide this type of case. Judges kept 
the extension of the law in their own hands. Therefore, English judges 
expanded certain existing principles of law in order to prevent visitors 
to property from recovering damages from the occupier or possessor of 
land. 12 This expansion process drew mainly upon four areas of law- 
nuisance on the highway, contracts, fraudulent conduct, and wrongs of 
commission rather than omission. 13 

The distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees were 
firmly established when the general principles of negligence began to 
develop. It was not until 1883 that Brett, Master of the Rolls in Eng- 
land, made one of the first attempts to state a formula of duty, 14 which 
was previously quoted. When the law of negligence, which presupposes 
some uniform standard of behavior requiring the actor to conform to 
a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others, 15 first ap- 
peared, the courts attempted to apply the negligence theory to occupiers 
of land. 16 However, the result was a compromise between the theory 
of negligence and the concept of property ownership. The compromise 
was a limitation on the liability of the owner or occupier of land in 
terms of the negligence requirement of a "duty." 17 The duty of the 
land occupier was dependent upon the status of the individual entering 
the owner's premises. The leading case fixing the three classes to visitors 
to land was Indermaur v. Dames, decided in 1867. 18 A later case which 

11 Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespass- 
ers, 69 L. Q. Rev. 182, 184 (1953) . 

12 Id. at 184. 

" Id. at 186-96. 

"Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883) . 

15 W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 32, at 153 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as 
Prosser]. See also Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position — Abro- 
gation of the Common Law Classifications of Trespasser, Invitee, Licensee, 13 St. 
Louis L.J. 449 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's 
Preferred Position]. 

18 Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L. Q. Rev. 184 
(1926) . 

" Prosser § 58, at 364. 

1S L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867). 


illustrated the absolute rigidity of these classifications was Robert Addie 
and Sons v. Dumbreck. 19 In Dumbreck, Lord Dundin said: 

What I particularly wish to emphasize is that there are the 
three different classes — invitees, licensees, trespassers .... 
Now the line that separates each of these three classes is an 
absolutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no noman's 
land between adjacent territories. 20 

The English courts faced a second problem in classifying the visitor 
to the property of the landowner. The difficulty arose in distinguishing 
a business visitor (paying guest) from a gratuitous lodger, as in a 
private home. The earliest case in which this distinction was discussed 
was Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Company. 21 The court held that the 
defendants, who operated a canal from which they failed to remove a 
sunken obstruction with resulting damage to the plaintiff's boat, were 
liable for the damage since the plaintiff had paid for the privilege of 
passing through the canal. 22 

As can be seen from this short history, the distinctions between 
trespassers, licensees, and invitees were developed early in English law. 
It required but a short crossing of the Atlantic for these distinctions 
to find a home in American jurisprudence. 

An early New York case which adopted the distinction between 
the duty owed a licensee and the duty owed an invitee was Sterger v. 
Vansiclen. 23 The court stated that the distinctions which were used in 
New York were a product of English law. The court said: "Mr. Pollock 
cites in support of the rule quoted, English decisions, mainly; but the 
same rule has been generally, if not universally, applied in the various 
jurisdictions in this country." 24 Though American courts have developed 
some exceptions — the primary one being that of active and passive 
negligence — there remains an adherance to these rigid and often arbi- 
trary distinctions. This stare decisis attitude is paramount in Mississippi 
law today. 

III. Mississippi Law — Trespassers 

A. Who Is a Trespasser? 

A trespasser is one who enters or remains on the land owned or 
possessed by another without the privilege to do so; he is present with- 

19 [1929] A.C. 358, 371, as cited in Prosser, n.63 at 364. 

20 Id. 

21 (1839) 11 Ad. & El. 223 as cited in Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 
Minn. L. Rev. 573, 576 & n.14 (1942) . 

22 Id. 

23 132 N.Y. 499, 30 N.E. 987 (1892) . 
24 Id., 30 N.E. at 989. 


out lawful right, authority, or invitation, either expressed or implied, 
of the owner. 25 A trespasser can also be a licensee or an invitee who has 
gone into an area not designed, adapted, or prepared for his presence, 
or into an area where the occupier could not reasonably expect him to 
be. 26 

B. The Duty Owed a Trespasser 

The general rule seems to be that the only duty owed to a tres- 
passer by an occupier or possessor of land is to refrain from reckless, 
wanton, or intentional injury. 27 The Mississippi Supreme Court has 
followed this general rule. 28 Why does the possessor or occupier of land 
not come under a duty to take reasonable precaution to prevent either 
the condition of his land or the activities upon the land from causing 
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to trespassers? Professor 
Fleming James has given four main reasons for the rule. These reasons 
are that people are not likely to trespass, that any other type of duty 
would be an unreasonable burden on the land, that the trespasser is 
a wrongdoer, and finally that the trespasser assumes any risk incurred 
by entering the premises. 29 Even though these reasons are highly ques- 
tionable, the Mississippi Supreme Court has continued to use the "will- 
ful and wanton negligence" rule. 30 

86 Restatement § 329 states: 

A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession 
of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or 
See Prosser § 58, at 365. Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss. 343, 349, 149 
So. 2d 312, 314-15 (1963) . The Marlon case defines a trespasser under Mississippi law. 
See also Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speedway, 224 Miss. 632, 644, 80 So. 2d 785, 791 (1955) . 
28 Langford v. Mercurio, 183 So. 2d 150 (Miss. 1966) . In the Langford case the 
court said: 

[T]he appellee was an invitee . . . she went far beyond the limits of the invita- 
tion .... She no longer was an invitee, but by her acts she became either a 
trespasser, or at best, a mere gratuitous licensee as to the premises over which 
she fled. Id. at 156. 
See also Selley v. McWilliams Realty Corp., 246 Miss. 568, 151 So. 2d 596 (1963) ; Dry 
v. Ford, 238 Miss. 98, 117 So. 2d 456 (1960) ; Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speedway, 224 Miss, 
at 648, 80 So. 2d at 792-93; Restatement § 332, Comment c. See also Comment, Lia- 
bility of a Land Occupier to Persons Injured on His Premises: A Survey and Criti- 
cism of Kansas Law, 18 Kan. L. Rev. 161, 174 (1969) . 

27 Prosser § 58, at 365; Restatement § 333 states: 

Except as stated in §§ 334-339, a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers 
for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care 

(a) to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception, or 

(b) to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them. 

28 Langford v. Mercurio, 183 So. 2d at 154 (Miss. 1966); Kelley v. Sportsmen's 
Speedway, 224 Miss, at 644, 80 So. 2d at 791. 

29 James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 
Yale L.J. 144, 150-53 (1953) . 

30 Langford v. Mercurio, 183 So. 2d 150 (Miss. 1966); Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speed- 
way, 224 Miss. 632, 80 So. 2d 785 (1955) . 


Although the formula is stated with finality, it is immediately 
obvious upon reading the Second Restatement of Torts that there 
are exceptions 31 to the willful and wanton rule. 

The first exception is that the possessor of land who knows that 
there are constant trespassers upon a limited area of his premises is 
liable to the trespasser for bodily harm which resulted either from 
highly dangerous activities or from highly dangerous artificial condi- 
tions. 32 A second exception is that the occupier or possessor of land 
who knows or has reason to know of trespassers upon his land is subject 
to liability for physical harm suffered by the trespasser either from 
dangerous activities or from highly dangerous artificial conditions on 
the land. 33 However, this liability on the part of the landowner arises 
only if the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care. These exceptions 
indicate a disenchantment with the idea of no liability for the land- 
owner regardless of the circumstances. The courts have increasingly 
felt that human welfare and safety outweigh the possessor's unrestricted 
use of his land. Thus, the question arises whether the duty of the pos- 
sessor of land should be limited by a status classification. 

IV. Mississippi Law — Licensees 

A. Who Is a Licensee? 

The Restatement defines a licensee as a "person who is privileged 
to enter or remain on the land only by virtue of the possessor's con- 
sent." 34 Dean Prosser said that the word, "licensee," as most commonly 
used by the courts, is "limited to those who enter with that consent 
[to enter upon the land] and nothing more." 35 The Mississippi Supreme 
Court has defined a licensee as a "person who is privileged to enter 
upon the land by virtue of the possessor's consent or permission." 36 
The court has further said that "consent may be expressed by acts other 
than words," 37 and that the question of whether consent has been given 
or implied is often a question for the jury. 38 The Mississippi court has 

31 Restatement § 333; Prosser § 58, at 365. 

32 Restatement §§ 334-35; Prosser § 58, at 368. 
83 Restatement §§ 336-37; Prosser § 58, at 369. 

34 Restatement § 330. 

35 Prosser § 60, at 385. 

86 Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss, at 350, 149 So. 2d at 315. 
37 Id. See also Allen v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 111 Miss. 267, 71 So. 386 (1916) ; Lepnick 
v. Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200, 16 So. 213 (1894) . 

38 Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss. 343, 149 So. 2d 312 (1963) . 


also defined a licensee as a "person who enters upon the property of 
another for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit." 39 

B. The Duty Owed to a Licensee 

Having determined that the status of a visitor to the premises is 
that of a licensee, the Mississippi court, as late as 1970, stated that "the 
possessor of the premises owed her [the licensee] the duty not to will- 
fully or wantonly injure her." 40 This concept of duty which is owed 
by the occupier of the premises to the licensee is based upon a long 
line of cases, none of which have deviated from the rule. 41 The court 
has recognized that the occupier of the premises has a duty not to set 
"traps" for the licensee by exposing him to hidden perils. 42 The court 

The duty is not to maintain the land in safe condition, but 
to disclose to the licensee any concealed, dangerous condition 
on the premises of which the owner has knowledge, and to exer- 
cise reasonable care to see that the licensee is aware of the 
danger. 43 

Under Mississippi law, the licensee can expect to be warned of the 
existing perils or hazards which exist on the land. 

However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has refused to depart 
from the "willful and wanton" rule in relation to activities of the 
occupier of the premises, 44 even though some courts have recognized 
that the occupier's duty is one of reasonable care when there is active 
negligence. 45 

89 Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speedway, 224 Miss, at 643, 80 So. 2d at 790; See also Murry 
Chevrolet Co. v. Cotten, 169 Miss. 521, 152 So. 657 (1934) ; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Mans- 
field, 160 Miss. 672, 134 So. 577 (1931) . 

40 Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 233 So. 2d at 524 (Miss. 1970) . 

41 White v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 196 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1967) ; Langford 
v. Mercurio, 183 So. 2d 150 (Miss. 1966) ; Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Walters, 
248 Miss. 206, 158 So. 2d 2, corrected at 160 So. 2d 908 (1963) ; Dry v. Ford, 238 Miss. 
98, 117 So. 2d 456 (1960); Bishop v. Stewart, 234 Miss. 409, 106 So. 2d 899 (1958); 
Murry Chevrolet Co. v. Cotten, 169 Miss. 521, 152 So. 657 (1934). 

42 Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss, at 351, 149 So. 2d at 315. In this 
case the defendant, Marlon Investment Co., maintained unlighted steep concrete 
stairs down to its basement. Marlon did not use the stairs. The plaintiff was seeking 
out one Gammel in order to procure change for certain coin-operated machines. A 
sign hanging over the abandoned staircase read "Gammel Music Co., Downstairs." The 
plaintiff, having been misled by the sign, started down the stairs, but realizing that 
he was going down the wrong staircase the plaintiff tried to return but slipped and 
fell to the bottom of the stairs. See also Wright v. Caffey, 239 Miss. 470, 123 So. 2d 
841 (1960); Dry v. Ford, 238 Miss. 98, 117 So. 2d 456 (1960). 

43 Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss, at 350, 149 So. 2d at 315. 

44 Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 233 So. 2d at 525-26. 

48 Restatement § 341; Prosser § 60, at 388-89; Harper & James § 27.10, at 1476. 


The California courts have recognized the active negligence dis- 
tinction for some time. 46 In Yamauchi v. O'Neill,* 7 the California Su- 
preme Court said: 

[T]here can be no doubt whatever that the negligent operation 
of a moving vehicle in a place where the operator has good 
reason to expect the presence of licensees constitutes active 
negligence as distinguished from passive negligence. Under 
such circumstances the duty owed by the operator of the mov- 
ing vehicle to a licensee, whether such operator be the licensor 
or any other person, is not merely the duty to refrain from 
willful or wanton conduct but is the duty to exercise ordinary 
care. 48 

Exactly the same situation existed in Astleford v. Milner Enter- 
prises, Inc., in which the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to recog- 
nize the active negligence exception. In an earlier case, the Mississippi 
court recognized the active negligence exception, but refused to apply 
the exception because the circumstances of the licensee's injury negated 
the application of the exception. 49 Thus, under Mississippi law the 
licensee may recover only if the occupier is guilty of willful and wanton 

In at least one case the Mississippi court found that the occupier 
of the premises was guilty of such gross negligence as to hold him 
liable for the injuries of a licensee. 50 In this case, the father of the 
plaintiffs was killed by an explosion of a blow torch which had been 
accidentally placed upon a hot stove near which the plaintiffs' father 
was standing. The service manager had observed that the mechanic had 
placed the blow torch upon the hot stove, but the manager had given 
no warning. The court said: "In fact, he appears to us to have been 
guilty of negligence so gross as to amount, in law, to wantonness." 51 
Though the plaintiffs were able to recover, even under the "willful 

46 Yamauchi v. O'Neill, 38 Cal. App. 2d 703, 102 P.2d 365 (1940) ; See also Ander- 
son v. Anderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1967) ; Hanson v. Richey, 
237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965) . 

47 38 Cal. App. 2d 703, 102 P.2d 365 (1940) . 

48 Id., 102 P.2d at 367. 

49 Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speedway, 224 Miss. 632, 80 So. 2d 785 (1955). Franklin 
Kelley was struck by a flying car wheel while standing in the pit watching a stock 
car race. The court said: 

It does not appear that Franklin Kelley was injured as a result of the active 

negligence of the appellees or the driver of the stock car. Id. at 647, 80 So. 

2d at 792. 
See also Colgrove v. Lampoc Model "T" Club, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 2d 18, 124 P.2d 128 
(1942) . 

50 Murry Chevrolet Co. v. Cotten, 169 Miss. 521, 152 So. 657 (1934). 

51 Id. at 529, 152 So. at 659. 


and wanton" rule, such recovery is rare, for the licensee distinction is 
used to protect the occupier from liability. 

C. The Social Guest 

The inclusion of the social guest in the licensee classification has 
probably caused the greatest disagreement and comment. The occupier 
of the land or premises usually has expressly invited the social guest, 
yet he is not an "invitee" in legal terminology. He is a licensee. 52 Dean 
Prosser states "that a social guest, however cordially he may have been 
invited ... is not in law an invitee — a distinction which has puzzled 
generations of law students, and even some lawyers." 53 The explanation 
usually given is that the guest is considered an additional member of 
the host's family. Thus, the guest cannot expect the host to prepare 
the premises for his reception or to take any precautions for his safety. 54 

The Mississippi Supreme Court has continued to classify a social 
guest as a licensee. 55 In Wright v. Caffey, 56 the court, citing a legal 
encyclopedia, said: 

The guest assumes the ordinary risks which attach to the prem- 
ises. No exception is made to the rule because of the fact that 
the guest enters on the host's express invitation to enjoy his 
hospitality. 57 

The court cited Wolfson v. Chelist, 58 a Missouri case, which has prac- 
tically the same factual situation as existed in Wright. In Wolfson, the 
Missouri court said that the plaintiff was a social guest — a licensee — 
and thus could not recover from the owner of the premises. 59 Is it 
logical or justifiable to use the licensee classification as a limiting factor 
on the duty owed by the occupier of the land to a visitor on his prop- 

V. Mississippi Law — Invitees 

A. Who Is an Invitee? 

"Invitee" is a word of art, with a special meaning in the law which 
does not necessarily coincide with the popular definition. Invitees gen- 
erally fail into two classes: 

1. those who enter as members of the public for a purpose 
for which the land is held open to the public; and 

83 Restatement § 330, Comment h (3) . 
88 Prosser § 60, at 387. 

84 Restatement, supra note 52. 

"Wright v. Caffey, 239 Miss. 470, 123 So. 2d 841 (1960). 

68 Id. 

87 Id. at 476, 123 So. 2d at 843. 

M 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955) . 

n Id. 


2. those who enter for a purpose connected with the business 
of the possessor. 60 

In Nowell v. Harris, 61 the Mississippi Supreme Court defined an 
invitee as 

[A] person who goes on the premises of another in answer to 
the expressed or implied invitation of the owner or occupant 
on the business of the owner or occupant or for their mutual 
advantage. 62 

The plaintiff, a truck driver, sued both his employer and a lumber 
yard operator for injuries sustained by him when a stack of lumber 
fell on him while he was delivering lumber to the yard for his em- 
ployer. The court said the plaintiff was a "business invitee." 63 

Courts often use one of two tests to determine if a visitor is an 
invitee. These two tests are the "economic benefit" test 64 and the 
"invitation" test. 65 The economic benefit test is based upon the theory 
that the occupier of the land owes a higher duty of care to the visitor 
from whom he will derive a pecuniary benefit. 66 The invitation test is 
based upon the assumption that since the occupier has invited the 
public to enter upon his premises, he has also prepared for a safe en- 
trance by the visitor. 67 The Mississippi court's definition of an invitee 
in Nowell v. Harris seems to indicate an acceptance of only the eco- 
nomic benefit test. Thus a visitor who meets the economic benefit test 
will be considered an invitee. This view is supported by the fact that 
the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to recover 
for injuries suffered as a result of tripping and falling over the handle 
of a hydraulic jack at a service station where the plaintiff had gone 
to see an employee on personal business. 68 The court stated: 

He did not go at the instance of the operator of the station 
nor for the purpose of transacting any business with the filling 
station. The fact that cold drinks, nabs, cookies, cigarettes and 
other sundries were sold at the filling station, does not alter 
the fact that on this occasion the plaintiff was a mere licensee 
on the premises and not an invitee for the purpose of making 

80 Restatement § 332, Comment a. 

61 219 Miss. 363, 68 So. 2d 464 (1953) . 

82 Id. at 370, 68 So. 2d at 467. See also Wright v. Caffey, 239 Miss. 470, 123 So. 2d 
841 (1960) ; Strand Enterprises v. Turner, 223 Miss. 588, 78 So. 2d 769 (1955) ; Pat- 
terson v. Sayers, 223 Miss. 444, 78 So. 2d 467 (1955) . 

63 Nowell v. Harris, 219 Miss. 363, 68 So. 2d 464 (1953) . 

"Prosser § 61, at 396; Harper & James § 27.12, at 1478. 

eB PROSSER § 61, at 398; Harper & James § 27.12, at 1478. 

"Prosser § 61, at 396; Harper & James § 27.12, at 1478. 

• t Prosser § 61, at 398; Harper & James § 27.12, at 1479. 

68 Graves v. Massey, 227 Miss. 848, 87 So. 2d 270 (1956). 


any purchase or transacting any other business with the filling 
station on that occasion. 69 (emphasis added) . 

It would seem that there is a continuing implied invitation to the pub- 
lic and that the service station should be liable for any visitor's injuries 
which resulted from the station's failure to exercise reasonable care. 
If the plaintiff in Now ell v. Harris had purchased a cold drink for ten 
cents, he would have become an invitee under the economic benefit 
test, and the station would have owed him the duty to exercise reason- 
able care. Thus, the distinction drawn by the Mississippi court is 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 

B. The Duty Owed an Invitee 

Having established the status of the visitor to be that of an invitee, 
Mississippi cases hold that the occupier of land owes an invitee the 
duty of reasonable or ordinary care in keeping the premises free of 
hazards and in warning of concealed perils of which the occupier knows 
or should know through the exercise of reasonable care. 70 The duty of 
reasonable care is required by ordinary principles of negligence. It 
should be understood, however, that the occupier of the premises does 
not become the insurer against all injuries to a business invitee. 71 The 
Mississippi court has also adopted an exception to the duty of reason- 
able care required of the occupier. In First National Bank of Vicks- 
burg v. Cutrer, 72 the court said that "... the owner is not required 
to anticipate or foresee unusual and improbable results as a conse- 
quence of the condition of the premises." 73 

"Id. at 851, 87 So. 2d at 271. 

T0 General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1969); First 
Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Cutrer, 214 So. 2d 465 (Miss. 1968) ; Stanley v. Morgan & 
Lindsey, Inc., 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967) ; Daniels v. Morgan &: Lindsey, Inc., 198 
So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1967) ; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes, 191 So. 2d 411 (Miss. 1966) ; 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1966) ; Colson v. Sims, 254 
Miss. 99, 180 So. 2d 327 (1965) ; Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 252 Miss. 693, 173 
So. 2d 603 (1965) ; Winn-Dixie Super Markets v. Hughes, 247 Miss. 575, 156 So. 2d 
734 (1963) ; Gulfport Winn-Dixie, Inc. v. Taylor, 246 Miss. 332, 149 So. 2d 485 (1963) ; 
Williamson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 237 Miss. 141, 112 So. 2d 529 (1959); Wallace 
v. J. C. Penney Co., 236 Miss. 367, 109 So. 2d 879 (1959) ; Strand Enterprises v. 
Turner, 223 Miss. 588, 78 So. 2d 769 (1955) ; Patterson v. Sayers, 223 Miss. 444, 78 So. 
2d 467 (1955) . 

71 General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1969) ; First 
Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Cutrer, 214 So. 2d 465 (Miss. 1968) ; Stanley v. Morgan & 
Lindsey, 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967) ; Daniels v. Morgan & Lindsey, Inc., 198 So. 2d 
579 (Miss. 1967) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916 (Miss 1966) ; Gulf- 
port Winn-Dixie, Inc. v. Taylor, 246 Miss. 332, 149 So. 2d 485 (1963) ; Wallace v. 
J. C. Penney Co., 236 Miss. 367, 109 So. 2d 879 (1959) . 

"214 So. 2d 465 (Miss. 1968). 

" Id. at 466. See also General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So. 2d 104 
(Miss. 1969) ; Stanley v. Morgan &: Lindsey, 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967) . 


The occupier's liability to invitees, therefore, is usually based upon 
ordinary principles of negligence. These negligence principles should 
be used, but they can only be applied after the visitor to the land has 
been classified as an invitee. Is this status classification necessary for an 
orderly process of determining liability? 

VI. The Trend: Abolition of the Distinctions 

The Mississippi Supreme Court has religiously followed precedent 
and adhered to the status classifications of the common law as the means 
of determining the duty owed to a visitor on the premises of another. 
Strong criticism has been directed at the use of these common law rules. 
Courts and writers have pointed out the difficulties of accurately classi- 
fying the visitor as either an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. These same 
authorities have argued that such status classifications are arbitrary 
and inflexible. 74 It is evident that these criticisms, changing social 
values, and an increasing emphasis on human welfare have forced the 
courts either to recognize exceptions to the duty requirement or to 
abolish the distinctions entirely. 75 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
accurately described the situation: 

In modern times the immunities have rightly, though gradually, 
been giving way to the overriding social view that where there 
is foreseeability of substantial harm landowners, as well as 
other members of society, should generally be subjected to a 
reasonable duty of care to avoid it. 78 

In 1959, the United States Supreme Court refused to adopt the 
common law rules relating to the liability of a possessor of land for 
the law of admiralty. 77 The Court said that the ship owner "owes to 
all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate in- 
terests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances 
of each case." 78 Thus, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
the common law distinctions could not be blindly followed. 

It was against this backdrop of history that the California Supreme 
Court decided to abandon the special rules for governing occupiers of 
land in favor of the ordinary principles of negligence liability. 79 Cali- 
fornia thus became the first state to abolish the historical classification 
of trespassers, licensees, and invitees. It is interesting to note that Eng- 
land, the country in which these classifications originated, had abolished 

74 Harper & James §§ 27.1-27.14, at 1430-98. See also Henson v. Ricliey, 237 Cal. 
App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965) . 

75 Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position, at 453-54. 

78 Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313, 317 (1956) . 

77 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) . 

78 Id. at 632. 


the distinctions between licensees and invitees 80 eleven years prior to 
Rowland v. Christian. 61 

In Rowland the plaintiff was invited into the defendant's apart- 
ment, and during the visit the plaintiff used the defendant's bathroom. 
When the plaintiff attempted to turn off the water faucet, the porcelain 
handle broke, severing the tendons in the plaintiff's right hand. The 
plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries and alleged that the 
defendant knew of the defect but had not warned the plaintiff. The 
defendant was given a summary judgment upon the basis that the 
plaintiff was a social guest. The California Supreme Court reversed 
the lower court and held that the visitor's status would not be determi- 
native of liability, but would be one of the factors considered in decid- 
ing whether there had been a breach of duty of ordinary care and skill. 
The court set forth the test: 

The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor 
of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is 
whether in the management of his property he has acted as a 
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, 
and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or 
invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status 
have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is 
not determinative. 82 

In April of 1969, the Supreme Court of Hawaii followed the lead 
of the California court. In Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 83 
the Hawaiian court said: 

We believe that the common law distinctions between classes 
of persons have no logical relationship to the exercise of rea- 
sonable care for the safety of others. We, therefore, hold that 
an occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care for the 
safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the 
premises, regardless of the legal status of the individual. 84 

The plaintiff in Pickard had obtained permission to use the restroom 
at the Honolulu Courthouse and was injured when he fell through a 

79 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Gal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) . 

80 Occupiers Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957) . Section 2 of the Act states: 

(1) An occupier of the premises owes the same duty, the 'common duty of 
care,' to all his visitors .... 

(2) The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all circum- 
stances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reason- 
ably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited 
or permitted by the occupier to be there. 

81 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 
82 Id. at 104, 443 P.2d at 568. 
88 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969) . 
84 Id. at 446. 


hole which he could not see because the light switch was not working. 
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and 
hence the only duty owed to the plaintiff was not to harm him will- 
fully or wantonly. The Hawaiian Supreme Court rejected the "willful 
and wanton" rule and in its place substituted the duty of reasonable 
care. 85 

VII. Adherance or Abolition? 

Since the Mississippi Supreme Court has rigidly adhered to the use 
of the trespasser, licensee, and invitee distinction, and the Supreme 
Courts of California and Hawaii have ceased to use the distinctions 
and have substituted therefore the "reasonable care" doctrine, the 
question arises whether the abolition trend should be followed. If 
the finding is that the distinctions should be abolished, what is the 
basis for this conclusion? 

The most obvious argument for the abolition of these status dis- 
tinctions is that the social and moral values of the twentieth century are 
dissimilar to those of the nineteenth century. This is a valid argument, 
for human welfare is of such importance that courts have refused to 
sustain immunity for the landowner solely because he owns property. 
The revitalization of strict liability indicates the courts' awareness of 
the need to protect the unwary plaintiff from harm and reimburse him 
for his injuries. It is not suggested that property rights should have no 
protection. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that dem- 
onstrators do not have the right to enter private property for the pur- 
pose of demonstrating against alleged civil rights violations. 88 The 
demonstration cases merely prohibit the misuse or destruction of private 
or state property, whereas the trespasser, licensee, and invitee cases deny 
an injured plaintiff the right of recovery because of his status in rela- 
tion to the owner of the land. Actually the landowner's "property" 
rights are not subrogated to the whim of the plaintiff; instead, the 
landowner is asked only to bear the loss suffered by the plaintiff who 
is injured as a result of the occupier's negligence — the failure to use 
reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. 

As has been previously stated, the theory of negligence developed 
during the nineteenth century when property ownership determined 
the prevailing values of society. Thus the distinctions which protected 
the occupier from liability were retained, and the negligence concept 
was not applied to the landowner. Today nearly all of tort law depends 
upon the concept of negligence which requires a person to conform to 

**Id. at 445-46. 

86 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) . 


a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others. 87 The stan- 
dard of conduct is a community standard which is the product of the 
jury's social judgment. 88 Since nearly all other tort cases are based upon 
the doctrine of due care, logical reasoning seems to demand the same 
standard of care from the landowner who through his own negligence 
has caused injury to a plaintiff whose presence could be foreseen. 

There is no argument that the presence of a licensee who has en- 
tered the premises with the consent of the possessor 89 cannot be antici- 
pated. However, the question of foreseeability does arise when the 
injured party is a trespasser. It can be stated with justification that the 
trespasser is foreseeable, but the problem is the size of the trespasser 
class. The class includes child trespassers, adults, burglars, and thieves, 
as well as those who habitually use the occupier's property as a short- 
cut. 90 These varied types of trespassers present totally different ques- 
tions of liability. Yet by using the status classification in determining 
duty, the courts prevent recovery by all members of the class. It is sub- 
mitted that these different factual situations can best be accounted for 
under the ordinary principles of negligence. The question should be 
whether an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent man under the same or 
similar circumstances standing as a landowner could foresee a risk of 
harm to the particular trespasser or licensee. The use of the status 
distinction as the decisive issue in the law prohibits the jury's con- 
sideration of certain important factors which would allow a more 
flexible and reasonable result. These factors include the magnitude 
of the risk, the nature of the premises, the activities conducted on the 
premises, the type of defect within the premises, the ease of correcting 
or warning of the danger, and the knowledge of the danger by the 
occupier or visitor. 91 

Advocates of the status distinctions argue that the distinctions 
between trespassers, licensees, and invitees provide a workable and rea- 
sonable approach to the problem of liability. The dissenting opinion 
of Justice Burke in Rowland v. Christian 92 argued that the distinc- 
tions provide "the degree of stability and predictability so highly 
prized in the law." 93 The judicial emphasis on predictability has 
caused one writer to state that ". . . when overemphasized, [it] is 

OT Prosser § 32, at 153. 

88 Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position, at 447. 

89 Restatement § 330. 

90 Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position, at 457. 
"Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. 

L. Rev. 186, 199 (1957) . 

82 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 
93 Id., 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105. 


abhorrent to our system of case by case analysis of legal problems." 9 * 
If the reasoning of Justice Burke is followed, the predictability becomes 
that of who wins the lawsuit rather than that of a fair result. 

The advocates of these distinctions also argue that the landowner 
will be subjected to unlimited liability if these distinctions are abolished. 
The dissent in Rowland states that the landowners may be subjected 
to "potentially unlimited liability despite the purpose and circum- 
stances motivating the plaintiff in entering the premises of another. 
. . ," 95 The fallacy of this type of reasoning is that other members 
of the community have been held liable for injuries by plaintiff- 
oriented juries; yet their liability has not been limited under the law 
of negligence. Why should the landowner be an exception? In fact, 
the landowner is in a better financial position to purchase liability 
insurance than are other members of the community. For instance, 
a person who rents an apartment or house, lives on a fixed income, and 
owns nothing but an automobile is subject to "unlimited" liability when 
he is involved in a traffic accident that results in injury to the occupants 
of the automobiles. However, such a person can protect himself by 
subscribing to as much liability insurance as he can afford. The land- 
owner can also avail himself of an adequate amount of insurance 
to protect himself if a jury should find that he has breached the duty 
of ordinary care which he owed to a visitor on his premises. 

VIII. Conclusion 

This comment has attempted to present a historical synopsis of 
the development of the trespasser, licensee, and invitee distinctions and 
a concise statement of the current law regarding these status distinc- 
tions. Emphasis has been placed upon Mississippi law, but these deci- 
sions are similar to those of most jurisdictions which still use these 
status classifications. Mississippi has, however, remained very close to 
the common law idea and has not deviated from a strict adherence 
to these distinctions. The decision in As tie ford v. Milner Enterprises, 
Inc., 96 indicates the Mississippi court's attitude. 

It is the belief of this writer that there are compelling reasons 
which indicate a need for the abolition of the trespasser, licensee, 
invitee distinctions. The occupier or possessor of the premises owes 
a duty of reasonable care to the foreseeable visitor to his premises. 
Any other standard is abhorrent to the values of present-day society. 

John Howard Shows 

94 Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position, at 456. 
•=69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105. 
96 233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970). 




I. Introduction 

Mississippi has, of course, a court system which divides the courts 
at the trial level into separate courts of law and equity. 1 The result 

is that the universal problem of subject-matter jurisdiction and the 
procedural rights and substantive remedies which arise because of the 
label which we attach to a cause of action is doubly complicated. In- 
deed, the problem would not be avoided by a unitary system of trial 
courts, 2 but it would be much simplified if the trial judge would have 
at his command the full range of legal and equitable procedural 
guarantees and extraordinary remedies in one trial forum. However, 
this is not the case in Mississippi, so practitioners here are faced with 
the problem of jurisdiction unnaturally but necessarily divided between 
the law and equity trial courts. 

The framers of the Mississippi Constitution sought to settle the 
problem by the adoption of § 147 of the Constitution of 1890. 3 In so 
doing, they created a makeshift system of jurisdictional distribution 
that has created as many problems as it has solved. It is not doubted 
that § 147 has ameliorated the abuse of the forms of pleading for 
which our nineteenth century predecessors were notorious; but in so 
doing, it has made great and unjustified inroads into the concept 
of procedural due process of law and has led to abuses of the juris- 
diction of the trial forums. A reconciliation of § 147 with the concept 
of due process, the convenient and efficient disposition of civil and 
equitable causes of action, uniformity of treatment of similar causes 
of action, and the attainment of essential fairness in the adjudicatory 
process is the subject of this article. 

The constitutional scheme of trial courts in Mississippi is essen- 
tially irrational: separate jurisdictions of the law and equity courts 

1 Miss. Const, art. 6, §§ 157, 162. 

2 Moore v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 155 Miss. 818, 125 So. 411 (1930) . 

3 No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a civil 
cause shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to 
render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the 
cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction; 
but if the Supreme Court shall find error in the proceedings other than as 
to jurisdiction, and it shall be necessary to remand the case, the Supreme 
Court may remand it to that court which, in its opinion, can best determine 
the controversy. Miss. Const, art. 6, § 147. 



are unequivocally established by §§ 157 and 162* of the Constitution 
of 1890, while § 147 of the Constitution provides that if a trial judge 
ignores the mandate of §§ 157 and 162, no error may arise from such 
action. This creates the singular anomaly of a unified system of juris- 
diction in the framework of separate law and equity courts. 5 Essential 
differences in the treatment of causes of action arise from the forum 
in which the cause is tried. The result of this difference is that unified 
jurisdiction does not exist in practice; it is rendered impossible by 
the real differences in the trial forums. However, the merits of the 
system aside, it is the system that we do have, and Mississippi judges 
must try to create the maximum of efficiency and fairness within its 
framework. The body of case law involving § 147 represents the 
attempts by four generations of the Mississippi Supreme Court to 
achieve the desired results. At the outset our suspicion is that the 
court's success has been mixed. 

II. The Evolution of the Present Rule 
A. The Cazeneuve Rule 

An early decision which interpreted § 147 and determined its 
character of application for the following decades was Cazeneuve v. 
Curell.* In this case, the court set its position with regard to § 147 in 
several particulars by adopting a rather absolutist position for its 
application. The court said: 

[T]he court below was without jurisdiction, in our opinion. 

But the court assumed jurisdiction, and as this is the only 
error assigned or apparent, we cannot reverse the decree over- 
ruling appellant's demurrer to the bill of complaint. 7 

It is significant that the court, in declining to reverse on jurisdic- 
tional grounds, couched its refusal in terms of the lack of constitutional 
power to do so, rather than in some policy or precedent. 8 The court, 
referring to "the virtual obliteration of the lines of demarcation 
between courts of law and equity," 9 in this decision rendered soon 
after the adoption of the "new" constitution gave full deference 
to the change in the scheme of the judicial system brought about 

4 Miss. Const, art. 6, §§ 157, 162. 

"Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 Miss. 521, 524, 13 So. 32, 33 (1893) . 

9 Id, See also Barrett v. Carter, 69 Miss. 593, 13 So. 625 (1891). 

7 Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 Miss, at 523, 13 So. at 32. 

8 Citing no authority other than § 147, the court said: 

And this court is forbidden to reverse or annul decrees or judgments rendered 
in the lower courts, even if there was want of jurisdiction, if no other error 
than want of jurisdiction is to be found. Id. at 524, 13 So. at 32-33. 

9 Id. at 524, 13 So. at 32-33. 


by § 147. In this connection, the problem that is basic to any considera- 
tion of § 147, and which has plagued Mississippi practitioners to the 
present day was first dealt with: reconciling a constitutional system 
which divides the law and equity functions of the judicial process 
between two specialized forums while maintaining, by the incidence 
of § 147, a "blended" or integrated system of jurisdiction. 10 

This problem has never been well disposed of even in the face 
of a strict and consistent adherence to the Cazeneuve rule by the Mis- 
sissippi Supreme Court. The decisions which followed the Cazeneuve 
case on the question of law versus equity jurisdiction are striking 
only in their consistency and brevity of treatment of the subject. 11 
The court summarily disposed of many varied fact situations under 
the strict interpretation of the rule during this early period. From 
the frequency with which cases were brought to the court during this 
period, it appears that the bar of that day found it difficult to reconcile 
itself to the constitutional fact that one could not object to clearly 
erroneous jurisdiction and that there was no appellate review of error 
on this subject. However, regardless of a continuing onslaught, the 
court held fast to its strict rule in the face of a variety of objections. 
The court refused to be persuaded by the following: the existence of 
a complete and adequate remedy at law, 12 that an action brought in 
chancery was clearly beyond any doubt proper only at law 13 and was 
appealed interlocutorily to determine jurisdiction, 14 a statutory lien 
which was brought in circuit court, 15 and mixing of law and equity 
matters which were properly separable in order to confer equity juris- 
diction on a legal case. 16 

10 We have the singular anomaly of a constitutional scheme of two courts, 
common law and equity, and yet with power in the inferior judges to ef- 
fectually blend the jurisdictions, each in his own district. But, remarkable 
as the results flowing from this anomaly are, we are not to disregard the 
plain requirements of the fudamental law. Id. at 524, 13 So. at 33. 

11 See, e.g., Yazoo Delta Mort. Co. v. Hutson, 140 Miss. 461, 106 So. 5 (1925); 
Cooley v. Tullas, 115 Miss. 268, 76 So. 263 (1917); Grenada Groc. Co. v. Tatum, 113 
Miss. 388, 74 So. 286 (1917) ; White v. Willis, 111 Miss. 417, 71 So. 737 (1916) ; Metzger 
v. Joseph, 111 Miss. 385, 71 So. 645 (1916); Dinsmore v. Harrison, 111 Miss. 313, 71 
So. 567 (1916) ; Town of Woodville v. Jenks, 94 Miss. 210, 48 So. 620 (1909) ; Missis- 
sippi Fire Ass'n v. Stein, 88 Miss. 499, 41 So. 66 (1906) ; Hancock v. Dodge, 85 Miss. 
228, 37 So. 711 (1905); Decell v. Hazlehurst Oil Mill & Fertilizer Co., 83 Miss. 346, 
35 So. 761 (1904) ; Irion v. Cole, 78 Miss. 132, 28 So. 803 (1900) ; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. 
Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650, 21 So. 760 (1897) ; Day v. Hartman, 74 Miss. 389, 21 So. 302 
(1897) ; Goyer v. Wildberger, 71 Miss. 438, 15 So. 235 (1894) . 

"Hancock v. Dodge, 85 Miss. 228, 37 So. 711 (1905); Decell v. Hazlehurst Oil 
Mill and Fertilizer Co., 83 Miss. 346, 35 So. 761 (1904) . 

13 Town of Woodville v. Jenks, 94 Miss. 210, 48 So. 620 (1909) . 

14 Id. 

u Cooley v. Tullas, 115 Miss. 368, 76 So. 263 (1917). 

"Yazoo Delta Mort. Co. v. Hutson, 140 Miss. 461, 106 So. 5 (1925) . 


By its own description in the Cazeneuve case, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court was faced with an "anomaly," 17 and the method of 
dealing with it that the court chose was not to deal with it at all. The 
court in these early cases uniformly held that it was powerless to 
reverse on the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction even where such 
jurisdiction was harmful to the objecting party. 18 The court never 
reached the merits of any of these cases except by pure dictum which 
was apparently written from time to time in an outrage of frustration. 19 
The question of when the error of jurisdiction could become so harm- 
ful to a party as to constitute "other error" 20 under which the court 
might reverse was not reached during the early period at all. And, 
in fact, it remains unanswered to the present. The impression from the 
cases is, however, that no error of jurisdiction would ever be reviewable 
and reversible where it was the sole error. 21 

The first retreat from the strict rule occurred in Grenada Grocery 
Company v. Tatum 22 in which the court stated its approval of the 
strict rule but reversed and entered judgment for the appellant on the 
merits without remanding. The grounds for reversal were that the 
decision of the chancellor was manifestly against the weight of the 
evidence. 23 This case does not represent a retreat from the Cazeneuve 
rule so much as it represents a judicial decision to reverse and enter 
a new judgment where the strict application of § 147 results in essential 
unfairness. It is significant that this opinion was written for the court 
by Justice Ethridge, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Talbot if 
Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co. 24 * which was the first 
case in which all of the implications of § 147, both procedural and 
substantive, were before the court. Unfortunately, the majority in 
this case contented itself with a recitation of the strict rule and an 
extensive list of authority for the rule, without reaching the essential 
substance of the controversy. 25 

"See note 10 supra. 

18 See cases cited note 1 1 supra. 

19 In Grenada Groc. Co. v. Tatum, 113 Miss, at 391, 74 So. at 287, the court stated: 
"It is inconceivable to the writer upon what theory the bill in this case was filed 

in the chancery court .... However, we are prevented by section 147 . . . from 
reversing it." 

20 Engelburg v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 524, 106 So. 447, 448 (1926). 

"This statement is subject to exceptions which are included in this article, but 
it remains valid because of the recent citations of § 147 by the supreme court without 
any exception taken to it. See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. State, 
354 Miss. 812, 182 So. 2d 919 (1966) ; Bullock v. Hans, 208 Miss. 41, 43 So. 2d 670 
(1949) . 

22 113 Miss. 388, 74 So. 286 (1917) . 

23 Id. at 391, 74 So. at 287. 

24 147 Miss. 186, 113 So. 433 (1927). 

25 Id. at 188-89, 113 So. at 433. 


This is an example of how a rule is engrafted onto the body of 
the law without rhyme, reason, or consideration of its future con- 
sequences and is then cited as justification for itself. The majority 
stated its lack of power to hear cases of erroneous jurisdiction in line 
with the earlier decisions. 26 In so doing the court failed entirely to 
reach the essential question — the denial of substantial remedies and 
procedural rights which spring directly from the error of jurisdiction. 
With rare and remarkable illogic, the court said: 

It is true that, where the chancery court assumes jurisdiction 
of a cause of action cognizable alone in the circuit court, in 
such a case the absolute right of trial by jury of the issues 
of fact given in circuit court causes by section 31 of the Con- 
stitution is taken away, for our court has held that it rests in 
the discretion of the chancery court whether a jury shall be 
granted to try issues of fact. But section 147 is just as much 
a part of the Constitution and is just as binding on the courts 
as section 31 of the Constitution. They are to be construed 
together, and construed together they mean that the right of 
trial by jury of issues of fact in civil causes in the circuit court 
shall remain inviolate, except in such cases of exclusively law 
cognizance as the chancery courts may erroneously assume 
jurisdiction of, where such error of jurisdiction is the only 
error in the decree, (emphasis added) . 27 

The illogic of this statement needs no amplifitory comment, but 
it is significant to note the basis of the statement, for it is the basis 
of the court's whole approach to § 147. Under § 31 of the Constitution 
of 1890, 28 a litigant is given the right of trial by jury in all civil 
matters which has been denned by our court to mean anything which 
was considered to be a legal matter at common law. 29 However, in this 
case the court is saying that a person has a right to trial by jury 
in circuit court, that he does not have such a right in chancery court, 
and that the character of the subject matter, the right of procedural 
due process of law, or apparently, the denial of substantial rights and 
remedies will not withstand this arbitrary distinction. It is submitted 
that this construction of § 147 is unwise and unjust, and it is beyond 
the specific provisions of § 31 of the Constitution. 30 It has been stated 
that § 147 has a very salutary purpose — that of preventing the mere 
form of actions from being grounds for reversal. 31 This purpose of 

20 Id. at 188, 113 So. at 433. 

27 Id. at 191, 113 So. at 434. 

28 Miss. Const, art. 3, § 31. 

29 Smith's Administrator v. Smith, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 102 (1834) . See also Yazoo & 
M.V.R.R. v. Wallace, 90 Miss. 609, 43 So. 469 (1907) . 

30 Miss. Const, art. 3, § 31. 

81 Metzger v. Joseph, 111 Miss, at 387-88, 71 So. at 647; Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 
Miss, at 526, 13 So. at 33. 


§ 147 undoubtedly has a great deal of merit, and one less removed 
from the nineteenth century abuse of forms of action would under- 
standably be highly persuaded by this argument. This article is cer- 
tainly not an argument for a return to the old emphasis on form, but 
it is rather to submit that a party should carry all of his rights, both 
procedural and substantive, and his remedies with him into whatever 
forum the law requires him to enter. There is nothing explicit or 
implicit in § 147 that would prevent this application of it. 

The dissenting opinion in Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. 
McLeod 32 takes the view expressed. Justice Ethridge in the dissenting 
opinion said: 

Section 147 of the Constitution did not intend to deny any 
litigant any right that inhered in any cause of action. It 
rather intended to accord to every litigant every legal and 
constitutional right, and it is only where these are accorded 
in full by the chancery court that this court is required to 
affirm a judgment where the right result is reached. 33 

It will be seen from a comparison of all these sections [157, 
159, 160, 161, 162] with section 147 of the Constitution that 
the Constitutional Convention did not intend to make the 
circuit and chancery courts control the general jurisdiction 
of all matters at the will of anybody. 34 

It is submitted that this is the more enlightened view of § 147. 
What policy, other than mere convenience (which surely is not 
powerful enough to command the far-reaching result indicated) serves 
to prevent this broader construction of § 147? Why should the supreme 
court circumscribe itself from correcting errors arising from the assump- 
tion of jurisdiction? Is not a denial just as harsh in its effect on the 
litigant if it arises from the abuse of jurisdictional discretion as it 
does from other abuses? The effect on the plaintiff is exactly the same 
if he is denied a jury in circuit court in contravention of § 31 of the 
Constitution or if he is denied a jury by an erroneous and unjustifiable 
transfer to chancery court. The same argument is valid in reverse 
as to the denial of chancery remedies by an erroneous transferral to 
circuit court. The rule that says that the correct result in the wrong 
forum will not be reversed does not compel the addendum that rights 
and remedies will rise and fall with the transfer. 

Arguments to the contrary were futile in the Talbot case, and 
although some exceptions have been taken to the strict rule, the argu- 
ments remain futile in many cases. The Cazeneuve rule extends down 

81 147 Miss, at 192, 113 So. at 434. ~~ 

83 Id. at 200, 113 So. at 437. 

84 Id. at 194, 113 So. at 435. 


to the present. 35 This is not to say that inroads have not been made 
into the evil consequences that flow from § 147. Albeit without a 
discernible method to the approach, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
has increasingly taken exception to the strict application of § 147 
under the Cazeneuve precedent. 

B. Exceptions to the Cazeneuve Rule 

Exceptions to the strict application of § 147 have been grudgingly 
made. There appears from a reading of a large volume of cases under 
§ 147 a predisposition of the Mississippi Supreme Court toward the 
chancery court, especially in the earlier cases. This predisposition, in 
cooperation with the adoption of a rule which defeats the court's 
review of jurisdictional errors without a consideration of the merits 
of the specific case 36 has greatly limited the number of exceptions 
taken to the Cazeneuve rule. However, in the face of the "remarkable 
results" 37 which the court predicted to be the result of § 147 in the 
Cazeneuve case, the court has from time to time taken exception to 
the rule. As early as 1899, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that 
one lower court could not appropriate the statutorily directed juris- 
diction of the other. 38 The court was not willing to leave the lower 
courts the absolute discretion they have under § 147 in the event of a 
statutory direction of certain powers to one court. However, the court 
has not adhered uniformly to this exception. 39 The court has also 
refused to uphold causes where the finding of the lower court was 
against the weight of the evidence. 40 The protection afforded by § 147 
was not felt to be sufficient to sustain an unfair verdict. 

35 See, e.g., Hull v. Townsend, 186 So. 2d 478 (Miss. 1966); United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. State, 254 Miss. 812, 182 So. 2d 919 (1966) ; Ready-Mix Concrete & Con- 
crete Prod. Co. v. Perry, 239 Miss. 329, 123 So. 2d 241 (1960) ; Laurel Racing Co., 
Inc. v. Jones, 223 Miss. 666, 78 So. 2d 879 (1955) ; Harrison v. Landrum, 223 Miss. 207, 
78 So. 2d 132 (1955); Freeman v. Bailey, 222 Miss. 904, 77 So. 2d 682 (1955) ; Forten- 
berry v. Wilkerson, 222 Miss. 70, 75 So. 2d 274 (1954) ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. McKay, 209 Miss, 706, 48 So. 2d 349 (1950) ; Bullock v. Hans, 208 Miss. 41, 43 
So. 2d 670 (1949) ; Grice v. McCarty-Holman Co., 161 Miss. 827, 137 So. 741 (1931) ; 
Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 So. 388 (1930) ; Moore v. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 155 Miss. 818, 125 So. 411 (1930); Boyett v. Boyett, 152 Miss. 201, 
119 So. 299 (1928). 

86 See note 8 supra. 

37 See note 10 supra. 

38 Board of Levee Comm'rs for Yazoo-Mississippi Delta v. Brooks, 76 Miss. 635, 
25 So. 358 (1899) . "[Ojne of these courts may not usurp the statutory power of the 
other, and have claimed for such usurpation the curative effect of § 147." Id. at 641, 
25 So. at 359. 

s *See, e.g., Engelburg v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 106 So. 447 (1926). 
40 Grenada Grocery Co. v. Tatum, 113 Miss. 388, 74 So. 286 (1917) . 


A case decided in the depression year of 1933 makes a further 
and most important exception to the Cazeneuve rule, although the 
viability of this exception is doubtful since the court has frequently 
ignored it. 41 The case of Dilworth v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 42 
would appear to adopt the position of the dissent in Talbot & Higgins 
Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co. 43 in that the court holds that 
reversible error may spring from an error of jurisdiction. The court 
held that § 147 did not intend that the trial courts should retain cases 
of which they did not have jurisdiction, but merely that the litigants 
should not be unduly harmed on appeal by such mistakes. The 
court held specifically that if it were shown on appeal that a party 
had been denied a substantial right by virtue of the forum of his trial, 
the supreme court would reverse the lower court and remand to the 
proper court. 44 It is strongly urged that this is the best construction 
to be placed on § 147. In limiting the scope of this exception to the 
usual interpretation of § 147, it is important to keep two facts in mind: 
(1) the supreme court is here reinforcing its prejudice toward the 
chancery court — the case involves a request for transfer to that court 
and not out of it; and, (2) the assignment of error results from a 
denial of remedies and not from a procedural objection. 

Three possible situations calling for reversal under § 147 appear 
where the subject-matter jurisdiction was erroneous and: (1) error 
resulted from grounds independent of jurisdiction; (2) error resulted 
from jurisdiction in the form of substantive rights and remedies that 
exist by virtue of the forum court, e.g. an equitable right of discovery; 
and, (3) error resulted from the jurisdiction in the form of procedural 
guarantees which arise from the nature of the forum court, e.g. the 
right of trial by jury. A fourth situation could be imagined where the 
procedural guarantees under situation three above become substantive 
in that they are determinative of the merits of the case. In any case, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court's position would appear to be that 
the first situation above will be reversed and remanded to the proper 
court, while the second may or may not be (no pattern or rule is 
discernible for the disposition of these cases) , and the third situation will 
never be reversed. 

41 See cases cited notes 11 and 35 supra. 

42 170 Miss. 373, 150 So. 821 (1933) . 

48 147 Miss. 186, 113 So. 43 (1927) . 

44 It was never intended by section 147 of the constitution for one court to 
take and retain jurisdiction, and still deny a party his rights under the law. 
If he has equitable defenses of which he cannot avail himself in the circuit 
court, and moves to be transferred to the chancery court, the circuit court 
should transfer the cause, so that the party may have the benefit of his 
equitable defenses. The legal rights of a party are not to be sacrificed, be- 
cause a court declines to administer the relief to which he is entitled. Dil- 
worth v. Federal Reserve Bank, 170 Miss, at 389, 150 So. at 825. 


Another important exception to the strict rule arises in cases where 
the forum court is by its inherent nature inappropriate to try the issues 
in the case. This is at once an extension of the rule of the Dilworth 
case and a grudging allowance of procedural protection. This excep- 
tion springs from the fact that the practice and procedure of the two 
lower courts is certainly different, and that from this difference there 
arise possible abuses of the courts' jurisdictional powers. 

Wroten v. Fenn 45 is a case in point. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
declined to reverse a circuit judge's refusal to transfer a case involving 
a boundary dispute and damages for timber cut to the chancery court. 
The court said ". . . it is not a question which the court must raise, 
for it is not a subject so foreign to equity jurisdiction as to require 
[the Supreme Court to raise it]." 46 The converse of this statement 
would be that the supreme court will be required to raise the question 
of jurisdiction when it is sufficiently "foreign" to the forum court's 
jurisdiction. It is submitted that the court is saying that it will review 
the jurisdiction of the lower court when by its nature the lower court 
is wholly inappropriate to hear the controversy or when the incidence 
of the erroneous jurisdiction acts to deny to a party legal rights and 
remedies to which he is entitled. Of course, it is not at all settled 
under what circumstances the court may or may not apply this rule, 
or how "inappropriate" or "foreign" to the jurisdiction of the court 
the subject-matter must be to invoke this exception to § 147. 

The suggested rule above was applied in the case of City of Biloxi 
v. Creel 47 in which case the supreme court abandoned its old prohibi- 
tion against retransfers of cases after they have been once transferred 
to the other court. 48 The court in this case remanded to the chancery 
court from which the case had been transferred to the circuit court, 
although such a finding is contrary to the general rule. 49 The grounds 
for this ruling were that the supreme court must remand to the court 
which "can best determine the controversy," 50 and that the extreme 
complexity of the subject-matter of the suit required a remand to the 
chancery court. However, it is significant to note that the supreme 
court assigned as an independent error the circuit court's ruling on an 
aspect of the merits of the controversy. 51 The court stopped short of 

"203 Miss. 361, 35 So. 2d 534 (1948) 
48 Id. 

47 232 Miss. 284, 98 So. 2d 774 (1957) . 

48 Id. at 286, 98 So. 2d at 775. See also Warner v. Hogin, 148 Miss. 562, 114 So. 347 
(1927) ; V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 517, at 526 (2d ed. 1950) . 

49 232 Miss, at 286, 98 So. 2d at 775. 

80 Id. at 287, 98 So. 2d at 776. 

81 Id. at 286, 98 So. 2d at 775. 


ruling that the acceptance of jurisdiction can of itself be reversible 
error when such acceptance subjects the appellant to a procedural 
deficiency or great inconvenience which could of itself be determinative 
that the merits have not been fairly heard. This case nevertheless 
is a step in the right direction in that it sets aside the old rule that 
transfers once made must remain final even though such transfers act 
to the substantial detriment of a party, and it recognizes that an unjust 
result may arise from the inherent limitations of the forum — both of 
procedure and of remedies available. This is the kind of reasoning 
that should be applied to § 147. The rights that attach to a party 
should not arise from which forum he is in but should be governed 
by what rights he legally has and what guarantees — procedural or 
substantive — are necessary to assure justice. 

Another exception to the Cazeneuve rule was taken when the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the 
circuit court to refuse to transfer an equitable case to the chancery 
court which had been erroneously appealed from the county court. 52 
The court speaks of §§ 157 and 162 of the Constitution of 1890 
as being "mandatory" in their requirement of transferring cases errone- 
ously brought. 53 It is submitted that the word "mandatory" is an 
unfortunate usage in view of the general effect of § 147. The basis of 
the decision is that the circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice 
and left the complainant no remedy. Since the merits had not been 
heard, the supreme court held that the refusal to transfer was a 
reversible error and remanded to the chancery court. The supreme 
court might easily have assigned the dismissal with prejudice as error 
and remanded to the chancery court under the usual construction of 
§ 147, but, curiously, they chose to find the constitutional order of 
transferral "mandatory" and assigned it as the error even though this 
was a simple assignment of jurisdictional error. 

The case of Fortenberry v. Wilkerson 54 represents an exception to 
the strict rule in that it overturns the old precedent 55 that interlocutary 
appeals may not be heard on the question of subject-matter jurisdic- 
tion. This case held that the nature of the cause of action and the 
adequacy of the remedy demanded a transfer to chancery. The court 
specifically held that § 147 does not remove the power of the supreme 
court to reverse an order of transferral. 56 The basis for this finding 

62 Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 198 Miss. Ill, 21 So. 2d 582 (1945) . 

63 Id. at 119,21 So. 2d at 583. 

64 222 Miss. 70, 75 So. 2d 274 (1954) . 

B5 Dunagin v. First Natl Bank, 118 Miss. 809, 815, 80 So. 276 (1919); See also 
V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice §§ 783-84, at 757-61 (2d ed. 1950) . 
M 222 Miss, at 70, 75 So. 2d at 274. 


was that the merits of the case had not been disposed of, and, con- 
sequently, there was no harm to the policy of § 147. 57 

This holding is diametrically opposite to the older cases. 58 The prob- 
lems and ill results which arise under § 147 could be greatly limited if the 
supreme court would widely apply this rule. However, it will be again 
noted that this case involves a transfer into the chancery court and not 
out of it, and the basis of the reversal is remedies and not procedural 
guarantees. Yet it is nonetheless an important reform because the ruling 
of this case is essential to any further reform of § 147. The supreme 
court cannot easily decide to implement safeguards in the area of 
subject-matter jurisdiction and its effect on the law and equity forums 
until it has enunciated a rule which allows it to look at the merits of 
each case, and then to reverse and remand to the proper forum when 
the error of jurisdiction has caused substantial harm. There would be 
little disruptive effect on the court system if an objection to jurisdic- 
tion were allowed to be appealed interlocutorily and then all cases of 
doubt were left undisturbed. 

III. Problems, Inequities, and Procedural 

Deficiencies Under § 147 

It may be seen from the above analysis of the rule of § 147 
that many inconsistencies and undesirable results flow from it. It is 
not at all certain what the current application of § 147 is, since the 
supreme court has made what are apparent reforms in interpreting 
it and subsequently abandoned them. 59 From a reading of the cases 
which have cited § 147, at least five major areas of unsatisfactory legal 
results flow from the rule: 

(1) The promulgation of a uniform rule of law concerning 
what cases should be brought in which trial court is impos- 

(2) Erroneous jurisdiction can result in the non-availability of 
remedies to a litigant in the wrong forum. 

(3) Causes of action may be adjudicated in a forum which is 
highly inappropriate to decide them. 

(4) The right of trial by jury in civil and quasi-criminal cases 
may be denied. 

67 It will be noted that this case has never been tried in the court to which it 
was transferred. The effect of said Section 147 has usually arisen where the 
case has been tried by such court. That would present a different question 
from that confronting us in this case. Id. at 74, 75 So. 2d 276. 

58 See, e.g., Dunagin v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Miss. 809, 815, 80 So. 276 (1919). 

69 See cases cited note 35 supra. The more recent cases cited were rendered with 
strict interpretation of the rule. 


(5) There is no limitation upon the abuse of jurisdic- 
tional discretion. 

An analysis of the cases which have resulted in the abuse of § 147 
will point out the need for a uniform reinterpretation of § 147, and 
it will shed additional light onto what the rule of § 147 currently is 
and how it may be changing. 

A. A Uniform Rule. 

In the early case of Whitney v. Hanover National Bank 60 the 
supreme court used the following contrasted words in the same opinion: 

[The Chancellor's action] fell little short of being a mere 
farce, saved from it only by the seriousness of the performance, 
with judicial gravity, in good faith. . . . 61 

Because of [§ 147], error is not predictable of 'any error or 
mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was 
of equity or common law jurisdiction.' 62 

This case is typical of the court's treatment of these cases. The court 
frequently dismissed them summarily with a citation of § 147, or it 
expressed its displeasure by dictum, as in Whitney, and then disposed 
of the case under § 147. The effect in either event is to inhibit the 
development of a case law on the question of jurisdiction. 63 

The court has not infrequently ruled on the question of juris- 
diction by dictum and then decided the appeal by a bare citation of 
§ 147. This is especially true where the appeal comes on a demurrer 
to the jurisdiction of the court before the merits of the question have 
been settled. In Ringold v. Goyer Co., 64 the court advised the chancellor 
upon the disposition of the case and then declined to rule on it, 
invoking § 147. This procedure may constitute an informal method 
of getting appellate review of the question of jurisdiction without 
violating the mandate of § 147. 

This aspect of the rule of § 147 is, in a sense, the heart of the 
problem of its application. The fact that no uniform rules of law/equity 
jurisdiction may be promulgated by the court is one of the major 
causes of the other problem areas. In beginning a reform of § 147, 
the first change upon which others may rest is to allow a judicial review 
of all errors of jurisdiction and to allow a reversal of those errors of 

80 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33 (1894) . See also Irion v. Cole, 78 Miss. 132, 28 So. 803 
(1900) . 

61 71 Miss, at 1019, 15 So. at 36. 

62 Id. at 1021, 15 So. at 37. 

83 Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 Miss, at 526, 13 So. at 83. 

64 164 Miss. 261, 144 So. 706 (1930) . 


jurisdictional assumption which in turn result in errors of procedural 
deficiency or remedies being unavailable. 

B. Remedies 

In the case of Dilworth v. Federal Reserve Bank, 65 the court re- 
versed the assumption of erroneous jurisdiction, and the consideration 
that precipitated this apparently inconsistent action was the unavail- 
ability of equitable defenses to which the defendant was entitled and 
which he was denied by his trial in the circuit court. This is an ex- 
ample of differences between the law and equity forums which affect 
a litigant because of his mere presence in the particular forum. The 
thesis submitted is that one has a right to an equitable defense, or he 
has not, and which forum he is in should not change this fact. It would 
not be an error for the circuit court to correctly dispose of the Dilworth 
case, but it is a substantial error for the court to deny the defendant 
a right to which he is entitled, even if it is a procedural right peculiar 
to the other forum. This is especially true when the procedural defense 
is determinative of the merits of the case. It is a simple matter for the 
supreme court to state that it lacks the power to reverse jurisdictional 
error under § 147, but none will doubt that the court may reverse for 
the failure to afford equitable defenses or civil procedural rights. When 
these denials result from an error of jurisdiction, they should neverthe- 
less be reversed. 

In Reed v. Charping 66 the court followed the Dilworth exception. 
The court stated that it was "not unmindful" of the rule of § 147 
and then reversed an order transferring the cause to circuit court 
because the legal remedies in the circuit court were insufficient (com- 
plainant was seeking an injunction) , 67 This seems to be clearly a 
reversal of a jurisdictional error because the consequences of the 
jurisdiction were themselves error. In the recent case of Roberts v. 
Spence es the court upheld the rule above in reverse: it ruled that 
specific performance was an inappropriate remedy and remanded to 
the circuit court although the appeal was from the chancery court. 

The above appears to enunciate a rule that errors which arise from 
jurisdiction but which stand alone as independent error will bring 
a reversal, but the rule is neither clear nor consistently followed. 

170 Miss. 373, 150 So. 821 (1933) . 
201 Miss. 477, 29 So. 2d 271 (1947) 
Id. at 486, 29 So. 2d at 273. 
209 So. 2d 623 (Miss. 1968) . 


C. Forum non Conveniens 

The chancery and circuit courts of Mississippi are essentially 
different in their procedure and in their remedy approach to conflict 
adjustment. It follows as a corollary of the above statement that real 
and immediate effects upon the litigant will be caused by this difference. 
Each forum will lend itself more or less to particular causes of action. 
Under § 147 the decision as to forum can be made at the election of 
the plaintiff with the consent of the trial judge, and the abuse of the 
jurisdiction may not be challenged. The Mississippi Supreme Court has, 
however, mitigated the effect of this rule when the forum is found to 
be sufficiently inappropriate to the particular cause of action. 

In Carbolineum Wood Preserving Co. v. Meyer 69 the court set 
forth the rule that a litigant has the right to the trial court which is 
most "ample and efficient" 70 to hear his cause of action. In this case 
the plaintiff had brought an action in both of the trial courts on the 
same set of facts. The defendant made a plea of abatement setting up 
the legal action as error and affirming the jurisdiction of chancery. The 
court said: 

[T]he allegations of the plea do not allege such a state of facts 
as would give the chancery court jurisdiction of the case. It 
is true that under section 147 of the state constitution, if the 
chancery court had assumed jurisdiction and had made a decree 
in the case, it would not have been reversed merely because 
the cause of action was not of equitable jurisdiction, but the 
chancellor, of his own motion, could have dismissed the suit, 
and the plaintiff would have been without remedy .... 
[T]he failure of the pleader to allege that the remedy in the 
suit pending in the chancery court was as ample and efficient 
as the suit in the circuit court rendered the plea ill. 71 

It will be noted that the result in this case is impossible under 
the usual construction of § 147. Here the court could review the juris- 
diction and guarantee the most "ample and efficient" trial forum be- 
cause the plaintiff-complainant proceeded in both trial forums. It is 
submitted that the supreme court should pursue this rule and assign 
as error the lack of the trial court's being "ample and efficient" and 
remand to the proper forum. The effect would be to get a review of 
jurisdiction only in those cases where it resulted in substantial harm 
to a litigant. 

In Fortenberry v. Wilkerson 72 the court reversed a case appealed 

69 76 Miss. 586, 25 So. 297 (1898) . 

70 Id. at 589, 25 So. 297. 

n Id. at 589, 25 So. at 298. 

"222 Miss. 70, 75 So. 2d 274 (1954) . 


from a demurrer to an order of transferral. The court first held that the 
nature of the suit and the adequacy of the trial forum should bring the 
suit into the chancery court. The court then reversed the order of 
transferral, saying: 

It will be noted that this case has never been tried in the court 
to which it was transferred. The effect of said Section 147 has 
usually arisen where the case has been tried by such court. 
That would present a different question from that confront- 
ing us in this case. 73 

The court in this case was (1) hearing an appeal on a demurrer, (2) 
assuming the power to rule on the merits of jurisdiction, and (3) re- 
versing the jurisdictional decision of the chancellor. The basis of the 
decision was the suitability of the trial forum to hear the case. 

The court overturned a jurisdictional decision because of the con- 
venience of the forum in City of Biloxi v. Creel. 74 The court construed 
§ 147 as demanding a remand to the forum which "can best determine 
the controversy." 75 It then held that the extreme complexity of the 
subject matter of the suit required a remand to chancery court. This 
was a reversal of a final disposition of a case which had been trans- 
ferred to circuit court. The supreme court found an independent error 
in the trial court's decision on the merits, but the main thrust of the 
opinion is the procedural inadequacy of the forum, and it appears to 
be the actual if not the stated ground for reversal. 

D. Trial by Jury 

It is generally agreed among practitioners of law in the English 
common law tradition that the procedure by which legal results are 
reached is an important aspect of guaranteeing the justice of the sys- 
tem. In our adversary system, we have set up a contest of facts and law 
and have carefully drawn rules of evidence and procedure to guarantee 
a fair result. It is submitted that the jury, for better or for worse, is 
the cornerstone of our system of procedure. The political history of our 
nation is recorded in a constant broadening and refining of the concept 
of due process of law. Therefore, we must look at § 147 in the light of 
modern developments in the constitutional guarantee of procedural due 
process of law. As previously stated, § 147 is a reform provision in that 
it was intended to end the old emphasis on form and forum. The un- 
intended result has been inroads into the rights of litigants, especially 
in the procedural area. 

73 Id. at 74, 75 So. 2d at 276. 

74 232 Miss. 284, 98 So. 2d 774 (1957). 

75 Id. at 289. 98 So. 2d at 776. 


Mississippi has from its beginning recognized a right of trial by 
jury similar to that which existed at common law. In 1834, the supreme 
court said: 

The right of trial by jury, as it exists here, is derived from 
the common law, and it is so highly valuable to the citizen, 
so essential to liberty, that it is secured as a constitutional 
right, and must, in a government like ours, be understood to 
extend at least as far as it did at the common law, and if altera- 
tions are made, policy would dictate an extension rather than 
a restriction of a privilege invaluable in itself, and so highly 
prized by the citizen. 76 

It was established in Mississippi, along with the common law 
right to trial by jury, that a chancellor could deny a jury trial. 77 When 
the Constitution of 1890 was adopted, the question of whether § 147 
could operate to deny the right of trial by jury soon arose. 78 A statute 
provided that the chancery court had jurisdiction of all cases of fraudu- 
lent transfers of property, and the chancery court took the case upon 
that ground and adjudicated the validity of a debt between the parties. 
The court held that the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial was 
not denied because § 147 operated to make this an equity question. 
However, the effect was to deny a jury trial, but the court did not 
answer this issue. 

In the case of Ringold v. Goyer Co., 79 the court spoke to the 
question of the denial of a right to trial by jury, but under the mandate 
of § 147 it found no right to trial by jury in law cases brought in 
chancery. It merely advised the chancellor on the matter and refused 
to reverse with a citation of § 147. 80 

A jury has been uniformly denied the accused in Mississippi in 
what may be called quasi-criminal cases — those in which a civil penalty 
is used as a sanction against criminal conduct. The supreme court from 
the first ruled that the chancery court could try without a jury cases 
involving a statutory penalty for the sale of liquor. 81 This rule has 

"Smith's Administrator v. Smith, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 102, 105 (1934). See also 
Byrd v. State, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 163 (1835) . 

"Carradine v. Carradine, 58 Miss. 386 (1880). See also Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 
Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920) . 

18 Scott v. Francis Vandergrift Shoe Co., 10 So. 455 (Miss. 1891) . 

79 164 Miss. 261, 144 So. 706 (1932) . 

80 In trial of suits at law upon disputed issues of fact, jury trial is an important 
right, and a party entitled to it should not be deprived of it until the chan- 
cery court is satisfied that some equitable ground exists warranting it in 
drawing the same to itself for a full decision of all rights involved. Id. at 
271-72, 144 So. at 709. 

81 State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792 (1911) . 


been recently restated without any comment upon its constitutionality. 82 
The effect of this construction of § 147 is that a statute may name a 
criminal fine a "tax" or "penalty" and confer jurisdiction for its en- 
forcement upon the chancery court. Then the judge may, at will, deny 
the defendant a jury. This process was used in the case of Freeman v. 
Bailey 83 to deny the defendant a jury in county court. This case was 
brought in county court, and a jury was denied to the defendant by 
labeling the action equity. It is submitted that whatever basis there 
may be for denying the right to trial by jury in chancery court does not 
exist in this case because the forum is unified. It is not unreasonable to 
demand that a judge of a unified court provide the litigant with a jury 
when he has a right to one. The mere labeling of the cause of action 
should not change the result. 

The Mississippi Supreme Court shed light on its treatment of 
§ 147 in several particulars in Moore v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 84 which was the basis of the above cited case. In ruling that the 
§ 147 jurisdictional rule applied equally to the county court, the court 
pointed out that a unified court system would not end the law/equity 
jurisdictional problem. It is significant that the decision was reasoned 
alternatively: (1) that the appeal to the circuit court and decision 
by that court brought it within § 147 even though the jurisdictional 
division anticipated by § 147 did not exist in county court; and, (2) 
that this finding was necessary to preserve the uniformity of the rule 
between the county court and the chancery/circuit courts. 

In 1954, the supreme court said: 

The right to a trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed in all 
criminal prosecutions by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution .... It is the foundation of our form of govern- 
ment and wholly foreign to totalitarianism. 85 

This illustrates the Mississippi court's reliance upon the federal 
concept of due process in its development of the same concept. The 
court had previously made the same sort of adoption of the federal 
rule in a civil suit, saying: "[denial of jury trial] would probably be 
void as in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, which 
forbids the deprivation of property 'without due process of law.' " 86 

The best discussion of the right to trial by jury under § 147 in 
the case law is the dissenting opinion in Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. 

82 Bishop v. Bailey, 209 Miss. 892, 48 So. 2d 588 (1950) . 

83 222 Miss. 904, 77 So. 2d 682 (1955) . 
84 155 Miss. 818, 125 So. 411 (1930). 

86 Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 815-16, 72 So. 2d 211, 213 (1954) . 
86 Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Wallace, 90 Miss, at 615, 43 So. at 470-71. 


v. McLoed Lumber Co. 87 In that dissent Justice Ethridge enunciated 
a passionate policy argument that might be entitled "Eulogy to the 
Fallen Jury": 

From now on, instead of being a captain to command, you 
have been relegated to the position of mere advisor to the 
chancellor and your advice may be disregarded and your coun- 
sel spurned, and it will be on many occasions. I deeply regret 
your misfortune and the state's vanishing rights. May God, in 
His wisdom, cause you to be re-established in your former 
position of umpireship in the courts where the rights of men 
are in dispute. 88 

Justice Ethridge was right in 1927, and the trend of cases may 
vindicate him in the foreseeable future. 89 In contrast to its earlier state- 
ments, the Mississippi Supreme Court said in 1948: 

The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution . . . has 
no application to state action; it is not a limitation of the 
powers of the states, and it is confined alone to federal action. 90 

There is no reason why the right to essential fairness in trials should 
be more jealously guarded by the United States Supreme Court than 
it is by the Mississippi Supreme Court; there is no reason why an 
institution which is a cornerstone of our democratic system of govern- 
ment — the jury trial — should be less jealously guarded by our court 
than it is by any other. In addition, the recent rulings of the United 
States Supreme Court have extended the Federal Constitution's guaran- 
tees of due process to the states to the extent that the last quoted state- 
ment cannot now be made with any confidence. 91 

E. Abuse of Discretion 

It is the general rule in Mississippi that once the chancery court 
had taken jurisdiction of a matter on one ground of equity, it may 
dispose of all aspects of the case even if the equitable matter fails 
utterly of proof. 92 This is a good rule in that it allows all matters that 
arise in a cause of action to be tried in one forum; in fact, the effect 
of it is to make the chancery court an integrated law/equity trial 
court. The limitation is, of course, that the whole concept of due process 

87 147 Miss, at 192, 113 So. at 434. 

88 Id. at 210, 113 So. at 441. 

89 See section IV infra. 

90 Odom v. State, 205 Miss. 572, 583, 37 So. 2d 300, 302 (1948) . 

91 See section IV infra. 

92 It has long been settled in this state, as one of the pre-eminent principles 
of equity procedure, that the chancery court having taken jurisdiction on 
any one ground of equity, [will settle all matters legal or equitable, even if 
the allegations of equity fail of proof]. McClendon v. Mississippi State 
Highway Comm., 205 Miss. 71, 78, 38 So. 2d 325, 327 (1949) . 


of law including trial by jury is not guaranteed by the law forum thus 
created. It will appear that the wide discretion created in this situation 
is susceptible to abuse. 

This type of case frequently arises in Mississippi, and it is not 
possible to object strenuously in many cases. However, the invariable 
effect is to deny a litigant the guarantees inherent in the legal form, 
and it is submitted that an apparently just result will not remove that 

When the chancery court takes an action to set aside fraudulent 
conveyances, it will also take and adjudicate the merits of the debt 93 or 
damage suit 94 which gave rise to the conveyance. The effect is to deny 
the defendant the right to a jury determination of his case. This pro- 
cedure may be abused by lawyers who desire to avoid juries by pur- 
posefully alleging some equitable ground and then proceeding with 
the trial in chancery when the equitable feature has failed of proof 
or been settled. For instance, the plaintiff might begin foreclosure of 
a mortgage as a means of trying the merits of a debt in chancery court, 95 
or the plaintiff might sue on an equitable writ for the same purpose. 86 

The clearest possible case of the abuse of chancery jurisdiction is 
presented by Matthews v. Thompson. 97 This was a damage suit which 
arose as a result of an automobile accident which was typical of the 
hundreds that are, and ought to be, tried in circuit court each year. 
However, in this case, the cause was pursued in chancery court by the 
device of the attachment of a mere twenty-three dollars owing to a 
non-resident defendant. This abuse of the chancery jurisdiction is 
wholly unjustified, unreasonable, and contrary to the letter of our law 
and the spirit of our legal system. It represents a gross and unwarranted 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge in an area where he cannot be 
reviewed by the supreme court under our present interpretation of 
§ 147. The supreme court found in this case that (1) the chancellor 
had the right to deny a jury to the defendant, (2) the statutory direc- 
tion that negligence is a question for the jury does not apply to a case 
brought in chancery, and (3) the assumption of equity jurisdiction in 
this case was not error since it was rendered "immaterial" by the inci- 
dence of § 147. 98 

93 Scott v. Francis Vandergrift Shoe Co., 10 So. 455 (Miss. 1891). 

94 Allred v. Nesmith, 245 Miss. 376, 149 So. 2d 29 (1960) . 

95 Atkinson v. Felder, 78 Miss. 83, 29 So. 767 (1901). 

98 Yazoo Delta Mortgage Co. v. Hutson, 140 Miss. 461, 106 So. 5 (1925) 

97 231 Miss. 258, 95 So. 2d 438 (1957) . 

98 Id. at 290, 95 So. 2d at 452. 


This case represents the result of an interpretation of § 147 which 
does not guarantee the litigant in the wrong forum his substantive and 
procedural rights, and which prevents the supreme court from review- 
ing this abuse of discretion. It is submitted that the court could have 
reversed this decision on the basis that (1) the case manifestly pre- 
sented no meaningful ground of equity jurisdiction, (2) the allegation 
of equity failed because it was apparently a sham device to confer 
jurisdiction on the court, (3) the chancellor abused his discretion when 
he found equitable jurisdiction by virtue of a mere twenty-three dollar 
attachment, or (4) a case which is preponderently a law case and which 
turns on the finding of negligence in fact must be afforded the statutory 
right to a jury determination of the facts. How this case might have 
been decided, however, is not presently as significant as the bare illus- 
tration of the abuse of § 147 and its effect. It also calls to mind Justice 
Ethridge's lament in the Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLoed 
Lumber Co. dissent" and strongly recommends his construction of 
§ 147 wherein all procedural and substantive rights accompany the 
litigant into either forum. 100 

The Mississippi Supreme Court has already promulgated a rule 
which allows them to review the abuse of chancery jurisdiction in 
certain cases. In Whitney v. Hanover National Bank 101 the court re- 
versed the erroneous assumption, saying: 

[T]he constitution does not apply [to a mere ex parte action], 
but relates to a civil cause as properly understood, and not all 
that a chancellor or judge may do. 102 

It may be that the rule suggested by the above is that the court 
will reverse the abuse of a trial judge's office while it will not reverse 
the abuse of jurisdictional discretion. 

In the case of Adams v. Stonewall Cotton Mills, 103 in an apparent 
inconsistency with the usual interpretation of § 147, the court reversed, 

We decline, in view of the entire want of jurisdiction in the 
chancery court to deal with this matter, which is all that is 
before us for judgment, to intimate any opinion whatever as 
to [the merits of the case]. 104 

The basis of this ruling was said to be "every single ground of 

"147 Miss, at 192, 113 So. at 434. 

100 Id. 

101 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33 (1894). 

102 Id. at 1022, 15 So. at 37. 

103 89 Miss. 865, 43 So. 65 (1907) . 

104 Id. at 898, 43 So. at 67. 


equity jurisdiction averred in the bill is, by the proof, utterly over- 
thrown." 105 

In the more recent case of Reed v. C harping 106 the court reversed 
a mistake of jurisdiction and consequent transfer to the circuit court. 
The basis of this reversal was that the transfer was made because of a 
finding of a complete absence of equitable rights, and that the case 
manifestly presented grounds for equitable relief and could not be tried 
at law according to right and justice. 107 

The Mississippi Supreme Court has refused to reverse abuse of 
jurisdiction when it is specified by statute. Where a plaintiff brought 
an action to recover rents which should have been brought under a 
statutory distraint procedure in the chancery court, the supreme court 
upheld the lower court. 108 In the recent case of Lippian v. Ros 109 the 
court stated that it was error for the circuit judge to transfer an appeal 
from the election commission to the chancery contrary to explicit direc- 
tion of statutory law and then refused to reverse on that ground, citing 
§ 147. In the 1968 case of Minter v. Hart, 110 the court refused to re- 
verse a case brought in chancery by attachment even though the alle- 
gations wholly failed to comply with the statutory requirements for 
attachment proceedings. 

A more persuasive case against trial of legal claims in chancery 
is presented in the case of non-resident defendants. In Myers v. Giroir, 111 
the supreme court held that a chancellor could validly render a judg- 
ment for damages against a non-resident defendant even though the 
attachment, which had conferred jurisdiction, had been dismissed from 
the suit. It is not difficult to imagine that a case such as this will be 
the test case for the United States Supreme Court to review its appli- 
cation of due process to the states in regard to trial by jury in civil 
cases. 112 If the defendant in this case were sued in his state of residence, 
in Mississippi, or in the federal court, he would have a right to trial 
by jury. By this incidence of § 147, he does not. When Mississippi thus 
strips a non-resident of his due process procedural guarantees, it would 
seem that we are in grave danger of drawing the attention of the United 
States Supreme Court. 

105 Id. at 896-97, 43 So. at 66. ~ ~~~~ 

1M 201 Miss. 477, 29 So. 2d 271 (1947) . 

107 Id. at 486, 29 So. 2d at 273. 

108 Engelbury v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 106 So. 446 (1926). 

109 253 Miss. 325, 175 So. 2d 138 (1965). 

110 208 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1968) . 

111 226 Miss. 335, 84 So. 2d 525 (1956) . 
112 See Section IV infra. 


IV. The Mandate of the Federal Constitution: 
The Evolving Concept of Due Process 

It is not within the compass of this paper to make an in-depth 
analysis of the United States Supreme Court's position on the applica- 
tion of the Bill of Rights to the states. There has been a great volume 
of writing on this fast-changing area of the law, and it will be sufficient 
to note some recent developments of the law in this area, and then 
speculate upon the effect of the trend of the law upon our present 
interpretation of § 147. It will appear that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court's confident statement in 1948 that the Bill of Rights does not 
apply to state action 113 is no longer valid, and that the trend of cases 
renders it less valid as time passes. 

The case of Duncan v. Louisiana 11 * appears to explain exhaustively 
the Supreme Court's position on the incorporation of the first eight 
amendments into the concept of due process of law and on its applica- 
tion to the states. The opinion contains a majority opinion by Mr. 
Justice White, separate concurrences by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. 
Justice Fortas, and a dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan. Among these four 
separate comments on the question, all of the major judicial views of 
the subject are discussed. It should be noted from the beginning that 
the effect of this case is to require a jury trial in criminal prosecutions 
where the possible punishment exceeds six months in jail, which is 
suggested, but not held by the court to be the line of demarcation of 
"petty offenses." 115 This finding is new and somewhat revolutionary 
because the great body of case law on the subject is contrary to this 
finding. 116 

For the present purposes of predicting what this case may fore- 
shadow for the court's later treatment of the right to jury trial in civil 
cases, the method by which the case law was abandoned and this ex- 
tension of the due process clause was arrived at is far more significant 
than the simple mandate of the case rule. 

It has been stated as the general rule that the first eight amend- 
ments apply only to the federal government and not to the states. 117 
However, the United States Supreme Court has, since the beginning of 
this century, increasingly applied the eight amendments to the states 
by incorporating them into the due process clause of the fourteenth 

" 3 Odum v. State, 205 Miss. 572, 583, 37 So. 2d 300, 302 (1948) . 

114 391 U.S. 145 (1968) . 

115 Id. at 159-62. 

118 See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) ; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 
(1877) . See also Annot., 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 334 (1964) . 
117 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 334 (1964) . 


amendment. 118 At present, virtually all of the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights have been incorporated into the due process clause and thus 
applied to the states. 119 

There are three major approaches by which the Supreme Court 
decides whether a Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the states. These 
are (1) selective incorporation, (2) total incorporation, and (3) non- 
incorporation. The first of these was the prevailing view in the Duncan 
case, although it must be noted that with three justices preferring con- 
curring opinions, and two dissenting, it does not prevail with a majority 
of the Court. The crux of this view is that the term "due process of 
law" which is made obligatory upon state action by the fourteenth 
amendment, encompasses "fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" 120 or 
those which are "basic in our system of jurisprudence." 121 To determine 
which of the Bill of Rights guarantees apply to a state prerogative that 
is before the court, the justices will ask whether such guarantees are 
"fundamental" or "basic" within the above stated test. By this process, 
the Court has selectively incorporated almost all of the first eight 
amendments into the fourteenth. 

The second two approaches to this problem appear to differ little 
from the one outlined. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas 
wholly embrace the above test as to whether a state action is constitu- 
tional as in compliance with due process, but go on to conclude that 
all guarantees of the eight amendments are included within the term 
since they are historically and by definition "basic" or "fundamental" 
within the test. 122 Mr. Justice Harlan with the concurrence of Mr. 
Justice Stewart agrees with the test of incorporation, but he dissents 
from the whole process of incorporation. His view is that due process 
of law should be defined by the Court in accordance with the totality 
of the concept of American government and that it should be an evolv- 
ing concept not tied to fast rules, i.e. the eight amendments. 123 It is 
submitted that the real disagreement of Mr. Justice Harlan with the 

118 Id. 

119 Mr. Justice White cites authority for the incorporation into the due process 
clause of: (1) the right to compensation for property taken by the state, (2) the 
rights of free speech, press and religion, (3) the fourth amendment prohibition of un- 
reasonable search and seizure, (4) the fifth amendment guarantee against compelled 
self-incrimination, (5) the sixth amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public 
trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 148 (1968) . 

120 Id. at 148. 

121 Id. at 149. 

122 Id. at 149. 

123 Id. at 176-77. 


majority it not with their thought processes, but with their inclusion 
of procedural guarantees into the concept of due process. He is dis- 
senting from the idea of a detailed and specific federal rule for pro- 
cedural law. 

For our present purposes it is enough to note that the synthesis of 
the above judicial decision process is the constant broadening of the 
concept of due process of law and the constant increase in the number 
and types of procedural guarantees that are required of state courts. 
The present state of the law on this subject could easily be arrived at 
by either of the three methods discussed. Therefore, for the limited 
purpose of forecasting the future treatment of the right to jury trial 
in civil cases by the United States Supreme Court, it is important to 
note the trend of the case law and the policy of the Court in this area. 
As noted above, the Court has already incorporated most of the first 
eight amendments into the fourteenth. 124 Extensive reading reveals no 
instance wherein the Court has retrenched in further broadening the 
impact of the due process clause. Therefore, even though the great 
weight of authority is to the contrary, 125 one may reasonably speculate 
that sooner or later the right to trial by jury in civil cases under the 
seventh amendment may be applied to the states. 

In June of 1969 the United States Supreme Court spoke again on 
the question of the applicability of the eight amendments to the states, 
and as would be expected, the Court again rendered them more in- 
clusively and specifically applicable to the states. In the case of Benton 
v. Maryland, 126 the Court used the following language: 

Recently . . . this Court has 'increasingly looked to the specific 
guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state 
criminal trial was conducted with due process of law . . . ' 
In an increasing number of cases, the Court 'has rejected the 
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States 
only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guar- 
antee of the Bill of Rights .... ' 127 

Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee 
is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice, . . . ' the 
same constitutional standards apply against both the State and 
Federal Governments. 128 

It should be seen from these quoted passages that the Court is 
approaching total incorporation of the eight amendments by the back 

124 Id. at 148. 

125 See cases cited note 116 supra. 

126 395 U.S. 784 (1969) . 

127 Id. at 794. 

128 Id. at 795. 


door, since the first quoted passage reveals that the Court increasingly 
goes to the specific provisions of the amendments to determine what 
guarantees are "fundamental" within the Duncan v. Louisiana test, 129 
and the second quoted passage reveals that once the court has incor- 
porated one of the eight amendments into the fourteenth, it does so 
"totally" or just as if it were being applied to federal courts. 

The cumulative effect of the recent developments in this area 
prompted Justice Rodgers in the case of Canning v. State 130 to declare 
for the Mississippi Supreme Court: 

There seems to be no question now that the United States 
Supreme Court has firmly 'absorbed' the first eight Amend- 
ments of the Constitution of the United States into the 'due 
process' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and has thus 
made them applicable to the states. 131 

If indeed the "eight amendments" are absorbed as Justice Rodgers 
states, then the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases 
is absorbed also, and the chancery courts of Mississippi may no longer 
deny to litigants a jury trial in legal cases erroneously brought in that 
court. The effect of this would be to render the whole scheme of juris- 
diction created by § 147 of the Mississippi Constitution void in each 
and every case where it resulted in denying a jury trial to a litigant who 
would have the right to one were the case brought in federal courts. 

It is not urged that the state of the law is presently as indicated, 
but it is submitted that it is no longer fanciful or unrealistic to predict 
that jury trial in civil cases may be brought within the fourteenth 
amendment and applied to the states. What Mississippi judges must 
carefully consider is that the United States Supreme Court has come 
very far in enlarging its application of the Bill of Rights to the states, 
and it must come but very little further to invalidate Mississippi's 
whole scheme of jurisdictional division. 

V. Conclusion 

There is included herein an examination of the application of 
§147 of the Constitution of 1890 to problems of subject-matter juris- 
diction in Mississippi, and a critique of the problems that arise from 
§ 147 as revealed in numerous cases. Criticism of the rule of § 147 can 
best be made by the example of the cases. The need for reform is 
apparent, and the method is simple. The Mississippi Supreme Court 

129 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 148. 

130 226 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1969). 

131 Id. at 752. Citing both the Duncan opinion and Benton v. Maryland as au- 
thority for the proposition. 


should rule that a trial court must adopt procedure, secure rights of 
litigants, and dispense remedies consistent with the subject-matter of 
the cause it is trying. Failure should be assigned as error, and the cause 
should be remanded to the trial court which, according to its nature and 
limitations, can best determine the controversy. This procedure is not 
inconsistent with the letter or spirit of § 147, and it has the advantage 
of being well within the recent rulings of the United States Supreme 
Court on the aspect of jury trial. 

As was said in beginning, the problem of subject-matter jurisdic- 
tion in Mississippi ultimately rests upon the division of our trial courts 
between law and equity forums. It will never be possible to have a 
well-integrated system of jurisdiction in cases of questionable subject- 
matter, or in cases of mixed law and equity so long as the divided 
court system persists. Given the present apparent vitality of the system, 
our courts should act to do that which they can do: guarantee to every 
litigant the rights and remedies consistent with the nature of his cause 
of action in every court in this state. 

Michael S. Alfred 


Evidence — The Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs 
of Business Records 

I. Introduction 

The law always seeks the best evidence and adjusts its rules 
to accommodate itself to the advancement of the age it serves. 1 

The preceding words were taken from the opinion of Presiding 
Justice Gillespie in the case of King v. State ex rel. Murdoch Accep- 
tance Corp., 2 where the Supreme Court of Mississippi was faced for 
the first time with the question of the admissibility into evidence of 
business records printed out by electronic computing equipment. This 
problem had been inevitable for some time with the ever increasing 
utilization of the computer in the business world. Computers today 
are being employed for everything from handling customers' orders to 
sorting and processing checks in banking institutions. The individual 
member of society is becoming keenly aware that the computer is 
playing a significant role in his business affairs. As disputes arise 
the courts will have to deal with the new evidentiary problems raised 
by an automated business society, and the lawyer must be well-informed 
to cope with these issues. 

The purpose of this note is to show the problems encountered by 
courts in allowing computer print-outs into evidence. Particular atten- 
tion is given to the King case and to the foundation which must be 
laid before such material is admissible. 

II. Historical Development of Business Entries Exception 

Traditionally, the business entries exception to the hearsay rule 
has included the requirements that the entries must be either the 
original or the first permanent record and not merely copies, that the 
makers of the record be unavailable, that the entries be based upon 
the first-hand observation of someone in a position to know the facts 
recorded, and that the record must have been made shortly after the 
transaction. 3 

It was apparent that as systems for keeping business records became 
more complex, the above requirements would become more difficult to 
meet. Courts were unable to adequately reshape the common law. As 
stated by Wigmore: "[T]he judicial applications of the principle have 
been limited by the historical boundaries of the rules. The gross result 

a King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 397 (Miss. 
1969) . 
2 Id. 

8 See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 281-88, at 596-606 


1970] STUDENT NOTES 605 

is a mass of technicalities which serve no useful purpose in getting at 
the truth." 4 

In an attempt to meet these problems and to simplify the rigid 
common law rules, the Commonwealth Fund of New York in 1927 
appointed a committee which proposed a Model Act which in essence 
would admit any writing or record into evidence that was found 
to have been made in the regular course of any business. 5 This act 
was enacted in New York in 1928 6 and a substantially similar act was 
passed by Congress in 1936. 7 

Later in 1936 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed 
a similar statute, known as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence 
Act. This statute sought to improve on the Commonwealth Fund Act 
by (1) clarification, and (2) a requirement that some appropriate 
person testify on the stand as to the record. 8 The Uniform Act reads 
as follows: 

§ 1. Definition. — The term 'business' shall include every kind 
of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of 
institutions, whether carried on for profit or not. 

§ 2. Business Records. — A record of an act, condition or event, 
shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the cus- 
todian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the 
mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course 
of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, 
and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, 
method and time of preparation were such as to justify its ad- 
mission. 9 

By 1967 a total of twenty-eight states had enacted the Uniform 
Business Records as Evidence Act. 10 

Rule 63 (13), (14) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 11 is a 
somewhat simplified version of the Uniform Act. 

III. The First Cases Dealing With Computer Print-Outs 

The Uniform Act came into play in the first two reported cases 
in the United States where courts passed directly on the admissibility 
of computer print-outs of business records. These cases were Transport 

4 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1520, at 361 (3d. ed. 1940) . 

s Id. at 362. 

•N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 4518 (McKinney 1963) , formerly, § 374a, 
ch. 532 (1928) . See generally Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records 
and Their Admissibility in New York, 31 Albany L. Rev. 61 (1967) . 

T 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964) , formerly ch. 640, § 1, 49 Stat. 1561 (1936) . 

8 5 J. Wigmore, supra note 4, at 362-63. 

•Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 506 (1965) . 

10 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 504 (1965) . 

11 Id. at 637. 


Indemnity Co. v. Seib 12 in Nebraska and Merrick v. United States Rub- 
ber Co. 13 in Arizona. 

In Seib 1 * the liability insurer of the defendant trucker brought 
an action to recover premiums under an insurance contract. To estab- 
lish the amount due, the plaintiff offered in evidence records prepared 
and printed by its electronic computing equipment. Plaintiff's director 
of accounting testified that the machine did the same work that in the 
past had been done by normal bookkeeping. A program containing 
the type of policy and all information concerning the insured was 
fed into the computer and stored on tape. The machine could retrieve 
the information at any time and recapitulate the premiums paid and 
due according to the program. Such record was sent to the insured 

Nebraska had adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence 
Act. 15 The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in admitting the print-outs 
from the taped record, held that a sufficient foundation had been 
laid and that it was not necessary to produce the witnesses who 
originally supplied the information that was recorded on the tape. The 
court said: 

In construing this statute, our court said in Higgins v. Loup 
River Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170, as 
follows: 'The purpose of the act is to permit admissions of 
systematically entered records without the necessity of identify- 
ing, locating, and producing as witnesses the individuals who 
made entries in the records in the regular course of the busi- 
ness rather than to make a fundamental change in the estab- 
lished principles of the shop-book exception to the hearsay 
rule.' 16 (emphasis by the court) . 

The court found no merit in the defendant's contention that the 
print-outs were prepared especially for use in that trial and were there- 
fore inadmissible. The court stated that the print-outs were retrieved 
from the taped record for the purposes of the trial, but that the taped 
record was made "in the usual course of business and for the purpose 
of the business alone." 17 The court further commented: 

The statute was intended to bring the realities of business and 
professional practice into the courtroom and the statute should 
not be interpreted narrowly to destroy its obvious usefulness. 18 

In Merrick 19 the Uniform Act 20 was also applicable. The plaintiff 
sued on an open account which was maintained on electronic account- 

"178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965); see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967). 

13 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968) . 

"Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). 

15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-12109 (1964). 

"Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. at 258, 132 N.W.2d at 874. 

17 Id. at 260, 132 N.W.2d at 875. 

18 Id. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875. 

"Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968). 
20 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2262 (B) (1956). 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 607 

ing equipment. The court allowed the print-out material in evidence 
even though the witness from plaintiff's credit department had no 
personal knowledge of the actual physical operation of the accounting 
equipment. He was familiar, however, with the particular account 
and generally familiar with the electronic aspect of the plaintiff's ac- 
counting records. 

IV. The King Case 

The court in the King 21 case, however, did not have the advan- 
tage of such a statute since Mississippi has never adopted the Uniform 
Business Record as Evidence Act. The common law rules of evidence 
were applicable. 

The case involved a false notarial certificate of acknowledgment 
to a deed of trust. In order to prove the amount of damages, Murdock 
attempted to introduce computer print-outs to show the amounts paid 
on the note. In laying the foundation, Murdock first produced its credit 
division manager. 22 He testified that the department over which he had 
supervision provided the accounting department the information from 
which the computer sheets were made. 23 He stated that he was satisfied 
that the information on the print-out sheets was the same as the 
information supplied by his department. 24 

An objection to the admission of the print-outs was made on the 
ground that the information contained thereon was not prepared under 
the division manager's supervision or direction, but was prepared by 
the accounting department. 25 King argued that the witness must be 
able to personally testify that the information contained on the print- 
outs is the same, correct information that he supplied. 26 The trial judge, 
in sustaining the objection, stated: 

The witness says that he cannot verify it except through his 
accounting department. 

He can testify to that which is under his control but he cannot 
testify to something in some other department that is not under 
his control and supervision. 27 

Later Murdock produced its accounting manager who testified 
that the electronic computing equipment was recognized as standard 
equipment and that the entries were made in the regular course of 
business. 28 In addition he showed his familiarity with the machine 
accounting procedures and described them. People working directly 

21 King v. State ex rel Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969) . 

22 Record at 96. 

23 Id. at 132. 

24 Id. at 134. 

25 Id. at 132-33. 

26 Id. at 133. 
21 Id. at 134. 

28 Record at 195; see also King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 
So. 2d at 396-97. 


under his supervision prepared the programs for the computer. Others 
under his direction punched the information received from branch 
offices onto a computer card which was verified by another operator 
and then processed through the machine and automatically punched 
on magnetic tape. The process was carefully structured to avoid errors. 
Murdock considered the information recorded on magnetic tape as the 
customer's permanent record. 29 The trial judge ruled the computer 
print-outs admissible based on the testimony of the accounting man- 
ager. 30 

It was contended that the computer print-outs did not meet the 
requirements of the shop book rule and were inadmissible as evidence. 31 
The shop book rule is an exception to the hearsay rule which, generally 
stated, allows one to introduce his business records into evidence pro- 
vided certain requirements are met. 32 These requirements have changed 
from time to time and differ in various jurisdictions. 

In Mississippi the shop book rule has been stated as follows: 

The account books of the party to the litigation are admis- 
sible, if they are books of original entry, are regular and con- 
tinuous, and the entries were made at or near the time of the 
occurrence of the transaction recorded, provided the entrant 
had personal knowledge of the matter recorded, and the 
entries are verified by his oath, or by proof of his hand- 
writing, in case he is dead or inaccessible. 33 

It has been held in Mississippi that the records must have been 
made in the regular course of business, as a part of a regular series 
of entries, and made contemporaneously with the transaction. 34 The 
entry must be in a book of accounts and not a casual or isolated one. 35 
If the entrant personally observed the transaction recorded, he must 
be present and testify, or his absence must be accounted for. 36 The 
original entry must also be produced. 37 

Two significant arguments were made in the King case in con- 
tending that the requirements of the shop book rule had not been met. 
First, it was argued that there was no proof that the computer 
print-outs were the first permanent and original records kept by 
Murdock. 38 The first records were made at the branch offices where 

29 Record at 203; see also King v. State ex. rel Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 
So. 2d at 397. 

30 Record at 204. 

31 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d at 397. 

32 See generally J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1517-20, at 347-66 (3d ed. 1940) . 

33 T. McElroy, Mississippi Evidence § 51, at 228 (1955); see also Note, Business 
Entries in Mississippi, 16 Miss. L.J. 266 (1944), for a comprehensive study of the 
"shop book" rule. 

84 Greene v. Greene, 145 Miss. 87, 110 So. 218 (1926) . 

36 W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Rotenberry, 174 Miss. 319, 164 So. 5 (1935) . 

36 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 95 Miss. 357, 49 So. 179 (1909) . 

"Panola County Bank v. Nessen Lumber Co., 117 Miss. 583, 78 So. 516 (1918). 

" Brief for Appellant at 32. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 609 

the customers paid, and it was contended that only these records could 
be admitted in evidence under the best evidence rule as set forth in 

Fatherree v. Griffin 39 and Hoye v. Newton Lumber & Manufacturing 
Co. 40 

The second argument was that the accounting manager had no 
personal knowledge of the transaction and the records maintained by 
the computer were based on memoranda or data furnished by others 
in the branch offices. 41 None of the parties who made the original entries 
in the branch offices or those who actually manipulated the machines 
in the data processing office were offered as witnesses. The appellant 
argued that the testimony of the accounting manager was inadmis- 
sible under the authority of Smith v. Chicago Portrait Co. 42 and Rains v. 
Thorp Finance Corp. 4S 

In the Rains case the court, quoting from an annotation in 27 
A.L.R. 1439 (1923) , stated: 

The doctrine is supported by many cases, that book entries 
not made by one who has personal knowledge of the trans- 
action, but based upon memoranda or data furnished by others, 
are not admissible in evidence, without verification by the one 
furnishing the data and having personal knowledge of the 
transactions on which it is based, since otherwise the entries, 
even though made in the regular course of business and as 
a part of the duties of the entrant, are not the best evidence, 
but are in the nature of hearsay. 44 

The appellee, Murdock, argued for the adaptation of the existing 
rules of law to the new methods of keeping business records which 
have arisen with modern technical advances in the computer industry. 
The accounting manager had testified that all of the records of the 
company were kept by the computer on tape in the ordinary course of 
business by people who were experienced in the operation of the 
machine. He had testified that the ultimate responsibility for the 
accuracy of these records lay on his shoulders. The appellee stated: 

The records kept by the magnetic tape were the general books 
of the corporation which in the past had been kept on 
ledgers. Therefore, the mechanical print-outs constituted the 
best evidence that was available and, in fact, was the only 
readable record of the company made from the non-readable 
magnetic tape permanent record. 

If it were necessary to produce all of the microfilm copies of all 
the charge slips, payment records, etc., then the end benefits and 

89 153 Miss. 570, 121 So. 119 (1929). 

40 99 Miss. 229, 54 So. 839 (1911) . 

41 Brief for Appellant at 32. 

42 120 Miss. 277, 82 So. 145 (1919) . 

"250 Miss. 320, 165 So. 2d 151 (1964). 

44 Rains v. Thorp, 250 Miss, at 327-28, 165 So. 2d at 153. 


efficiency of the data processing system would be seriously 
impaired. 45 

The court adopted the reasoning of the appellee and declared that 
the print-outs were admissible. The court did not find the lack of a 
statute such as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act to be a 
hindrance. The court declared: 

[T]his Court is not dependent upon legislative action to 
determine the question before us. The rules of evidence gov- 
erning the admission of business records are of common law 
origin and have evolved case by case, and the Court should 
apply these rules consistent with the realities of current 
business methods. 46 

Thus the court in admitting the computer print-outs extended 
the shop book rule in order to bring the realities of the business world 
into the courtroom. The court stated that had conventional books been 
used instead of magnetic tape, the requirements of the shop book 
rule would have been met. 47 The records stored on magnetic tape were 
unavailable and useless unless printed out by the computer. 48 

V. Conclusion 

Although Mississippi has not adopted the Uniform Business Records 
as Evidence Act, it should be noted that Miss. Code Ann. § 1761.5 (Supp. 
1968) allows photographic copies of records kept in the regular course 
of business to be introduced into evidence. In King, Murdock had 
microfilmed the original records of the branch offices and destroyed 
the originals. These microfilmed copies were not introduced into evi- 
dence, but § 1761.5 apparently would have allowed them. 

In the future this statute, § 1761.5, in conjunction with the King 
case, should provide adequate procedure in Mississippi for the admis- 
sibility of business records. 

The Seib i9 and Merrick 50 cases from Nebraska and Arizona will 
most likely set precedents for courts of the other twenty-six states which 
have adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act 51 and 
for other states which have similar statutes. 52 It is interesting to note 
that Florida has amended its uniform act by inserting these words: 
"including a record kept by means of electronic data processing." 53 

"Brief for Appellee at 28-29. 

46 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d at 397. 
4T /d. 

48 Id. at 398. 

"Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d. 871 (1965). 
50 Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968). 
81 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 504 (1965) . 

52 Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 59 (1957) ; Mass. Atmn. Laws ch. 233, § 78 (1956) ; N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-12 (1953) . 

63 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.36 (Supp. 1970) . 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 611 

The comparable federal statute 54 will probably be construed in a like 
manner when the question arises in federal courts. 

For states which adhere to the common law regarding business 
entries, the King case should provide well-reasoned authority to follow. 
The requirements for the admissibility of computer evidence were 
carefully structured by the court. Such evidence is admissible, King 
said, provided: 

(1) that the electronic computing equipment is recognized 
as standard equipment, (2) the entries are made in the 
regular course of business at or reasonably near the time of 
the happening of the event recorded, and (3) the foundation 
testimony satisfies the court that the sources of information, 
method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness and justify its admission. 55 

The foundation in King was met by: 

(a) The supervisory capacity of the witness over the opera- 
tion of the machine. 

(b) The familiarity of the witness with machine procedures. 

(c) A description of the operation of the machine. 

(d) Showing precautions taken to prevent errors. 

The court concluded, however, that computer evidence is not 
infallible and that it is subject to refutation to the same extent as 
conventional books. 56 Nevertheless, if a foundation such as the one 
in the King case is laid, no problems should be encountered in 
admitting computer print-outs into evidence. 

James S. Armstrong 

Constitutional Law — Procedural Guidelines Involved in 
Municipal Control of Motion Pictures 

I. Introduction 

All authorities agree that motion pictures are within the first 
and fourteenth amendments' basic protection of freedom of expression. 1 
This protection may best be illustrated by the opinion in Kingsley 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 2 where the United States Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a New York statute which prohibited the show- 

84 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964). 

65 222 So. 2d at 398. See also Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, 16 Am. 
Jur. Proof of Facts 273, 310 (1965) . 

66 222 So. 2d at 399. 

x See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495 (1952) . 

2 360 U.S. 684 (1959) . 


ing of motion pictures that presented adultery in a way that would 
seem desirable. In striking down the statute, the court observed that 
the first amendment's protection "is not confined to the expression of 
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy 
of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than 
advocacy of socialism or the single tax. . . ." 3 

To say that motion pictures are protected by the first amendment, 
however, does not mean that municipalities are powerless to act. The 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not prevent a city 
or municipality from protecting its citizens against obscenity in the 
motion pictures. This was pointed out in the case of Burstyn v. Wilson* 
wherein the court observed that the constitution does not allow "absolute 
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times 
and in all places. . . ." 5 A municipality can, therefore, protect its citizens 
from obscene motion pictures, but it must tread that " 'dim and uncer- 
tain line' that often separates obscenity from constitutionally protected 
expression." 6 This note will, therefore, show some of the difficulties 
faced by a municipality in its attempt to regulate motion pictures, with 
special attention being given to the procedural guidelines set down by 
the courts. 

II. Licensing Boards 

One of the most effective methods that a municipality can employ 
in the regulation of motion pictures is through the use of a licensing 
board. In other words, if a film distributor wished to have his film 
exhibited to the public, he would first have to submit the film to a 
local board and obtain a license for the film. This, of course, raises 
the constitutional question of prior restraint. The United States 
Supreme Court faced this question in the landmark case of Times Film 
Corp. v. Chicago. 1 The petitioner in Times Film was challenging the 
validity, on its face, of a Chicago ordinance which required the sub- 
mission of all motion pictures for examination prior to their public 
exhibition. The petitioner was not challenging the specific standards 
that were used in the ordinance, and the only question before the 
Court was whether the "ambit of constitutional protection includes 
complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and 
every kind of motion picture. . . ." 8 In answering this question in 
the negative, the Court stated, "It is not for this court to limit the 
state in its selection of the remedy it deems most effective to cope 

• Id. at 689. 

4 343 U.S. 495 (1952) . 

6 Id. at 502. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) , where the Court 
stated, "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have 
the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon 
the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First 
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social impor- 
tance ....'* Id. at 484. 

•Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 187. 

7 365 U.S. 43 (1961) . 
•Id. at 46. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 613 

with such a problem, absent, of course, a showing of unreasonable 
strictures on individual liberty resulting from its application in partic- 
ular circumstances . . . ." 9 The Court left for a future date their opinion 
as to what would constitute "unreasonable strictures on individual 
liberty," and the states and municipalities across the country were 
then free to adopt any measures they deemed necessary to control 
obscenity in the motion pictures. 

Four years after their decision in the Times Film case, the Supreme 
Court, in Freedman v. Maryland,™ established what they considered 
to be the minimum statutory standards required of a motion picture 
licensing board. The appellant in that case was convicted of failing 
to submit the film Revenge at Daybreak to the Maryland State Board 
of Censors and exhibiting it without obtaining the required license. 
The appellant's main contention was that the procedure used by the 
censorship board was unconstitutional and not simply that the statute 
was unconstitutional on its face. 11 The Supreme Court found that the 
statute was unconstitutional in that it did not provide sufficient pro- 
cedural safeguards and thus ran afoul of the first amendment. The 
Court stated that a valid censorship system would require that: (1) 
the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest 
upon the censor; (2) the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or 
authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a 
specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain 
snowing the film; (3) any restraint prior to judicial review can be 
imposed only briefly in order to preserve the status quo; (4) the pro- 
cedure must assure a prompt final judicial decision. 12 Concerning 
the second requirement, the Court pointed out that, "The teaching 
of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adver- 
sary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expres- 
sion, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to 
impose a valid final restraint." 13 

After the Freedman decision, many states and municipalities en- 
acted statutes that required a film distributor to submit his film to a 
local licensing board. Many of these statutes ran afoul of the procedural 
safeguards set forth in Freedman while some, on the other hand, have 
been accepted by the courts. 

III. Defective Procedures 

In 1967 the City of Chicago enjoined the Teitel Film Corporation 
from showing an allegedly obscene motion picture within the Chicago 
city limits. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this action and held 
that the city's censorship ordinance was constitutionally sound. 14 On 

9 Id. at 50. 

10 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 

11 Id. at 54. 

12 Id. at 58-59. 

13 Id. at 58. 

14 Cusack v. Teitel Film Corp., 38 111. 2d 53, 230 N.E.2d 241 (1967) . 


appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. 15 The Court 
summarized the ordinance as follows: 

The Chicago Motion Picture Censorship Ordinance prohibits 
the exhibition in any public place of 'any picture . . . without 
first having secured a permit therefor from the Superintendent 
of Police.' The Superintendent is required 'within three days 
of receipt' of films to 'inspect such . . . films ... or cause them 
to be inspected by the Film Review Section . . . and within 
three days after such inspection' either to grant or deny the 
permit. If the permit is denied the exhibitor may within seven 
days seek review by the Motion Picture Appeal Board. The 
Appeal Board must review the film within 15 days of the re- 
quest for review, and thereafter within 15 days afford the ex- 
hibitor, his agent or distributor a hearing. The Board must 
serve the applicant . . . within five days after close of the hear- 
ing. If the Board denies the permit, 'the Board, within ten days 
from the hearing, shall file with the Circuit Court ... an action 
for an injunction against the showing of the film .... The 
court shall set the cause for hearing within five (5) days after 
the defendant has answered . . . . ' 16 

Relying principally on the decision in Freedman, 17 the Court found 
that the Chicago Ordinance was procedurally defective in two ways. 
First, the 50 to 57 days provided in the ordinance for completion of 
the administrative process before initiation of the judicial proceeding 
was defective in that the procedure did not satisfy the requirement that 
the " 'censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license 
or go to court to restrain showing the film . . . . ' " 18 Secondly, there was 
no provision in the ordinance for a prompt judicial decision by the 
trial court, and this violated the requirement that the " 'procedure 
must also assure a prompt final judicial decision . . . . ' " 19 

In Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 20 the District Attorney 
of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint in equity alleging 
that defendants were exhibiting an obscene motion picture at a local 
theatre. The defendants received no notice of the filing of the com- 
plaint, nor of the hearing which took place later in the day before the 
judge. A hearing on a final injunction was set for four days later at 
which time the defendants requested a continuance. The defendants 
later appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme 
Court found the procedure, used by the lower court, to be "shockingly 
defective in at least two respects — the hearing without notice . . . and 

18 Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) . 

18 Id. at 140. 

"Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
18 Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. at 141-42. 

19 Id. at 142. 

20 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 45 (1968) . See also Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 
418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969) , where the court stated that the Pennsylvania preliminary 
iniunctive process failed " 'to provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibi- 
tion of protected expression.' " Id. at 91. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 615 

the censorship without provision for a prompt judicial decision." 21 
Relying partly on Freedman 22 the Court concluded by saying: 

The fact that appellants may have been offered a full dress 
hearing within four days of the original restraint does not suf- 
fice. Quite clearly, there is no provision for a prompt [judicial] 
decision. It is vital that the continuance of First Amendment 
freedoms not be dependent upon the efficiency of a particular 
judge but upon procedural safeguards clearly embodied in a 
statute . . . . 23 

The Kansas Censorship System was also declared unconstitutional 
because it did not meet the requisite procedural safeguards. 24 In stat- 
ing that the system was unconstitutional, the court observed, "First, 
once the Board disapproves a film, the exhibitor is required to assume 
the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the 
courts that the film is protected expression. Second, once the Board 
has acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited pending judicial re- 
view, however protracted .... Third, no assurance is provided for a 
prompt judicial determination." 25 

The foregoing cases illustrate some of the procedural defects found 
in municipal ordinances since the Supreme Court's decision in Freed- 
man 26 Film licensing standards are also subject to other defects, per- 
haps the most common being that of vagueness. The standards used 
in an ordinance must be as precise as possible and not so vague as to 
set "the censor . . . adrift upon a boundless sea ... . " 27 A Dallas film 
licensing ordinance was recently struck down by the United States 
Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit v. Dallas 28 The Court indicated that 

21 Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d at 47. 

22 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 

28 Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d at 48. 

24 State v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 197 Kan. 448, 417 P.2d 255 (1966). See Em- 
bassy Pictures Corp. v. Hudson, 242 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) , where the court 
found a Memphis censorship ordinance unconstitutional because the action by the 
censorship board was final and subject to judicial review only for illegality or for 
want of proper jurisdiction. See also Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 
2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968) , where the court found that Seattle's censorship ordinance 
was unconstitutional in that the board was not required to hold a hearing or give 
notice to the film exhibitor beyond the demand to submit the film for review and 
that the ordinance did not place the burden of proof upon the board nor was there 
any provisions for a prompt judicial review. 

25 State v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 197 Kan. 448, 417 P.2d at 258. 

26 Freedman v. Maryland 380 U.S. 51 (1965) . 
2T Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 504. 

28 390 U.S. 676 (1968) . The Court indicated that this was not the first film licens- 
ing ordinance where the standards were found to be unconstitutionally vague. The 
Court listed the following cases as examples of unconstitutionally vague standards: 
Burstyn v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495 (1952) , where "Sacrilegious" was found to have such 
an all-inclusive definition as to be vague and indefinite; ". . . of such character as 
to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said city," Gelling v. Texas 
343 U.S. 960 (1952) ; "moral, education or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, 
Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); "immoral," and "tend to corrupt 


the Dallas ordinance had met the requirements of Freedman, 29 but 
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it failed to state nor- 
rowly drawn, definite, and reasonable standards for the censorship 
board to follow. The Court observed that "[v]ague standards, unless 
narrowed by interpretation, encourage erratic administration whether 
the censor be administrative or judicial; 'individual impressions become 
the yardstick of action, and result in regulation in accordance with the 
beliefs of the individual censor rather than regulation by law.' " 30 

It is obvious from this discussion that, while a municipality has 
the power to regulate and control obscenity in motion pictures, it is 
not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases and to completely dis- 
regard the teachings of the first amendment. 

The problem thus presented is manifest: How can a municipality 
draft an ordinance which will adhere to the principles of Freedman 
and not run afoul of the first amendment? 

IV. Effective Procedures 

A few months after the decision in Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 31 
the City of Chicago revised its ordinance to comply with the Court's 
findings. Under this revised ordinance, "no more than 12 days may 
elapse during the entire administrative process, and a final judicial 
determination must follow within eight days ... at the most, exclusive 
of actual trial time .... " 32 The court found this procedure to be 
acceptable under the Freedman doctrine. Another major consideration 
under review was the vagueness of the word "obscene" as it was used 
in the revised ordinance. The court held that the word "obscene" as 
used in the ordinance was not vague and stated that: 

[The word] 'obscene' has become a word of art, the definition 
of which has been tortuously but definitively evolved through 
a long series of . . . decisions. It has been held that a statute 
prohibiting 'obscene' materials provides a reasonably ascertain- 
able standard of guilt, justifying a criminal conviction .... [I]t 
is the opinion of this court that if the . . . ordinance is applied 

morals," Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) ; "approve such 
films . . . [as] are moral and proper; . . . disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, in- 
decent or immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals," Holmby Produc- 
tions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) . Id. at 682-83. 

23 Id. at 690 n.22. The Court discussed the requirement of Freedman and found 
that the ordinance in question was not in contravention of those requirements. 

30 Id. at 685. The Court here was quoting the decision in Kingsley Int'l Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. at 701. 

31 390 U.S. 139 (1968). As mentioned previously, the ordinance was struck down 
because the 50 to 57 day period for completing the administrative process before 
a judicial review could be instituted was in contravention of the Freedman require- 
ments. The ordinance did not comply with the requirement that the censor must, 
within a brief period, either issue a license or go to court to seek an injunction, and, 
furthermore, there was no provision for a prompt judicial decision. 

82 Universal Film Exchanges Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286, 290-91 
(N.D. 111. 1968) . 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 617 

only to 'obscene' materials, the absence of further definition 
. . . does not render it unconstitutionally vague. 33 (emphasis 
added) . 

In Freedman, the Court said that while it was up to the state to 
adopt its own statutory scheme, a model was not lacking. 34 The Court 
had reference to a New York injunctive procedure which prevented 
the sale of obscene books. This procedure provided for a hearing within 
"one day after the joinder of issue, [and] the judge must hand down 
his decision within two days after termination of the hearing .... " 35 
The Court recognized, however, that such a system, if applied to motion 
pictures, may require different time limits, but that it may serve as an 
aid in drafting legislation. 

Maryland has since revised her statute, 36 and any state or munici- 
pality wishing to create a censorship system would be well advised to 
use it as an example. 

V. Conclusion 

The case of Times Film Corp. v. Chicago* 7 was, of course, a land- 
mark decision. However, the Court was divided with Chief Justice 
Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissenting. In his 
dissent, Chief Justice Warren declared that: 

[T]he decision presents a real danger of eventual censorship 
for every form of communication .... I am aware of no consti- 
tutional principle which permits us to hold that the communi- 
cation of ideas through one medium may be censored while 
other media are immune .... I submit that in arriving at its 
decision the court has interpreted our cases contrary to the 
intention at the time of their rendition and, in exalting the 
censor of motion pictures, has endangered the First and Four- 
teenth Amendment rights of all others engaged in the dissemi- 
nation of ideas. 38 (emphasis added) . 

Justice Black in his dissent stated that: 

[A]s long as the First Amendment survives, the censor, no mat- 
ter how respectable his cause, cannot have the support of gov- 
ernment. It is not for government to pick and choose according 
to the standards of any religious, political, or philosophical 
group. It is not permissible, as I read the Constitution, for 
government to release one movie and refuse to release another 
because of an official's concept of the prevailing need or the 
public good . . . . 39 (emphasis added) . 

83 Id. at 294. 

84 Freedman v. Maryland, 280 U.S. 51 (1965). 
86 Id. at 60. 

38 Md. Ann. Code art. 66A, §§ 1-26 (1957) . Due to their length, the code provisions 
are not set out here. 

8T 365 U.S. 43 (1961) . 

88 Id. at 51. 

89 Id. at 81. 


The potential repressive effects of the Times Film decision were 
mitigated, somewhat, by the Court's decision four years later in Freed- 
man v. Maryland* By establishing the basic requirements for any 
system of film censorship, the censor is now required to act in the role 
of a prosecutor with the judicial system actively participating in the 
review of motion pictures. Even with this protection the same basic 
problem is prevalent: One man or several men are making a decision 
based on their personal values and philosophies, and this decision is 
binding on anyone who happens to be under their respective authority. 
Perhaps Justice Douglas in his dissent in Freedman epitomized this 
writer's view on motion picture censorship. Justice Douglas stated 
that, "a pictorial presentation occupies as preferred a position as any 
other form of expression. If censors are banned from the publishing 
business, from the pulpit, from the public platform — as they are — they 
should be banned from the threatre . . . . " 41 

C. Gray Bur dick 

Constitutional Law — Welsh v. United States: 
Once Again — New Guidelines on Conscientious Objections 

I. Introduction 

In Welsh v. United States, 1 decided June 15, 1970, the Supreme 
Court said that a draftee, rather than allege religious convictions as 
previously required in order to obtain exemption from military service 
as a conscientious objector, may obtain an exemption based solely on 
moral and ethical objection to participation in any war at any time. 2 
This was perhaps the most far-reaching decision to date in the field of 
military conscription. It has opened the door of exemption to many 
persons eligible for service in the armed forces, added to the problems 
of the nation's draft boards, and created many new dilemnas of its own. 

The purpose of this note is to present the background of the rules 
on conscientious objectors, discuss the leading case of United States v. 
Seeger 3 as it led to the Welsh decision, and explore the possible develop- 
ments that may arise from the June 15 holding. 

II. Historical Background to 1965 

This country has always provided the conscientious objector some 
exemption from military service. 4 During World War I, the Draft Act 
of 1917 5 only allowed conscientious objector status to members of "well- 
recognized" 6 religious groups. This had the practical effect of letting 

40 380 U.S. 51(1965). ~~~~ 
"Id. at 62. 

1 398 U.S. 333 (1970) . 

2 Id. 

8 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 

4 Id. at 170. 

6 National Defense Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78. 


1970] STUDENT NOTES 619 

only Quakers and members of other pacifist religious sects obtain exemp- 
tion. The constitutionality of the exemption withstood a first amend- 
ment attack as being an establishment of and interference with re- 
ligion in the Selective Draft Law Cases. 7 

With World War II imminent, the Selective Training and Service 
Act of 1940 8 broadened the criteria and shifted the exemption to any 
individual "who, by reason of religious training and belief is con- 
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 9 The prob- 
lem with this Congressional criterion arose over the meaning of the 
phrase "religious training and belief" which did not adequately define 
the individual belief that would qualify one for the exemption. The 
Second Circuit in United States v. Kauten 10 took the position that "the 
existence of a conscientious scruple against war in any form ..." was 
the basis of the exemption. 11 However, in Berman v. United States, 12 
the Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion, saying that the appel- 
lant's belief was "based entirely upon a philosophical, social or political 
policy and does not entitle him to exemption from military duty." 13 

In an obvious effort to settle this intercircuit conflict, Congress 
passed the 1948 Selective Service Act 14 redefining the phrase "religious 
training and belief" 15 as "an individual's belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, 
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 16 This Act, 
however, merely gave the courts new terms to interpret and resulted in 
another conflict, this time as to what is a "belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being." 17 Some courts in the 1950's construed this phrase as 
being restricted to the traditional idea of a deity that punishes with 
everlasting damnation those who take the lives of others. 18 The Second 
Circuit in United States v. Seeger 19 initiated the idea that the phrase 
could be more liberally related to people in whom "the stern and moral 
voice of conscience occupies that hallowed place in the hearts and 
minds of men which was traditionally reserved for the commandments 

T 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 456 (1964) [Originally 
ch. 625 § 6 (j) , 54 Stat. 889] [hereinafter cited as 1940 Act]. 

9 Id. 

10 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943) . 

11 Id. at 708. 

12 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) . 

13 Id. at 382. 

"Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6 (j) , 62 Stat. 612 [hereinafter cited as 
1948 Act]. 

15 1940 Act. 

16 1948 Act at 613. 


ls See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert, denied, 352 
U.S. 882 (1956) ; United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) . 

19 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964) . 


of God." 20 This holding led to the landmark Supreme Court decision 
in 1965 that reshaped the law in the area of conscientious objection. 

III. The Seeger Decision 

In United States v. Seeger, 21 the "Supreme Being" clause 22 was 
challenged as being a violation of the establishment of religion clause 
and the due process clause of the first and fifth amendments. 23 Seeger 
asserted that because of his individual training and belief, he con- 
scientiously objected to participating in war in any form, and that this 
should exempt him from military duty. However, possessing no belief 
in the existence of God, Seeger refused, on the Selective Service form, 
to affirm or deny a belief in a Supreme Being. He said he held " 'belief 
in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a 
religious faith in a purely ethical creed.' " 24 The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found Seeger's beliefs to 
be sincere but convicted him for failure to submit to induction. His 
personal beliefs were not found to satisfy the 1948 congressional stan- 
dard 25 and therefore merited him no exemption as a conscientious 
objector. The conviction was reversed by the Second Circuit, and the 
"Supreme Being" clause 26 was said to be an impermissible classification 
that was violative of the fifth amendment's due process clause. 27 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari 28 and combined Seeger's case with 
two others. 29 

The Supreme Court, in afrrming the court of appeals' judgment, 
considered what is a " 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being.' " 30 
After stating the first and fifth amendment questions that Seeger had 
raised, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, avoided the 
constitutional issues and established a test that was an interpretation 
of what Congress had meant by using the term "Supreme Being" rather 
than "God": "We believe . . . the test of belief 'in a relation to a 
Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful 

20 Id. at 853. " ~~ 

** 380 U.S. 163 (1965) . 
22 1948 Act at 613. 

23 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 

24 Id. at 166. 

25 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) . 
26 1948 Act at 613. 

27 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964) . 

28 United States v. Seeger, 377 U.S. 922 (1964) . 

29 See United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), in which the claim 
for the exemption was based on a humanistic belief in the supreme "Goodness" which 
dictated the defendant's opposition to war; the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed the conviction for failure to determine the exact grounds 
for denying the exemption; Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963) , in 
which the appellant was not a member of any religious group and did not clearly 
show belief in a Supreme Being to whom he owed obedience; the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction for failure to submit to 

88 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 621 

occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the 
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." 31 

The Court went on to say that this construction followed the Con- 
gressional intention of avoiding any arbitrary classification of religious 
beliefs which was first enunciated in the 1940 Act and re-emphasized in 
the 1948 Act. 32 Noting the "vast panoply of beliefs" in the United 
States, the Court also said that Congress did not intend "picking and 
choosing among religious beliefs." 33 In looking at an applicant for 
conscientious objector status, the local boards were admonished not to 
look at the credibility or correctness of the individual's belief, but "to 
decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held 
and ... in his own scheme of things, religious." 34 

It has been suggested that the reasoning in Seeger was the only 
alternative to holding the statutory conscientious objector status un- 
constitutional. 35 But since the Court chose instead to interpret the 
broad concept of "religious training and belief," 36 the constitutional 
issue was subrogated to the national policy of not leaving conscientious 
objectors without exemptions and trying to work out a test to determine 
who deserves it. Under the Seeger test, the Court satisfied both the 
traditionalists, by making the basic standard "the orthodox belief in 
God," and the more liberal by allowing exemptions to those whose 
beliefs are "parallel" to the basic standards. 37 The Court still read Con- 
gress' intent as excluding "essentially political, sociological, or philo- 
sophical views." 38 A moral code, excluded from the statutory exemption, 
had not only to be personal, but also the "sole basis for the registrant's 
belief and ... in no way related to a Supreme Being." 39 Therefore, since 
Seeger's beliefs met the Court's test, his objection could not be based 
merely on a personal moral code; the Court's test and a personal moral 
code were deemed to be mutually exclusive. 40 

Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion saying that he 
did not think that Congress meant the term "Supreme Being" to be used 
in such a narrow sense because of the many and diverse religious views 
that exist in this country. 41 

The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 42 occasioned by the 
Seeger decision, deleted the term "Supreme Being" and left the exemp- 

zl Id. at 165-66. 

82 Id. at 176. 

83 Id. at 175. 

34 Id. at 184-85. 

35 Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religion: United States v. Seeger and the 
Scope of Free Exercise, 51 Corn. L.Q. 231, 240 (1965) . 

36 1940 Act. 

37 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66. 

88 Id. at 165. 

39 Id. at 186. 

40 Id. 

"Id. at 192. 

^Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) [hereinafter cited 
as 1967 Act]. 


tion to any person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form .... 
[T]he term 'religious training and belief does not include essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or merely a personal moral 
code." 43 Thus Congress tried to nullify the Supreme Court's test, setting 
the stage for the Court's recent reply. 

IV. The Welsh Holding 

Elliott Ashton Welsh II was raised in a religious atmosphere as a 
child but did not attend a church that taught pacifist doctrines. As a 
young man he did not belong to any religious organization, conform to 
an orthodox faith, or hold a pacifist viewpoint. Later, Welsh's ideas 
formed and matured, and in April 1964 he applied to his local draft 
board for conscientious objector status. On the Selective Service con- 
scientious objector form which reads, "I am, by reason of my religious 
training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war 
in any form," Welsh signed only after crossing through the words 
"religious training and." He also stated that he did not believe in a 
Supreme Being, but in March 1965 [probably after the Seeger decision] 
he requested to leave the question open. 44 Welsh believed "the taking 
of life — anyone's life — to be morally wrong." 45 He said, "I believe that 
human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will 
not injure or kill another human being. This belief [and the corre- 
sponding 'duty' to abstain from violence toward another person] is not 
'superior to those arising from any human relation.' On the contrary: 
it is essential to every human relation." 46 Because of this, he felt he 
could not become a member of the armed forces and thus "assume 
duties which I feel are immoral and totally repugnant." 47 

Welsh refused to submit to induction when his application for 
exemption was denied, and his conviction of three years' imprisonment 
was affirmed in 1968 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 48 The court of appeals said that there was no doubt as to 
Welsh's sincerity in his views, and the United States acknowledged that 
his beliefs were held as strongly as orthodox religious tenets are by a 
traditional religious believer. But, the court continued, since Welsh 
"constantly declared that his beliefs stemmed from sociological, eco- 
nomic, historical, and philosophical considerations," and "denied that 
his objection to war was premised on religious belief," the Appeal 
Board "was entitled to take him at his word ..." and deny him the 
exemption. 49 

On October 13, 1969, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 50 and, 
following the reasoning of Seeger, reversed the court of appeals on 

i3 ld. " 

44 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-38 (1970) . 

43 Id. at 343. 

48 Id. 

41 Id. 

48 Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (1968). 

49 Id. at 1081-82. 

69 Welsh v. United States, 396 U.S. 816 (1969). 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 623 

June 15, 1970. 51 The government sought to distinguish the Seeger hold- 
ing on the two grounds accepted by the Ninth Circuit: Welsh was more 
definite than Seeger in denying that his views were religious, and Welsh's 
beliefs were more "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical, 
or a merely personal moral code" 52 than Seeger's. 53 Speaking through 
Mr. Justice Black, the majority of the Court did not accept the gov- 
ernment's contentions. To the first the Court said, "very few registrants 
are fully aware of the broad scope of the word 'religious' . . . and accord- 
ingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly 
unreliable guide .... " 54 To the second contention the Court replied 
that the statutory exclusion from exemption should not omit "those 
who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even 
those whose conscientious objection ... is founded to a substantial 
extent upon considerations of public policy." 55 Those to be excluded 
from the exemption were registrants who do not hold strong beliefs and 
those whose objection "does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or 
religious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, 
pragmatism, or expediency." 56 Strongly held moral convictions were 
thus seemingly equated with religion: 

If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are 
purely ethical or moral in source and content but which never- 
theless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from 
participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly 
occupy in the life of that individual 'a place parallel to that 
filled ... by God' in traditionally religious persons. Because 
his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual 
is as much entitled to a 'religious' conscientious objector exemp- 
tion ... as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition 
to war from traditional religious convictions. 57 

The Court further stated that under the Seeger standards and those set 
out in the Welsh case, religious, moral, and ethical beliefs cannot be 
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical, or a merely personal 
moral code." 58 Again, as in Seeger, these two concepts were concluded 
to be mutually exclusive. 

Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate concurring opinion, 59 felt that 
it was now time to face the constitutional issues upon which Mr. Justice 
Black specifically refused to pass. 60 Harlan reasoned that any exemption 
on religious grounds was a benefit to religion and therefore violative of 
the first amendment's prohibition of an establishment of religion. 61 He 

61 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) . 

52 1967 Act. 

s3 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 340-42. 

54 Id. at 341. 

05 Id. at 342. 

68 Id. at 342-43. 

67 Id. at 340. 

68 Id. at 343. 
™Id. at 344-69. 
*°Id. at 335. 

61 Id. at 345. 


argued further that Congress could totally eliminate the exemption for 
conscientious objectors and thereby be "neutral" on the issue of religion. 62 
He concluded, "having chosen to exempt, it [Congress] cannot draw 
the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one 
hand and secular beliefs on the other." 63 So, Harlan's position was to 
save the Congressional policy of allowing exemptions and to adopt the 
Court's test to give the aura of constitutionality to the conscientious 
objector exemption. 

A strong dissent was lodged by Mr. Justice White (joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart) that the majority's interpretation 
had distorted Congress' intention in granting the exemption. 64 White 
stated: "Even if Welsh is quite right in asserting that exempting religious 
believers is an establishment of religion forbidden by the first amend- 
ment, he nevertheless remains one of those persons whom Congress took 
pains not to relieve from military duty." 65 He went on to say that a 
solid Congressional basis for exempting only religious objectors existed 
in the "necessary and proper" clause as it related to the raising and 
supporting of armies. Because of this, he did not want to frustrate the 
aim of Congress by expanding the exemption to those whose objection 
to war stems from nonreligious grounds. 66 

V. The Aftermath of Welsh — and Beyond 

The Welsh ruling again pointed out vividly that there still exists 
the "terribly onerous duty" 67 of deciding who qualifies for the con- 
scientious objector exemption and who does not. The day after Welsh, 
Selective Service Director Curtis W. Tarr issued, at a news conference, 
the four standards that would be required for a young man to prove 
that his ethical and moral opposition to war is not only deeply felt 
but is the result of some type of training beyond a purely personal 
moral code: 68 

(1) There must be "no question" that the applicant's belief is sin- 

(2) The applicant must be opposed to war in all forms, not just 
to the war in Vietnam. 

(3) The applicant's belief must be something more than a personal 
moral code. He must have taken into account the thoughts of 
"other wise men" and must have consulted "some systems of 
belief" beoynd the scope of his own thoughts. 

(4) The applicant's views must be the product of "some kind of 
rigorous training." 69 

62 Id. at 356. 
83 Id. at 356. 
M Id. at 367-74. 
"Id. at 368. 

88 Id. at 371-72. 

67 Why the Draft? 180 (J. C. Miller ed. 1968). 
e8 N.Y. Times, June 17, 1970, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.) . 

89 Id. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 625 

Tarr went on to say that the Welsh decision and the guidelines 
that followed it may produce a more unfair system. Unless the applicant 
can show a knowledge of philosophy, religion, and ethics, he may fall 
short of the "rigorous training" standard. This, Tarr said, would put 
the uneducated man at a disadvantage in applying for the exemption. 70 
Although the ruling may open the way for more exemptions and in- 
crease the work of local boards and appeal boards, Tarr did not believe 
many registrants would qualify for the exemption because of the diffi- 
culty in convincing the draft boards that their views are sincere or based 
on "rigorous training." 71 To keep the draft boards from being swamped 
with applications, Tarr noted that the new ruling would not apply 
retroactively. 72 

On July 6, 1970, in a directive to the local boards throughout the 
country, Director Tarr broadened slightly the guidelines he had an- 
nounced on June 16, 1970. 73 The primary test for local boards to follow 
in looking at an applicant for the exemption was said to be the sincerity 
and depth of belief, and not whether the beliefs are comprehensible to 
the board members. 74 The "rigorous training" requirement was seem- 
ingly extended to hold that the applicant's training must arise from an 
activity "comparable in rigor and dedication" to traditional religious 
training. 75 Tarr also directed the draft boards to "make every effort" 
not to let the educated man talk his way to an exemption where the 
uneducated applicant could not. 76 

Even with the efforts of the Supreme Court and the Selective Service 
System, the Welsh ruling will probably not be the final word in the 
field of military conscription and conscientious objection. It has left the 
area open to many old problems and suggested some new ones of its 
own. One observation has been that Congress may void the decision. 77 
In the light of the concurring and minority opinions that Welsh ex- 
empted those to whom Congress had explicitly denied the exemption, 
the Congress may, as they so often have done on the conscientious ob- 
jector subject, step in and alter or override the Supreme Court formu- 
lated test. This could set the stage for forcing a majority of the Court 
to face the first amendment issue of the conscientious objector exemption 
as an "establishment of religion." 

The Welsh holding does not exempt those who are opposed to a 
particular war and not to all war. 78 The war in Vietnam has raised this 

™Id. at 13, col. 1. 

n Id. 

n Id. 

7S N.Y. Times, July 7, 1970, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.) . 

74 Id. at 1, col. 3. 

75 Id. at 1, col. 3. 

76 Id. at 7, col. 1. 

77 Time, June 29, 1970, at 40. 

78 See the argument in favor of such exemption in 3 Harv. Civil Rights — Civil 
Liberties L. Rev. 3 (1967-68) . The author contends that to refuse exemption to those 
opposed to a particular war is a denial of fifth amendment due process, violates the 
first amendment's "free exercise" provision, and that such exemption would not im- 
pair the government's capacity to wage war. 


issue, and the Court avoided deciding that precise question in mid- 
summer, 1970, in United States v. Sisson where a registrant refused to 
be inducted and contended that he could not constitutionally be made to 
participate in a war to which he conscientiously objects. 79 

The Welsh ruling and the new Selective Service guidelines 80 will 
almost certainly be challenged in court. Director Tarr's statement that 
the opinion of the Court was not to be applied retroactively 81 will 
probably be opposed by a registrant who was denied an exemption on 
moral or ethical grounds prior to June 15, 1970, and a future litigant 
may say that too much discretion is left in the hands of local draft 
officials in deciding such a nebulous term as "sincerity." Another court 
challenge could possibly ensue when an uneducated registrant, not as 
sufficiently articulate in explaining his ideas as one with a college edu- 
cation, asserts a denial of equal protection of the laws despite the local 
boards' efforts to keep this from happening. 

VI. Conclusion 

The Welsh decision has made it much easier for a draft registrant 
to win a conscientious objector exemption. The Supreme Court has 
extended the exemption to "those whose consciences, spurred by deeply 
held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or 
peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument 
of war." 82 As our society has acquired more sophistication, so the Court 
in Seeger and Welsh has circumvented the terms "God," "Supreme 
Being," and "religion" to express the viewpoint that an individual's own 
concept of a phenomenon beyond his own imagination and existence 
is deserving of the government's respect. The Court could spend a great 
deal of time constructing a framework to buttress the Welsh holding. 
But if Welsh is to be a valid judicially established policy which inter- 
prets Congressional intent, the question remains open whether or not 
this is a point of cessation where the Court may draw the line. With 
the protection given systems of belief under the expanding construction 
of the free exercise clause, tacitly reiterated in Welsh, the Court, to 
be honest with itself, cannot stop here. The issue of conscientious 
objection to a particular war will have to be faced, and the oppor- 
tunity will arise during this term. The final issue of the draft itself may 
be presented in the near future if the Court keeps the initiative which 
it seized last June. 

William C. Trotter, III 

Labor Law — The Policies and Decisional Processes in 
the Boys Markets Decision 

I. Introduction 

The broad area of labor law is peculiarly affected by policy con- 
siderations. There is no common law of labor, and so the search for 

"Time, supra note 77. 

80 N.Y. Times, supra note 68, at 13, col. 1. See also n.73, supra. 

81 N.Y. Times, supra 68, at 13, col. 1. 

82 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 344. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 627 

precedent in this field is usually a quest for the golden fleece of legis- 
lative intent. Legislative intent is by definition a statement of policy, 
and thus precedent in labor law is a precedent of policy considerations. 

The labor policy of this nation is changing in a perceptible trend 
toward restraint and arbitration as opposed to economic warfare and 
compromise. This trend brings to the forefront the legal problems sur- 
rounding the labor contract and the no-strike clause. The developing 
role of the no-strike clause and the legal incidents of its enforceability 
are the subject of this note. 

The recent decision of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 
770 1 is a very significant and surprising development in labor law. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court could 
enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike clause of a labor contract. 
This represents an abrupt change of direction in the Court's treatment 
of the conflict between the anti-injunction provisions of the N orris- 
La Guardia Act 2 and the Taft-Hartley Act, 3 and it is a rejection of the 
Court's earlier position on the question taken in Sinclair Refining Co. 
v. Atkinson. 4 ' At stake is the role of the contract injunction in the col- 
lective bargaining and arbitration processes, and the effect of the op- 
posing thrusts of the two Acts on that role. This note will attempt to 
discover the decision making processes by which this change in direc- 
tion occurred and the contending policies which led to the Boys Markets 

The Sinclair Refining decision, ruling that federal district courts 
could not issue injunctions against strikes in violation of no-strike 
clauses in labor contracts, 5 had two "mutually unpleasant" possible 
results: 6 (1) to frustrate the arbitration encouragement purposes of the 
Taft-Hartley Act 7 and the Steelworkers Trilogy 8 or (2) to make of the 
state court a preferable forum for labor contract litigation. 9 The un- 
pleasantness was visited upon the arbitration policy when the court in 
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735 10 decided that state court injunc- 
tions could be avoided by removal. The Boys Markets decision is a re- 
affirmance by the Court of the Steelworkers Trilogy policy in favor of 

The opinion in the Sinclair Refining case and the recent rejection 
of that opinion in Boys Markets reveal markedly different processes of 
. __ __ _ _____ ^ ____ 

2 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964). 
8 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). 
4 370 U.S. 195 (1962) . 

6 Id. at 203. 

•Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 
63 Colum. L. Rev. 1027, 1039 (1963) . 

7 29 U.S.C. § 141-531 (1964). 

8 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) . 

9 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 226. 

10 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968) . 


decision. The Sinclair Refining opinion and the Boys Markets dissent, 11 
both written by Mr. Justice Black, use what might be called a "strict 
construction" method of decision making. According to this view, the 
anti-injunction provisions of Norris-La Guardia within the four corners 
of the Act, read in the light of the legislative history, forbid the use of 
an injunction in a labor dispute, and a labor contract strike is a labor 
dispute. 12 The opinion in Sinclair Refining is characterized by a de- 
tailed and exhaustive research of the legislative intent, and this is the 
basis of decision. On the other hand, the Sinclair Refining dissent and 
the Boys Markets majority opinion, both written by Mr. Justice Bren- 
nan, are grounded in policy considerations in view of the conflict of 
purpose and policy between Norris-La Guardia and Taft-Hartley. 13 Mr. 
Justice Brennan's view would seek an "accommodation" 14 of the two 
Acts, while Mr. Justice Black maintains that there is no conflict requir- 
ing compromise. 15 

The view of Mr. Justice Brennan gained ascendancy in the Boys 
Markets decision. It will appear that this reversal is due to the triumph 
of policy over precedent in the Court's continuing promotion of arbitra- 
tion in the collective bargaining process. 

II. Basis of Reversal: Policies Analyzed 

Objections made to the Sinclair Refining decision are generally 
made on the basis of policy considerations. It has been said that the 
holding is "indefensible on policy grounds." 16 The reasons for this 
conclusion apparently are the harmful effects on the collective bargain- 
ing process and on arbitration. In support of the federal district court's 
power to enforce an arbitrator's award and specifically enforce a no- 
strike clause, the judge said: 

Any expansive reading of the Sinclair decision would seem 
inconsistent with the declared congressional policies under- 
lying the two acts. 17 

This harmful effect upon the arbitration process is the basis of the 
Court's reversal in Boys Markets. 

Although Mr. Justice Black does not believe the conflict compels 
reversal, 18 his opinion in Sinclair Refining is based upon the conflict 
between Norris-La Guardia and Taft-Hartley, 19 as is the dissent. 20 This 

"Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 203; The Boys Markets, Inc. v. 
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 255. 

"Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 203. 

18 Id. at 216; The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 250. 

"Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 225. 

M /d. at 213. 

18 Comment, Labor Law: Norris-La Guardia Act Bars Specific Enforcement of 
No-Strike Clause, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 650 (1963) . 

" Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremens & Warehousemens Union, 
304 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1969) . 

18 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 213. 

19 Id. at 196. 
80 Id. at 216. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 629 

is the realistic view of the matter in view of the purposes of § 301 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act — to promote uniformity in labor decisions by the 
creation of a federal forum and to effectuate enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements. 21 

Assuming that some accommodation between the statutes is neces- 
sary, it is submitted that the Boys Markets view of the matter is the 
more enlightened one because it squarely faces the compromise to be 
made, 22 while the Sinclair Refining opinion ignores it. 23 It is especially 
difficult to justify the Sinclair Refining position in view of the earlier 
positions of the Court on the process of accommodation in closely 
analogous cases. 24 

It is submitted that a literal reading of legislative intent is inappro- 
priate to the decision being made. The legislative intent in the Norris- 
La Guardia Act is several decades away from the problem at hand, 25 
and the nature of the conflict compels accommodation. 26 The Court in 
Lincoln Mills 27 said that the legislative history of Taft-Hartley revealed 
that both parties were to be equally compelled to bargain collectively, 28 
and said further: 

21 Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses; From Lincoln 
Mills To Avco and Beyond, 15 Vill. L. Rev. 32 (1969) . See also Note, Labor Law — 
Jurisdiction — State Courts — Violations of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 36 Tul. 
L. Rev. 868 (1962) . 

22 The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 250; Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 216 (dissenting opinion) . 
13 370 U.S. at 196-97. 

24 We hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in matters 
dealing with railway labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of 
that statute and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the 
enactment of each is preserved. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Chi- 
cago River & Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957) . 

Though a literal reading might bring the dispute within the terms of the 
[Norris La Guardia] Act ... we see no justification in policy for restricting 
§ 301 (a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbi- 
trate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that 
Act. Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957) . 
35 The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932, and the basis of the Act is in- 
variably said to be the securing of the right of labor to organize and the guaranteeing 
to labor of its remedies in the self help context. There is no authority that contract 
remedy enforcement is an end toward which the Act was directed. Pacific Maritime 
Ass'n v. International Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union, 304 F. Supp. at 
1316-17; Aaron, Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 292, 298 (1963) ; 
Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301; The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia 
Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 980, 982-83 (1969) ; 
Keene, supra note 21, at 39. 

28 The Court then should so exercise its judgment as best to effect the most 
important purposes of each statute. It should not be bound by inscrutable 
congressional silence to a wooden preference for one statute over the other. 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 224 (dissenting opinion) . 
"Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51. 
28 Id. at 458-59. See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 
(1962) . 


The congressional policy in favor of the enforcement of agree- 
ments to arbitrate grievance disputes being clear, there is no 
reason to submit them to the requirements of § 7 of the Norris- 
La Guardia Act. 29 

In the face of the conflicts in policy of the recent decisions, 30 some 
change in the thrust of the Sinclair Refining rule was necessary. Taken 
together with Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney* 1 wherein the Court 
continued the viability of state labor jurisdiction, the rule resulted in 
a lack of a parallel between the state and federal courts as labor forums. 
This result was intolerable, and stop-gap measures such as defeating 
the jurisdiction of the state court by removal, as in Avco Corp. v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, Z2 did not cure the defect. The two alternatives of the 
Court were to apply the Sinclair Refining rule to the state courts, 33 or 
to overturn the rule as to the federal courts. It chose the latter because 
all other alternatives resulted in injury to the Steelworkers Trilogy 
policy in favor of arbitration. The Court found no acceptable "accom- 
modation" of the conflicting statutes in view of its policies without a 
rejection of the Sinclair Refining rule. 

An important policy factor is that the harm to the purposes of 
Norris-La Guardia from the Boys Markets rule is far less than that to 
the policies of Taft-Hartley from the Sinclair Refining rule. 34 Little, if 
any, harm to the protective purposes of Norris-La Guardia results from 
prohibiting contract strikes, while great harm to § 301 results from 
a strike in violation of a contract. 

The Norris-La Guardia Act was intended to protect the power 
position of labor organizations in contending with management in the 
economic arena. 35 This purpose was not defeated by the Boys Markets 
decision There is no harm to labor's self-help position in requiring 
immediate and specific adherence to the arbitration clause of the con- 
tract. The contract itself will still be written by the contending forces. 
The effect of the Boys Markets rule is to deny to labor the right to 
select their remedies — to enter arbitration or to strike as conditions or, 
more frequently, emotions dictate. Now labor, as well as management, 
may be immediately compelled to conform their self-help activity to 
the terms of the contract. It is submitted that this is a very salutary rule 
in its effect, and that this result is essential to a meaningful arbitration 

Profound changes have occurred in the political and economic 
environment of the nation in the last four decades. When we speak of 
"policy" as being persuasive or even determinative of the construction 

29 Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458-59. 
*°See notes 8-10 supra. 
81 368 U.S. 502 (1962) . 

32 390 U.S. 557 (1968) . 

33 For comment in favor of this position, see Bartosic, supra note 25. 

"It cannot be denied that the availability of the injunctive remedy in this 
setting is far more necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of § 301 
than it would be detrimental to those of Norris-La Guardia. Sinclair Refin- 
ing Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 218. 

35 See note 25 supra. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 631 

to be put on statutory law or precedent, we mean that we rule in view 
of the practical facts of the day. It is now universally accepted that 
precedent is binding only so long as the reason for that precedent per- 
sists. Therefore, the changes in the environment surrounding organized 
labor are a valid basis for changes in the application of Norris-La 
Guardia. 36 

It was said by the Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. 
Chicago River & Indiana R.R. 37 that injunctions against contract 
strikes do not strip labor of its primary weapon because it provides, in 
arbitration, a reasonable alternative. 38 If the purpose of Norris-La 
Guardia is to prevent judicial interference with the national labor 
policy, then the use of injunctions to encourage arbitration does not 
harm that policy. 39 If the purpose of injunctions is to prohibit illegal 
conduct resulting in irreparable harm for which there is no legal 
remedy, 40 then it is difficult to justify the objections to their use against 
contract strikes. 

There appears to be very little authority or persuasive comment 
which approves the policy of using Norris-La Guardia to defeat an in- 
junction in the limited case of contract strikes. The basis of the Norris- 
La Guardia Act invariably is cited as being directed at allowing labor 
the right to organize and compete by bargaining collectively. 41 None 
of the objections to labor injunctions are relevant to contract strikes, 
and they are uniformly articulated in terms of self-help protection. 42 
In view of the present economic circumstances of the nation, Norris- 
La Guardia has been called an "anachronism." 43 The Court in Lincoln 
Mills recognizes this change in circumstances: 

The kinds of acts which had given rise to abuse of the power 
to enjoin are listed in § 4. The failure to arbitrate was not a 
part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed. 44 

The dissenting opinion in Sinclair Refining took the view indicated 

M Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements 
in Labor Contracts, 32 Albany L. Rev. 303, 315 (1967) . 

87 353 US. 30, 41 (1957) . 

88 See Comment, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes, 32 
Tenn. L. Rev. 264, 285 (1965) (contract strike injunction is "not even remotely" a 
restraint on self help power) ; Note, supra note 21, at 871 ("distinctly different") . 

"Comment, Labor Law — Section 301 from Lincoln Mills to Sinclair Refining, 11 
Loyola L. Rev. 326, 329 (1963). 

40 Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts — Part II: A Critique, 50 Va. L. 
Rev. 1147 (1964). 

41 Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremens & Warehousemens Union, 
304 F. Supp. at 1316-17; Aaron, supra note 25, at 298; Bartosic, supra note 25, at 
982-83; Comment, supra note 38, at 265. 

42 The objections to injunctions made contemporaneous with the enactment of 
Norris-La Guardia are enumerated by Professor Benjamin Aaron uniformly in terms 
of the merits of the labor conflict. Aaron, supra note 40. 

48 Aaron, supra note 25, at 344. 

"Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458. 


and said that the issue in that case was contract remedies and not the 
larger area of labor policy. 45 The purpose of Taft-Hartley was to pro- 
vide a federal forum to secure enforcement of collective agreements and 
to promote uniformity in the national labor policy. 46 Norris-La Guardia 
was a product of the early days of the labor struggle, 47 while Taft- 
Hartley was a post-World War II attempt to discipline "Big Labor" 
resulting from a national anti-strike mood, acute inflation, and the 
Republican resurgence. 48 In view of the opposing thrusts of the two 
Acts, the changed relative positions of labor and management, and the 
new direction of the Court's labor policy with the great emphasis on 
arbitration for conflict adjustment, it is not strange that the Sinclair 
Refining decision was overturned. 

The Sinclair Refining dissent and the Boys Markets opinion both 
reveal the importance accorded to the encouragement of arbitration as 
a policy basis for the reversal. 49 The Court in Lincoln Mills said that 
the agreement by management to arbitrate is the "quid pro quo" for the 
no-strike clause. 50 A lower court, in construing the pre-Boys Markets 
rule, said: 

[I]t would be a strange conclusion that parties who agree to 
arbitration would still be free to disrupt the labor-manage- 
ment relationship and orderly flow of commerce by a work 
stoppage in disregard of the arbitrator's award. 51 

In the Steelworkers Trilogy the Court said that inclusion of a 
grievance in arbitration is to be presumed 52 so as to include the widest 
possible range of conflicts within its processes, and that arbitration can 
effect its purpose of stabilization only when all disputes are arbitrated. 53 
Under these policies, the Sinclair Refining rule was an intolerable, dys- 
functional effect on the arbitration process because labor could always 
elect whether to strike or arbitrate or both on a given occasion. 

The most significant aspect of the Steelworkers Trilogy policy is the 
transcendence of contract principles by the Court and the creation of 
the idea of the "industrial self-government." 54 The opinions refer to 
the collective bargaining agreement as a "code" of government. 55 It is 
submitted that "government" presupposes the existence of a final authori- 
ty with the power of enforcement. The question becomes, "Where is the 
final authority to be vested?" The Supreme Court ruled that courts are 

46 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 224-25. 
48 Kiernan, supra note 36. 

47 See note 25 supra. 

48 Aaron, supra note 43, at 323. 

49 The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 235; Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 US. at 227. 

50 Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. 

51 Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremens & Warehousemen Union, 
304 F. Supp. at 1318. 

62 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 580. 
68 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567. 
"Id. at 570. 
65 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 578. 

1970] STUDENT NOTES 633 

not to interfere with the merits of the arbitration dispute, but are to be 
limited to compelling performance of the agreement to arbitrate. 56 
Pursuing this policy, the power of enforcement must be vested some- 
where. This seems a particularly appropriate function of the courts 
(an outside influence from the standpoint of the "industrial self- 
government") . 

It is a common rule in both playgrounds and appellate courts that 
agreement must be enforced equally on both sides. This natural reaction 
assumes the proportions of an important policy for at least two reasons: 
(1) the parties may be expected to react negatively if the rule is not 
equally applied, and (2) it is an integral feature of our common law 
of contracts and other laws. The Sinclair Refining dissent noted this 
effect of the rule of the opinion in these words: 

It is strange, I think, that § 7 of the Norris-La Guardia Act 
need not be read, in the face of § 301, to impose inapt pro- 
cedural restrictions under the specific enforcement of an em- 
ployer's contractual duty to abritrate; but that § 4 must be 
read, despite § 301, to preclude absolutely the issuance of an 
injunction against a strike which ignores a union's identical 
duty. 57 

This result has been rightly called "preposterous." 58 It was noted 
in the Chicago River opinion 59 in an analogous situation that the 
union would hardly support the same rule in reverse. 

The trend of labor law in this country is clearly away from the old 
economic warfare concept and toward more restraints upon the latitude 
of both labor and management to use self-help tactics. When the injunc- 
tion jurisdiction of the state courts was destroyed by Avco Corp. v. 
Aero Lodge No. 735 60 in pursuit of uniformity in the law and in the 
forums, the burden of the Sinclair Refining rule was finally put upon 
arbitration. This result was contrary to the most basic policies of the 
developing trend in our labor law. The Boys Markets reversal was the 
surprise result. 

Michael S. Allred 

56 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 

BT Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 219-20. 

68 Aaron, supra note 43, at 344-45. 

69 353 U.S. 30, 34 n.8 (1957). 
60 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 


A. Resolutions of Mississippi State Bar 

WHEREAS, our President and Friend, Honorable Boyce Holleman, has served 
our profession and our Association and the people of our state faithfully and well 
during a particularly difficult and trying period, and in spite of impossible demands 
on his time and energies as a result of the tragic loss of life and property resulting 
from Hurricane Camille, and 

WHEREAS, his dogged, determined, and unceasing efforts to meet these de- 
mands, and to bring legal assistance to a stricken people, and to, at the same time, 
serve the Mississippi Bar Association with the same devotion and duty, have required 
much of him and his substance, which he freely gave and in giant measure, and 

WHEREAS, his appearances for and on behalf of the Bar have reflected great 
credit upon the Bar and have resulted in notable accomplishments for the Bar, and 
for the judiciary and for the public, and 

WHEREAS, he is now seriously ill, and 

WHEREAS, his illness is a matter of grave concern to us all, and 

WHEREAS, his absence from our midst leaves a lonely place that cannot be 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Mississippi Bar Association 
expresses its sincere appreciation to Honorable Boyce Holleman for the great and 
unselfish service he has rendered and the remarkable accomplishments he has achieved 
during this year as our President, in behalf of the Bar, the judiciary and the public, 
and we hereby convey to him our affection, and our hopes and prayers for his early 
and complete recovery of health. 

WHEREAS, the time has come for the establishment of a permanent home for 
our Mississippi Bar Association; 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Mississippi Bar Association 
requests and authorizes the Board of Commissioners of the Mississippi Bar Association 
to appoint the necessary committee and take the necessary action to obtain a grant 
of state land in Jackson, Mississippi from the Mississippi Legislature, and to prepare 
plans for a suitable Bar Center Building, and to solicit and raise the necessary funds, 
and to proceed within its means to the construction of a permanent Mississippi Bar 

WHEREAS, the 65th annual meeting of the Mississippi State Bar, held at the 
Broadwater Beach Hotel, Biloxi, Mississippi, June 25-27, 1970, has been most reward- 
ing and enjoyable; and 

WHEREAS, the entire membership of the Bar, particularly those attending this 
convention, feel deeply indebted to all those who have worked so capably and effi- 
ciently in planning and arranging this convention. 

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the members of the Mississippi State 



Bar, in convention assembled, hereby express our heartfelt appreciation to the fol- 

Our capable and outstanding President, Honorable Boyce Holleman, for his 
excellent leadership which has contributed immeasureably to the growth and success 
of our organization; 

The other officers and members of the Board of Commissioners; 

The officers and Directors of the Junior Bar Section; 

The Gulfport Junior Bar wives for the Ladies' Luncheon, Art Show and Style 

The Registration personnel and reporters; 

The Committee which served during the year and at this convention; 

Our featured speakers, Hon. Joseph Mullen, Hon. William V. Alexander, Jr., 
Hon. Henry L. Pitts, Hon. Edward L. Wright, Hon. Tom Davis, Hon. Jimmie Davis, 
Hon. J. H. "Dizzy" Dean, and Hon. Bidwell Adam, for their valuable contributions 
to our program; 

The University of Mississippi School of Law and the Mississippi Supreme Court 
for the Moot Court presentation; 

The Hon. Gibson B. Witherspoon, Hon. Francis Bowling, Hon. Hugh N. Clayton, 
Hon. Roger Landrum, and Hon. John C. Satterfield for the panel discussion of the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility; 

All members of the news media for their coverage of this convention; 

The Harrison-Hancock Counties Legal Secretaries Association for providing com- 
plimentary secretarial assistance; 

Gilsbar, Inc., and Hester & Hester Agency for hosting the Wednesday Reception; 

The Trust Department of the Deposit Guaranty National Bank for hosting the 
President's Reception on Friday Night; 

The Sperry and Hutchinson Company for staging the Ladies' Style Show; 

Day Detectives, Inc., for providing security services; 

The City of Biloxi, the Harrison County Bar Association and the management 
and staff of the Broadwater Beach Hotel for their cooperation in planning and pro- 
viding for our comfort, convenience and pleasure; 

All our guests whose presence added so much to the enjoyment of our conven- 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that our Executive Director forward copies of 
this Resolution to all appropriate persons and that a copy be spread on the perma- 
nent records of the Mississippi State Bar. 

WHEREAS, the cooperation of all the advertising media is necessary to bring 
the full message of Law Day to all citizens of Mississippi; and 

WHEREAS, such cooperation was prominent in the 1970 Law Day USA program; 


THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Mississippi State Bar expresses its 
appreciation to: 

The members of the Outdoor Advertising Association of Mississippi for providing 
one hundred twenty (120) highway billboards for this year's Law Day message; 

The members of the Mississippi Broadcasters Association for providing public 
service time on radio and television for Law Day announcements, and their invalu- 
able assistance in the production of the Law Day film; 

And the members of the Mississippi Press Association for news articles and edi- 
torials on the Law Day theme. 

B. Resolutions of Junior Bar Section 

We have recommended the amendment of the By-Laws, Article One, Section 
One, to read as follows: 

Section One. Name. This organization shall be a section of the Mississippi 
State Bar and its name shall be the Young Lawyers Section, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as 'Section.' 

Article Three, Section One. 

Section One. Composition. The Board of Directors shall be composed of nine 
elected members, three of whom shall be elected from each Supreme Court 
District in the State of Mississippi. The President, the President-Elect, the 
Secretary, the immediate Past President of the Section, and one representative 
of each local Young Lawyers Section which is affiliated with the Young Law- 
yers Section of the American Bar Association shall also be a member of the 

WHEREAS, a high degree of competence and professional skill is required of 
persons licensed to practice law; and 

WHEREAS, the citizens of our state are entitled to expect and receive the most 
capable and professional representation which our licensing procedures can provide; 

WHEREAS, the prestige and reputation of the Mississippi State Bar and its mem- 
bers will be materially enhanced by a requirement that all persons permitted to sit 
for examination — for the bar examination — and all persons licensed to practice law 
in Mississippi be graduates of established law schools; and 

WHEREAS, the Young Lawyers Section of the Mississippi State Bar believes the 
preceptorship program is an inappropriate and outmoded method of preparing at- 
torneys for the practice of law; and 

WHEREAS, the Young Lawyers Section of the Mississippi State Bar believes that 
the preceptorship program should be abolished; and 

WHEREAS, the legislation has been introduced by the Mississippi Legislature 
but not acted upon whereby the preceptorship program would be abolished; and 

WHEREAS, application to study under the preceptorship program must first be 
approved by the Board of Examiners of the Mississippi State Bar; 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Young Lawyers Section of 


the Mississippi State Bar goes on record as supporting the abolition of the precep- 
torship program as a means of becoming qualified to sit for the bar examination. 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Board of Bar Examiners for the Missis- 
sippi State Bar be urged to withhold approval of any application to study law under 
the preceptorship program, pending action by the Mississippi Legislature on a bill 
which proposed abolition of the program. 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Secretary of the Mississippi Young Law- 
yers Section be directed to send copies of this resolution to all of the officers and 
commissioners of the Mississippi State Bar and the members of the Board of Bar 

WHEREAS, the Young Lawyers Section of the Mississippi State Bar is concerned 
and interested in adequate representation of the indigent defendant in all criminal 
matters; and 

WHEREAS, legislation has been introduced in the Mississippi Legislature to 
provide for the creation of the office of public defender in each judicial district, or 
for increased compensation for counsel appointed by the Court to represent the indi- 
gent criminal defendant; and 

WHEREAS, the Young Lawyers Section of the Mississippi State Bar is of the 
opinion that some form of legislation is necessary which would provide a more com- 
prehensive defense for the indigent defendant; 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Young Lawyers Section of 
the Mississippi State Bar recommends that the Legislature of the State of Mississippi 
enact legislation creating the office of public defender or provide increased compen- 
sation for court appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants, and the Young 
Lawyers Section further recommends to the Legislature of the State of Mississippi 
that said legislation be enacted during the regular legislative session of 1971. 

BE IT RESOLVED, that it is necessary to establish and maintain a nationwide 
program of voluntary specialization in the various fields and specialties of the prac- 
tice of law, and the American Bar Association is the one national organization of 
attorneys of sufficient strength to aid in the development and control of legal speciali- 
zation with practical standards to encourage flexible and reasonable control of develop- 
ment in the regulation of specialization on a state by state and specialty by specialty 
basis, and any nationwide program of legal specialization should be actually admin- 
istered by the State Boards of Legal Specialization in accordance with national 
standards to be prescribed by the American Bar Association, and this organization 
does hereby recommend to the Mississippi State Bar Association that the American 
Bar Association develop and establish a nationwide program of legal specialization 
to be administered by State Boards of Legal Specialization in accordance with na- 
tional standards for specialties and competence of specialists within the various fields. 
This organization does hereby further recommend that the Mississippi State Bar 
Association lend its assistance and support to the accomplishment of the purposes of 
this resolution. 

WHEREAS, the laws of the State of Mississippi provide that oral depositions can 


only be taken in specific instances thereby requiring an agreement of all parites for 
the general taking of depositions of parties, witnesses and others; and 

WHEREAS, most other jurisdictions generously allow for the taking of prac- 
tically unlimited depositions upon proper notice; and 

WHEREAS, such unrestricted procedure of deposing parties, witnesses and others 
is desired and needed in this jurisdiction; 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Young Lawyers Section of 
the Mississippi State Bar go on record supporting and recommending the passage 
at the next regular legislative session of the proper legislation to permit the oral 
deposition of witnesses, parties and others upon notice. 

WHEREAS, there have been many injustices and inequities in the administra- 
tion of the present law in relation to the admission, detention and treatment of 
persons suffering from mental illness and mental retardation; and 

WHEREAS, the Young Lawyers Section of the Mississippi State Bar has recog- 
nized that the organized Bar has a responsibility to promote the enactment of appro- 
priate laws to protect the rights of those citizens suffering from mental illness and 
mental retardation, as well as to assure prompt and effective treatment of such per- 
sons; and 

WHEREAS, a Committee was appointed by said Young Lawyers Section to study 
the present laws and possible revision thereof, and such Committee has concluded 
that the laws in relation to the admission, retention and treatment of persons who 
are in need of mental treatment, or who are mentally retarded, are in need of revi- 
sion, and such Committee has prepared and endorsed a bill being attached hereto 
as an exhibit to this resolution; and 

WHEREAS, the attached bill is worthy of endorsement of the Board of the Young 
Lawyers Section and should be recommended for enactment to the Mississippi State 
Bar and members of the legislature. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, RESOLVED that the attached bill with the revision of 
the laws relating to admission, detention and treatment of persons suffering from 
mental illness and mental retardation be and it is hereby recommended by the mem- 
bership of this organization for enactment by the Mississippi Legislature at its next 
session. That the attached bill be recommended to the Mississippi State Bar Asso- 
ciation for its approval and endorsement with the request that such Mississippi State 
Bar use its influence to gain enactment in the Legislature. 



AUGUST 1970 


Richard B. Booth 

Harrison Bldg. 
Claude A. Chamberlin 

P. O. Box 72 
Judge Allen Cox 
David Winston Houston 

P. O. Box 72 
D. W. Houston, Jr. 

Watkins Bldg. 
Michael Davis Jonas 

P. O. Drawer E 
John E. Johnson 

P. O. Box 190 
David B. King 

P. O. Box 170 
Armond D. Lee, Jr. 

P. O. Box 170 
Robert D. Patterson 

P. O. Box 170 
Ralph E. Pogue 
Judge L. T. Senter, Jr. 
Johnny N. Tackett 

P. O. Box 183 
William S. Turner 

P. O. Box 386 


Jack B. Carlisle 

P. O. Box 181 
Judge J. P. Coleman 

P. O. Box K 
Thomas Allen Coleman 

P. O. Box 268 
James Dennis Dobbs 

P. O. Box 327 
Thomas Henry Roden 

5th Circuit Court 


Billy James Funderburk 

N. Main St. 
J. O. Prude, III 

P. O. Box 124 
Jack N. Thomas 

P. O. Box 267 
Judge Fred P. Wright 


Anthony T. Farese 

P. O. Box 135 
John B. Farese 

P. O. Box 125 
Peggy Anita Jones 

P. O. Box 125 
William G. Kemp 

P. O. Box 121 
L. Hamer McKenzie 

P. O. Box 121 


Virgil G. Cook 


W. H. Cox 

P. O. Box 353 
M. Paul Haynes 
M. Paul Haynes, Jr. 

P. O. Box 278 


Morris Collins Bailey 

P. O. Box 568 
Dennis M. Baker 

210 Broadway 
Robert H. Broome 

210 Broadway 
William J. Clayton 

210 Broadway 
Charles C. Finch 

P. O. Drawer 568 
D. R. Johnson 

P. O. Box 288 
Mose E. Kincaid 

113 Wood Street 
Robert T. Riser 
Ben Barrett Smith 

Batesville Security 
Bk. Bldg. 
Daniel Briggs Smith, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 568 
Ted Lucas Smith 

P. O. Drawer 568 
Arnold R. Smythe 
Ralph O. White 

P. O. Box 271 


Joseph H. Benvenutti 

144 Main St. 
Evelyn Hunt Conner 

P. O. Box 281 
Sam Leroy Favre 

P. O. Drawer 71 
William M. Frisbie 

P. O. Box 406 
Gerald C. Gex 

Merchants Bank Bldg. 
Joseph W. Gex 
Lucien M. Gex 

Merchants Bank Bldg. 
J. R. Griffin 

P. O. Drawer 71 
Michael D. Haas 

P. O. Box 304 
Nicholas M. Haas 

P. O. Drawer UU 
Edward I. Jones 

P. O. Box 15 
Cornelius Joseph Ladner 

P. O. Box 412 
George H. Lipscomb, Jr. 

P. O. Box 121 
Walter J. Phillips 

Merchants Bank Bldg. 
Judge Dan M. Russell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 253 
W. Harrison Alexander 
Reuben Kidd Houston, Jr. 

P. O. Box 374 
Judge Joe A. McFarland, Jr. 

Circuit Court 
Robert H. McFarland 
O. M. Oates, Jr. 

P. O. Box 25 
Roy L. Osborne 
Thomas G. Roberts 

P. O. Box 521 


J. E. Ulmer, Jr. 
P. O. Box 1 





L. P. Allen 
P. O. Box 220 


James T. Bridges 

P. O. Box 322 
V. B. Montgomery 

P. O. Drawer 634 
Paul B. Murphy 

P. O. Box 662 
Irby Turner, Jr. 

P. O. Box 447 
Hugh R. Varnado 

P. O. Drawer 634 
Lucian R. Wadlington 

P. O. Box 355 
W. D. Womack, Jr. 

P. O. Box 217 
Arthur Eugene Wood 

84 Church St. 


Lloyd E. Hogue 


Edwin T. Neilson 
Rt. 2 


Dixon Dossett 


Robert M. Acevedo 

P. O. Box 506 
Byron A. Adams 

2416 Wilkes Ave. 
Gerald Blessey 

Suite 224 Barq Bldg. 
Luther R. Boyd 

130 W. Water St. 
Billy F. Brown 

209 Rich Ave. 
Amy Burkett 

Rt. 3, Box 353 
Fred G. Cody 

450 Renoir St. 
L. C. Corban, Jr. 

P. O. Box Q 
William L. Denton 

450 Renoir St. 
Frederick L. Donahower 

134 Lameuse St. 

Donald E. Dore 

Edgewater Plaza 

Shopping City 
Wilson J. Foster, Jr. 

1335 Lafayette St. 
Leslie B. Grant 

20 B Edgewater 
Garden Apt. 
Daniel D. Guice 

P. O. Box 153 
Jacob D. Guice 

P. O. Box 153 
W. L. Guice 

P. O. Box 153 
Peter Halat, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1079 
Joe Ben Hawkins 

P. O. Drawer MM 
Louis Hengen 

RM 217 Barq Bldg. 
Clare Sekul Hornsby 

P. O. Box 548 
Albert S. Johnston, Jr. 

P. O. Box 214 
Albert Sidney Johnston, III 

P. O. Box 214 
Arnaud O. Lopez 

202 Barq Bldg. 
James S. Love 

Hotel Buena Vista 
Frederick J. Mannino 

P. O. Box 241 
Nick A. Mavar, Jr. 

1214 West Beach 
Howard McDonnell 

Barq Bldg. 
Newton Kelly McKoin 

P. O. Drawer MM 
Judge Walter L. 
Nixon, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer A 
Lyle M. Page 

P. O. Box 222 
Ronald Peresich 

P. O. Box 222 
Carl B. Prestin 

266 Brady Dr. 
Charles K. Pringle 

P. O. Box 292 
Victor B. Pringle 

P. O. Box 292 

Jules A. Schwan 

P. O. Box 272 
John Sekul 

203 Barq Bldg. 
Lawrence Semski 

P. O. Box 506 
Sanford R. Steckler 

P. O. Box 486 
William Wyatt Sumrall 

113 Miramar Ave. 
Paul R. Tarbutton 

239 Langley Dr. 
Charles L. Todaro 

1136 W. Howard Ave. 
E. C. Tonsmeire, Jr. 

P. O. Box 241 
Edward George Tremmel 

P. O. Box 272 
Kosta N. Vlahos 

P. O. Box 36 
Walter J. Wadlington 

P. O. Box 2 
Edmund J. Walker 

Rt. 3, Box 97 
Thomas L. Wallace 

505 Lameuse St. 
Alonzo S. Westbrook 

175 Oak Grove Place 
Thomas J. Wiltz 

P. O. Box 302 
Thelma S. Zimmer 

P. O. Box 67 


Clarence Chase 

Schultz Bldg. 
Floyd W. Cunningham 

P. O. Box 146 
James A. Cunningham, Sr. 

P. O. Box 146 
Jack M. Dubard 

P. O. Box 225 
Ellis W. Finch 

P. O. Box 46 
Donald Franks 
Eugene B. Gifford, Jr. 

P. O. Box 254 
James N. Godwin 

P. O. Box 687 

Thomas Douglas 

Keenum, Sr. 

P. O. Box 267 



Joe Ray Langston 

College St. 
Edgar Watson Massey 

P. O. Box 421 
Charles S. Vail 

P. O. Box 447 
E. K. Windham 


David B. Clark 

Bullock Bldg. 
Jerry T. Johnston 

North Timber St. 
George Dan Martin 

P. O. Box 9 
Marcus E. Martin 

P. O. Box 8 
W. E. Mclntyre 
W. E. Mclntyre, Jr. 
John C. McLaurin 

P. O. Box 25 
Robert S. McLaurin, Jr. 

112 High St. 
David Lewis Morrow 

P. O. Box 168 
James Anthony 
Morrow, Jr. 
J. C. Murray 

Rankin County Bank 
Joe H. Sanderson 

P. O. Box 151 
J. David Williams 

P. O. Box 267 


Emmette P. Allen 

P. O. Box 828 
Burce H. Brady 

P. O. Box 548 
Tullius Grady 

P. O. Box 115 
Charles Emmette Brennan 

P. O. Box 9 
Judge Michael L. Carr, Jr. 

P. O. Box 52 
Rudolph Davis 

228 South First St. 
James W. Elliott, Jr. 

P. O. Box 774 
George H. Gulley, Jr. 

P. O. Box 317 
H. W. Hobbs 

P. O. Box 356 

Henry W. Hobbs, Jr. 
P. O. Box 356 

Robert E. Jones 

220 S. First St. 
Jerrald L. Nations 

P. O. Box 867 
J. F. Noble, Sr. 

P. O. Box 4 
William B. O'Neal 

P. O. Box 242 
Donald B. Patterson 

220 S. First St. 
Ralph L. Peeples 

P. O. Box 202 
R. Pearce Phillips 

P. O. Box 786 
Owen Roberts 

P. O. Box 677 
Richard E. Stratton, III 

1 1 1 East Cherokee St. 
Terry S. Swalm 

Swalm Bldg. 


Charles W. Cook 
Ottis B. Crocker, Jr. 

P. O. Box 207 
C. R. Easley 

Yancy & Gibson 
Billy R. Gibson 

P. O. Box 425 
Jesse Lee Yancy, Jr. 

P. O. Box 425 


George Mitchell Swindoll 
Judge W. W. Brown 

P. O. Box 75 
Henry L. Lackey 

P. O. Box Y 
Paul M. Moore 

P. O. Drawer 230 


Edgar Lee Walker 


James A. Butchart 

P. O. Box 382 
James M. Cain 

Rt. 2, Box 105 
S. R. Cain, Jr. 

P. O. Box 286 

W. S. Cain 
P. O. Box 286 

George Milton Case 

114 West Center St. 
Nelson R. Cauthen 
John W. Christopher 
Heroman Dean 
Sim C. Dulaney, Jr. 

Rt. 3, Box 34 B 
H. Nolen Fancher 

P. O. Box 245 
Joe R. Fancher, Jr. 

P. O. Box 245 
Robert Louis Goza, Jr. 

114 West Center St. 
J. M. Greaves 

P. O. Box 128 
Chancellor G. B. Herring 

11th District 
James H. Herring 

P. O. Box 344 
Josephine Hood 
S. T. Lloyd, Jr. 

312 S. Liberty St. 
Ray H. Montgomery 

324 Shady Lane 
Robert Montgomery 

114 West Center St. 
Judge Percy F. Parker 

Madison County Court 
Robert H. Powell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 245 
L. C. Spivey, Jr. 

P. O. Box 8 
William H. Sutherland, Jr. 

102| N. Liberty St. 
J. Collins Wohner 


James Roberts Allen 

P. O. Box 387 
Joe P. Barnett 

P. O. Box 48 
Judge O. H. Barnett 

Circuit Court 
Robert Norman Brooks 

P. O. Box 48 
Vernon R. Cotten 

205 Main St. 
Harold W. Davidson 
J. O. Hollis 

P. O. Box 305 



James G. McLemore, Jr. 

P. O. Box 387 
Bonnie Mills 

209 N. Van Buren St. 
J. E. Smith 

P. O. Box 387 
A. M. Warwick 

P. O. Box 207 
A. R. Wright, Jr. 

P. O. Box 406 


Andrew C. Baker 

P. O. Box 190 
James A. Blount 

Hughes Bldg. 
George P. Cossar 

Cossar Bldg. 
George P. Cossar, Jr. 

Cossar Bldg. 
Joseph L. Tennyson 

P. O. Box 190 
Albert D. Whitten 

P. O. Box 28 


William R. Bradley 

101-105 Stevens Bldg. 
C. Willis Connell, Jr. 

Bank of Clarksdale 
Edward P. Connell 

P. O. Box 368 
Martin Douglas Cook 

P. O. Box 786 
John W. Crisler 

P. O. Box 1116 
Chester Harris Curtis 

Bank of Clarksdale 
Jack F. Dunbar 

Stevens Bldg. 
George M. Fleming 

P. O. Box 368 
L. Alex Gilliam, Jr. 

P. O. Box 100 
Wayne S. Harris 

Coahoma Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Pascal D. Holcomb 

P. O. Box 368 
Joseph W. Hopkins 

Stevens Bldg. 

David R. Hunt 

123 Court St. 
Ogwen L. King 

232 Leflore Ave. 
Stovall Lowrey 

P. O. Box 662 
I. Semmes Luckett 

121 Yazoo Ave. 
William O. Luckett 

P. O. Box 306 
Lawrence M. Magdovitz 

P. O. Box 997 
Sidney A. May 

P. O. Box 237 
G. F. Maynard, Jr. 

P. O. Box 488 
William H. Maynard 

P. O. Drawer 488 
Ralph G. Metcalf 

P. O. Box 641 
Leigh ton S. Miller 

P. O. Box 787 
Doyle Benton Moorhead 

419 W. Second 
G. Rives Neblett 

P. O. Box 368 
Thomas H. Pearson 

P. O. Box 912 
Leon L. Porter, Jr. 

P. O. Box 431 
Judge Greek P. Rice 

Coahoma County 
Shed Hill Roberson 

121 Yazoo Ave. 
Harvey T. Ross 

P. O. Box 22 
Tom T. Ross 

P. O. Box 339 
Lester M. Sack 

P. O. Box 626 
Allan D. Shackelford 

P. O. Box 306 
Philip A. Sherman 

645 Catalpa St. 
Elzy J. Smith, Jr. 

Suite 222-226 Stevens 
Charles L. Sullivan 

P. O. Box 1196 
Larry A. Thompson 

523 Catalpa St. 

Robert W. Wood 

647 Cherry St. 
Howard G. Woodward 

P. O. Box 876 


William B. Alexander, Jr. 

112 N. Pearman St. 
Judge William H. Bizzell 

P. O. Box 117 
Ancil L. Cox, Jr. 

116 S. Court St. 
C. H. Crump 
Joseph C. Feduccia 

112 N. Pearman Ave. 
Judge Ed H. Green 

Circuit Court 
Lonnie E. Griffith 

P. O. Box 151 
John L. Hatcher 

P. O. Box 151 
Joseph M. Howorth 

P. O. Box 627 
Lucy S. Howorth 

P. O. Box 627 
Gerald H. Jacks 

P. O. Box 1031 
Robert E. Jackson 
Charles C. Jacobs, Jr. 

P. O. Box 151 
Robert G. Johnston 

112 North Pearman Ave. 
Alfred A. Levingston 

P. O. Drawer 728 
C. Arthur Mcintosh 

P. O. Box 151 
Lawrence Y. Mellen 

P. O. Box 159 
Judge Ben F. Mitchel 

County Judge 
Donald L. Moak 

Delta State College 
Dana C. Moore, Jr. 

116 S. Court St. 
W. E. O'Hare 

P. O. Box 630 
William Allen Pepper, Jr. 

Smith & O'Hare 
Abe D. Somerville 

P. O. Box 387 
A. B. Sparkman 
James Irving Tims 

P. O. Box 700 



Carmon E. Valentine 

205 South Court St. 
John White Valentine 

205 South Court St. 
James H. Walker 

P. O. Box 966 
Arthur C. Whittemore 

609 John Dr. 
Frank O. Wynne, Jr. 

Commerce Bldg. 


Catherine L. Barter 

1212 Rockingham 
Jack C. Boyles 

137 Murial Dr. 
James V. Carr 

P. O. Box 114 
Herbert D. Farrell 

1002 Laurewood Dr. 
N. Shelton Hand, Jr. 

Miss. College 
William H. Hewitt 

800 East Leake St. 
John L. Kennedy 

1210 Manchester 
Ewell McDonald, Jr. 

P. O. Box 264 
Frank Wilson McLendon 

101 Mt. Salus Dr. 
Percy Howard Parkman 

P. O. Box 224 
George Dudley Pearce 

1401 Post Rd. 
William R. Phillips 

101 Sunset Dr. 
John H. Rogers 

1007 Tanglewood Dr. 
George B. Taylor 

716 Bellvue St. 
Robert P. White, Jr. 

805 East Leake St. 
Gladstone E. Williams 

P. O. Box 172 


M. M. Butler 
Rt. 1 


Jack Terry Peeples 
P. O. Box 240 


William D. Adams 

P. O. Box 743 
William W. Allred 

P. O. Box 521 
W. W. Dent 
John K. Keyes 
Dan A. Mcintosh, III 

P. O. Box 554 
Tommy Bott Rogers 

P. O. Box 752 
Bonnie Smith 

P. O. Box 364 


Vernon H. Broom 

203 Newsom Bldg. 
Bernard Callender 

310-312 Newsom Bldg. 
William C. Callender 

P. O. Box 604 
Judge Sebe Dale 

P. O. Box 603 
James Seaborn Dale, Jr. 

P. O. Box 603 
Maurice Dantin 

310 Newsom Bldg. 
James R. Davis 

P. O. Box 222 
Ernest R. Duff 

216 Newsom Bldg. 
Richard D. Fox worth 

216 Newsom Bldg. 
Toxey Hall 

310-312 Newsom Bldg. 
Thomas D. McNeese 

% Broom & Singley 
Peggy G. Mullins 

P. O. Box 364 
Uhl Poole Fornea Patterson 

P. O. Box 216 
Henry E. Pope 

P. O. Box 165 
Ben Mounger Rawls 

P. O. Drawer 232 
Philip Singley 

P. O. Box 9 
Garland D. Upton 

P. O. Box 46 


William Ellis Bearden 
P. O. Box 1032 

William G. Burgin, Jr. 

516 2nd Ave. N. 
Dudley H. Carter 

P. O. Box 981 
H. T. Carter 

521 2nd Ave. N. 
Richard Chotard 

2106 Blue Cut Rd. 
James Albert Dale, III 

519 2nd Ave. North 
Chester Davis Gaston 

Rt. 5, Box 7 
Gary L. Geeslin 

P. O. Box 1366 
Hunter M. Gholson 

516 N. 2nd Ave. 
John H. Holloman 

P. O. Box 1102 
James Tyson Graham 

P. O. Box 166 
Thomas Clower Harvey, Jr. 

P. O. Box 602 
Dewitt T. Hicks, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1094 
Robert Harold Jackson, Jr. 

429 Springdale 
W. Welborn Johnson 

P. O. Box 1442 
W. H. Jolly 

P. O. Box 743 
Billy J. Jordan 

519 Second Ave. North 
Joseph R. Lipscomb 

223 6th Street North 
Jerome Lee Lohrmann 

519 2nd Ave. North 
Hal H. H. McClanahan, III 

207 5th St. North 
James C. Mauldin 

Mauldin Furniture 
Aubrey Eugene Nichols 

510 Second Ave. North 
Ben L. Owen 

P. O. Box 1001 
Jacob C. Pongetti 

126 5th St. North 
J. O. Sams 

514 2nd Ave. North 
Joe O. Sams, Jr. 

P. O. Box 249 
George J. Schweizer 

P. O. Box 1017 



John F. S. Sims 

P. O. Box 648 
Taylor B. Smith 

P. O. Box 1094 
Douglas C. Stone 

P. O. Box 166 
R. C. Stovall 

P. O. Box 591 
Robert Clark Stovall 

P. O. Box 591 
W. J. Threadgill 

P. O. Box 1094 
Henry K. Van Every 

P. O. Box 761 
James A. Walters 

519 North 2nd Ave. 
Robin Weaver 

P. O. Box 1003 
David J. Whitaker, Jr. 

P. O. Box 981 


J. M. Stockton 
Rt. 1, Box 57 


W. C. Adams 
Neal B. Biggers, Jr. 

402 Franklin St. 
Aubrey Horace Brewer 

500£ Filmore St. 
David Lee Coleman 

P. O. Box 741 
James P. Dean 

P. O. Box 207 
William Peyton Dodson 

1500 Thomas St. 
Donald Ray Downs 

P. O. Box 191 
Jimmy Blaine Fisher 

1907 Magnolia Circle 
James L. Gullett 

P. O. Box 668 
H. A. Hopper 

Chambers Liddon Bldg. 
Robert G. Krohn 

P. O. Box 549 
Joe B. Mitchell 

509$ Waldron St. 
James E. Price, Jr. 

P. O. Box 866 
John Curlee Ross, Jr. 

P. O. Box 741 

William L. Sharp 

P. O. Box 844 
Rodney F. Simmons 

1217 Washington St. 
Earl Skelton 

P. O. Box 207 
Judge Orma R. Smith 

U. S. District Court 
Orma R. Smith, Jr. 

P. O. Box 191 
N. S. Sweat 

P. O. Box 227 
N. S. Sweat, Jr. 

P. O. Box 227 
W. C. Sweat, Jr. 

P. O. Box 128 
Charles R. Wilbanks 

P. O. Box 801 
John Ronald Windsor 

1504 Cruise St. 
B. F. Worsham 

P. O. Box 146 
John Richard Young 

P. O. Box 408 


J. Harold Graham, Jr. 

P. O. Box 287 
James Warren Kitchens 

186 N. Jackson St. 
Merrimen M. Watkins 

P. O. Box 233 


James B. Everett 

P. O. Box 51 
Leo Horan 

P. O. Box 367 
William H. Johnson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 55 


J. H. Daws 
Helen J. McDade 

P. O. Box 112 
Louie J. Spinks 

P. O. Box 26 


Woods Eugene Eastland 
P. O. Box 25 


Thomas M. McWilliams 

111 S. Main St. 
O. M. Marsalis 
Pascol J. Townsend, Jr. 

105 South Main St. 


S. R. King 

P. O. Box 91 
James A. White 

P. O. Box 283 


Bobby Leon McHann 

P. O. Box 96 
Sander Paul Margolis 

P. O. Box 375 


Mary L. Busch 

P. O. Box 266 
W. D. Carmichael 

P. O. Box 250 
Glender Dennis 

P. O. Box 426 
Cecil G. Johnson 

P. O. Box 403 
Billy Joe Landrum 

P. O. Box 6 


W. C. Butler 

P. O. Box 86 
Thomas E. Childs, Jr. 

P. O. Box 450 
William T. Denman, III 

P. O. Drawer G 
W. D. Gary 

P. O. Box 577 
John Wesley Gary, III 

P. O. Box 111 
Rolfe L. Hunt, Jr. 

P. O. Box 401 
W. Buchanan Meek 
Edwin Arnold Snyder 

P. O. Box 134 
Judge R. P. Sugg 



Harry L. Corban 
R. L. Corban, Jr. 



Carroll J. McLaurin 
Ed Davis Noble, Jr. 

P. O. Box 428 
Richard M. Truly, Jr. 

P. O. Box 344 
James M. Walker 

P. O. Box 36 


Joseph Bruce Garretty 

P. O. Box 102 
Billie Juhan 

P. O. Box 371 
James Elliott Williams 

Rt. 1, Box 3588 


J. Frank Evans 
P. O. Box 364 


Jerry Lee Bustin 

P. O. Box 719 
T. Marx Huff 

P. O. Box 87 
William A. Huff 

P. O. Box 179 
Dannye L. Hunter 

P. O. Box 336 
Oxborn G. Idom 

P. O. Box 336 
James Walter Lee 

P. O. Box 385 
Roy Noble Lee 

P. O. Box 370 
Thomas Arayton Lee 

P. O. Box 370 
Tom Stewart Lee 

P. O. Box 16 
Howard B. McCrory, Jr. 

P. O. Box 46 
Roby L. Stegall 

612 Marion Blvd. 
William C. Thompson 

P. O. Box 147 
O. B. Triplett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 247 
O. B. Triplett, III 

P. O. Box 247 
William Samuel Weems 

711 Raleigh St. 


T. Victor Bishop 

P. O. Box 563 
William Herman Camp 
Euple Dozier 

P. O. Box 284 
Percy A. Martin 

P. O. Box 491 
Nell C. May 

P. O. Box 538 
Frank Russell 

P. O. Box 525 
Stacy B. Russell 

P. O. Box 525 


William P. Joyer 

Hercules Fishing Club 


Fred Alvin Anderson, III 

P. O. Box 368 
Walker J. Carney, Jr. 

P. O. Box 99 
J. T. Lowrey 

P. O. Box 429 


George Douglas Abraham 

P. O. Box 24 
Nathan P. Adams, Jr. 

P. O. Box 271 
Roy G. Ayles 

1327 E. John St. 
Edward J. Bogen 

P. O. Box 689 
Eugene M. Bogen 

536 Washington Ave. 
Marvin Burchfield 

1137 Lourdes St. 
Roy D. Campbell 

P. O. Box 895 
William Darrel Carlson 

P. O. Box 1019 
Frank Carlton 

P. O. Box 442 
George L. Cottingham, Jr. 

P. O. Box 40 
Fountain D. Dawson 

P. O. Box 1151 
Anse Dees 

111 Walnut St. 

Fred C. DeLong, Jr. 

P. O. Box 895 
Howard Dyer 

309-10 Weinberg Bldg. 
Howard Dyer, III 

309-10 Weinberg Bldg. 
Guy Kenner Ellis, Jr. 

635 Fairview Ave. 
Holland O. Felts 

214-220 Weinberg Bldg. 
L. Carl Hagwood 

P. O. Box 895 
John R. Hailmal 

P. O. Box 190 
Edward B. Hill, Jr. 

P. O. Box 5613 
Frank Watson Hunger 

P. O. Box 918 
Judge William C. Keady 

P. O. Box 190 
William C. Keady, Jr. 

P. O. Box 895 
Judge Ernest Kellner, Jr. 

9th District 
Martin A. Kilpatrick 

P. O. Box 773 
Raymond V. Kimble, Jr. 

205-08 Weinberg Bldg. 
J. A. Lake, Jr. 

P. O. Box 918 
Phillip Mansour 

P. O. Box 773 
W. M. McGough 

P. O. Box 660 
W. L. Mcllwain 

P. O. Box 558 
William E. McLellan 

1204 Margaret St. 
Horace L. Meredith, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 99 
H. A. Miller 

P. O. Box 1334 
Julian David Orlansky 

P. O. Box 1334 
S. Ira Pittman, Jr. 

405-10 Weinberg Bldg. 
Judge Zelma W. Price 

P. O. Box 766 
Tony P. Provenza 

1208 Fairview Ave. 
Eugene J. Raphael 

Woolworth Bldg. 



James Robertshaw 

P. O. Box 99 
James L. Robertson 

P. O. Box 895 
Geo. Ramsey Russell 

214-220 Weinberg Bldg. 
Laurence J. Sievers 

P. O. Box 506 
George H. Slade 

P. O. Box 1214 
Earl Solomon 

P. O. Box 453 
Earl S. Solomon, Jr. 

P. O. Box 453 
Walter B. Swain, Jr. 

P. O. Box 4874 
William D. Swain, Jr. 

127 Robertshaw St. 
Clayton J. Swank, III 

217 Bermuda Dr. 
John William Tarver 

859 S. Washington 
Philip Baird Terney 

P. O. Box 99 
Frank S. Thackston, Jr. 

P. O. Box 918 
S. B. Thomas 

P. O. Box 395 
William Thomas, Jr. 

211-212 Weinberg Bldg. 
W. Scott Thompson 

620 McAllister St. 
Charles S. Tindall 

P. O. Box 918 
Charles Sumner Tindall, III 

P. O. Box 918 
James Marvin Ward 

125 Sherwood Dr. 
Rodger Downing Wasson 

P. O. Box 1093 
J. W. Watkins, III 

May Bldg. 
Judge Burwell B. Wilkes 

Circuit Judge 
Joseph E. Wroten 

P. O. Box 1334 
Douglas C. Wynn 

P. O. Box 1295 


Edward J. Antoon 
P. O. Box 417 

Billy Burton Bowman 

P. O. Box 518 
Norman C. Brewer 

P. O. Box 411 
Henry Donald Brock 

P. O. Box 941 
James W. Burgoon, Jr. 

P. O. Box 391 
Travis H. Clark, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer B 
Joseph G. Colson 

P. O. Box 364 
James Yeayer Dale 

405 E. Monroe 
Charles Milton Deaton 

P. O. Box 411 
George H. Dulin 

P. O. Drawer 657 
William P. Eason 

P. O. Box 846 
Gray Evans 

P. O. Box 411 
George A. Everett 

P. O. Box 253 
John J. Fraiser, Jr. 

P. O. Box 391 
Arnold F. Gwin 

P. O. Box 725 
James E. Upshaw 

P. O. Box 671 
James E. Higginbotham 

P. O. Box 366 
O. L. Kimbrough 

P. O. Box 516 
Hardy Lott 

P. O. Box 725 
R. Cunliffe McBee 

P. O. Drawer 657 
George Hite McLean 

P. O. Box 516 
George Hite McLean, Jr. 

405 East Adams 
Pearl McLellan 

P. O. Box 54 
W. H. Montjoy 

P. O. Box 906 
Yerger Morehead 

Whittington Bldg. 
Frank K. Odom 

P. O. Box 674 
H. Talbot Odom 

P. O. Drawer 1218 

Porter W. Peteet 

P. O. Box 263 
James M. Pierce 

P. O. Box 915 
Judge Charles Pollard 

P. O. Box 393 
William H. Roberson 

P. O. Box 263 
J. Stanny Sanders 

P. O. Box 725 
Luke J. Schissel 

P. O. Drawer 1218 
Gordon L. Smith 

804 Bell Ave. 
Richard L. Smith 

P. O. Box 246 
Anthony Lavon Thaxton 

P. O. Box 146 
Seth Wheatley, Jr. 

P. O. Box 389 
W. M. Whittington, Jr. 

P. O. Box 941 
Fred Witty 

P. O. Box 912 


Jim McRae Criss 

P. O. Drawer C 
Edwin Tharp Cofer 
Floyd M. Davis, Jr. 

1584 Vance Rd. 
William H. Fedric 

North Side of 
Public Square 
Jay Gore, Jr. 

P. O. Box 901 
John T. Keeton 

P. O. Box 666 
Lucille T. Latta 

P. O. Box 922 
William A. Lomax 

861 Line 
Mitchell M. Lundy 

11 Evans Bldg. 
Judge Marshall Perry 

P. O. Box 444 
Leon E. Provine 

P. O. Box 99 
William O. Semmes 

P. O. Box 567 
Bryant Jerome Shaw 

1176 South Mound St. 



Lida B. Shaw 

1176 South Mound St. 
Samuel J. Waits 

P. O. Box 204 


Bidwell Adam 

P. O. Drawer BB 
Harry Roger Allen 

P. O. Box 996 
Judge Frank W. Alexander 

P. O. Box 986 
B. O. Bailey, Jr. 

1015 Pass Rd. 
Wade Baine 

P. O. Box 1834 
Dwight Nicholas Ball 

33 53rd St. 
Robert Barber, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer DD 
John H. Barnett, Jr. 

915 Wanda Place 
Thomas Davis Berry, Jr. 

1319 24th Ave. 
Leonard A. Blackwell, II 

P. O. Box 88 
Eldon Bolton, Jr. 

P. O. Box 100 
E. D. Bostrom 

P. O. Box 2223 
Norman Breland 

P. O. Box 1030 
Rae Bryant 

P. O. Box 10 
Pete H. Carruba 

P. O. Box 1826 

Napoleon LePoint 

Cassibry, II 

P. O. Box 1686 
John W. Capers 

404 Hewes Bldg. 
Roger T. Clark 

4003 B Washington Ave. 
David Leroy Cobb 

P. O. Box 996 
Everett E. Cook 

P. O. Drawer C 
Bruce G. Cornell 

Hewes Bldg. 
David Cottrell, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer H 

Billy M. Davis 

5102 Quincey Ave. 
Jimmy G. Dedeaux 

406 Hewes Bldg. 
Harold Joseph Demet 

P. O. Box 1297 
William F. Dukes 

P. O. Box 1826 
Phil R. Dunnaway 

P. O. Drawer C 
James S. Eaton 

P. O. Drawer H 
G. E. Estes, Jr. 

P. O. Box 88 
William Estopinal 

Medical Bldg. 
John A. Evans 

1317 24th Ave. 
Milton Ray Fairchild 

1919 15th St. 
Mark T. Finch USAF 

1101 Beach Ave. 
Margaret E. Fisher 

609 Woodward Ave. 
Jason H. Floyd 

P. O. Box 1107 
Jason H. Floyd, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1107 
Cary L. Fondren, Jr. 

P. O. Box 141 
E. J. Ford, Jr. 

201 Hatten Bldg. 
Paul M. Franke, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 100 
Edward Gaines 

2209 14th St. 
Charles R. Galloway 

P. O. Drawer H 
Robert Charles Galloway 

P. O. Drawer H 
John M. Gardner 

1425 24th Ave. 
Virgil G. Gillespie 

2nd Floor Abstract Bldg. 
D. M. Graham, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22 
Richard B. Graves, II 

P. O. Box 1649 
P. D. Greaves 

Gulf National Bk. Bldg. 
Clyde Hurlbert 

P. O. Box 541 

T. J. Buchanan Heiss 

1510 19th Ave. 
John F. Hester 

Parliament House 
Apt. 221 
Harry P. Hewes 

2nd Floor Abstract Bldg. 
Gaston H. Hewes 

Hewes Bldg. 
William G. Hewes 

P. O. Box 454 
Viola J. Hilbert 

P. O. Box 4043 
Forrest E. Holder 

22 Poplar Circle 
Boyce Holleman 

P. O. Drawer 1030 
Raymond Hunter 

P. O. Box 88 
Robert E. Husband 

Suite 302, 

Gulf South Bldg. 
John C. Johnson 

1216 22nd St. 
Walter R. Johnson 

211 Gulf S, Bldg. 
Walter Rayford L. Jones 

P. O. Drawer 1720 
Oscar B. Ladner 

P. O. Box 727 
Eaton A. Lang, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer H 
Larry Lee Lenoir 

2nd Floor Abstract Bldg. 
Edward M. Lindsey 

P. O. Box 524 
H. Crockett Lindsey 

1707 Jones Ave. 
Floyd J. Logan 

P. O. Box 1268 
William E. Logan 

309 Hatten Bldg. 
Judge Luther W. Maples 

26th Ave. 
Ernest G. Martin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 730 
James M. McCarthy 

P. O. Box 542 
Joseph R. Meadows 

P. O. Box 1649 
R. B. Meadows 

P. O. Box 402 



Edward Owen Miller 

2606 Kelly Ave. 
Robert H. Milner, Jr. 

P. O. Box 579 
Webb M. Mize 

310 Gulf Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Alfred E. Moreton, III 

1015 Pass Rd. 
John S. Morris 

303 Gulf South Bldg. 
George E. Morse 

P. O. Box 100 
Stanford E. Morse, Jr. 

P. O. Box 100 
Sherman L. Muths, Jr. 

P. O. Box 127 
Albert Necaise 

P. O. Box 1030 
Paul M. Newton 

2414 Fourteenth St. 
H. G. O 'Conor 

4512 Jefferson Ave. 
Edgar L. O'Neill, Jr. 

2513 Palmer Dr. 
Owen T. Palmer, Jr. 

P. O. Box 717 
Robert D. Portwood 

P. O. Drawer 760 
George M. Quin 

454 Champin St. 
William M. Rainey 

P. O. Drawer S 
Clayton Rand 

The Dixie Press 
James Norman Randell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 749 
Brent A. Richardson 

P. O. Box 4051 
Donnie D. Riley 

P. O. Box 1649 
Grover Roberts 

P. O. Box 992 
Thomas N. Roberts, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer Y 
George Rosetti, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer Y 
Scotty R. Rosetti 

P. O. Box 1297 
Ernest L. Shelton, III 

4708 Jefferson Ave. 
James Sideris 

?. O. Box 819 

Donald O. Simmons 

P. O. Box 1206 
Upton Sisson 

1410 24th Ave. 
George R. Smith 

P. O. Box 177 
Lee R. Spence 

Trust Dept. Hancock 
Herbert J. Stelly, Sr. 

P. O. Drawer Y 
Thomas L. Stennis, II 

P. O. Box 10 
William L. Stewart 

P. O. Box 717 
Ben H. Stone 

P. O. Drawer H 
Thomas B. Sumrall 

Hatten Bldg. 
Charles T. Sykes, Jr. 

1225 Thirty First Ave. 
Robert L. Taylor 

P. O. Box 730 
Jerry O. Terry, Sr. 

308 Gulf Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Hollis C. Thompson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 580 
James David Thompson 

4513 Finley St. 
R. W. Thompson 

300 Gulf Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
McRae Turner, Jr. 

Miss. Power Co. 
Fred Haden Walker 

2817 25th Ave. 
Judge Harry G. Walker 

P. O. Box 1529 
Knox W. Walker 

408 Hewes Bldg. 
Gerald M. Warren 

P. O. Box 901 
Knox White 

P. O. Drawer 100 
Neil W. White, Jr. 

412 Hewes Bldg. 
Marguerite L. Williams 

1805 19th Ave. 
Jean S. Wilson 

4 Lexington Place 
Richard L. Yarbrough 

P. O. Box 1138 

Ralph D. Young 
P. O. Drawer 7 


James W. Bingham 
P. O. Box 25 


Lawrence D. Arrington 

P. O. Box 1292 
Robert E. Arrington 

P. O. Box 22 
Bruce C. Aultman 

P. O. Box 750 
Dorrance Aultman 

P. O. Box 750 
James W. Backs trom 

P. O. Box 713 
B. H. Baker 

P. O. Box 801 
J. C. Bell 

P. O. Box 566 
Carl E. Berry, Jr. 

112 W. Front St. 
M. D. Brett 

P. O. Box 189 
Robert L. Calhoun 

P. O. Box 461 
Lester Clark 

302 First Federal Bldg. 
Judge Harold B. Cubley 

P. O. Box 969 
Edward J. Currie, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2044 
George Gibon Currie 

P. O. Box 626 
George W. Currie 

P. O. Box 626 
George C. Curry 

P. O. Box 1709 
T. W. Davis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 529 
James K. Dukes 

P. O. Box 2055 
S. Wayne Easterling 

P. O. Box 870 
James Finch 

P. O. Box 1169 
Lawrence Y. Foote 

P. O. Drawer 1231 
Davis T. Fortenberry 

Rt. 3, Box 186 



Paul E. Grady 

P. O. Box 1769 
Reginald A. Gray, Jr. 

201 Carter Bldg. 
Reginald A. Gray, III 

611 S. 21st Ave. 
John S. Grove 

P. O. Box 1024 
Wallace R. Gunn 

P. O. Drawer 1729 
Judge Stanton A. Hall 

P. O. Drawer 135 
William Haralson 

P. O. Drawer 1609 
F. C. Hathorn, Jr. 

P. O. Box 865 
Rowland W. Heidelberg, Jr. 

301 W. Pine St. 
Paul H. Holmes 

P. O. Box 2055 
John Roane Howell 

518 Rebecca Ave. 
Carroll H. Ingram 

P. O. Box 24 
Robert T. Jackson 

P. O. Box 1288 
Rex K. Jones 

P. O. Box 125 
William F. Jones 

P. O. Box 95 
Karl W. Kepper 

702 W. Pine St. 
Marie P. Kepper 

702 W. Pine St. 
Joe R. King 

P. O. Box 1207 
Raymond L. Laakso 

Rt. 4, University PL 
John Wincie Lee, Jr. 

302 First Federal Bldg. 
Robert Lawrence Lennon 

3rd Floor First Fed. Bldg. 
James F. McKenzie 

301 W. Pine St. 
Richard L. Miller 

3002 Prince George Rd. 
Frank D. Montague, Jr. 

201-04 Carter Bldg. 
Alfred Moore 

P. O. Box 95 
C. M. Morgan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1333 

Forrest M. Morris, Jr. 

215 E. Front St. 
John Alan Morris 

P. O. Box 1981 
William V. Murry 

204 Conner Bldg. 
La Fare Murphy 

P. O. Box 2044 
Larry N orris 

501 Carter Bldg. 
Mildred W. Norris 

P. O. Box 1633 
Thomas D. Ott 

P. O. Box 1386 
Judge Howard L. Patterson 

P. O. Box 808 
Edwin Lloyd Pittman 

204 W. Front St. 
Homer Pittman 

407 Carter Bldg. 
Jack Homer Pittman 

407 Carter Bldg. 
James C. Pittman 

407 Carter Bldg. 
Moran M. Pope, Jr. 

P. O. Box 750 
Thomas J. Riley 

P. O. Box 654 
M. M. Roberts 

P. O. Box 870 
Shelby R. Rogers 

P. O. Box 109 
Donald B. Ruiz 

Rt. 2, Box 394-A 
Milton A. Schlesinger 

304 First Fed. Bldg. 
Elliott E. Schlottman 

P. O. Box 1902 
W. L. Shappley 

P. O. Box 6 
J. B. Van Slyke, Jr. 

P. O. Box 750 
Luther A. Smith 

P. O. Box 1386 
Billy H. Stephens 

P. O. Box 1606 
Michael David Sullivan 

P. O. Box 1568 
R. M. Sullivan 

P. O. Box 1568 
Dan Gary Sutherland 

301 W. Pine Bldg. 

James H. C. Thomas, Jr. 

210 Carter Bldg. 
Joe A. Thompson 

P. O. Box 348 
James K. Travis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 590 
Leonard D. Van Slyke, Jr. 

102 Capitol St. 
Jack B. Weldy 

P. O. Box 24 
Ben M. West 

P. O. Box 465 
Darl Jene Whitecotton 

P. O. Box 2057 
William W. Wicht, Jr. 

100 Professional Bldg. 
Elliott T. Wooten 

P. O. Box 133 
Francis T. Zachary 

P. O. Box 24 


S. E. Allen, Jr. 

P. O. Box 208 
Cecil L. Allred, Jr. 

408 Gallatin St. 
John T. Armstrong 

P. O. Box 190 
John T. Armstrong, Jr. 

P. O. Box 190 
E. R. Arrington 

P. O. Box 347 
Donald C. Cooley 

P. O. Box 388 
Harris B. Henley 

P. O. Box 509 
W. S. Henley 

P. O. Box 509 
Harry O. Hoffman, Jr. 

P. O. Box 190 
Carroll Kemp 

P. O. Box 226 
Julius L. Lotterhos, Jr. 

P. O. Box 509 
Lena C. Zama 

P. O. Box 108 


John M. Sims 
P. O. Box 412 




William W. Ballard 

County Attorney 
Dudley Black 

Bridgforth, Jr. 

% Walker, Franks & Rone 
Gerald Wilborn 
Chatham, Jr. 

53 E. Center St. S.E. 
Ross Lee Franks 
Boyce Lee Garner 

17 Union St. 
Harry Randolph Garner 

17 Union St. 
William F. Hagan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 346 
Lee Virden Hamberlin 

P. O. Box 715 
F. C. Holmes, Jr. 
Arthur Cinclair May 

17 Union St. 
George S. Mclnvale 
William L. Rone 
Joel P. Walker 
Edward Lee Whitten 

17 Union St. 
W. E. Wilroy 

P. O. Box 5 
W. E. Wilroy, Jr. 

P. O. Box 5 
James E. Woods 

Mclnvale Bldg. 


W. M. Everett 

P. O. Box 115 
S. E. McGee 


Forrest Durwood Ruegger 
P. O. Box 542 


Fred M. Belk, Jr. 

P. O. Box 66 
John W. Bryant, Jr. 

Merchant & Farmers 
Bank Bldg. 
Warren E. Cox 

N. Miss. Rural Legal 
Robert P. Crutcher 

P. O. Box 66 

Wall Doxey, Jr. 

P. O. Box 667 
Lester G. Fant, Jr. 

P. O. Box 66 
Lester G. Fant, III 

Bank of Holly Springs 
Sidney L. Hurdle 

First State Bk. Bldg. 
John L. Kennedy 

North Side of Square 
D. Rook Moore, III 

P. O. Box 446 
L. A. Smith, III 

P. O. Box 276 
William Collins Spencer 

P. O. Box 518 
Fred E. Swaney 

Van Dorn Ave. 
George H. Rather 


H. B. Abernethy 
Woodrow Wilson Brand, Jr. 

P. O. Box 128 
Thomas B. Davis 

432 S. Jackson St. 
John P. Fox 

P. O. Box 167 
James S. Gore 

P. O. Box 367 
A. E. Hawkins 

P. O. Box 266 


Richard M. Allen 

P. O. Box 688 
W. Dean Belk, Jr. 

P. O. Box 229 
Joe M. Buchanan 

P. O. Box 654 
Arthur B. Clark 

P. O. Box 229 
Frank O. Crosthwait, Jr. 

100 Court St. 
Howard Q. Davis 

P. O. Box 229 
Howard Q. Davis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 229 
Aaron M. Edwards 

210 Sunflower Ave. 
Alex B. Gates 

P. O. Box 229 

John T. Haltom 

P. O. Box 654 
Gordon L. Lyon 

100 Court St. 
J. H. Price 
David M. Quinn, Jr. 

P. O. Box 172 
G. P. Ritchey 

P. O. Box 628 
Champ T. Terney 

100 Court St. 


Cleveland Davis 

P. O. Box 98 
Robert Leon Mangum 

Rt. 2 
Perry W. Morton 

P. O. Box 82 


John Walter Garrard 
P. O. Box 173 


J. O. Clark 

Elm Shopping Center N. 
Richard O. Clark 

Elm Shopping Center N. 
James Barry Finch 

P. O. Box 335 
J. D. Finch 
William Carr Lowrance 

Rt. 4 
Cecil L. Sumners 

311 S. Fulton St. 


Lynn D. Abernethy, Jr. 

6561 Rich wood Dr. 
Thomas G. Abernethy, Jr. 

5811 Kings Place 
James Milton Abram 

121. N. Farish St. 
Lee B. Agnew, Sr. 

418 Yazoo St. 
L. M. Adams 

5025 Wayneland Dr., 
Apt. C-4 
Lee Bryant Agnew, Jr. 

5573 Hartsdale Dr. 
John E. Aldridge 

P. O. Box 1699 



Chalmers W. Alexander 

P. O. Box 291 
James Alexander, Jr. 

P. O. Box 410 
Julian P. Alexander 

1040 Milner Bldg. 
Paul G. Alexander 

P. O. Box 807 
William A. Allain 

P. O. Box 220 
James E. Allen 

P. O. Box 1200 
Leigh B. Allen, III 

P. O. Box 119 
Sam S. Allred 

218 S. President St. 
Alex Alston 

P. O. Drawer 1532 
Lester Alvis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1507 
Daniel Thomas Anderson 

P. O. Box 263 
Reuben Vincent Anderson 

1206 Dewey St. 
Carl F. Andre 

4445 Audubon Park Dr. 
Lloyd Arnold 

P. O. Box 22622 
George M. Arthur 

5705 Ridgewood Rd. 
B. Galloway Austin 

518 E. Pascagoula St. 
William A. Bacon 

P. O. Box 15 
James T. Baggett 

5655 Clinton Blvd. 
Oliver Ray Bailey, Jr. 

5347 Keele St. 
Emily V. Baker 

P. O. Box 1345 
Maston Leland Ballew, III 

949 Morningside Terrace 
Fred Lee Banks, Jr. 

538| N. Farish St. 
Taunya Marita Banks 

2361 Montebella Dr. 
Judge Charles T. Barber 

County Court House 
Frank Barber 

1504 State Office Bldg. 
Harold J. Barkley, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1631 

Henry E. Barksdale 

P. O. Box 2337 
James A. Barnett 

P. O. Box 2442 
Rober G. Barnett 

P. O. Box 1200 
Ross R. Barnett 

P. O. Box 1288 
Ross R. Barnett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1288 
John Edward Bat 

575 Woodward Ave. 
Stephen L. Beach, Jr. 

P. O. Box 663 
Stephen L. Beach, III 

P. O. Box 663 
Loyd Lamar Beacham, Jr. 

822 Plaza Bldg. 
Bobby Ray Beatty 

P. O. Box 1127 
James A. Becker, Jr. 

P. O. Box 650 
Thomas A. Bell 

P. O. Box 1084 
J. A. Bellan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2599 
Marshall G. Bennett 

282 Sun Dr. 
Richard Thomas Bennett 

P. O. Box 326 
Walter Berry 

P. O. Box 1199 
Robert A. Biggs, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1370 
Herbert Wingfield Biggs 

5455 Kaywood 
Louis S. Bills, Jr. 

P. O. Box 622 
Richard A. Billups, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1056 
Alvin Binder 

P. O. Box 25 
Samuel E. Birdsong, Jr. 

4047 Pine Hill Dr. 
Melvin B. Bishop 

512 E. Pearl St. 
Walter R. Bivins 

235 Cooper Rd, 
D. Carl Black, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22567 
Maurice Black 

P. O. Box 220 

William P. Black 

5939 Baxter Dr. 
Jack W. Blasingame 

704 Forrest Ave. 
Jerry Holmes Blount 

512 E. Pearl St. 
Grover L. Boone 

4660 Meadowridge Dr. 
Singleton Smith Bonner 

P. O. Box 528 
James A. Boone 

P. O. Box 2182 
Carl C. Bostic 

200 S. President 
Francis S. Bowling 

425 Tombigbee St. 
Hartwell Bowling 

P. O. Box 78 
Richard C. Bradley 

406 Rollingwood Dr. 
Joe Alister Brady, Jr. 

530 Pennsylvania Ave. 
Judge Tom P. Brady 

New Capitol 
Jack W. Brand 

P. O. Box 22489 
Bill Claud Breazeale 

4330 Liberty Hill Rd. 
Dan E. Breland 

P. O. Box 765 
Charles A. Brewer 

P. O. Box 1631 
Thomas J. Brewer, Jr. 

P. O. Box 5602 
Billy G. Bridges 

P. O. Box 5767 
Craig Brigsten 

P. O. Box 1242 
Kenneth M. Britt 

1829 Dep. Gty. Bk. 
Charles L. Brocato 

P. O. Box 22 
Gordon Broom 

753 Woodlake Dr. 
Harmon W. Broom 

P. O. Box 1275 
R. H. Broome 

P. O. Box 5915 
Joseph E. Brown, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2091 



J. T. Brown 

P. O. Box 291 
R. Jess Brown 

125^ N. Farish St. 
William Howard Brown, Jr. 

690 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
W. F. Browning, Jr. 

4730 Shadow Wood Dr. 
Douglas H. Brumfield 

165 Carmel Ave. 
E. L. Brunini 

P. O. Box 119 
Edmund Lawrence 
Brunini, Jr. 

P. O. Box 119 
Henry Warren Bryan 

P. O. Box 743 
Clifton E. Bryant 

4250 Athens Dr. 
Noel W. Buckley 

1251 First Ave. 
Gary E. Bufkin 

P. O. Box 1172 
James D. Buford 

P. O. Box 1172 
Donald V. Burch 

216 Ellis Ave. 
Delos H. Burks 

New Capitol 
Robert Burns 

P. O. Box 131 
Jack C. Burrell 

P. O. Box 78 
Charles W. Busby 

126 S. President St. 
William A. Busby 

418 Yazoo St. 
Charles C. Bush 

1602 Standard Life Bldg. 
George H. Butler 

P. O. Box 22567 
Joseph B. Cadwallader 

245 Sykes Rd. 
T. Eugene Caldwell 

P. O. Box 1704 
James E. Caldwell 

1230 St. Ann St. 
K. Hayes Callicutt 

P. O. Box 1172 
Robert C. Cannada 

P. O. Box 22567 

Natie P. Caraway 

P. O. Box 2337 
Taylor Carlisle 

756 E. Northside Dr. 
Geraldine Harrington 

603 N. Farish St. 
Robert M. Carpenter 

Dept. Gty. Natl. Bk. 
Lyle Carroll 

P. O. Box 1136 
Charles A. Carter 

P. O. Box 2216 
William O. Carter, Jr. 

P. O. Box 651 
Craig Castle 

P. O. Box 566 
Edward L. Cates 

P. O. Box 2005 
Reynolds Cheney 

P. O. Box 1666 
James K. Child, Jr. 

P. O. Box 651 
W. M. Childress 

P. O. Box 12 
Bernard W. Chill 

P. O. Drawer 2427 
Clifford C. Chittim 

P. O. Box 427 
Anson Bob Chunn 

2419 Nottingham Rd. 
Judge Charles Clark 

U. S. Court House 
Grover C. Clark 

140 W. Pearl St. 
Hollis M. Clark 

135 Sivley Ave. 
John B. Clark 

211 Sun Dr. 
Neal Clement 

1411-13 Standard 
Life Bldg. 
James L. Clemons 

1105 Garden Park Dr. 
John W. Coalter 

325 Sun Dr. 
William Thad Cochran 

P. O. Box 650 
J. W. Cocke 

1339 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
John V. Cockrell 

1816 St. Ann St. 

Marvin A. Cohen 

P. O. Box 427 
Curtis E. Coker 

P. O. Box 1084 
Walter D. Coleman 

1330 N. State St. 
William Dewitt Coleman 

828 Briarfield Rd. 
William F. Coleman 

425 Tombigbee 
Aline J. Collum 

416 Plaza Bldg. 
James Ousley Conner 

821 Madison 
Henry D. Cook 

1216 Raymond Rd. 
Fred L. Cooper 

439 Boehle St. 
Robert F. Cooper, Jr. 

1335 Linden Place 
James P. Cothren 

425 Tombigbee St. 
John R. Countiss, III 

P. O. Box 241 
Hansell August Courtney 

1239 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Bobby Louis Covington 

P. O. Drawer 2428 
Tom Coward, Jr. 

220 S. President St. 
Frederick G. Cox, Jr. 

P. O. Box 4311 
Justin Lamar Cox 

P. O. Box 22489 
Judge William Harold Cox 

P. O. Box 2447 
William Harold Cox, Jr. 

1741 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Merrida Powell Coxwell 

P. O. Box 10332 
John A. Crawford 

P. O. Box 22567 
Robert Adkins Crawford 

927 Cooper Rd. 
James Hiram Creekmore 

628 Electric Bldg. 
Rufus Creekmore 

822-25 Plaza Bldg. 
Wade H. Creekmore, Jr. 

628 Electric Bldg. 
Wade H. Creekmore 

1000 Plaza Bldg. 



Thomas R. Crews 

P. O. Box 410 
Alfred N. Crisler 

431 Tombigbee Ct. Sq. 
Bert Crisler 

813 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Charles W. Crisler, Jr. 

431 Tombigbee Ct. Sq. 
James Walter Crisler 

3605 Old Canton Rd. 
Tom Crockett 

P. O. Box 22628 
Earl R. Cruthirds 

4580 Old Canton Rd. 
E. Hugh Cunningham, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1288 
Arthur Dale Currie 

805 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
James Yeager Dale 

720 Gillespie St. 
Joe H. Daniel 

P. O. Box 1084 
Dale Banks, Jr. 

623 Bankers Trust 
Plaza Bldg. 
R. A. Darden 

3438 Old Canton Rd. 
Thomas Edwin Davidson 

P. O. Box 663 
Charles R. Davis 

P. O. Drawer 1532 
Jack Roy Davis 

218 S. President St. 
James L. Davis 

110 Poinciana Dr. 
Joe Sanford Deaton 

4243 Meadowland Dr. 
Joe Dehmer, Jr. 

P. O. Box 291 
Henry Lee Denton, Jr. 

5372 Jamaica Dr. 
Albert Dickens, Jr. 

300 Church Svgs. Bldg. 
R. R. Dinsmore 

4096 Redwing Ave. 
J. Hubern Dodd 

212 Barnett Bldg. 
Billy Dogette 

5737 Brownlee Dr. 
Warren C. Dorsey, Jr. 

Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 

Richard W. Dortch 

P. O. Box 119 
James K. Dossett 

1801 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
James K. Dossett, Jr. 

1801 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Angelo John Dorizas 

2002 Robinson St. 
John H. Downey 

611 Barnett Bldg. 
Colbert Dudley 

2329 Oakhurst Dr. 
Vardaman S. Dunn 

1741 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Bradford J. Dye, Jr. 

1948 Cherokee Dr. 
Douglas R. Duke 

P. O. Box 1172 
P. H. Eager, Jr. 

P. O. Box 650 
Al D. Eatmon 

309 First Fed. Svgs. Bldg. 
Barney Edward Eaton, III 

P. O. Box 2448 
Grady Jyles Eaves 

E. Amite St. Plaza Bldg. 
John Arthur Eaves 

Plaza Bldg. 
Richard Mack Edmonson 

P. O. Box 326 
Allan T. Edwards 

707 Plaza Bldg. 
E. Ray Edwards 

1250 Petroleum Bldg. 
William E. Ellington 

P. O. Box 504 
Joseph B. Ellioitt 

P. O. Box 22527 
J. L. Enochs 

1035 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Lura Clark Ethridge 

P. O. Box 119 
Judge W. N. Ethridge, Jr. 

New Capitol Bldg. 
Clyde V. Eubanks 

P. O. Box 10087 
Don Evans 

P. O. Box 1695 
George Q. Evans 

P. O. Box 651 
William D. Evans 

202£ W. Capitol 

R. D. Everett 

507 N. Park Dr. 
Jack H. Ewing 

P. O. Box 330 
Michael P. Fedorak, Sr. 

1500 E. Woodrow Wilson 
Bethel Ferguson 

Miss. Power & Light 
Douglas Mims Ferris 

1111 St. Ann 
Robert D. Findley 

P. O. Box 743 
Grey Flowers 

P. O. Box 2022 
Henry G. Flowers 

P. O. Box 609 
W. B. Fontaine 

1623 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Harry Lanier Beach Foote 

2944 Terry Rd. 
Aaron L. Ford 

609 Plaza Bldg. 
Cecil A. Ford 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Dennis M. Ford 

P. O. Box 1775 
Victor John Ford 

129 Pasa Robles 
Hugh Craig Forshner 

604 Magnolia State Bldg. 
John D. Fournet 

P. O. Box 1031 
John H. Fox, III 

P. O. Box 22547 
Lawrence J. Franck 

P. O. Box 22567 
J. B. Franklin 

P. O. Box 12 
Lawrence C. Franklin 

P. O. Box 444 
Kenneth I. Franks 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Billy J. Fulgham 

% Governor's Office 
Gabriel M. Fuqua 

P. O. Box 1083 
Louis A. Fuselier 

P. O. Box 95 
Joe Dewitt Gallaspy 

823 Winn St. 



Sara Edith Gallaspy 

823 Winn St. 
Sam Hooper Gammill 

1509 Poplar Blvd. 
Evelyn Gandy 

727 Arlington St. 
Leman Dale Gandy 

172 Clyde St. 
James L. Garner, Jr. 

1304 Riverwood Dr. 
Arthur G. Gearheard, III 

611 Barnett Bldg. 
Martha W. Gerald 

P. O. Box 22489 
Walter J. Gex, III 

P. O. Box 1172 
P. Olney Gibson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 743 
A. Spencer Gilbert, III 

P. O. Box 651 
Karen Annette Gilfoy 

3759 Kings Hwy. 
Don A. Gill 

P. O. Box 4271 
Judge R. G. Gillespie 

New Capitol Bldg. 
Robert G. Gillespie, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1729 
Thomas P. Givens 

P. O. Box 1225 
William F. Goodman 

P. O. Box 650 
Paul Roger Googe, Jr. 

5115 Shirlwood Dr. 
Weaver E. Gore, Jr. 

P. O. Box 186 
John G. Gourlay, Jr. 

P. O. Box 427 
William A. Gowan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22628 
Robert S. Graham 

P. O. Box 1841 
Brelon E. Grantham, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1773 
R. Gordon Grantham 

P. O. Box 119 
Charles L. Graves 

185 Thompson St. 
Elizabeth W. Grayson 

P. O. Box 650 
Elmore D. Greaves 

P. O. Box 426 

Garner W. Green 

P. O. Box 1666 
Garner W. Green, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1666 
Joshua Green 

P. O. Box 1666 
John M. Grower 

P. O. Box 119 
Judge Carl E. Guernsey 

215 Courthouse 
Claude W. Guice 

4313 Ridgewood Rd. 
Stephen L. Guice 

1500 Woodrow Wilson 
Van Douglas Gunter 

4256 Forest Park Dr. 
Charles C. Hairston 

P. O. Box 1269 
Doric Hakes 

348 Sylvian Trail 
Carsie A. Hall 

121 N. Farish St. 
Lowell D. Hamilton 

P. O. Box 899 
Richard B. Hamilton 

1957 Meadowbrook Rd. 
Robert B. Hamilton 

P. O. Box 275 
W. Jeff Hamm 

P. O. Box 97 
Marshal E. Hanbury 

3785 Northview Dr. 
Timmie Hancock 

850 N. Jefferson 
Bobby Ray Hardin 

515 Yazoo St. 

Patrick Nicholas 

Harkins, III 

P. O. Box 650 
Charles Edward Harper 

P. O. Box 727 
Nolan Sidney Harper 

P. O. Box 1791 
Alan H. Harrigill 

1120 Bankers Trust 
Plaza Bldg. 
Herbert F. Harris 

4558 Eastwood Rd. 
William R. Harris 

1615 Pine Ridge PI. 
Newt P. Harrison 

P. O. Box 119 

Robert W. Hartford 

P. O. Box 2247 
Robert E. Hauberg 

P. O. Box 2091 
Ben Hawkins 

P. O. Box 4714 
George W. Haynes 

P. O. Box 686 
Jay Homer Hedgepeth 

P. O. Box 1467 
T. H. Hedgepeth 

P. O. Box 1467 
Cecil F. Heidelberg, Jr. 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Scott P. Hemleben 

P. O. Box 22489 
Leon F. Hendrick 

P. O. Box 1473 
Jimmy Alexander Henry 

1025 Branch St. 
Charles B. Henley 

P. O. Box 326 
Byron T. Hetrick 

P. O. Box 1818 
George P. Hewes, III 

P. O. Box 119 
L. B. Hilburn 

P. O. Box 1793 
John Hill 

4911 Old Canton Rd. 
J. T. Hill 

1363 Belvoir 
Joe W. Hobbs 

P. O. Box 650 
E. Clifton Hodge, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22567 
Clarence H. Holland 

New Capitol Bldg. 
David Holderfield 

4645 Kirkley Dr. 
Edwin R. Holmes, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2091 
Richard B. Holmes 

P. O. Box 1640 
Alben Norris Hopkins 

P. O. Box 1084 
Hugh S. Hopkins 

P. O. Box 1145 
Calvin A. Hopper, Jr. 

955 Park Ln. 
Frank C. Horton 

P. O. Box 1084 



Judge W. T. Horton 

1001 Monroe St. 
Jones H. Hoskins 

%Miss. Valley Title 
Ins. Co. 
Homer Lee Howie 

161 E. Pearl St. 
Joseph H. Howie 

P. O. Box 724 
Theodore G. Huffman 

1322 Hazel St. 
Charles E. Hughes 

P. O. Box 25 
Joe Jack Hurst 

P. O. Box 131 
H. L. Hutcherson 

P. O. Box 1699 
John Reese Hutcherson 

P. O. Box 119 
Edgar D. Ingels, III 

200 Wood Dale Dr. 
Cecil E. Inman, Jr. 

316 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Judge William H. Inzer 

New Capitol 
Forrest B. Jackson 

P. O. Box 124 
Samuel N. Jennings 

P. O. Box 1450 
Harmel Johnson 

475 Eminence Row 
Larry L. Johnson 

1510 N. State St. 
Otis Johnson, Jr. 

690 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Willis Howard Johnson, Sr. 

3129 Adrienne Dr. 
E. Grady Jolly, Jr. 

512 E. Pearl St. 
Ben Block Jones 

P. O. Box 2511 
Fannie Elizabeth Jones 

3615 Hawthorne Dr. 
Paul Tudor Jones 

P. O. Drawer 1532 
Judge Robert Lee Jones 

New Capitol 
P. Zeb Jones 

P. O. Box 807 
Shirley Norwood Jones 

P. O. Box 1666 

W. Roger Jones 

P. O. Box 22561 
William Timothy Jones 

P. O. Drawer 119 
John T. Kabbes 

P. O. Box 1818 
Harry Lee Kelley 

210 Barnett Bldg. 
James E. Kemp 

P. O. Box 651 
Henry M. Kendall 

P. O. Box 330 
W. D. Kendall 

200 Petroleum Bldg. 
Earl Keyes 

P. O. Box 528 
John Major Kinard 

Morningside Terrace — 

Bobbie L. King 

130 N. Grandview Circle 
Robert W. King 

P. O. Box 123 
Curtis G. Kirby 

418 Barnett Bldg. 
James D. Kirby 

111. Central RR 
Thomas Davis Kirschten 

Miss. Supreme Court 
Lee G. Kirk 

5964 Westmore Dr. 
James P. Knight, Jr. 

P. O. Box 161 
John Kuykendall 

P. O. Box 961 
Don Preston Lacy 

127 Barnes St. 
E. E. Laird, Jr. 

P. O. Box 291 
Ralph L. Landrum 

1121 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Roger C. Landrum 

P. O. Box 22567 
James Jerry Langford 

P. O. Box 131 
Thomas F. Larche, Sr. 

P. O. Box 4253 
William Larry Latham 

P. O. Box 1084 
M. Scott Lawyer 

1904 Bellewood Rd. 

Tommie Christine Layton 

P. O. Box 1012 
Catherine Warren Lee 

500 First Federal Bldg. 
Dan M. Lee 

200 Petroleum Bldg. 
J. Larry Lee 

4460 Azalea Dr. 
Robert M. Lee 

136 E. Griffith 
Horace Baxter Lester, Jr. 

1350 Eastover Dr. 
Melvyn Rosenman 

528| N. Farish St. 
M. A. Lewis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1353 
Roland C. Lewis 

P. O. Box 1695 
W. Baldwin Lloyd 

901 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Edward P. Lobrano, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1172 
Thomas G. Lilly 

P. O. Box 651 
L. H. Long 

1727 St. Ann 
Glenn M. Longino 

829 Arlington St. 
Fred J. Lotterhos 

P. O. Box 2292 
Martha G. Love 

P. O. Box 1345 
Connie Mack Lloyd 

3304 Casa Grande 
John M. Luckett 

614 Barnett Bldg. 
G. Lowrey Lucas 

P. O. Box 25 
Jack H. Lucas 

P. O. Box 54 
Warren V. Ludlam, Jr. 

P. O. Box 427 
G. Garland Lyell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 220 
Daniel Eugene Lynn 

P. O. Box 2091 
Oscar P. Mackey 

P. O. Box 220 
B. F. Madole 

P. O. Box 4374, 
Fondren Station 



Joe W. Magee 

4537 Office Park Dr. 
Otho Magee 

2055 Flowers 
Frank E. Magill 

P. O. Box 1972 

A. W. Magruder, Jr. 
515 Yazoo St. 

Lauch Magruder, Jr. 

1801 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Thomas J. Mallette 

2418-236 Bldg. 
John P. Maloney 

P. O. Box 1200 
Michael J. Malouf 

Suite 420, 

236 E. Capitol St. 
Lee Mansell 

1331 Kimwood Dr. 
Roland D. Marble 

P. O. Box 131 
E. Michael Marks 

214 Bkrs. Trust Plaza 
James L. Martin 

1744 Cheswood Dr. 
Charles A. Marx 

P. O. Box 958 
Herman Milton Mason 

5941 Whitstone Rd. 
Lynel Echols Massie 

1239 Dep. Gty. Natl. Bk. 
J. Morton Matrick 

1123 Garden Park Dr. 
John L. Maxey, II 

123 E. Griffith St. 
James Dent May 

P. O. Box 2216 
Mansul Charles May 

1965 Edward Ln. 
Walter Dent May 

P. O. Box 42 
Rose P. May 

540 Woodbury Rd. 
Velia Ann Mayer 

P. O. Box 220 
Charles R. Mayfield, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2192 
Robert Travis McAdory 

P. O. Box 2599 

B. B. McClendon 

903 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 

George T. McClintock 

P. O. Box 1288 
A. B. McCraw 

1922 Belvedere Dr. 
Jaffa W. McCraney 

5518 Concord Dr. 
Dan McCullen 

P. O. Box 22567 
John L. McDavid 

P. O. Box 326 
Sarah Ann McDaird 

P. O. Box 1467 
C. Wallace McGehee, Jr. 

P. O. Box 3576 
R. B. McGehee, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1954 
Roger L. McGehee, Jr. 

130 Wesley Ave. 
Judge M. M. McGowan 

Circuit Court 
Raymond L. McGuire 

P. O. Box 811 
James Grant Mclntyre 

417 Barnett Bldg. 
James M. McKay 

P. O. Box 1200 
M. Curtiss McKee 

P. O. Box 651 
Curtis W. McKewen 

1103 Alta Vista Blvd. 
Dale McKibben 

P. O. Box 22561 
William E. McKinley 

418 Yazoo St. 
Martin McLendon 

P. O. Box 22489 
Clyde A. McLeod 

P. O. Box 1849 
James N. McLeod 

621 Eagle Ave. 
Harry McMain 

P. O. Box 3467 
Orland Murray McNeely 

930 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
David McMullan 

P. O. Box 427 
Jack F. McPeak 

P. O. Box 1972 
C. Eugene McRoberts, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22567 
George D. Meek 

619 Mohawk Ave. 

George O. Miles 

518 E. Capitol St. 
William Edward Miller, II 

P. O. Box 2899 
Harold D. Miller, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22567 
Claude Milstead 

1305 Woodcrest Dr. 
Cecil M. Mitchell 

165 Bristol Blvd. 
Milton H. Mitchell 

P. O. Box 2216 
E. W. Montgomery, II 

P. O. Box 724 
Hugh C. Montgomery, Jr. 

1801 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Lloyd Madison 

Montgomery, Jr. 

660 Forest Ave. 
Malcolm B. Montgomery 

P. O. Box 1288 
Samuel A. Montgomery 

809 N. State St. 
W. W. Moffett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 3320 W J S 
Charles O. Moore 

P. O. Box 16125 
E. Don Moore 

P. O. Box 10087 
Northside Station 
Frank T. Moore, Jr. 

P. O. Box 22489 
Judge Russel D. Moore, III 

P. O. Box 171 
William S. Moore 

200 Petroleum Bldg. 
Dan W. Morse 

604 Bkrs. Trust Plaza 
W. E. Morse 

601 Bkrs. Trust Plaza 
Donald Morrison 

P. O. Box 22628 
Thomas Earl Mullen 

P. O. Box 2026 
Henry H. Mounger 

P. O. Box 1041 
William H. Mounger, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1651 
Adrian E. Mullen 

1746 Hillview Dr. 



Jean Denman Muirhead 
1344 Dunleith Place 

Corwin G. Muse, Jr. 
P. O. Box 11267 

John Herr Musser, IV 

327 Briarwood Dr. 
George Lee Nassar 

3902 W. Capitol St. 
George S. Neal, Jr. 

P. O. Box 945 
William H. Neely 

P. O. Box 78 
William T. Neely 

P. O. Box 17 
James H. Neeld, III 

300 Shamrock Bldg. 
R. Hugo Newcomb, Jr. 

1078 Meadowbrook Rd. 
Hugo Newcomb 

New Capitol Bldg. 
John A. Nichols 

538| N. Farish St. 
James W. Newman, III 

328 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Robert G. Nichols, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1526 
Samuel J. Nicholas, Jr. 

604 Webster St. 
Wayne L. Nix 

P. O. Box 291 
Henry Russell Nobles 

781 Gillespie St. 
James W. Nobles 

P. O. Box 1288 
J. T. Noblin 

P. O. Box 651 
James W. O'Mara 

P. O. Box 22567 
Junior O'Mara 

P. O. Box 22567 
Emile C. Ott 

P. O. Box 95 
N. W. Overstreet, Jr. 

P. O. Box 961 
John Mack Osborne, Jr. 

724 Chickasaw 
Harry D. Owen 

P. O. Box 2599 
James Z. Palmertree, Jr. 

104 Catalina Circle 
Derek Parker 

839 Fairview St. 

Rufus Eugene Parker, Jr. 

507 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Richard Wayne Parker 

300 Old Canton Rd. 
George Collins Pate 

1103 Manship St. 
Judge J. Neville Patterson 

New Capitol Bldg. 
William Nye Patterson 

631 Forest Ave. 
W. R. Patterson 

850 W. Capitol St. 
Mary Libby Payne 

401 -D New Capitol 
Thomas B. Payne 

4801 N. State St. 
James A. Peden, Jr. 

507 Merigold Dr. 
Thomas E. Pegram, III 

905 N. Congress St., 
Apt. 10 
Rufus Wilson Peebles, Jr. 

3971 Council Circle 
Charles Pendleton 

P. O. Box 584 
John L. Penny 

313 Wacaster 
Kenneth Giles Perry 

P. O. Box 1172 
Robert Perry 

P. O. Box 22628 
James Brady Persons 

1801 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Edward J. Peters 

P. O. Box 22628 
M. J. Peterson 

P. O. Box 4547 
Ellen L. Pfister 

P. O. Box 521 
Rubel L. Phillips 

P. O. Box 22628 
James A. Phyfer 

501 E. Pearl St. 
W. W. Pierce 

300 Shamrock Bldg. 
George B. Pickett, Jr. 

1717 E. Northside Dr. 
Bob W. Pittman 

P. O. Box 1849 
Barry H. Powell 

300 Shamrock Bldg. 

Gilbert Bailey Powell 

P. O. Box 8153 
John R. Poole 

214 Plaza Bldg. 
Roy D. Powell 

P. O. Box 22493 
Thomas W. Prewitt 

P. O. Box 22567 
John H. Price, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 1532 
Thomas Bennett Price 

1158 Argor Vista 
Victor B. Pringle, Jr. 

1009 Meadow Brook Rd. 
Robert A. Pritchard 

300 Shamrock Bldg. 
Fred H. Purser, Jr. 

812 Timberlain Dr. 
John M. Putnam 

P. O. Box 2075 
L. Arnold Pyle 

P. O. Box 427 
William A. Pyle 

P. O. Box 427 
Dixon Pyles 

507£ E. Pearl 
John D. Quarles, Jr. 

935 Branch St. 
James Rankin 

P. O. Box 220 
Robert D. Ray 

200 Petroleum Bldg. 
Woodrow W. Reagan 

1316 Kimwood Dr. 
William C. Reed, Jr. 

809 N. State St. 
Jimmie B. Reynolds, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2337 
Donald K. Richards 

1503 Wilhurst St. 
Charles C. Richmond 

2601 Lake Circle Dr. 
Bernard L. Riddick 

145 Catalina Circle 
C. R. Ridgway 

P. O. Box 187 
Louis E. Ridgway, Jr. 

P. O. Box 187 
William B. Ridgway 

P. O. Box 187 
A. H. Ritter, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1200 



Jack L. Ritter 

P. O. Box 701 
John M. Roach 

P. O. Box 1084 
W. E. Robbins 

5058 Old Canton Rd. 
Nolle T. Roberts 

309 Barnett Bldg. 
Frank A. Robertson 

P. O. Box 95 
Judge Stokes V. 
Robertson, Jr. 

New Capitol Bldg. 
Sidney A. Robinson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 920 
Stuart Robinson 

1120 Bkrs. Trust Plaza 
Frederick F. Roberts, Jr. 

1431 Canton Mart Rd. 
Judge Henry Lee Rodgers 

New Capitol 
Guy N. Rogers 

P. O. Box 220 
Joe B. Rogers 

P. O. Box 205 
Fred A. Ross, Sr. 

P. O. Box 4321 
Fondren Station 
Howard C. Ross, Jr. 

309 Fst. Fed. Svgs. Bldg. 
Fred A. Ross, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1324 
Abe A. Rotwein 

P. O. Box 22582 
Fred T. Rucker, III 

P. O. Box 1176 
Roderick S. Russ, Jr. 

3726 Crane Blvd. 
Glenn M. Russum 

602 Barnett Bldg. 
Darold L. Rutland 

P. O. Box 862 
Thomas E. Royals 

717 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
David Sadler 

P. O. Box 9634 
Northside Station 
Natale A. Salvo 

P. O. Box 4593 
L. F. Sams, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1084 

Thomas W. Sanford 

P. O. Box 22493 
Charles W. Satterfield 

5383 Keele 
Clarence R. Scales 

P. O. Box 1176 
Jewelle Scales 

202£ W. Capitol 
Patrick Hugh Scanlon 

930 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
E. G. Scott 

P. O. Box 1818 
Frank T. Scott 

729 Fairview St. 
Sam E. Scott 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Tom B. Scott, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1818 
William F. Selph, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1567 
Dugas Shands 

1121-23 Fst. Natl. Bk. 
John A. Shanks 

4635 Hazlewood Dr. 
George E. Shaw, Jr. 

P. O. Box 289 
Dan H. Shell 

P. O. Box 1172 
A. Jerry Sheldon 

P. O. Box 22489 
Ernest L. Shelton 

712 Plaza Bldg. 
Leon Shelton 

221 N. President St. 
N. R. ShoemakeT 

P. O. Box 1954 
Walter L. Shows 

P. O. Box 2355 
Eugene A. Simmons 

402 Lamar Life Bldg. 
Constance lona Slaughter 

233 N. Farish St. 
J. E. Skinner 

839 Gty. Natl. Bk. 
Bennett E. Smith 

1105 Woolfolk Bldg. 
Conner D. Smith 

414-236 E. Capitol St. 
Judge L. A. Smith, Jr. 

New Capitol Bldg. 

L. O. Smith, Jr. 

P. O. Box 15 
Neal Smith 

P. O. Box 1524 
Stone M. Smith 

P. O. Box 1729 
William C. Smith 

P. O. Drawer 2428 
Wayne Snuggs 

1121 Ridgewood 
James L. Spencer 

523 Plaza Bldg. 
Lawrence Morris Spivey 

3738 Crane Blvd. 
Tatum R. Stacey 

P. O. Box 431 
R. L. Stainton 

P. O. Box 4391 
Herbert Glenn Stampley 

3107 Shirley Dr. 
Perry Stanfield, Jr. 

615 Bkrs. Trust Plaza 
Thomas I. Starling 

P. O. Box 22628 
Horace Steel 

P. O. Box 731 
Lottie M. Steele 

2306 E. Manor St. 
Jerome B. Steen 

P. O. Box 2337 
E. W. Stennett 

P. O. Box 17 
Judge J. C. Stennett 

P. O. Box 868 
John H. Stennis 

P. O. Box 427 
Andrew Sullivan 

3400 W. Capitol 
Hubert Stephens 

P. O. Box 849 
Joseph Taylor Stephens 

Dep. Gty. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Lowell F. Stephens 

P. O. Box 1200 
Francis B. Stevens 

P. O. Box 22567 
Phineas Stevens 

P. O. Box 22567 
Nausead Stewart 

603 N. Farish St. 



Robert N. Stockett, Jr. 

1073 Manship 
John E. Stone 

4212 Brookdale 
R. B. Stovall 

1621 Peach tree St. 
F. Kent Stribling 

P. O. Box 807 
A. C. Stringer 

1463 Meadowbrook Rd. 
Quentin Stringer 

1807 Ridgeover Place 
Forrest W. Stringfellon 

416 Glen Rose Dr. 
D. R. Stump 

4115 Hawthorne Dr. 
W. E. Suddath, Jr. 

P. O. Box 650 
Charles M. Sudduth 

4104 Del Rosa Dr. 
C. Arthur Sullivan 

P. O. Box 2366 
John C. Sullivan 

P. O. Box 528 
John C. Sullivan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 528 
A. F. Summer 

P. O. Box 220 
Minor C. SumneTS, Jr. 

P. O. Box 961 
Valentine Surgis 

P. O. Box 17 
Robert Edward Swindoll 

1449 Morson Rd. 
Thomas M. Tann 

P. O. Box 1505 
Anthony A. Tattis 

P. O. Box 235 
Ernest G. Taylor, Jr. 

P. O. Box 427 
John S. Taylor, Jr. 

1932 Bellewood Rd. 
O. B. Taylor, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 2428 
Rowan H. Taylor 

P. O. Drawer 2428 
Swep S. Taylor, Jr. 

P. O. Box 912 
Scott Tennyson 

1829 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
E. Grant Tharpe 

611 Barnett Bldg. 

Earl T. Thomas 

P. O. Drawer 1532 
William Patrick Thomas 

1216 Wooddell Dr. 
Allen C. Thompson 

810 Fairview 
Clifford C. Thompson 

3941 Redwing Ave. 
Fulton Thompson 

P. O. Box 410 
Helene L. Thompson 

P. O. Box 119 

Luther Moorman 


690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Robert H. Thompson 

P. O. Box 410 
Collis M. Thornell 

365 Francis St. 
W. A. Thornton 

700 N. Jefferson St., 
Apt. 101 
Bernard L. Tighe 

416 Plaza Bldg. 
Bowman Stirling Tighe 

416 Plaza Bldg. 
John E. Tracy 

P. O. Box 5025 
Fondren Station 
Robert C. Trainor 

P. O. Box 4973 
Cecil F. Travis 

P. O. Box 995 
John A. Travis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 807 
John A. Travis, III 

P. O. Box 22567 
L. K. Travis 

4632 N. State St. 
Robert C. Travis 

P. O. Box 651 
John B. Traylor 

P. O. Box 5005 
Betty Bartee Tucker 

507£ E. Pearl St. 
Eddie Howard Tucker 

115| N - Farish St. 
Davey Lewis Tucker 

374 Rollingwood 
James B. Tucker 

P. O. Box 1631 

Luther B. Turbeville 

P. O. Box 291 
Felix J. Underwood, Jr. 

4308 Manhattan Rd. 
Robert W. Upchurch 

2623 Clinton Ave. 
Harlon H. Varnado 

1250 Petroleum Bldg. 
Lynn Douglas Wade 

501 E. Pearl 
Guy Morrison Walker 

P. O. Box 244 
James A. Wallace 

511 Plaza Bldg. 
Laure S. Wallace 

1841 Parkridge Dr. 
Bill Waller 

P. O. Box 22547 
Ben H. Walley 

704 State Office Bldg. 
Charles W. Walton 

P. O. Box 3271 
O. B. Walton, Jr. 

1600 Eastover Dr. 
Erwin C. Ward 

P. O. Box 673 
Howard S. Warner, II 

328 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
H. V. Watkins 

P. O. Box 427 
Thomas H. Watkins 

P. O. Box 650 
Louis H. Watson 

1436 Amherst 
Walker L. Watters 

P. O. Box 22489 
Robert H. Weaver 

P. O. Box 427 
David Thomas Webb, Jr. 

222 N. President St. 
W. Scott Welch, III 

P. O. Box 22567 
Calvin L. Wells 

P. O. Box 22489 
Erskine W. Wells 

P. O. Box 131 
W. Calvin Wells 

P. O. Box 22489 
W. Calvin Wells, Jr. 

P. O. Box 131 
John A. Welsch, Jr. 

P. O. Box 119 



Carol Catherine West 

741 Fairview 
John M. Weston 

P. O. Box 1818 
Charles R. White 

140 W. Pearl 
John Harold White, Jr. 

140 W. Pearl 
Hassell Hendon Whitworth 

P. O. Box 650 
Yandell Wideman 

235 E. Capitol St. 
Samuel H. Wilkins 

P. O. Box 504 
Gene A. Wilkinson 

P. O. Box 673 
Michael C. Wilkinson 

P. O. Box 4932 
Fondren Station 
Frank T. Williams 

P. O. Box 1172 
James L. Williams 

P. O. Box 2425 
Donald W. Williamson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1467 
W. R. Willis 

P. O. Box 743 
Earl R. Wilson 

901 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
James M. Wilson 

P. O. Box 8487 
Richard Baxter Wilson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 651 
William F. Winter 

P. O. Box 427 
Sherwood W. Wise 

P. O. Box 651 
Larry W. Wood 

1431 Canton Mart Rd. 
W. Wayne Wood 

5952 Waverly Dr. 
George F. Woodliff 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Thomas H. Woodrow 

4929 Clinton Blvd. 
Charles S. Wright 

P. O. Box 2201 
W. Swan Yerger 

690 Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Rice P. York 

P. O. Box 22511 

Frances M. Young 

P. O. Box 263 
Jack H. Young 

207 Redmond Bldg. 
Jack H. Young, Jr. 

3760 Brinkley Dr. 
James Leon Young 

930 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
J. Will Young 

930 Dep. Gty. Bk. Bldg. 
Frank M. Youngblood 

P. O. Box 1567 
Thomas Lee Zebert 

404 N. Biederman Rd. 
John B. Zuccaro 

3344 Santa Rosa St. 


John Percy Allen 

300 N. Jackson St. 
William D. Brooks 

105-07 S. Madison St. 
David E. Crawley, Jr. 

Crawley Bldg. 
William Reynolds Ford 

Crawley Bldg. 
D. H. Glass 

P. O. Box 746 
John D. Guyton 

105-07 S. Madison St. 
George Lee Dorrill 

Thornton & Mikell 
Chatwin M. Jackson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 189 
John C. Love, Jr. 

P. O. Box 527 
John C. Love, Sr. 

P. O. Box 527 
Alton Massey 

P. O. Box 189 
Ray S. Mikell 

P. O. Box 658 
Clarence E. Morgan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 721 
John E. Shaw 

112 Cedar Lane Dr. 
G. J. Thornton 

Morgan & Lindsay Bldg. 
Harold W. Williams 

517 Lucas St. 
Claude Jackson Woodward 

Doty Bldg. 


John L. Hopkins 
P. O. Box 85 


Walter E. Dreaden, Jr. 
P. O. Box 215 

Thomas Sharp 
Hoke Stone 


E. R. Alley 

P. O. Box 2744 
Luther Austin 

5th Ave. Office Bldg. 
Ray D. Baldwin 

3815 Baldwin Dr. 
E. C. Bonney 

P. O. Box 957 
H. Harvey Breazeale 

2018 Briarwood Dr. 
Ronald C. Brown 

P. O. Box 171 
James Travis Buckley 

P. O. Box 52 
Kenneth Bullock 

P. O. Box 2008 
John A. Bruce Caldwell 

P. O. Box 726 
J. Edwin Campbell 

P. O. Box 584 
Judge Lunsford Casey 

P. O. Box 185 
Leonard B. Caves 

717 29th Ave. 
Fledell Chain. 

48 Oakcrest Dr. 
Thomas Gene Clark 

P. O. Box 731 
Elson K. Collins 

P. O. Box 732 
Edwin P. Connolly 

P. O. Box 525 
Henry S. Davis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1137 
William M. Deavours 

P. O. Box 106 
W. O. Dillard 

P. O. Box 581 
Sarah L. Entrekin 

768 Northwood Dr. 
E. Brooke Ferris, III 

Gardiner Center Offices 



Carl Dexter Ford 

Rm. 303 Wallace Bldg. 
Denton Gibbes, Jr. 

Box 2008 Choctaw Sta. 
Steward J. Gilchrist 

P. O. Box 106 
Ernest W. Graves 

Box 2008 Choctaw Sta. 
Matthew Harper, Jr. 

P. O. Box 726 
James D. Hester 

P. O. Box 713 
Thomas J. Holifield 

P. O. Box 726 
W. Major Holifield 

P. O. Box 901 
John Leonard Jeffries 

P. O. Box 844 
Harry E. Koch 

P. O. Box 2455 
George D. Maxey 

P. O. Box 731 
Apheus Holland McRae 

P. O. Box 65 
Harold W. Melvin 

P. O. Box 142 
Leonard B. Melvin, Sr. 

P. O. Box 142 
Leonard B. Melvin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 142 
Judge Goode Mont- 
gomery, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 5 
Humphrey C. Moynihan 

P. O. Box 222 
William S. Mullins, III 

P. O. Box 2008 
Choctaw Station 
William Harold Odom 

P. O. Box 354 
L. A. Pacific 

P. O. Box 1860 
Samuel V. Pack 

P. O. Box 706 
Charles W. Pickering 

P. O. Box 713 
L. Percy Quinn 

P. O. Box 1085 
Kalford C. Ratcliff 

P. O. Box 706 
Charles G. Reeder 

% Central Oil Co. 

Quitman Ross 

P. O. Box 464 
A. S. Scott, Sr. 

P. O. Box 403 
A. S. Scott, Jr. 

P. O. Box 403 
Philip E. Stevens 

P. O. Box 434 
William B. Sullivan 

P. O. Box 41 
Jon A. Swartzfager 

P. O. Box 121 
Paul G. Swartzfager 

P. O. Box 121 
Raymond C. Swartzfager, 


P. O. Box 65 
Lowell W. Tew 

P. O. Box 732 
C. H. Walker 

P. O. Box 732 
Guy M. Walker 

P. O. Box 41 
J. Larry Walters 

Arcade Bldg. 
Milton B. Weems 

P. O. Box 106 
Raynold Lee Willett 

10-11 Oferrall Bldg. 


Curtis Breland 

P. O. Box 154 
T. Horton Hillman 

P. O. Box 555 


Edward Joshua Bogen, Jr. 

Broad St. 
Burrell O. McGee 

209 Broad St. 
William B. Waits 

P. O. Box 128 
John C. Webb 

P. O. Drawer 392 
Taylor Webb 

P. O. Box 109 


John William Barrett 

P. O. Box 149 
Pat M. Barrett 

P. O. Box 149 

Pat M. Barrett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 149 
J. R. Gilfoy 

P. O. Drawer 30 
William L. Jordon 

P. O. Box 415 
Calvin R. King 

106 Carrollton St. 
P. P. Lindholm 

P. O. Box 5 
G. H. McMorrough 
Marshall H. Smith 
H. Edwin White 

208 Court Square 


T. F. Badon 

P. O. Box 353 
Mary Jo Poole Forman 

P. O. Drawer L 
Joe D. Gordon 

P. O. Box 268 
Joseph D. Gordon, Jr. 

P. O. Box 268 
Kenneth Gordon 

P. O. Box 373 
F. W. Stratton 

P. O. Box D 


Harold J. Demetz 

York Drive 
Albert E. Easterling, Jr. 

123 Buena Vista Dr. 
James M. Maxwell, Jr. 

400 Gulfview Ave. 
James W. Ware 

215 Cox Ave. 


R. W. Boydstun 

P. O. Box 560 
R. W. Boydstun, Jr. 

P. O. Box 342 
David E. Crawley, III 

P. O. Box 543 
Frank M. Deramus 

P. O. Box 31 
Charles D. Fair 

P. O. Box 509 
J. Hoy Hathorn 

Masonic Bldg. 



James Cal Mayo 

P. O. Box 509 
Edward C. Prisock 

Masonic Bldg. 
Neal Prisock 

Masonic Bldg. 
Burris Oien Smith 

P. O. Box 31 
David T. Wilson, Jr. 

109 McCully Ave. 
Henry C. Wood 


William Thames Bailey 

P. O. Box 265 
John Laverne Dale 

P. O. Box 67 
H. M. Hunter 

Route 1 
Darryl A. Hurt 

P. O. Box 45 
Maurice L. Malone 

P. O. Box 208 
Darwin M. Maples 

P. O. Box 75 
J. O. Moss 

P. O. Box 572 
Andrew M. N. Murphy 

P. O. Box 585 
Williams S. Murphy 
William Avery Wilkerson 

P. O. Box 255 


Michael R. Eubanks 

P. O. Box 527 
Bobby J. Garraway 

P. O. Box 335 
Joseph H. Montgomery 

P. O. Box 392 


E. H. Britton 
Ernest L. Brown 

500 Jefferson St. 
Leroy R. Kenneday 

Jefferson St. 
Jesse P. Stennis 

Jefferson St. 


H. S. Owens 
P. O. Box 7 


Judge Thad Leggett, III 

P. O. Box 307 
O. W. Phillips 

225 E. Bay St. 
Robert S. Reeves 

P. O. Box 508 
William Benjamin Regan 

225 E. Bay St. 
B. D. Statham 

110 N. Cherry St. 
William F. Watkins 

101 N. Cherry St. 


T. M. Bishop 

P. O. Box 623 
L. R. Floyd 

RFD 2, Box 122 
Willis T. Matthews 

P. O. Box 932 


Philip Ross Adams 

Rt. 2, Box 136-A 
Ben M. Caldwell 

P. O. Box 370 
Partee L. Denton 

331 Locust St. 
Ellen E. Goldman 

551 Lamar 
Ney M. Gore, Jr. 

337 First St. 
T. N. Gore 
Lomax Lamb, Jr. 
Larry O'Keefe Lewis 

P. O. Box 370 
Eugene Thompson 

P. O. Box 66 


Will P. Starnes 
P. O. Box 33 


Sidney J. Abdalla, Jr. 

202 Westview Circle 
Louis Alford 

P. O. Box 489 
Clinton Ashley Atkinson 

P. O. Box 155 
Robert W. Brumneld 

P. O. Box 998 

Charles Wayne Dowdy 

P. O. Box 853 
John B. Ewing 

P. O. Box 428 
Norman B. Gillis, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer G 
William S. Guy 

P. O. Box 853 
Judge Bert H. Jones 

L. S. McClaren 

P. O. Box 201 
Gerald M. McMillan 

P. O. Box 73 
John N. Pigott 

P. O. Drawer P 
Clyde Ratcliff 

P. O. Box 81 
R. B. Reeves 

P. O. Box 998 
J. Gordon Roach 

Brent Bldg. 
John Gordon Roach, Jr. 

P. O. Box 506 
Bobby D. Robinson 

P. O. Box 806 
Hansford L. Simmons 

509 Caston 
Wayne R. Sterling 

P. O. Box 592 
Laverne A. Varnado 

P. O. Box 959 
Thomas Halton Walman 

900 Hickory 
John H. White, Jr. 

P. O. Box 672 
William A. Wiltshire 

P. O. Drawer 527 


L. L. Forman 

K. Maxwell Graves, Jr. 

P. O. Box 361 
W. Wilson Hewitt 
M. Bradley Lawrence 

P. O. Box 188 
Nolan M. McCoy 

P. O. Box 265 
H. B. Mayes McGehee 

P. O. Box 188 
Judge James A. Torrey 

Circuit Court 



James A. Torrey, Jr. 

P. O. Box 188 
Sanfred P. Torrey 

P. O. Box 277 


Thomas B. Alexander 
Ras Milton Boyles 

P. O. Box 576 
Grover C. Coleman 

P. O. Box 402 
A. K. Edwards 

P. O. Box 66 
George B. Grubbs 

P. O. Box 217 
Isom C. Harrington 

P. O. Box 217 
Aleita M. Sullivan 

P. O. Box 36 
Thomas H. Sullivan, Jr. 

P. O. Box 37 
J. W. Walker 

P. O. Box 37 
Connie S, Whitfield 

P. O. Box 458 
George G. Williamson 

P. O. Box 687 


J. P. Abston 

208 Lamar Bldg. 
Gerald Adams 

P. O. Box 849 
George W. Allen 

2105 6th St. 
Brad B. Bailey 

2314 17th St. 
L. D. Beard 

207-09 Lamar Bldg. 
Thomas D. Bourdeaux 

P. O. Box 2009 
A. S. Bozeman, Jr. 

2811 20th St. 
Maxie Gene Brown 

P. O. Box 305 
Frank J. Buchanan 

USF & G Bldg. 
Joe G. Byrd 

2810 7th St., Apt. A 
Overton W. Cameron 

P. O. Box 888 
Edwin K. Clayton 

3523 31st Ave. 

W. L. Clayton 

1513 25th St. 
Robert D. Coit 

P. O. Box 424 
William Bond Compton 

P. O. Box 845 
Alfred E. Corey 

P. O. Box 1413 
Lyle V. Corey 

P. O. Box 1413 
J. Michael Corrigan, Jr. 

413 Greater Miss. Life 
Oliver Wendell Cosey 

P. O. Box 643 
Billy R. Covington 

P. O. Box 1904 
J. A. Covington 

P. O. Box 786 
Dal M. Crenshaw 

Meridian Bldg. & 
Loan Bldg. 
Robert H. Crook 

P. O. Box 289 
Thomas W. Dawson 

Citizens Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Robert B. Deen, Jr. 

P. O. Box 888 
Aubert C. Dunn 

P. O. Box 1745 
Edwin A. Dunn 

P. O. Box 1745 
J. Thomas Dunn 

P. O. Box 5333 
Cecil S. Edmundson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 3125 
Walter W. Eppes, Jr. 

Meridian Bldg. & Loan 
Don L. Fruge 

P. O. Box 1088 
G. Rayner Gaillard 

1000 20th Ave. 
Champ C. Gipson 

P. O. Box 804 
J. V. Gipson 

P. O. Box 804 
Wingfield Glover, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1389 
C. Dennis Goldman 

P. O. Box 1625 
Thomas L. Goldman 

P. O. Box 1625 

Thomas W. Goldman, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1625 
Hardy P. Graham 

2000 Country Club Dr. 
William J. Gunn, Jr. 

Meridian Bldg. & Loan 
John M. Harmon 

P. O. Box 1443 
Joe Clay Hamilton 

315 Citizens Natl. Bk. 
Robert Wallace Hamill 

3111 29th Ave. 
Robert Hunter Harmon 

P. O. Box 5028 
Judge J. Emerson Harwell 

County Court 
Thomas M. Hendricks, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1501 
Thomas C. Hogan 

402 25th Ave. 
Thomas K. Holyfield 

308-09 Lamar Bldg. 
Harry L. Hopkins 

Rt. 3, Box 62-A 
Philip D. Hughes 

P. O. Box 1468 
Alvis C. Johnson 

P. O. Box 824 
Granville Jones 

P. O. Box 1562 
S. B. T. Jones 

P. O. Box 711 
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2009 
Maurice F. Kahlmus 

P. O. Box 5658 
Irvin L. Martin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 202 
Dempsey G. Knight, Jr. 

1308 22nd Ave. Hts. 
Jerry Gordon Mason 

426 Citizens Natl. Bk. 
Thomas Y. Minniece 

315 Citizens Natl. Bk. 
S. R. Nettles 

903 31st Ave. 
Paul Mains Neville 

315 Citizens Natl. Bk. 



Judge William Deb Nevill 

P. O. Box 908 
Harold Noe 

P. O. Box 2009 
Joe R. Odom 

P. O. Box 607 
Howard R. Pigford 

P. O. Box 1501 
Claude L. Pitts 

300 Rosenbaum Bldg. 
John Leslie Prichard 

P. O. Box 888 
Thomas Jefferson Prince, Jr. 

Trust Dept. 

Citizens Natl. Bank. 
Lawrence W. Rabb 

413 Greater Miss. Life 
Harvey Blanton Ray 

P. O. Box 5633 
William E. Ready 

P. O. Box 927 
Fred M. Rogers 

1823 34th St. 
Margaret E. Rogers 

2612 19th St. 
James Edgar Sandusky 

P. O. Box 1754 
Daniel P. Self, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1625 
John Rex Shannon 

Rt. 7, Box 152 
C. D. Shields 

P. O. Box 367 
James T. Singley 

P. O. Box 5333 
Kendric Earl Smith 

Route 3 
Timothy R. Smith 

3303 29th Ave. 
E. L. Snow 

P. O. Box 786 
James T. Speed 

P. O. Box 5355 
Frances M. St. Germain 

P. O. Box 5733 
Dequincy V. Sutton 

401 Greater Miss. Life 
W. Arlo Temple 

P. O. Box 786 
Jon P. Thames 

2441 37th Ave. 

Robert L. Tinsley, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1327 
Thomas R. Ward 

P. O. Box 3125 
George D. Warner, Jr. 

P. O. Box 5633 
Homer C. Watkins 

P. O. Box 1952 
Singleton B. Watkins, Jr. 

P. O. Box 205 
Thomas K. Watts 

P. O. Box 786 
J. C. Wilbourn 

P. O. Box 1389 
Richard E. Wilbourn, II 

P. O. Box 1389 
J. Pat Wiley 

P. O. Box 504 
James D. Williams 

P. O. Box 1389 
Marvin Williams 

Meridian Bldg. & Loan 
Donald W. Williamson 

P. O. Box 425 
N. S. Williamson 

P. O. Box 86 
James E. Williamson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 804 
Judge Lester F. Williamson 

P. O. Box 1501 
Gibson B. Witherspoon 

P. O. Box 845 
Henry S. Woodall 

P. O. Box 11 
Robert F. Wright, Jr. 

3102 16th Ave. 
Ralph E. Young 

P. O. Box 888 


James Shelby George 
Jack A. Morris 

P. O. Drawer C 
J. P. Patterson 
Judge E. A. Turnage 

Francis Marvin Vining 

P. O. Drawer 250 


Ben Himelstein 


William M. Richardson, Jr. 
P. O. Box 32 


Charles B. Bratt 

P. O. Box 461 
Louis Fondren 

617 Main St. 
Frank J. Hammond, Jr. 

P. O. Box 356 
Robert T. Mills 

P. O. Box 83 
Richard E. Perkins, Jr. 

312 Dantzler St. 


Atticus A. Calhoun 
Route 2 


Lawrence Adams 

P. O. Box 1377 
Basil G. Ballard 

P. O. Box 1443 
Edwin E. Benoist, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 1344 
Frederick C. Berger 

P. O. Box 1144 
Judge Robert A. Bonds, Jr. 

508 Main St. 
David C. Bramlette 

P. O. Box 1377 
James M. Brandon 

P. O. Box 1344 
J. Walter Brown, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1047 
B. C. Callon 

P. O. Box 640 
Carl A. Chadwick 

P. O. Box 1187 
Vernon H. Chadwick 

P. O. Box 1187 
Curtis L. Collins 

Chancellor 17th Dist. 
E. H. Fitzpatrick, Jr. 

P. O. Box 226 
Brent Forman 

P. O. Box 1377 
W. A. Geisenberger 

7 Fry Bldg. 
Wilfred Wyatt Geisenberger 

30 Oakhurst Dr. 



John T. Green 

110 S. Wall St. 
Thomas K. Green, Jr. 

P. O. Box 262 
Lucien G. Gwin 

P. O. Box 1384 
Lncien G. Gwin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 375 
G. Stuart Handy 

P. O. Drawer 1344 
Graham H. Hicks 

P. O. Box 364 
Oliver M. Hornsby 

P. O. Box 1021 
Eunice V. Johnson 

P. O. Box 1322 
Forrest A. Johnson 

P. O. Box 1322 
James H. Keyer 

Lomond Bldg. 
Robert D. Lee 

P. O. Box 699 
Hugh Lumpkin 

P. O. Box 490 
Anabel Y. Maxie 

P. O. Box 844 
Thomas M. McNeely, Jr. 

116 S. Wall St. 
John E. Mulhean, Jr. 

202 S. Wall St. 
Clyde W. Mullins 

133 S. Commerce St. 
Robert L. Netterville 

P. O. Box 946 
Daniel J. O'Beirne 

P. O. Drawer 1344 
Thomas J. O'Beirne 

6-7 Eola Office Bldg. 
C. F. Patterson 

P. O. Box 92 
Claude Pintard, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1047 
Jack E. Pool 

202 S. Wall St. 
William F. Riley 

P. O. Box 174 
J. Fred Schmidt, Jr. 

304 Auburn Ave. 
S. Barnett Serio, Jr. 

331 Market St. 
Cecil Gill Smith, Jr. 

133 S. Commerce St. 

William Marion Smith 

P. O. Box 1377 
Stanley Leroy Taylor, Jr. 

115 S. Pearl St. 
John Merritt Tipton 

Fry Bldg. 
E. G. Truly 

P. O. Box 1377 
Frank W. Walden 

319 Main St. 
Edwin C. Ward 

P. O. Box 1377 
Calvin B. Wells 

Fry Bldg. 
George Ferdinand 
West, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1202 
Robert Y. Wood, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1047 
Clarence N. Young 

P. O. Box 1407 
Leonard Albert Young 

55 Sgt. Prentiss Dr. 
Joseph S. Zuccaro 

P. O. Box 1047 


J. E. Boone 

P. O. Box 42 
Hugh C. Clayton, Jr. 

Clayton Bldg. 
Hugh N. Clayton 

P. O. Box 157 
W. G. Collins 

Route 4 
Tom Leslie Darden 
Henry H. King 

212 Apple St. 
Baxter N. Knox, Jr. 

P. O. Box 336 
Talmadge D. Littlejohn 

P. O. Box 833 
W. Lester McDonough 

P. O. Box 186 
John David Pennebaker 

P. O. Box 96 
William O. Rutledge, III 

Route 4 
Edgar J. Stephens, Jr. 

P. O. Box 330 
Lester F. Sumners 

P. O. Box 123 


John M. Dunnam, Jr. 
P. O. Box 138 


A. B. Amis, Jr. 
D. M. Anderson 

P. O. Box 7 
W. A. Byrd 

102 Byrd St. 
Pv. S. Ma jure 

P. O. Box 220 
George S. Monroe 

P. O. Box 28 
S. T. Roebuck 

104 N. Main St. 
Singleton B. Watkins, Jr. 

P. O. Box 205 



W. C. Neill 

Peoples Bank & Trust Co. 


John R. Blossman 

206 Shearwater Dr. 
Lynden Bowring 

114 La Fontaine Ave. 
Judge L. C. Corban 

P. O. Box 547 
Alfred Lee Felder 

General Delivery 

A. Y. Harper 

P. O. Box 712 
John L. Heiss, Jr. 

304 Langland Dr. 
Oscar R. Jordan 

914 Washington Ave. 

B. Nowlin Keener, Jr. 
P. O. Box 705 

Russell Moran 

P. O. Drawer A A 
Schuyler Poitevent, Jr. 


Robert K. Coleman 
H. L. Morrison 
Walter M. O'Barr 

P. O. Box 309 
John D. Sibley 

Main St. 




Drue Birmingham, Jr. 


John Howard Shows 
.Route 1 


Vettra Glenn Alderson 

P. O. Box 345 
Charles A. Becker, Jr. 

Rt. 4, Box 18-A 
George Read Blackman 

Rt. 4, Box 15A 
Russell Blair 

426 S. Lamar 
Charles L. Clark 

2162 S. Lamai 
Robin O. Cotten 

626 Park Dr. 
Omar Dell Craig 

P. O. Box 507 
Pegg Ann Dolan 

Hwy. 7 South 
William M. Dye, Jr. 

217 Ross Ave. 
Thomas R. Ethridge 

P. O. Box 566 
Thomas H. Freeland, III 

P. O. Box 269 
James Oliver Ford 

N. MS Rural Legal Serv. 
Gerald A. Gafford 

P. O. Box 269 
Albert Jean Gamot, Jr. 

33 Church St. 
Norman Gillespie 

Ass't U.S. Attorney 
Lowell E. Grisham 

P. O. Box 566 
Will A. Hickman 

P. O. Box 430 
William Walker Joor 

P. O. Box 207 
Joel Joseph Kamp 

211 S. 5th St. 
Clyde Gray Huggins, Jr. 

P. O. Box 8 
William R. Lamb 

P. O. Box 349 
Alfred Eugene Lee 

406 Thomas St. 

James Lewis 

108$ S. Lamar 
William Lewis, Jr. 

P. O. Box 31 
Falton O. Mason, Jr. 

409 S. Lamar 
Robert E. Jack McCormick 

426 S. Lamar 
Taylor H. McElroy 

P. O. Box 269 
John Purves McLaurin, III 

McLaurin Dr. 
Thomas Richard Mayfield 

108£ S. Lamar 
Fred Bar ringer Patt 

518 Tyler Ave. 
F. Edwin Perry 

P. O. Box 345 
J. W. Price 

307 S. Lamar 
H. M. Ray 

P. O. Box 191 
Jean Rand Richey 

Country Club Rd. 
Basil W. Richmond, Jr. 

426 S. Lamar 
Bramlett Roberts 

P. O. Box 507 
William L. Rogers 

1310 Jefferson Ave. 
Alix Henry Sanders 

108| N. Lamar 
R. X. Williams 

1008-10 Van Buren 


Glenn Barlow 

P. O. Box 1241 
W. E. Belt 

P. O. Box 666 
Vincent Blackwell 

P. O. Box 909 
James A. Bowlin 

P. O. Box 2092 
Raymond L. Brown 

P. O. Box 787 
John F. Bryan, III 

P. O. Box 396 
French Caldwell 

P. O. Box 149 
Joe R. Colingo 

P. O. Box H 

James H. Colmer 

P. O. Box 787 
John Gordon Corlew 

706 Meadowbrook Dr. 
Dan Costello 

P. O. Box 2248 
Arvis Cumbest 

P. O. Drawer 1287 
Donald W. Cumbest 

P. O. Drawer 1287 
William B. Dorsey 

345 Watts Ave. 
Guy C. Faggard 

P. O. Box 714 
Henry A. Fly 

P. O. Box 792 
Charles W. Ford 

P. O. Box 100 
Lester C. Franklin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1056 
E. M. Galloway 

P. O. Box 658 
H. Bernard Gautier 

P. O. Box 299 
J. D. Gautier 

312 Canty St. 
Rex Gordon 

P. O. Box 396 
George W. Howell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 149 
Peyton S. Irby, Jr. 

P. O. Box 396 
Albert S. Johnston, III 

P. O. Box 1087 
Ranson P. Jones, III 

1403 Old Mobile Hwy. 
William B. Jones 

P. O. Box 100 
Earl Leslie Koskela 

P. O. Drawer 546 
Jesse Elmo Lang 

P. O. Box 481 
Dempsey M. Levi 

300 Delmas Ave. 
Clinton E. Lockard 

P. O. Box 427 
Chester Lott 

518 Jackson Ave. 
Kenneth W. Martin 

P. O. Box 1303 
Charles J. May, III 

614 Washington Ave. 



O. L. McLeod 

P. O. Box 609 
Carl A. MeGehee 

P. O. Box 787 
Roland J. Mestayer, Jr. 

404 Pascagoula Moss Pt. 
Bk. Bldg. 
Melvin L. Mitchell 

P. O. Box 991 
B. C. Moore 

P. O. Box 1056 
Joe A. Moore 

P. O. Box 100 
William H. Myers 

Bryan & Gordon 
Edward S. Nelson 

P. O. Box 396 
Bobby Gene O'Barr 

P. O. Box 541 
Robert H. Oswald 

P. O. Box 909 
William J. Palmer 

P. O. Box 59 
Judge Merle F. Palmer 

P. O. Box 59 
M. R. Penton 

P. O. Box 506 
Roy W. Pike 

P. O. Drawer 1469 
Willard L. Richardson 

P. O. Box 966 
Kenneth B. Robertson 

P. O. Box 854 
Ernest R. Schroeder 

P. O. Box 100 
Harold M. Seamen 

605 9th St. 
Lloyd Y. Sexton 

P. O. Box 714 
George M. Simmerman 

104 S. Pascagoula St. 
David A. Stewart, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer A A 
Henry L. Tillman 

525 Washington Ave. 
Judge L. A. Watts 

P. O. Box 244 
Pat H. Watts, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 1499 
Charles J. Weeks 

P. O. Box 506 

Karl Wiesenburg 

P. O. Box 26 
Roy C. Williams 

P. O. Box 787 
Edmund A. Wilson 

P. O. Box 415 
Edward Hermann Winnige 

1308 Tyler Ave. 
Fielding L. Wright, Jr. 

408 Lake Ave. 


C. Randall Jones, Jr. 
P. O. Box 283 


Charles G. Clifford 
Rt. 2, Box 231 


Turman L. Clark 

P. O. Box 366 
Gilbert F. Heinbaugh 

P. O. Box 261 
H. B. Lingle 

P. O. Box 695 


Herman W. Alford 

Key Building 
Thomas L. Booker 

461 Evergreen Ave. 
Clayton Lewis 

P. O. Box 162 
Clayton T. Lewis 

P. O. Box 162 
William M. Mars 

Key Building 
Wilburn D. Moore 
Joe Henry Mulholland 

P. O. Box 337 
Judge Robert Prisock 

Bobby F. Sanders 

P. O. Box 81 
Laurel G. Weir 

P. O. Box 156 
William G. Yates, Jr. 

P. O. Box 54 


Sam P. Cooper, Jr. 
P. O. Box 125 

Emile J. Gex, Jr. 

620 Stovall Ave. 
Charles R. Holladay 

P. O. Box 177 

Robert (Rip) I. 

Prichard, III 

P. O. Box 269 
Lonnie Smith 

P. O. Drawer 1076 
Edward H. Stevens, III 
L. Jack Stewart 

P. O. Box 608 
Ray M. Stewart 

P. O. Box 269 
J. E. Stockstill 

203 Picayune Bank Bldg. 
Monroe David Tate, II 

108 E. Canal St. 
Granville H. Williams 

P. O. Drawer 1076 
Robert J. Williams 

P. O. Box 29 


James E. Bost 

P. O. Box 148 
Jackson D. Doty 

First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
William A. Grist 

P. O. Box 118 
Joe Ray Henderson 

P. O. Box 217 
Boudie A. Jaggers 

P. O. Box 364 
Burd P. Mauldin 

512 S. Main St. 
Kendall G. Rayburn 

P. O. Box 124 
William Lowrey Sneed 

Route 1 
Charles D. Thomas 

First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
T. Fred Wicker 

P. O. Box 297 
Joseph E. Winston 


Almond Garry Lumpkin 

108 W. Beers St. 
Martin T. Smith 

P. O. Box 393 



E. B. Williams 

Williams Bldg. 
E. B. Williams, Jr. 

Williams Bldg. 
Lampton O. Williams 

P. O. Box 113 


Jake L. Abraham 
Farmers St. 

William H. Ban- 
Route 2 

Joseph Davenport, Jr. 

Edwin D. Davis 
P. O. Box 602 

Joseph Turpin Drake 

Robert Douglas Gage, III 
P. O. Box 224 

William B. Lowrance 
P. O. Box 523 

P. M. Watkins 
Person Bldg. 

Karl Weil 


Joseph Dale 

P. O. Box 518 
Onette E. W. Johnson 

P. O. Drawer C 
O. W. Johnson 

P. O. Drawer C 
Donald G. Kruger 

P. O. Drawer 11 
Floyd P. Smith 

P. O. Box 357 


William E. Andrews, Jr. 

P. O. Box 92 
Elmer A. Canfield 

P. O. Box 188 
Jesse W. Shanks 

P. O. Box 367 


Robert E. Covington, Jr. 

Jeff Carter Bldg. 
G. F. Dabbs, Jr. 

P. O. Box 199 
G. F. Dabbs, III 

P. O. Box 371 
Billy Ernest Harris 

P. O. Box 304 
Andrew J. Reese, Jr. 

P. O. Box 231 
Tally D. Riddell 

P. O. Box 199 
Charles W. Shepherd 

P. O. Box 359 
J. E. Shirley 

P. O. Box 25 
Peter K. Smith 

200A S. Archusa Ave. 


S. W. Craft 
Homer Currie 
Crymes G. Pittman 

P. O. Box 265 
Luther David Pittman 
Eugene C. Tullos 

P. O. Box 74 
Jerry Lawrence Yeager 


James H. Adams 
G. Robert Ferguson 

P. O. Drawer 89 
William W. Ferguson 

P. O. Box 300 
Hugh B. Gillespie, Jr. 

P. O. Box 146 
Hugh B. Gillespie, III 

P. O. Box 27 
Andrew John Hannon 

Rt. 1, Box 100 
Thomas Van Magers 

Faculty Dr., 

Hinds Jr. College 
Joe G. Moss 

P. O. Box 144 


Louie F. Ruffin 
P. O. Box 421 


Judge William H. 
Benton W. Elliott 
Robert William Elliott 
George W. Floyd, Jr. 
Robert Sidney Hardin 

H. G. Ladner, Jr. 

120 Jefferson 
Thomas E. Pegram, Jr. 

P. O. Box 26 
Marion D. Roten 

P. G\ Box 375 
Fred B. Smith 


E. C. Clements 

210 Locust St. 
Rush M. Clements 

210 Locust St. 
Clay D. Cooley 

303 Martin Ave. 
Herman C. Glazier, Jr. 

P. O. Box 368 
Albert V. Miller 

P. O. Box 193 
J. Wesley Miller 

P. O. Box 453 


Joseph A. Eddins 
John L. Pearson 


Robert L. Crook 
William M. Pittman, Jr. 
646 Floyce St. 


John Leroy Long 
Route 1 


J. Martin Mooney 
P. O. Box 256 


William E. Corr, Jr. 

P. O. Box 450 
H. M. Fant 

P. O. Box 246 
James McClure, Sr. 

P. O. Box 246 
James McClure, Jr. 

P. O. Box 246 


David E. Adams 
505 B Longstreet 



E. R. Arms 

James E. Cahill, Jr. 

P. O. Box 186 
T. V. Speck Dixon 

222 E. Main St. 
Leon Edward Hannaford 

P. O. Box 364 
Roy E. Johnson 

K M Bldg. 406 Main St. 
Herbert Kirkland 
Moore, Jr. 

210 S. Ward St. 
L. P. Puryear 
Dick R. Thomas 

Hannaford Bldg. 
Ward St. 
Nathaniel G. Troutt 

210 S. Ward St. 
Raymond D. Williams 

P. O. Box 302 


Raynold Chiz 
P. O. Box 541 


C. W. Burke 

P. O. Box 88 
Wayne Thompson 


Robert Galtin Gilder 

P. O. Box 55 
Arthur E. Huggins 

P. O. Box 8 
B. G. Perry 

P. O. Box 188 
Rex Franklin Sanderson 

P. O. Box 173 
Ronald L. Taylor 

P. O. Box 188 


James E. Brown 

P. O. Box 29 
James A. Bryant 

Route 4, Box 152-A 
P. L. Douglas 

103 W. Main St. 
George F. Henry, Jr. 

Court Square 
Ben F. Hilbun, Jr. 

P. O. Box 332 

Douglas P. Lanier 

103 W. Main 
Edward F. McDowell 

Court Square 
William Quinn McKee 

Court Square 
John Paul Moore 

P. O. Box 414 
Charles P. Newell, Jr. 

Rt. 2, Box 61 
Gary R. Parvin 

P. O. Box 782 
Judge J. H. Richmond, Jr. 

320 University Dr. 
J. Wilmot Thomson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 289 
B. M. Walker, Jr. 

P. O. Box 289 
Will E. Ward 

P. O. Box 6 
William H. Ward 

P. C*. Drawer 59 
Frank L. Watson 

Route 1, Box 7 A 


William L. Richmond 
P. O. Box 84 


Carter Dobbs, Jr. 
R. H. Henderson 

P. O. Box 218 
Joseph W. Kellum 
James W. Pennington 

P. O. Box 417 
J. W. Whitten, Jr. 


Zelda S. Labovitz 
P. O. Box 386 


J. W. Dulaney, Jr. 
William P. Dulaney 
Martin Garner 
Judge J. T. Lowe 
Jack Norris Tucker 

P. O. Box 332 
Douglas L. Tynes 

P. O. Box 834 


George F. Adams 

P. O. Box 706 
M. T. Adams 

P. O. Box 706 
Sam H. Allen 

647 Allen St. 
C. R. Bolton 

City Hall Bldg. 
Paul Kent Bramlett 

209£ Court St. 
William H. Brewer 

1609 Patterson 
Fred M. Bush, Jr. 

316 Court St. 
F. M. Bush, III 

P. O. Box 466 
Gary Lee Carnathan 

Rt. 3, Box 409 
Dudley R. Carr 

P. O. Box 234 
Michael Dale Cooke 

601 Magnolia Dr. 
Glenn Davidson 

P. O. Box 1026 
Jeremy J. Eskridge 

204 Nanney Dr. 
Charles A. Evans, Jr. 

P. O. Box 313 
William W. Ford, III 

P. O. Box 1146 
Thomas J. Gardner, III 

P. O. Box 466 
Marshall Lee Graves, Jr. 

1615 N. Clayton Ave. 
Ralph Holland 

Lumpkin Bldg. 
Flavous L. Hutchinson 

813 Varsity Dr. 
Stephen Jackson 

P. O. Box 682 
Wade H. Lagrone 

316 Court St. 
William S. Lawson 

Court St. 
S. H. Long 

P. O. Box 706 
Richard Maynard 

P. O. Box 590 
Joseph L. McCoy 

Court St. 



Robert N. McNutt 

316 Court St. 
Kenneth E. Milam 

2 Pare Monceau 
B. T. Mitchell 

1226 Houston St. 
Guy W. Mitchell, Jr. 

316 Court St. 
Guy W. Mitchell, III 

316 Court St. 
W. P. Mitchell 

P. O. Box 29 
James L. Mounce 

209£ Court St. 
Roy O. Parker 

2225 W. Main St. 
Tulane E. Posey, Jr. 

Route 1 
Larry O'Neil Putt 

Varisty Dr. 
Cason Rankin 

209| Court St. 
William Fred Randle 

2225 W. Main St. 
James Hugh Ray 

Lumpkin Bldg. 
Frank A. Riley 

P. O. Box 1026 
Jesse B. Rogers 

551 N. Madison 
Arthur Raye Sanders 

920 S. Thomas 
Robert E. Scribner 

P. O. Box 736 
David E. Shands 

P. O. Box 673 
Douglas D. Shands 

P. O. Box 673 
Billy W. Shelton 

P. O. Drawer 589 
Jimmy Douglas Shelton 

504 Feemster Lake Rd. 
Donald G. Soper 

P. O. Box 590 
Robert Fulton Thompson 

P. O. Box 343 
Robert Kimmons Upchurch 

112 N. Broadway 
James L. Weir 

P. O. Box 1026 
Carroll E. White 

P. O. Box 289 


William O. May field 
P. O. Box 127 


Breed O. Mounger 

P. O. Box 231 
Breed O. Mounger, Jr. 

P. O. Box 231 


Marcus D. Gordon 
P. O. Drawer M 

John Keith Henry 
P. O. Drawer M 

Judge L. B. Porter 


Michael S, Allred 


Guthrie Abbott 

School of Law 
C. Samuel Beardsley 

P. O. Box 4164 
Joel Blass 

School of Law 
V. W. Bidden, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1567 
John A. Brooks 

P. O. Box 1232 
Harry L. Case, Jr. 

P. O. Box 21 
Thomas L. CockreJl 

P. O. Box 2013 
Aaron S. Condon 

P. O. Box 337 
Michael H. Cox 

P. O. Box 4854 
William D. Eshee, Jr. 

P. O. Box 4937 
Robert Sharp Foster 

P. O. Box 1119 
Joseph Paul Fuchs 

P. O. Box 2763 
George W. Howell 

P. O. Box 104 
Robert John Kelly 

P. O. Box 4362 
Robert Khayat 

University of Miss. 

George W. Stengel 

School of Law 
N. S. Sweat 

School of Law 
Stephen Robert Vaughan 

P. O. Box 7077 
Charles Harrison Walker 

P. O. Box 5263 
Parham H. Williams, Jr. 

School of Law 


G. B. Carmichael 

P. O. Box 65 
Samuel N. Weaver 

P. O. Box 276 


Luther S. Gilmer 


Allen T. Akin 

P. O. Box 991 
William G. Beanland 

First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
James P. Biedenharn 

1201 Cherry St. 
Ellis B. Bodron, Jr. 

P. O. Box 669 
William M. Bost, Jr. 

602 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Gerald E. Braddock 

P. O. Drawer 750 
Alexander J. Brunini 

810 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Nathaniel W. Bullard 

914 Grove St. 
Jack P. Canizaro 

304 Hildegarde Terrace 
George Chaney 

P. O. Box 648 
William M. Conerly, Jr. 

2845 Clay St. 
Lucius B. Dabney, Jr. 

1515 Walnut St. 
Robert L. Dent 

Marchants Natl. Bk. 
Watkins B. Duggins 

200 Enchanted Dr. 
David W. Ellis 

P. O. Box 628 


John E. Ellis 

District Attorney 
Frank E. Everett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 991 
Ellis J. Farris 

1219 Monroe St. 
Cedric L. Feibelman, Jr. 

P. O. Box 768 
John B. Gee 

402 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
V. W. Good 

Merchants Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Judge Ben Guider 

Circuit Court 
Richard F. Heffel 

P. O. Box 60 
Charles D. Hosemann 

810 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Nat J. Hovious 

1300 Mulvihill 
Lavonia C. Jones 

1645 Chambers St. 
Leonard Katzenmeyer, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1079 
Oscar P. Labarre 

First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Ernest Lane, III 

P. O. Box 789 
Wesley R. Lominick, Jr. 

P. O. Box 789 
Paul Kelly Loyancono 

P. O. Box 669 
Donald K. Marcus 

1201 Cherry St. 
Burkette H. Martin 

Merchants Natl. Bk.Bldg. 
George Gilmore Martin 

P. O. Box 991 
John Wayne Jabour 

P. O. Box 1026 
Raymond Beatty May 

P. O. Box 1240 
Wren C. May 

P. O. Box 789 
William F. McGehee 

P. O. Drawer 751 
George K. Mihalyka 

Oakmont Manor 3A 
Judge James E. Nichols 

County Court 
David Hugh Nutt 

P. O. Drawer 750 

John W. Prewitt 

914 Grove St. 
B. H. Quin 

810 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
James B. Ramsey 

P. O. Box 669 
W. W. Ramsey 

P. O. Box 669 
William W. Ramsey 

P. O. Box 669 
George W. Rogers, Jr. 

1201 Cherry St. 
Frank Shanahan, Jr. 

402 Merchants Bk. Bldg. 
Landman Teller 

1201 Cherry St. 
Landman Teller, Jr. 

1201 Cherry St. 
J. Stanford Terry 

Merchants Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Judge J. D. Thames 

P. O. Box 351 
Lee Davis Thames 

P. O. Box 669 
Travis Thomas Vance, Jr. 

914 Grove St. 
M. Emmett Ward 

Merchants Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Robert A. Weems 

810 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
John Wheeless, Jr. 

P. O. Box 991 


Eugene L. McLemore 
P. O. Box 2 


James Palmer Brantley 

Judge Kermit R. Gofer 

P. O. Box 287 
Ben F. Horan 

P. O. Box 648 
John S. Throop 

Fortinberry Bldg. 
Dick Reynolds Wilhoit 

Rt. 5, Box 119 
Murray L. Williams 

P. O. Box 468 


Lucien M. Gex, Jr. 
P. O. Box 430 


Louie McCue Bishop 

Lott Bldg. 
Judge J. Shannon Clark 

P. O. Box 168 
Rankin Green 

Azalea Dr. 
Paul S. Griffith 

P. O. Box 373 
Joseph C. Hartley 

724 Station St. 
G. N. Jones, Jr. 

P. O. Box 325 
W. Vol Jones 

P. O. Box 96 
W. Vol Jones, Jr. 

P. O. Box 96 
John Cleveland Martin, Jr. 

P. O. Box 191 
Stanford Young 

P. O. Box 372 


Robert H. Taylor, Jr. 
P. O. Box 126 


Charles A. Ray, Jr. 

Masonic Lodge Bldg. 
Lewis J. Weeks, Jr. 

P. O. Box 374 


Harvey S. Buck 

203 Jordan Ave. 
Howard Clark Coleman 

P. O. Box 226 
A. M. Edwards, Jr. 

129 Jordan Ave. 
James E. Hamlin 

Davis Bldg. 
W. G. Hamlin 

P. O. Box 164 
James Clay Hoskins, II 

Jordon Ave. 
Thompson McClellan 

P. O. Box 165 
Andren K. Naugle, III 

202 Court St. 



Albert Carpenter Pippen 

202 Court St. 
Lenore L. Prather 

120 Jordon Ave. 
Robert Brooks Prather 

120 Jordon Ave. 
L. F. Sams 

Box 371 
Thomas B. Storey, Jr. 

129 Jordan Ave. 
Joseph J. Stevens, Jr. 

P. O. Box 324 
Thomas J. Tubb 

P. O. Box 324 


W. D. Blackwell 

P. O. Box 66 
Robert S. Newton 

P. O. Box 337 
Jack Parsons 

P. O. Box 689 
Toxey Hall Smith, Jr. 

P. O. Drawer 8 
Roy B. Strickland 

P. O. Box 156 
Donald M. Waits 

P. O. Box 246 


Hugh L. Bailey 

P. O. Box 133 
Donald W. Bond 

403 Sterling 
William H. Liston 

P. O. Box 375 
John M. Sumner 

102 S. Front St. 
James C. Sumner 

412 College St. 


O. W. Catchings 
Ronald John Senko 
C. B. Tucker 
Donald Edwin Walsh 

P. O. Box 637 
Richard T. Watson 

P. O. Box 637 
A. H. Sturgeon 

P. O. Box 36 
James E. Wilkerson, Jr. 

P. O. Box 637 


J. S. Barbour 

P. O. Box 174 
Wiley J. Barbour 

P. O. Box 960 
W. H. Barbour 

P. O. Box 960 
William H. Barbour, Jr. 

P. O. Box 960 
Walter R. Bridgforth 

Hegman Bldg. 
L. W. Brown, Jr. 

P. O. Box 5 
T. H. Campbell, Jr. 

P. O. Box 35 
Thomas H. Campbell, III 

P. O. Box 35 
M. Kelly Collins 

P. O. Box 314 
L. Owen Cooper 

P. O. Box 388 
Edward G. Cortright, Jr. 

108 E. Jefferson St. 
Edgar Martin Crane 

P. O. Box 122 
Herman B. Decell 

P. O. Box 960 
Harry C. Griffith 

Miss. Chemical Corp. 
W. A. Henry 

P. O. Box 960 
John H. Hogue, Jr. 

P. O. Box 82 
John S. Holmes 

108 E. Jefferson St. 
H. M. Love, Jr. 

Hegman Bldg. 
Hugh Marshall Love, Jr. 

P. O. Box 48 
M. B. Montgomery, Jr. 

421 E. Broadway 
James H. Neeld, III 

P. O. Box 388 
Dan Nicholas, Jr. 

P. O. Box 990 
Griffin Norquist 

P. O. Box 87 
Hollaman M. Raney 

P. O. Box 388 
Ted Russell 

P. O. Box 313 

John C. Satterfield 

P. O. Box 466 
John Mack Varner 

Oak Hill Dr. 
Judge Louis J. Wise 

County Court 


Gus W. Colvin, Jr. 

414 Commercial Bk. Bldg. 
John G. Tyler 

P. O. Box 334 


Robert R. Criss 
Auburn University 
Dept. of Economics 8c 
Bus. Adm. 


Milton Anton 

2313 Wexford Lane 
Irvin H. Buchalter 

1381 Swallow Lane 
Robert M. Flynt, Jr. 

P. O. Box 771 
Louis A. Gily, Jr. 

1925 Post Oak Rd. 
Robert S. Major, Jr. 

1785 Cornwall Rd. 
George F. Maynard, III 

First Natl. Bldg. 
J. T. Wilkins, III 

3995 Natchez Dr. 


Johnny M. Lane 
129 Baratare Dr. 


Melvin Dovith 

P. O. Box 2288 
Y. D. Lott 

P. O. Drawer 881 
J. N. Ogden 

104 St. Francis St. 
James H. Brumby 

6658 Zeigler Blvd. 
William J. Huff 

5917 Montfort Rd. South 
Wright Patton 

4538 Kingsway Dr. 




J. S. Simmons 

3415 Ridgefield Rd. 
Hugh V. Smith, Jr. 

719 First Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Howard M. Stroud 

P. O. Box 270 


Richard L. Watson 
25 Edgewood St. 


Stanley E. Munsey 
1035 Hemlock St. 


Robert K. Yandell 

105 Turnagain Arms Apt 


William Thomas Moroney 
111 W. Monroe, 706 
Ariz. Title Bldg. 


Fred P. Talmadge 
P. O. Box 638 


Percy Knapp Alford 
7051 Katchina Ct. 


William T. Bundy, Jr. 
503 Narroway 


James E. Baine 
P. O. Box 1024 


Charles Shuffield 
4112 Fresno 


Edward Grauman 
326 Phillips St. 


Bud B. Whetstone 
400 Tower Bldg. 


Philip B. Purifoy 
3322 County Ave. 


Albert A. Covington 

Staff Judge Advocate 
HQ 1st Infantry Div. 
Cyril T. Faneca, Jr. 

PSC Division 
Alton H. Harvey 

Staff Judge Advocate 
M. A. Methvin 



Boyd H. Reynolds 
35451 Beach Rd. 


David Dee Thomas 
50 Via Belarde 
Apt. 14 


James Alfred Waits 
11043 Aldea Ave. 



Toxey Hall Smith 

1800 N. Highland Ave. 


Bertrand D. Mouron, Jr. 

107 S. Broadway 
Frederick F. Straus 

237 S. San Pedro 


Sheldon Leroy Foreman 
234 E. Colorado Blvd. 
Suite 204 


William J. Lawler 
615 Montgomery St. 

Rosalind D. Sanders 
1479 32nd Ave. 


Cecil E. Gantt 
6955 Roberts Ave. 


Cecil J. Jaquith, Jr. 
No. 6 Santa Marie St. 



Rowan Thayer Thomas 
213 Mining Exchange 


David Gross 

1700 Broadway 
Alvin L. Smith, Jr. 

136 Magnolia St. 



Douglas R. Daniels 
58 Fountain St., Apt. B-2 

Myres Smith McDougal 
401 -A Yale Station 


Sims Marion Gaston, Jr. 
673 Dart Hill Rd. 



Nathan Levy, Jr. 
7 Craigmoor Rd. 




Thomas J. Campbell 

1430 Longworth Bldg. 
Robert Chadwick 

6201 Cloverdale Dr. 
J. Kenton Chapman 

909 Tower Bldg. 
W. M. Colmer 

House Office Bldg. 
Nannie Mayes Crump 

304 4th St. S.E. 
Marion E. Wright Edelman 

3307 Fessenden St. N.W. 
Carl J. Felth 

805 810 18th St. N.W. 
Ann Dodge Goodbee 

4201 Mass. Ave. N.W. 
John H. Holloman, III 

2226 New Senate Off. 
Sam D. Knowlton 

1636 44th St. N.W. 
Margaret M. Laurence 

753 Warner Bldg. 
Douglas Heath Lefeve 

IBM Corporation 
Elliott C. Lichtman 

1001 Connecticut Ave. 
Samuel D. Mcllwain 

815 Conn. Ave. N.W. 
Raymond W. Miller 

2540 Mass. Ave. N.W. 
Leonard E. Nelson 

824 Conn. Ave. 
Robert V. Pollard 

Home Loan Bank Board 
Harry Ross, Jr. 

Warner Bldg. 
William Mac Rouse 

1405 Eye St. N.W. 
Orville F. Rush 

1034 Washington Bldg. 
John C. S tennis 

209 Senate Off. Bldg. 
Duval Stoaks 

2030 F St. N.W. 
Michael B. Trister 

1823 Jefferson PL N.W. 
James T. Welch 

1000 Vt. Ave. N.W. 

Jamie L. Whitten 
House Office Bldg. 

W. Roberts Wilson, Jr. 
1717 Penn. Ave. N.W. 


Enoch M. Overby, III 
Legal Dept. Hercules Inc. 


George A. Mueller 
2032 W. Ridge Dr. 


Dr. Sylvester J. Hemleben 
800 N. Fiske Blvd. #602 


Ernest M. Jones 

418 N.W. 29th St. 
Winton E. Williams 

Holland Law Center 
Univ. of Fla. 


Wirt Adams Beard 

P. O. Box 2909 
James C. Blanton 

P. O. Box 2575 


D. S. Canning 
700 Brookside Rd. 


John Richard Farrell 

150 Southeast Second Ave. 
S. William Fuller 

3235 N.W. 62nd St. 
Sidney B. Majure 

4200 SW 82nd Ct. 
John Witherspoon 

880 N.W. 177th Ter. 


Richard Morton 

1035 N.W. 125th St. 


Maxene S. Paschal 
7031 Cocas Dr. 


A. Obie Stewart 
Fst. Natl. Bk. Bldg. 


Hugh Barr Miller, Jr. 
Naval Air Station 


Joshua M. Morse, III 

College of Law 
Fla. State Univ. 
Earl N. Vaughan 

2415 Tamarack Ave. 


Andrew J. Mirabole 
3008 N. Lincoln Ave. 

Morris E. White 
P. O. Box 1438 


Will A. Nason 
P. O. Box 1309 



James J. Smith 

2800 N. Andrews Ave. 



Kenneth L. Swarthout 
P. O. Box 592 


Samuel M. Davis 
School of Law 
Univ. of Georgia 


Thomas A. Bowman 

153 Pryor St. SW 
Thomas A. Buford 

2980 Buford Hwy NE 



Overton A. Currie 

1405 Fulton Natl. Bk. 
Robert A. Demetz 

3901 Cambellton Rd. 
Doris Elizabeth Gray 

1202 Glenwood Ave. SE 
James R. Harland, Jr. 

822 Fulton Fed. Bldg. 
J. B. Hough 

P. O. Box 5077 
Thomas I. Kent 

290 Hillwick Court NE 
George R. Lewis 

200 Franklin Rd. NE 
Thomas Davis Yarbrough 

P. O. Box 29921 


Robert Payne Moore 
P. O. Box 1686 


Douglas M. Magee 
Office of Staff Judge 


Paul Montgomery, Jr. 
106 Gilbert Circle 


Janette Blair Clark 


Thomas L. Adams 
1630 Millirons Rd. 


Walter Thomas Hendrix 
P. O. Box 556 


Horace M. Watkins 
2308 Pine Cliff Dr. 


Virgil W. Burgess 

1106 N. Champaign St. 


John J. O'Brien 

111 W. Jackson Blvd. 
Paul P. Pennick 

332 S. Mich. Ave. 


Frank L. Calderala 
714 S. Parkside Ave. 


Jerry L. Patton 
P. O. Box 48 


Martha M. Parsons 
141 A Callan Ave. 


Tom B. Warner 

112 E. 11th St. 


Cary Alton Phillips 
904 Juniper Dr. 


Martin E. Horn 
414 W. Greenway PI. 


Howard B. Trimble 
111 Park Ave. East 


E. K. Correll 
205 Michael Dr. 


Lewis H. Day 
319 Eighteenth St. 


George Blue 
1161 N. 3rd 


Ralph B. Elston 
1505 Hickory 


Harry L. Schroeder 
7156 Kings wood Circle 


James M. Fleming, Jr. 
P. O. Box 572 


Randall Wall 


John Basil Preston 


Charles G. Thomas 
1800 Knollwood Rd. 


Roscoe Cross 
Route 5 


J. Rush Wimberly 
P. O. Box 59 


Louis G. Baine, Jr. 

721 Government St. 
Henry A. Brumfield, III 

P. O. Box 1486 
Ted L. Jones 

4307 Plank Rd. 
James W. Leake 

3769 Scholor Ct. 
Charles W. Phillips 

P. O. Drawer 2471 


Robert A. Anderson, Jr. 
P. O. Box 36 


Jessie David Parnell 
106 Bolton St. 


Julius W. Grubbs 
P. O. Box 223 




Samuel W. Ethridge 
1103 Williams Blvd. 


Mclnnis L. Ward 
2605 Prienwood Dr. 


W. S. Gordon, Jr. 

P. O. Box 1283 
Bob P. Griffith 

P. O. Box 1743 
Ruffin T. Lowry 

P. O. Box 1673 


Wayne A. Bigner 

3129 43rd St. 
D. K. Galtney 

P. O. Box 127 
James R. Hicklin 

2935 Ridgelake Dr. G3 
Robert E. Hill 

1920 Caesar St. 
Howard O. Leach 

221 E. Gatehouse Dr. 
Joann Taylor Myers 

3500 Division St. 


Tyrus Cobb Gibbs 

Rt. 3, Box 324T 
John E. Mulhearn 

1810 Emerson 


Beverly C. Adams 

8318 Sycamore PI. 
William H. Beck, Jr. 

225 Baronne Bldg. 
John M. Bee 

1010 Whitney Bldg. 
J. B. Brumfield 

1111 Tulane Ave. 
Tom P. Caldwell 

P. O. Box 60626 
Carl S. Downing 

Whitney Bk. Bldg. 
Carl Eugene Drake 

1610 Robt. E. Lee Blvd. 

Wm. George Grayson, Jr. 

Haskins & Sells CPA 
Trade Mart 
Abner E. Hughes 

225 Baronne St. 
Ralph S. Johnson 

P. O. Box 60626 
John W. Kelly, Jr. 

P. O. Box 60252 
S. Allen Lackey 

Shell Bldg. 
Robert E. Lowry 

2214 Albert Apt. 102 
Jesse D. Puckett, Jr. 

P. O. Box 61812 
Harold James Schneider 

2246 Carondelet— 2F 
David Smith 

P. O. Box 50879 
David M. Smith 

P. O. Box 50879 
W. Malcolm Stevenson 

1424 Whitney Bk. Bldg. 
George M. Strickler, Jr. 

4703 Prytania St. 
Vernon Lagrange Terrell 

P. O. Box 60193 
Joseph Ray Terry, Jr. 

3300 Garden Oaks Dr. 
John L. Toler 

1500 Natl. Bk. of 
James E. Welch 

237 Carondelet St. 
Joseph V. Wilson, Jr. 

800 the Calif. Bldg. 
William G. Wright, Jr. 

1111 Tulane Ave. 


J. C. Seaman, Jr. 

La. Polytechnic Institute 


Augustus Albert 
Simpson, Jr. 
420 Country Club Blvd. 


William L. Koerber 

P. O. Box 277 
Harry J. Rosenthal 

1620 Camellia St. 

L. H. Rosenthal 
201 Pine St. 


Frederick Eugene Moss 
6120 Temple St. 


Donald E. Mullen 

12516 Windover Turn 


Jack D. Warren 
7552 Eastwood Ct. 


Robert P. Roberts, Jr. 
Foreston Rd. 


Peter M. Stockett 
P. O. Box 2124 



Alvin J. Bronstein 
78 Mountauburn St. 



Marshall G. Bennett, Jr. 
6 Army St. 


John L. Thompson 

Ann Arbor Trust Bldg. 


Kavanaugh P. Wood, Jr. 
129 E. Broadway 



David Alan Gustafson 
47 Golf Rd. 


Charlie J. Elsea 
808 Mock Ave. 




Donald Gene Laird 


Michael H. Stauder 
866 Chelesea Ave. 


Kenneth Mitchell Romines 
1002 W. Main St. 


Duane W. Chisman 
4406 E. 107th Terrace 

Stanley M. Cox 
1221 Romany Rd. 

T. A. Hartley 

124 Meadow Lake Off. 


James C. Bullard 
203 College Ave. 


Frank Thompson Hearne 
P. O. Drawer 1007 


Edwin P. McKaskel 
11306 E. 61st Terrace 


James N. Stearns, Jr. 
918 Vernon Ave. 


R. Boyd Pickens, Jr. 
7931 Forsyth Blvd. 



Russell A. Johnson 

801 Cooper Landing Rd. 


Jesse W. Eavenson 
17 Ballantine Rd. 


Charles John Girard 
P. O. Box 554 


Lee A. Stricklin, Jr. 
1 Hess Plaza 


Michael Lawrence Keleher 
P. O. Drawer AA 


Joseph L. Herring 
108 Annistor Ave. 



Grier J. Gregory 

503D Admin. Co. ORB 
William W. Franklin 

8th Infantry Div. 
Douglas B. Lewis 

U.S. Army Med. Comm. 
Robert B. Sessums 

Office of SJA 


Robert Erskine Broach 

Milton W. Kirkpatrick, Jr. 
U.S. Naval Station 


George Earl Parker 
80 E. Hartsdale Ave. 
Apt. T. 20 



Warren P. Palzer 
597 Old Country Rd. 



Raymond P. Laduc 
RD 2 Campion Rd. 


Allen H. McCreight 

301 E. 69th St. 
Hugh V. Sherrill 

44 Wall St. 
Mitchell Emmett Ward, III 

220 E. 42nd St. 


Barron C. Ricketts 
253 Alexander St. 


Joseph N. Corsale, Jr. 
107 Walnut St. 


William H. McMullen, Jr. 

1450 Academy St. 
Avery Martin Springer, Jr. 

2111 Canterwood Dr. 
Apt. 3 


Myron H. McBryde 
Rt. 3, Beaver Brook Rd. 



James Larry Senter 
24 S. Main St. 


John J. Franco, Jr. 
317 Westover Rd. 



Russell Johnson 
2405 Laramie Dr. 


Clovis E. Bull 

705 Winston Dr. 
Stephen M. Stephens 

P. O. Box 121 


Wiley C. Hill 

1401 SE Grandview 




Michael B. Gratz 

120 NW 44th St. D-8 


Losie V. Watkins, Jr. 
P. O. Box 1367 


R. W. Featherstone 
2000 Classen Center 


Donald Reagan Stacy 
2515 Burnet Ave. 
Apt. 906 


D. P. Newton 
5866 Timber Dr. 


Arthur B. Custy 
College of Law 
Williamette University 


William C. Ryback 
12 E. Fourth St. 


James Knoll Gardner 
1617 Land Title Bldg. 


Irwin W. Coleman 

Box 1166 

Gulf Oil Corp. 
Idna L. Fischer 

1714 Beech wood Blvd. 


Russell D. Thompson 
2322A N. O'Neal Ave. 

Ernest B. Lipscomb, III 
P. O. Box 5207 


Richard J. Lee 
4116 Brookside Dr. 



Walter E. Grantham, II 

409 Bouton Dr. 
John N. Nassar 

523 Lupton Bldg. 


John U. Miller, III 
715 Old Kentucky Rd. 


Ralph I. Lawson 
P. O. Box H 


James W. Abernathy, Jr. 

P. O. Box 841 
George W. Hymers 

1400 Hollywood Dr. 

Ben C. Adams 

Suite 2020 

1st Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
Lynn Allen Agee 

167 N. Main 
Louis Feree Allen 

2410 Sterick Bldg. 
Paul Marion Baddour 

1887 Latham St. 
John D. Blaylock 

Suite 201 

44 N. Second St. 
James L. Bonner 

1446 Wheaton 
W. Kerby Bowling 

555 Perkins Extended 
Walter Buford 

932 Commerce Title 
James V. Coggin, Jr. 

167 N. Main St. 
Ferdinand Prince 
Cribbs, Jr. 

Apt 3, 5859 Poplar 
Oscar Earl Davis, Jr. 

3395 Clearbrook St. 
Ralph D. Davison 

3440 Dell Glade Dr. 

Elwood L. Edwards 

900 Memphis Bk. Bldg. 
E. Allen Gardner 

Suite 201 
44 N. Second St. 
Ben D. Gilliland, Jr. 

1016 Falls Bldg. 
J. Frank Hall 

1030 100 N. Main Bldg. 
Joseph B. Jones 

1106 81 Madison Bldg. 
Robert A. Lanier 

4151 Hilldale 
William E. Marston 

705 Union Planters 
Natl. Bk. 
Robert L. McChaney, Jr. 

2020 1st Natl. Bk. Bldg. 
G. Thomas McPherson 

1331 Union Ave. 
Paul O. Miller, III 

555 S. Perkins Extended 
Charles M. Murphy, Jr. 

602-4 Dermon Bldg. 
Thomas H. Pigford 

1343 Turkey Run Lane 
Richard G. Pitchford 

545 Kinsman Rd. 
A. L. Pressgrove, Jr. 

1301 Lincoln Amer. 
Arthur Earl Ray, Jr. 

1368 S, Faronia Sq. 
Lackey Rowe, Jr. 

5933 Poplar Pike 
Ext. 5 
Guy M. Rowland 

5331 Sea Isle Rd. 
Leeolin V. Russell 

P. O. Box 367 
Harold C. Streibich 

1350 Commerce Title 
Herman E. Taylor 

147 Jefferson Ave. 
Michael Byron Taylor 

863 N. Willett 
C. Wilson Viar, Jr. 

P. O. Box 18127 
John T. Wilkinson, Jr. 

44 N. Second St. 





Curtis S. Person, Jr. 
% Curtis Person 
Chev. Co. 
Hardy R. S tennis 
573 John Paul 
Jones Ave. 



Hampton Stennis 
Little, Jr. 

330 Wilmbledon Rd. 
Hunter S. Neubert 

159 Oak Valley Dr. 


James Thomas Caldwell 
113 Williams 


Howard D. Lowrance 
P. O. Box 190 


Wayne Bolton 
255 Maple St. 


Royce L. White 
1014 Crown Point 
Rd. E. 


Hardy M. Graham 
Old & Third Natl. 
Bk. Bldg. 



Charles L. McReynolds, Jr. 
2313 Briarwood 


William Jefferson East 
4503 Larch Lone 


Phillip Gerald Harris 



W. H, Bennett, Jr. 

5030 Cape Romain 
Eugene Love Fair 

Cnavantra Naval 
Air Station 


Samuel Herbert Miller 
1107 Frances St. 


Joe B. Chandler, Jr. 

4132 Purdue St. 
Jan P. Charmatz 

SMU School of Law 
P. O. Box 8245 
Robert Walter Collins 

4412 Edmondson Ave. 
Jack Pendleton Leigh 

P. O. Box 2855 


May S. Ringold 
Apt. 212, 191 Ruddel 


William T. Alvis 

6221 Genoa Rd. 
Robert A. Walker 

3712 Slade Blvd. 


Robert M. Bass, Jr. 

P. O. Box 2180 
Walter J. Blessey, IV 

2602 Tenneco Bldg. 
Rees T. Bowen 

1700 Bk. of the S.W. 
Billy K. Chapman 

6166 Olympia Dr. 
Murray Christian 

P. O. Box 1521 
Robert C. Kelley 

P. O. Box 22546 
H. P. Pressler, Jr. 

1122 S.W. Tower 
Ralph D. Pruett, Jr. 

9823 Emnora 


Thomas H. Scruggs 
1606 Heights Dr. 



Robert B. Vickery 
Training Squad 23 
Naval Air Station 



T. E. Edmonds 
P. O. Box 532 



Edward L. Atkinson 
P. O. Box 520 



George T. Sullivan 
203 S. Lois Lane 



B. B. Ford 

829 Canterbury Hill 



Paul V. Dixon 
106 A Atlas St. 


John B. Abernathy 
Rt, 4, Box 301B 


Charles B. Doyle, II 
1801 Blossom Lane 


Guy C. Mitchell 
P. O. Box 6392 


Donald A. Deline 
Asst. Post Judge Adv. 


W. E. Ainsworth, Jr. 
6421 King Louis Dr. 



Lloyd L. Martin 

8 S. Van Dorn St. — 42 
Lawrence S. McWhorter 

4561 Southland Ave. 
Dan S. Murrell 

6481 Frenchmens Dr. 
Charles J. Swayze, Jr. 

8561—102 Richmond 
George S. Whitten 

8207 Glyn St. 


Grover Michael Myers 
4325 Americana Dr. 
Apt. 102 


Burns M. Deavours 
4501 Arlington Blvd. 
Apt. 202 
Elwyn J. Darden 

5209 6th Place South 
Francis L. Hall 

1800 N. Edge wood St. 
William D. M. Holmes 
815 S. 18th St., 
Apt. 410 
Louis A. Pavlik 
931 S. Buchannan St. 
Apt. 36 
Elmo Avery Rollins, Jr. 
2341 N. 11th St. 
Apt. 304 


Roger L. Tuttle 
4190 Traylor Dr. 


Fred N. Colmer 
P. O. Box 1301 


Francis M. Harris 
10119 Blue Coat Dr. 


Robert A. Bridges 

6018 Hardwick PI. 
Raymond Mize Conner 

202 N. Virginia Ave. 
Terry J. Dalton 

6339 Crosswoods Dr. 
James L. Davis, Jr. 

2600 Faber Ct. 
John H. Gordon 

208 E. Columbia St. 
James M. Menger, Jr. 

7606 Marian Ct. 
James F. Shumate, Jr. 

7011 Roundtree Rd. 
Lura M. Womack 

3020 Cedar Hill Rd. 


Charles Richard Gear 
HOD Thompson Circle 

Joe L. Howell 

6317 Mori St. 
James Roy Jones 

P. O. Drawer Z 


Billy Joseph Legg 
BOQ A51 
Naval Station 


Hoke I. Home, H 
214 Chestnut St. 


Lem Cabaniss, Jr. 
6217 Dana Ave. 

William P. Cassedy 

7418 Flora St. 
William Byron Harvey 

5913 Noblestown Rd. 
Apt. 42 


John Donovan Ready, Jr. 
2705 Keystone Lane 
Apt. 204 


Warren Harding Adam 
10427 S.E. 14th St. 


John G. Lee 

11th Judicial Circuit 


Robert E. Levy 
810 Third Ave. 


James R. Walsh 
701 S. 51st Ave. 


Michael Clay Smith 
P. O. Box 211 



Sidney F. Beck, Jr. 
514 Main St. 


Donald B. Samuels 
CPO Box 1898 


Ramon Lomba Miranda 
P. O. Box 3504 





Published by 








Administrative Law 

Determination of Administrative Bodies Usually Supported in Courts 434 


Absolute Liability of Shipowner for Unseaworthy Vessel 142 

Burdens of Proof 146 

Causes of Action for Injured Seamen 142 

Claims for Unseaworthiness, Maintenance and Cure May Be Heard Together, 

Under Jones Act 149 

Comparative Negligence in 146 

Congressional Intent That Fixed Platforms Be Within Admiralty Jurisdiction. . 172-3 

Contributory Negligence in 146 

Custom and Practice as Evidence of Unseaworthiness 149 

Duty of Seaworthiness Compared to Contractual Warranty 144 

Duty of Shipowner to Furnish Reasonably Suitable Appliances 143 

Extension of Jones Act to Apply to Fixed Drilling Platforms 174-75 

Failure of 5th Circuit to Follow U.S. Supreme Court on Theory of Maritime 

Insurability 152 

Federal Requirements for Jurisdiction of Maritime Law Cases 145 

Fitness of Crew 146 

Humanitarian Protection for All Engaged in Maritime Service 150 

Jones Act Not Applicable to Employees on Offshore Drilling Platforms 169 

Maritime Torts Resulting in Death 151 

Negligence and Unseaworthiness Combined 145 

Recent Developments in Unseaworthiness Doctrine in 5th Circuit 142 

Relationship of Common Law Rules of the Liability of Possessions of Land to. . 152 

Removal of Offshore Drilling Platforms From Adm. Jur 170 

Res Ipsa Loquitur Applied to Unseaworthiness Actions 146 

Seaworthiness, Defined 144 

Shipowner's Absolute Liability for Temporary Unseaworthiness 148 

Shore-Based Workers 150 

State Death Acts and General Maritime Law 151 


Agricultural Adjustment Act 422 

Agricultural Allotments 422-43 

Agricultural Employer's Immediate Family Not Covered by 1966 Amendment to 

Fair Labor Standard Act 413 

Allotment Appeals Allowed After Crop Is Planted 436 

Allotment System Described 422-24 

Appealing Agricultural Allotments, Choice of Court 434 

Appealing Allotment Determination of the State Commission 437-41 

Appealing Marketing Quota 424 

Appealing Decisions of Secretary of Agriculture 442-43 

Application of Administrative Procedure Act on Allotment Appeal 439 

Child Employees 419-20 

Classes of Exemptions on Exclusions to Prevent the Agricultural Employee From 

Being Entitled to the Minimum Wage 409 


County Committee for Acreage Allotments 423-24 

Court Review of County Commission Decisions 432-34 

Courts May Not Fix and Allocate the State Reserve 438 

Employee Qualifying for the Minimum Wage 419 

Establishment of Marketing Quota for Cotton 423 

Exception to Time Limit for Filing Appeal of Marketing Quota 425 

Fair Labor Standards Coverage for Agricultural Employees 409 

Farmer Approval of Marketing Quota 423 

Function of Local Review Committee 427 

Jurisdiction of Local Review Committee 425-26 

Minimum Wage Law 421 

Role of Courts in Deciding Appeals of Agricultural Allotments 435-36 


Client Relations 250, 252 

Establishing Practice 249 

Final Argument 268 

Introducing Evidence 263 

Opening Statements 263 

Plaintiff's Lawyer 233 

Preparation for Trial 247, 256 

Preparation of Instructions 267 

Selecting a Jury 260 

Settlement Negotiations 254 

Attorney and Client 

Client Relations 250 


Plaintiff's Lawyer 245 


Contribution of Capital by New Partner Covering Selling Your Interest 321 

Contribution to Partnership 314-16 


Charitable Immunity 483-84 

Civil Laws 

Aggregate Theory as Regards Partnership Entity Concept 312 

Civil Rights 

Colleges and Universities Not an Open Forum for Outside Speakers 136 

Do College Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Hear Outside 

Speakers? 135 

Freedom to Learn 139 

Standing of Students to Challenge School's Denial of Permission for Outside 

Speaker 136 

Policy Reasons for Excluding Outside Speakers From Campuses 138 

Unfettered Right to Receive Mail 137 

Class Actions 

Initial Development of Class Action in Federal Court 380 

1969-70] INDEX 

Colleges & Universities 

Do College Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Hear Outside 

Speakers? 135 

Freedom to Learn 139 

Not an Open Forum for Outside Speakers 136 

Overturning of Administration Denials of Permission for Outside Speakers on 

Campuses 136 

Policy Reasons for Excluding Outside Speakers From Campuses 138 

Regulation of Time, Place, and Manner of Outside Speakers on Campus 141 

Standing of Students to Challenge School's Denial of Permission for Outside 

Speaker 135 


Fair Labor Standards Act 419 

Goods Produced for Commerce 414 

Comparative Negligence 

In Admiralty 146 

Conflict of Laws 

Conflict Between Norris-La Guardia Act and Taft-Hartley Act 628 

Consumer Actions 395 

Constitutional Law 

Colleges and Universities Not an Open Forum for Outside Speakers 136 

Conscientious Objector Exemption as a Violation of the First Amendment 620 

Conscientious Objector Exemption for Those Who Oppose All Wars 625 

Conscientious Objectors, Requirements 624 

Do College Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Hear Outside 

Speakers? 135 

Equal Protection for Conscientious Objectors, Rigorous Training 624 

Freedom to Learn 139 

Motion Pictures Are Within Basic Protection of 1st and 14th Amendments 611 

Overturning of Administration Denials of Permission for Outside Speakers on 

Campuses 136 

Policy Reasons for Exclusion of Outside Speakers on Campuses 138 

Protection of Students' Rights to Hear Outside Speakers 137 

Regulation of Time, Place, and Manner of Outside Speakers on Campuses 141 

Requirement of License for Motion Pictures Is Not Illegal "Prior Restraint" . . . 612 

Right to Jury Trial as a Due Process Guarantee Mandatory Upon the States 602 

Standing of Students to Challenge School's Denial of Permission for Outside 

Speaker 136 

Unfettered Right to Receive Mail 137 

Zoning as Being Constitutional 271 


Court's Power to Enforce No-Strike Clause in Labor Contracts, Support for 627 

Court's Use of Injunction for Violation of No-Strike Clause 627 

Effects on Disposition of Estate 182 

Encouragement of Arbitration as a Policy Basis to Allow Courts to Enforce 

No-Strike Clause 630 

Labor Agreement Must Be Enforced Equally on Both Sides 633 


Labor and Management Compelled to Conform Self-Help Activity to Terms of 

Contract 630 

Option Land 340 

Contributory Negligence 

In Admiralty 146 


Masonite Corp 160 


Not Liable for Tort in Absence of Statute 289-90 

Role in Distributing Acreage Allotments 423-24 


Addition of Judges to Relieve Congested Dockets 24 

Administrative Director to Appoint Temporary Circuit, Chancery, or County 

Judge in Mississippi 24 

Alleviation of Congested Dockets 23 

Better Compensation for Judges in Mississippi 27 

Burden of Proof in Admiralty Cases 146 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Need for in Mississippi 27 

Compilation of Judicial Statistics in Mississippi 28 

Desirability of State Agency for Collation of State Court Statistical Reports 23 

Direction of Office of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi by Supreme Court 

of Mississippi 24 

Disparity in Sizes of Dockets in Mississippi Courts 23 

Disparity in Types of Cases in Mississippi Courts 23 

Duties of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi 24 

Efficiency of Mississippi Courts 23 

Experience and Education Requirements for Mississippi Judges 30 

Failure of 5th Circuit to Follow U.S. Supreme Court on Theory of Maritime 

Insurability 152 

Fifth Circuit Definition of "Seaworthy" 144 

Financial Allowances for Judges in Mississippi 29 

Financial Disclosure of Judges in Mississippi, Recommendations for 27 

Fitness of Crew in Admiralty Cases 147 

Intermediate Appellate Court, Alleviation of Necessity for in Mississippi 24 

Judges' Salaries in Mississippi 29 

Lack of Uniformity in Administration of Circuit and Chancery Courts 23 

Mississippi Chancery, Circuit, and Supreme 578 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission to Assist Legislature 28 

Mississippi Retirement Plans for Judges 30 

Nation-wide Concern With Spot-Zoning 156 

Need for Creation of Office of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi 24 

Overturning Denials of Permission for Outside Speakers on Campuses 136 

Proposed Mandatory Retirement Age for Judges in Mississippi 31 

Proposed Salaries for Judges in Mississippi 30 

Recent Developments in Unseaworthiness Doctrine in 5th Circuit 142 

Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission Relating to 32 

Redistricting for Alleviation of Congested Court Dockets 23 

Removal Procedures for Judges in Mississippi, Need for 27 

Requirements for Federal Court Jurisdiction of Maritime Law Cases 145 


70] INDEX 

Supreme Court of Mississippi; Chief Justice of, Time Consumed by Administrative 

Matters 23 

Supreme Court of Mississippi; Presiding Justice of, Time Consumed by Admin- 
istrative Matters 23 

Survey of Judges by Age in Mississippi 31 

Temporary Assignment of Trial Judges to Relieve Congested Dockets in Missis- 
sippi 24 


Water Pollution 355 

Criminal Law 

Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission for Administration of... 32 


Caused by Laying a Second Pipe Line 490-97 

Plaintiff's Ability to Prove Liability and Damages 402 


As Will Substitutes 178-80 

Constructive Delivery in Mississippi 399 

Conveyance of Vested Interest at Time of Writing Necessary to Validity as Will 

Substitute 179 

Delivery and Acceptance Necessary to Validity as Will Substitute 179 

Descent and Distribution 

Wrongful Conduct as Bar to Heirs Taking 359 

Wrongful Conduct Prohibiting Taking 359 

District Attorneys 

Inclusion in Insurance Plans 29 

Due Process 

Class Actions 381 

Necessary Procedure of Motion Pictures Licensing Boards 612 

Requirement of Jury Trial to Meet Standard of Due Process 592 


Agricultural Employees and the Minimum Wage 417 

Child Employees in Agriculture 420 

Classes of Exemptions or Exclusions Preventing the Agricultural Employee From 

Being Entitled to the Minimum Wage 409 

Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 418 

Fair Labor Standards Coverage for Agricultural Employees 409 

"Found-Dead" Persumption 233 

Member of the Agricultural Employees Immediate Family Is Not Covered by the 

1966 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 413 

Mines and Quarries 416 

Minimum Wage Law 421 

What Constitutes an Employee 411 

Environment Law 

Class Actions 393 


Mississippi Chancery Court as a Court of Equity 578 


Collateral Estoppel in Multiple Tort Claims 497-507 


Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs of Business Records as 604 

Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs of Business Records as, Mississippi 607 

Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs of Business Records as, Other States 604 

Best Evidence Rule 604 

Business Entries Exception 605 

Custom and Practice as Evidence of Unseaworthiness 149 

Expert Testimony 282, 287 

Introducing Evidence 263 

Mississippi Shop Book Rule 

Non-Expert Witnesses Before Zoning Board 281-82 

Presented to Zoning Board 280 

Presumptions, "Found-Dead" 233 

Presumptions, General 235, 237-41, 244 

Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act 605 

Uniform Rules of Evidence 605 

Federal Procedure 

Burden of Proof in Admiralty Cases 146 

Burden of Proof on Libelant to Show Unseaworthiness 146 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 485-86, 506 

Requirements for Federal Court Jurisdiction of Maritime Law Cases 145 

First Amendment 

Do College Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Hear Outside 

Speakers? 135 

Freedom to Learn 139 

Overturning of Administration Denials of Permission for Outside Speakers on 

Campuses 136 

Policy Reasons for Excluding Outside Speakers From Campuses 138 

Protection of Students' Rights to Hear Outside Speakers 137 

Regulation of Time, Place, and Manner of Outside Speakers on Campuses . . 141 
Standing of Students to Challenge School's Denial of Permission for Outside 

Speaker 136 

Unfettered Right to Receive Mail 137 

Fourteenth Amendment 

As Applied to States' Requirement of Jury Trial 602 

Free Speech 

Colleges and Universities Not an Open Forum for Outside Speakers 136 

Policy Reasons for Excluding Outside Speakers From Campuses 138 

Protection of Students' Rights to Hear Outside Speakers 137 

Unfettered Right to Receive Mail 137 

Full Faith and Credit 

Collateral Estoppel in Multiple Claimant Actions 502-05 

1969-70] INDEX 


As Will Substitutes 182-84 

Elements of Gift causa mortis 183 

Elements of Gift inter vivos 1 83 

General Legacies 346 

Partnership Interest 316 

Special Legacies 346 


Before the Mississippi Judiciary Commission 82 


Execution and Recordation of Deeds 341 


Courts Use of Injunction for Violation of No-Strike Clause 627 

Disappearance as Remedy in Cases of Alleged Unfair Labor Practices 167 

Effect of Court's Injunction Power on Arbitration Process 

Effect of Norris-La Guardia Provision on State Courts 161 

Effect of Remedy in Cases of Unfair Labor Practices Contrary to Congressional 

Policy 167 

Pollution Control 355 

Power of Injunction Not Taken From State Courts Under Section 301 of Taft- 
Hartley Act 163 

Section 4 of Norris-La Guardia Act, Conflict in Third and Sixth Circuit 163 

Section 4 of Norris-La Guardia Act, Supreme Court Avoidance of Question of 

Applicability to State Courts 164 

State Court Injunction Against Labor Strike 630 

Use of Injunctions to Encourage Arbitration 628 

Use of Injunctions, Violation of No-Strike Clause 626 


Plaintiff's Instructions ....<..,. 267 


Direct Action by Third Party , 485-90 

Inclusion of Mississippi District Attorneys in Insurance Plans 29 

In Mississippi 406 

In Other States 408 

Interests of the Insured 400 

Life Insurance as Will Substitute 181-82 

Life Insurance Proceeds Exempt From Debts in Mississippi 182 

Need for Inclusion of Judges in Insurance Plans 29 

Obligation of Company to Settle Within Policy Limits 398 


Plaintiff's Instructions 267 

Joint Tenants 

Right of Survivorship Shows Intent to Create Joint Tenancy 181 

Jones Act 

Claims for Unseaworthiness, Maintenance and Cure May Be Heard Together 

Under Jones Act 149 


Injured Seamen 142 

Remedies for Injured Seamen 145 

Shore-Based Workers 150 


Addition of Judges to Relieve Crowded Dockets 24 

Administrative Director to Appoint Circuit, Chancery, or County Judges Tem- 
porarily in Mississippi 24 

Better Compensation for in Mississippi 27 

Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Mississippi, Time Consumed by Adminis- 
trative Matters 23 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Need for in Mississippi 27 

Demands on Time of 23 

Experience and Education Requirements for Mississippi Judges 30 

Financial Allowances for in Mississippi 29 

Financial Disclosure of, Recommendations for in Mississippi 27 

Inclusion in Insurance Plans 29 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission 22 

Presiding Justice of Supreme Court of Mississippi, Time Consumed by Admin- 
istrative Matters 23 

Proposed Mandatory Retirement Age in Mississippi 31 

Proposed Salaries for in Mississippi 30 

Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission Relating to 32 

Removal Procedures in Mississippi, Need for 27 

Retirement Plans for in Mississippi 30 

Salaries in Mississippi 29 

Survey of by Age in Mississippi 31 

Temporary Assignment of Trial Judges to Relieve Congested Dockets in Missis- 
sippi 24 

Judicial Administration 

Addition of Judges to Relieve Congested Dockets , 24 

Administrative Director to Appoint Temporary Circuit, Chancery, or County 

Judges in Mississippi 24 

Alleviation of Congested Court Dockets 23 

Appointment of, Term of Office of, Salary of Administrator of Courts in 

Mississippi 24 

Class Sections 393 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Need for in Mississippi 27 

Compilation of Judicial Statistics in Mississippi, Need for 28 

Demands on Time of Judges 23 

Desirability of State Agency for Collation of State Court Statistical Reports .... 23 
Direction of Office of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi by Supreme Court of 

Mississippi 24 

Disparity in Sizes of Dockets in Mississippi Courts 23 

Disparity in Types of Cases in Mississippi Courts 23 

Duties of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi 24 

Effect of Division of Law and Equity in Mississippi 578 

Efficiency of Mississippi Courts 23 

Financial Disclosure of Judges, Recommendations for in Mississippi 27 

Improvement of 22 

Intermediate Appellate Court, Alleviation of Necessity for in Mississippi 24 

1969-70] INDEX 

Judges' Salaries in Mississippi 29 

Lack of Uniformity in Administration of Circuit and Chancery Courts 23 

Legislature Should Constitute Existence of Mississippi Judiciary Commission . . 27 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission — A Synopsis 22 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission Serving as Commission on Judicial Qualifica- 
tions 28 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission to Assist Legislature 28 

Need for Creation of Office of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi 24 

Proposed Mandatory Retirement Age for Judges in Mississippi 31 

Proposed Salaries for Judges in Mississippi 30 

Recommendations for, by Mississippi Judiciary Commission 32 

Redistricting for Alleviation of Congested Court Dockets 23 

Retirement Plans for Mississippi Judges 30 

Snyder Decision 387-89 

Supreme Court of Mississippi; Chief Justice of, Time Consumed by Administra- 
tive Matters 23 

Supreme Court of Mississippi; Presiding Justice, Time Consumed by Administra- 
tive Matters 23 

Survey of Judges by Age in Mississippi 31 

Temporary Assignment of Trial Judges to Relieve Congested Dockets in Missis- 
sippi 24 

Use of Collateral Estoppel 390 

Judicial Review 

Zoning Decisions 280-81 


Factors Which Jury Considers in Determining Notice to Municipality 292 


Ability to Aggregate Claims of Members of a Class 383 

Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts in Appeals of Agricultural 

Allotments 434 

Consumer Legislation 396 

Courts Limited to Questions of Law in Deciding Appeals of Agricultural Allot- 
ments 435 

Creation of Federal Enclaves by Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 170 

Death and Injury on Fixed Offshore Drilling Platforms 170 

Expansion of Jurisdiction in Federal District Courts by Section 301 of Taft- 
Hartley Act 162 

Federal Court Jurisdiction of Maritime Law Cases 146 

Nature of Agricultural Allotment System Prevents Either Party From Declaring 

That a Moot Question Is Involved 436 

Notice as a Prerequisite to Exercise of Jurisdiction by Zoning Board 278 

Of Zoning Board 271 

Property Boundaries When a River Divides Two States 451-54 

Redistricting in Mississippi for Alleviation of Congested Court Dockets 23 

Removal of Action on Breach of No-Strike Clause From State to Federal 

Court 163-65 

Review Committee Under AA.A 425-26 

Scope of Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 170 

State Courts in Alleged Unfair Labor Practices 161 

State and Federal Courts as Labor Forums 626 


Justice of the Peace 

Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission for Upgrading of 34 


Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission for Improvement of 

Youth Courts 33 

Labor Law 

Changes in Environment of Organized Labor as Valid Basis for Changes in 

Application of Norris-La Guardia Act 628 

Common Law and Labor Law 626 

Conflict Between Norris-La Guardia Act and Taft-Hartley Act 627 

Court's Power to Enforce No-Strike Clause 627 

Court's Use of Injunction for Violation of No-Strike Clause 627 

Difficulties in Establishing Consistent Federal Laws 166-67 

Encouragement of Arbitration as a Policy Basis to Allow Court to Enforce No- 
Strike Clause 629 

Federal Courts Should Be Able to Enjoin Breaches of No-Strike Clauses 167-68 

Inclusion of Grievance in Arbitration Is Presumed 632 

Labor and Management Compelled to Conform Self-Help Activity to Terms of 

Contract , , . , , 630 

Labor Agreement to be Enforced Equally on Both Sides . 633 

Norris-La Guardia Act 

Anti-Injunctive Provision Not Applicable to State Courts . . . 163 

Applicability of Anti-Injunctive Provision to State Courts ... 161 

Conflict Over Applicability of Section 4 in Two Circuits 163 

Effect in State Courts 161 

Question of Applicability of Section 4 Avoided by Supreme Court 164 

Restriction to Federal Courts 161 

power of Court Limited to Compelling Performance of the Agreement to Arbi- 
trate 629 

Prohibition of Contract Strikes 631 

Removal of Action on Breach of No-Strike Clause From State to Federal 

Courts ..'..' 163-65 

Restraints on Use of Self-Help Tactics in Labor Dispute 631 

State and Federal Courts as Labor Forums 630 

State Court Injunctions 160-68 

Taft-Hartley Act 

Effect on Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts 162, 626 

Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, Congressional Policy 162, 626 

Substantive Law Expressed 162, 626 

Use of State Law 162, 626 


Cross-Conveyance as Result of Pooling in Mississippi 213-14 

Duty of Executive to Promote Development of Mineral Interests 229-31 

Effect of Rule Against Perpetuities on Executive Right to Lease in Mississippi 193-96 

Effect of Unitized Lease Contract in California 210 

Effect of Unitized Lease Contract in Mississippi 208 

Effect of Unitized Lease Contract in Texas 209 

Exclusive Power to Lease Minerals as Property Right in Mississippi 193-94 

Executive Right to Lease Follows Ownership of Mineral Interest 200 

1969-70] INDEX 

Implied Obligations of Holder of Executive Right 227 

Power to Lease Does Not Include Power to Pool in Texas 218 

Remedies for Breach of Duties Against Holder of Executive Right 227-228 

Timely Execution Is Duty of Holder of Executive Right 228 

Whether Executive Has Power to Pool as Well as Lease Not Yet Raised in Mis- 
sissippi 217 


Assistance by Mississippi Judiciary Commission 28 

Continued Existence of Mississippi Judiciary Commission 27 

Misissippi Judiciary Commission; Establishment, Purposes of 22 

Subsistence Allowance for Members of in Mississippi 29 

Zoning Classification for Legislature Rather Than Judiciary 156 

Mentally III 

See Mental Retardation 

Mental Retardation 

Capacity as a Witness 107 

Cessation of Guardianship 83 

Civil Liability 105 

Vicarious Liability of Third Persons 106 

Commitment Process 85 

Court Hearing 85 

Appeals 85 

Mental and Physical Examination 84 

Contracts 86 

Criminal Responsibility 97 

Burden of Proof 101 

Sources of Evidence 102 

Temporary Insanity 102 

Incapacity at Time of Offense 100 

Insanity After Conviction 103 

Jury Duty and Voting 104 

Present Insanity 98 

Motion of a Suggestion of Insanity 98 

Preliminary Hearing 99 

Responsibility Test 100 

Deeds 91 

Avoidance of Conveyances 3 88 

Effect of Cancellation 90 

Divorce and Annulment 92 

During NCM's Lifetime 95 

Quantum of Evidence 96 

Time to Bring Action 97 

Duties and Powers of Guardians 82 

Guardianship 81 

Marriage 92 

Removal of Guardian ; 83 

Sexual Sterilization <. 109 

Appeal 1°9 

Hearing 109 


Procedure for i 108 

Wills 90 


"Apportionment" Theory in Pooling and Unitizing 207 

Characteristics of Non -Participating Royalty 191-92 

Distinction Between Grant of Royalty and Non-Executive Right 190-91 

Duty of Executive Toward Non-Executive Interests 224-32 

Executive Right to Lease Follows Ownership of Mineral Interest 200 

Executive Right to Pool 205-24 

"Non-Apportionment" Rule in Pooling or Unitizing 206 

Power to Lease as Property Right in Mississippi 193-94 

Reservation of Bonuses and Rentals Should Not Be Construed as Reservation of 

Executive Right 202-03 

Reservation of Mineral Interest Implies Reservation of Power to Execute Leases. 198 

Right of Pooling Defined 206 

Rule Against Perpetuities and Executive Right to Lease 195-96 

Separation of Interests Allowed in Mississippi 190 


Deeds, Constructive Delivery of 339-46 

Requirements for Rezoning 154 

Spot Zoning in 154 

Wills, Abatement of 154 

Mississippi Law School 

Legal Internship Program 112 

Alternative Programs 124 

Clinical Legal Education 112 

Existing Types of Clinical Programs 

Actual Participation 121 

"In-School" Research Clinic 123 

Legal Aid Clinic 120 

Social and Governmental Agencies 121 


Abrogation of Tort Immunity 307-09 

Areas of Tort Immunity 290-91 

Classification of Governmental Functions 289 

Common Defect of Film Licensing Ordinances Is Vagueness 615 

Decline of Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Mississippi Municipal Tort 

Liability 471-85 

Invalidity of Zoning Ordinance 278 

Liability for Drains and Sewers 295 

Falling Trees 297-98 

Injuries Sustained at Recreational Facilities 298-300 

Negligently Maintaining Sidewalks 296 

Negligently Maintaining Streets 291-92 

Nuisance 300 

Obstructions in Street 293 

Liability to Abutting Property Owner 294-95 

Liability Where Instrumentality Built for Private Use 293 

Licensing Boards as Method of Regulating Motion Pictures 612 

1969-70] INDEX 

Motion Picture Licensing Board — Procedural Safeguards Outlined 616 

Motion Picture Licensing Boards — Minimum Statutory Standards Required .... 616 
Motion Picture Control — Failure to Notify Theatre of Complaint Is Unconstitu- 
tional 614 

Municipal Tort Liability Contrasted With County Tort Liability 289 

New York Procedure as Model for Control of Obscene Matter 617 

Notice of Defects 291 

Power to Protect Citizens From Obscene Motion Pictures 611 

Procedural Defects in Motion Picture Licensing Procedures 613 

Relieved of Liability Where State Takes Over Maintenance 294 

Rezoning Requirements 154 

Spot Zoning in Mississippi 154 

Trivial Defect as Respects Tort Liability 295-96 

Zoning and Police Power 156 

Zoning Ordinance as Constitutional 271 


Abrogation of Municipal Tort Immunity 289 

Comparative Negligence 505-06 

Comparative Negligence in Admiralty Claims 146 

Contributory Negligence in Admiralty 146 

Disputed Evidence 400 

Duty Owed by Landowner to Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees 562 

Failure of Insurer to Investigate 403 

In Recovery for Crop Damage 492-93 

Municipalities' Liability for Falling Trees 297-98 

Municipalities' Liability for Injuries Sustained at Recreational Facility 298-300 

Municipalities' Liability in Maintaining Sidewalks 296 

Municipalities' Liability to Abutting Property Owner 294-95 

Municipalities Liable for Negligently Maintaining Streets 291-92 

Municipalities Liable for Obstructions in Street 293 

Municipalities Liable in the Maintenance of Drains and Sewers 295 

Municipalities Liable Where Instrumentality Built for Private Use 293 

Municipalities Relieved of Liability Where State Takes Over Maintenance .... 294 

Municipalities Required to Have Notice of Defect 291-92, 296 

Negligence and Unseaworthiness Combined 145 

Public Utilities, Liability for 298 

Res Ipsa Loquitur Applied to Unseaworthiness Actions 146 

Strict Liability of Shipowners for Unseaworthiness 142 

Third Party Action Against Insurer 485 

Trivial Defect Not Forseeable 295-96 


As a Prerequisite for Municipalities' Tort Liability 291-92, 296 

As Essential Requirement of Procedural Due Process for Zoning Board 277-78 


Municipal Censorship of Motion Pictures 611 

Oil and Gas 

"Apportionment" Theory in Pooling or Unitizing 207 

Argument for Right to Pool Within Right to Lease 221-22 

Characteristics of Non-Participating Royalty 191-92 


Compulsory Unitization Law in Mississippi 223 

Creation of Executive Rights 189-90 

Cross Conveyance as Result of Pooling in Mississippi 213-14 

Cross Conveyance of Real Property as Result of Unitizing Contract in California 210 

Difficulty in Fitting Oil and Gas Law Into Common Law Property Concepts 217 

Duty of Executive Not Yet Defined in Mississippi 231 

Duty of Executive to Promote Development 229-31 

Duty of Executive Toward Non-Executive Interests 224-32 

Executive Right to Pool 205-24 

Holder of Executive Right as "Ordinary, Prudent Landowner" 225-26 

In Louisiana Power to Lease Includes Power to Pool Interests 219 

Mississippi Involvement in Offshore Drilling 168 

"Non-Apportionment" Rule in Pooling or Unitizing 206 

Obligations of Holder of Executive Right 227 

Pooling-Contract or Cross Transfer of Interests 208-09 

Pooling Results in Cross Conveyances in Texas 209 

Power to Lease and Pool in Oklahoma 219-20 

Power to Lease Does Not Include Power to Pool in Texas 218 

Questions About Executive Right to Be Answered in Mississippi 232 

Remedies for Breach of Duties of Holder of Executive Right 227-28 

Right of Pooling Defined 206 

Rights of Holder of Non-Executive Interest 190 

Rules Governing Pooling Interests in Mississippi 207-08 

Standard of Care of Holder of Executive Right Compromise Between Fiduciary 

Duty and Ordinary Care 227 

Suggested Standards of Duty of Executive Right 225 

Timely Execution of Leases, Duty of Executive Right 228 

Whether Executive Has Right to Pool as Well as Lease Not Yet Raised in Mis- 
sissippi 217 


Death or Retirement of Partner 333-38 

Distribution in Liquidation 329-33 

Formation of 313-19 

Sale of Partnership Interest, Tax Aspects 321-28 

Status of a Partnership 311-12 

Tax Consequences of Partnership Formation 310-38 

Termination of 319 

Police Power 

And Zoning 156 

Pollution and the Law 

Common Law Remedies 352 

Criminal Action 355 

Injunction 355 

Legislative Remedies 356-57 

Water Pollution Control 351 

Practice and Procedure 

Final Argument 268 

Introducing Evidence 263 

Settlement Negotiations 254 

1969-70] INDEX 

Trial Preparation 247, 256 

Voir Dire 260 


Appealing Agricultural Allotments 424-43 

Chronological Synopsis of Mississippi Decisions on Joinder 368-74 

Cross-Examination of Witnesses at Zoning Hearing 284-86 

Four Requisites for Joinder at Common Law 367 

Indifference Toward Improvement 365-66 

Informality of Zoning Board Procedures 272-74 

Joinder at Common Law 366-68 

Joinder of Causes of Action in Mississippi 365-75 

Procedural Problem Raised by Witnesses Not Being Sworn in Zoning Board Dis- 
putes 277 

Requirement for Zoning Board to Keep Records 279-80 

Reopening an Appeal of County Committee or Review Committee 431 

Requirement That Changes to Zoning Ordinance Be Made After Public Hearing 276 

Rule for Joinder in Mississippi 374 

Rules for Procedure for Zoning Hearings 288 

Snyder and The Class Action 397 

Suggested Rules for Zoning Boards 275-76 

U.S. Supreme Court Interpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- 
cedure 379 

Written Opinions of Zoning Board 286-87 

Zoning Boards' Following of Rules of Procedure 272 


Adjusted Basis of Partnership Property 327-28 

Application of Prescription and Acquiescence to Land Bounded by Water 449-51 

Application of Thalweg Doctrine 447-48 

Boundaries Changed by Accretion 444-47 

Change in Boundaries by Avulsion 448-49 

Contributed to Partnership 313-16 

Deeds to, Constructive Delivery of 339-46 

Distinctions Between Trespassing, Licensees, and Invitees and the Trend to 

Abolish These Distinctions 562 

Felonious Slayer Inheriting From Victim 359 

Fixed Law of Changing Boundaries 444-56 

Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving a River Which Is the Boundary of Two 

States 451-54 

Treatment of Depreciable and Depleteable Property in Partnership Situations. . 328 

Treatment of Property Contributed by a Partner 327 

Wills, Abatement of 346-51 

Public Boards and Commissions 

Board of Zoning Appeals 271 

Evidence Heard by Zoning Board 280, 283-86 

Examination of Witnesses Before Zoning Board 279 

Informal Procedure of Zoning Board Hearings 272-73 

Notice as a Fundamental Requirement of Zoning Commission 277-78 

Requirement of Public Hearing Conducted by Zoning Board 276 

Rights of Parties Before Zoning Authorities 271-88 

Suggested Rules of Procedure for Zoning Boards 275-76 


Testimony of Expert and Non-Expert Witnesses Before Zoning Board . . . 281, 285-86 

Zoning Board Findings 287 

Zoning Board Records 279-80, 286-87 

Zoning Boards and Rules of Procedure 272, 274, 288 

Public Lands 

Municipal Liability for Injury 298-300 

Public Laws 

Ordinance Held Void for Failure to Give Proper Notice 278 

Public Officers 

Members of Zoning Board May Act on Personal Knowledge If Divulged in the 

Record 283-84 

Public Utilities 

Liability for Negligence 298 


Against Holder of Executive Right to Lease for Breach of Duties 227-28 

For Injured Seamen Under Jones Act 145 

Retirement Laws and Pensions 

Mississippi Retirement Plans for Judges 30 

Public Employees Retirement System, Inclusion of Mississippi Judges in 30 


Partnership Interests 321-29 


Change of Injunction Provisions of Norris-La Guardia Act and Taft-Hartley Act 628 

Conflict of Purpose and Policy Between Norris-La Guardia Act and Taft-Hartley 

Act 628 

County Liability in Tort 289-90 

Labor Law Dependent on Legislative Intent 

Statutory Procedure as a Prerequisite to Changes in Zoning Ordinance 277 


Right of Third Parties to Take Property Through or From One Who Has 

Murdered the Then Present Owner of the Property 359 

Supreme Court of Mississippi 

Chief Justice of, Time Consumed by Administrative Matters 23 

Definition of Spot-Zoning 155 

Direction of Office of Administrator of Courts in Mississippi, by 24 

Justice's Salary 29 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission 22 

Presiding Justice of, Time Consumed by Administrative Matters 23 

Proposed Salaries for Members of 30 

Recommendations of Mississippi Judiciary Commission Relating to 32 

Reluctance to Label an Ordinance as Spot-Zoning 154 

Treatment of Section 147 of Mississippi Constitution that Corrects Erroneous 

Jurisdiction 578 

1969-70] INDEX 

Supreme Court of the United States 

Applying 14th Amendment and Bill of Rights to the States 599 

Humanitarian Protection for All Engaged in Maritime Service 150 

Spurious Class Actions 379 


Advantages of Private Annuity to Annuitant 458 

Changes in Procedures for Taxing Private Annuities 457 

Income Tax on Private Annuities 457-70 

Partnership Interests 310-38 

Tax Consequences of a Private Annuity to the Transferee 461-67 


Receipt of Delivery 340 

Recordation of 340 

Transfer of Title 339 


Abrogation of Municipal Tort Immunity 301-09 

Areas of Municipal Immunity 290 

Areas of Municipal Liability 291-300 

Classification of Municipal Activities as a Basis for Tort Liability 289 

Counties Liable for Tort Only If Statute so Provides 289-90 

Maritime Torts Resulting in Death 151 

Municipal Liability Predicated Upon Notice of Defects 291-92, 296 

Municipalities Relieved of Liability Where State Takes Over Maintenance 294 

State Death Acts and General Maritime Law 151 

Trivial Defect Not Foreseeable 295-96 

Public Utilities Liable for Negligence 298 

Uniform Consumer Credit Code 

Background and Preliminary Considerations 36 

Ban on Confession of Judgment Clauses 67 

Comparison of UCCC With the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 38 

Consumer Protections Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 36 

Consumer's Right to Cancel Home Solicitation Sale 60 

Credit Industry Concerns About Subjection to Third-Party Defenses 58 

Criticisms of UCCC Waiver-of -Defense Rules 56 

Curbs on Deficiency Judgments 68 

Disclosure of the Cost of Credit 43 

Disclosure Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 45 

Effect of UCCC on Existing State Law 40 

Emergency Sales and Down Payments 62 

Evaluation of Disclosure as a Consumer Protection Device 49 

Evaluation of UCCC Holder-In-Due-Course and Waiver-of-Defense Rules 58 

Exemption of Wages From Garnishment 71 

Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Requirements 43 

General Introduction 36 

General Scope of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 40 

Holders in Due Course 52 

Home Solicitation Sales 60 

Irrevocable Wage Assignment Illegal 74 

Pre-judgment Garnishments 70 


Prohibitions Against Discharge of Employee Because of Garnishment 73 

Prohibitions on Excess Security 65 

Referral Sales Schemes 64 

Regulation of Garnishments and Wage Assignments 70 

Restrictions on Door-to-Door Salesmen 60 

Rights of Consumers Against Seller's Assignee 52 

Rights of Parties After Concellation of Home Solicitation Sale 62 

Waiver-Of-Defense Clauses 54 


Absolute Liability for Temporary Unseaworthiness of Vessel 148 

As a Question of Fact 146 

Burden of Proof on Libelant to Show 146 

Combined With Negligence 145 

Custom and Practice as Evidence of 149 

Fitness of Crew as Cause of 146 

Recent Developments in 5th Circuit 142 

Shipowners Liability for 142 

Shore-Based Workers 150 

And Humanitarian Protection for all Engaged in Maritime Service 150 

Wages and Hours 

Agricultural Employees 419 

Minimum Wage and Agricultural Employees 421 


Compared to Duty of Seaworthiness 144 


Abatement Between Legacies and Devices 350 

Abatement of 

Devices 348-49 

Legacies 347-48 

Wills 346 

Bank Account Trusts as Substitutes 185 

Classes of Legacies 346 

Consideration of Intent in Survivorship Interests 180 

Contractual Agreements as Substitutes 182 

Conveyance of Realty or Personalty Upon Trust as Substitute 185-86 

Conveyance of Vested Interest Necessary to Validity of Deeds as Wills 179 

Deeds as Will Substitutes 178-80 

Demonstrative Legacies 347 

Establishing Plan of Abatement in Wills 351 

General Legacies 346 

Gifts as Substitutes 182-84 

Life Insurance as Substitute 181-82 

Residuary Legacies 347 

Right of Third Parties to Take Property Through or From One Who Has 

Murdered the Then Present Owner of the Property 359 

Specific Legacies 346 

Survivorship Interests as Will Substitutes 180-81 

Testator Slain Feloniously by Devisee 359 

Wrongful Conduct as Bar to Devisee's Taking 359 

1969-70] INDEX 


Before Zoning Board 275, 279, 281-86 

Questioning by Plaintiff's Attorney 266 

Workman's Compensation 

"Found Dead" Presumption 233 

Wrongful Death Statutes 

Death on High Seas Act Not Applicable to Fixed Drilling Platforms 170 

Extension of Jones Act as Possible Remedy for Injury and Death on Fixed Drill- 
ing Platforms 174-75 

State Death Acts and General Maritime Law 151 

State Law Applicable to Fixed Offshore Drilling Platforms 170 


Abuse of Board Discretion 271 

Administration by Local Board of Appeals 271 

And Aesthetic Considerations 155 

And Police Power 156 

Burden of Proof in Changes of 155 

Classification for Legislature Rather Than Judiciary 156 

Evidence Given Before Zoning Board 280 

Examination of Witnesses Before Zoning Board 279, 281-86 

Findings of Zoning Boards 287 

Informal Proceedings Before Zoning Commissions 272-73 

Legal and Illegal Spot-Zoning 155 

Mistake in, Effect of , 154 

Nationwide Concern of Courts With Spot-Zoning 156 

Presumption of Validity of Rezoning 156 

Requirements for Rezoning in Mississippi 154 

Requirements for Zoning Board to Keep Records 279-80, 283-84 

Requirement of Notice by Zoning Commission 277-78 

Requirement of Public Hearing 276 

Rights of Parties Before Zoning Authorities 271-88 

Spot-Zoning and Land Planning 159 

Spot-Zoning, Definition of 155 

Spot-Zoning in Mississippi 154 

Statutory Procedure as a Prerequisite to Any Change in Zoning Ordinance 277 

Suggested Rules for Zoning Board Procedure. 275-76 

Supreme Court of Mississippi Reluctant to Label an Ordinance as Spot-Zoning 154 

Test of Reasonableness 159 

Upheld as Being Constitutional 271 

Valid Spot-Zoning, Test of 156 

Written Opinions of Zoning Boards 286-87 

Zoning Boards' Utilization of Rules of Procedure 272, 274, 288 

By Author 

Joel Blass and Jean Rand Richey 

An Analysis of the Rights and Duties of the Holder of the Executive Right. 189 


Francis S. Bowling 

Thoughts of a Plaintiff's Lawyer 245 

William M. Champion 

Fair Labor Standards Coverage for Agricultural Employees 409 

W. Thad Cochran 

The Obligation to Settle Within Policy Limits 398 

Wade H. Lagrone 

Let's Abolish the "Found-Dead" Presumption 233 

James W. Mann and Gene Parker 

Legal Status of the Mentally Retarded and Mentally 111 in Mississippi 78 

Frank L. Maraist and T. Page Sharp 

After Snyder v. Harris: Whither Goes the Spurious Class Action? 379 

Mary Libby Payne 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission — A Synopsis 22 

James L. Robertson 

Consumer Protection Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 36 

William F. Winter 

Judging the Judges — The Techniques of Judicial Discipline 1 

By Title 

After Snyder v. Harris: Whither Goes the Spurious 

Class Action? Frank L. Maraist and T. Page Sharp 379 

An Analysis of the Rights and Duties of the Holder of the 

Executive Right Joel Blass and Jean Rand Richey 189 

Consumer Protection Under the Uniform Consumer Credit 

Code James L. Robertson 36 

Fair Labor Standards Coverage for Agricultural 

Employees William M. Champion 409 

Judging the Judges — The Techniques of Judicial 

Discipline William F. Winter 1 

Legal Status of the Mentally Retarded and Mentally 111 in 

Mississippi James W. Mann and Gene Parker 78 

Let's Abolish the "Found-Dead" Presumption Wade H. Lagrone 233 

Mississippi Judiciary Commission — A Synopsis Mary Libby Payne 22 

Obligation to Settle Within Policy Limits, The W. Thad Cochran 398 

Thoughts of a Plaintiff's Lawyer Francis S. Bowling 245 


A. Case for the Abolition of Municipal Tort Immunity in 

Mississippi Alan E. Michel and John P. McLauren, III 289 

A Legal Internship Program for the University of Mississippi 

Law School Anson Bob Chunn and George Q. Evans 112 

A Tax Guide for the General Practitioner: The Tax Consequences of Part- 
nership Formation, Change in Membership, Dissolution, and 
Termination Timothy R. Smith 310 

Appealing Agricultural Allotments C. Michael Malski 422 

Do College Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Hear Outside 

Speakers? Joseph L. McCoy and Roger T. Clark 135 

Due Process of Law in Mississippi Courts: Implications of Erroneous Jurisdic- 
tion Under § 147 of the Constitution of 1890 Michael S. Allred 578 

Income Tax Consequences of the Private Annuity Woods Eastland 457 

1969-70] INDEX 

Recent Developments in the Unseaworthiness Doctrine in the 

Fifth Circuit Ernest Lane, III 142 

The Fixed Law of Changing 

Boundaries Douglas H. Lejeve and Ernest G. Taylor 444 

Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees — Are the Distinctions 

Needed? John Howard Shows 562 

Within a Delicate Jurisdiction: The Rights of Parties Before 

Zoning Authorities James A. Peden, Jr. 271 



The Changing Law of Fixed Offshore Installations C. Michael Malski 168 

Collateral Estoppel 

The Multiple Tort Claimant Anomaly Kenneth A. Rutherford 497 

Constitutional Law 

Welch v. United States: Once Again — New Guidelines on 

Conscientious Objectors William C. Trotter, III 618 


The Landowner's Right to Damages as a Result of a 

Second Pipe Line John Howard Shows 490 


Constructive Delivery of Deeds in Mississippi Hugh Carter Clayton 339 


The Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs of Business 

Records James S. Armstrong 604 


Should an Injured Third Party Have a Direct Right 

of Action? Richard L. Forman 485 


Joinder of Causes of Action in Mississippi Rufus Eugene Parker 365 

Labor Law 

State Court Injunctions for Breach of Collective 

Bargaining Agreements George Q. Evans 160 

The Policies and Decisional Processes in the Boys 

Markets Decision Michael S. Allred 626 

Municipal Corporations 

The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction and Municipal Tort Immunity 

Begin to Fall in Mississippi James A. Peden, Jr. 471 


Procedural Guidelines Involved in Municipal Control of Motion 

Pictures C. Gray Burdick 61 1 


The Weakest Link in the Chain? Alan E. Michel 359 

Public Law 

Water Pollution Control in Mississippi Roger T. Clark 351 


Abatement of Wills Ernest G. Taylor, Jr. 346 

Will Substitutes in Mississippi Douglas H. Lefeve 177 


An Analysis of "Spot Zoning" in Mississippi Rezoning 

Cases William M. Bost, Jr. 154 



Rule 41 508 

Comment Robert G. Gillespie 509 


The Liquidation Reincorporation Problem: A Running Tax Battle by James 
O. Hewitt and James A. Cuddihy 
Reviewed by Warren V. Ludlam, Jr 376 




Boyce Holloman, President's Report 511 

Henry L. Pitts, Legal Ethics in the Courtroom 516 

Edward L. Wright, The Nexu Code of Professional Responsibility 523 

Symposium: The New ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 

Roger C. Landrum, Hugh Clayton, John C. Satterfield, Francis Bowling 527 

Tom Davis, Aviation Law Practice 532 

Bidwell Adam, The Case of Casey Jones 537 

William A. Bacon, Incoming President's Remarks 540 


Frank Crosthwait, ABA Convention Report 544 

Pat H. Scanlon, President's Report 545 

Joe Mullen, Young Lawyers Challenge to the Bar 549 

Frank Crosthwait, Incoming President's Remarks 553 

William V. Alexander, Crisis in Rural America . . . , 555 

Dean Joel W. Bunkley, Jr., University of Mississippi Law School Report . . 560 





Abernathy v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. . . 406 

Abney v. Lewis 192 

Acree v. Collins 256 

Adams v. Frothingham 446 

Adams v. Kelly Drilling Co 175 

Adams v. Reed 157 

Adams v. State 594 

Adams v. Stonewall Cotton Mills . . 597 

Aderley v. State of Florida 575 

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price 404 

Aisloff v. Murdock 283 

Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. 

Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple 403 

Aldrich v. Usry 310, 311 

Alexander v. City of Vicksburg 476 

Alexander v. Sims 314 

Alfred v. M/V Margaret Lykes 150 

Allen v. Yazoo M.V.R.R 567 

Allison v. Allison 183 

Allison v. Smith 224, 228 

Allore v. Jewel 189 

Allred v. Nesmith 596 

Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin. 416 
Alvarez v. Pan American Life 

Ins. Co 382 

Amer. Dredging Co. v. Local 25, 

Marine Div. Operating 

Engineers 163,. 164 

American Fidelity & Cas. Co. 

v. Greyhound Corp 402, 404 

American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 

v. Cooper 398, 403 

American Sand and Gravel Co. 

v. Rushing 353 

Anderson v. Anderson 363 

Anderson v. Anderson 569 

Anderson v. Butler 192 

Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury 

Indem. Co 402 

Anderson v. State 102 

Anderson-Tully Co. v. Wilson 234 

Anderson v. Vanderslice 476, 483 

Andretta v. West 228, 229 

Anglo-American Provision Co. 

v. Davis Provision Co 503 

Antoine v. Antoine 94 

Arcos Bros. Builders Inc. v. 

Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City 

of North College Hill 279 

Arkansas v. 

Tennessee . . 448, 449, 450, 454, 455, 456 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. 

Southwest Nat. Prod. Co 208 

Armstrong v. Bell 190, 192 

Ashcot, Inc. v. Texas Eastern 

Transmission Corp 492 

Astleford v. Milner 

Enterprises 562, 568, 577 

Aswood v. Patterson 362 

Atkinson v. Felder 596 

Attorney General v. Chambers 446 

Atwood v. National Bank of Lima. 381 

Auslander v. City of St. Louis 472 

Austin v. Atlas Subsidiaries of 

Mississippi, Inc 53, 64, 77 

Austen v. Austen 395 

Autenreith v. Commissioner 461 

Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 

Machinists 163, 164, 165, 168 

627, 630, 633 

Avent v. Tucker 485 

Avey v. City of West Palm Beach.. 472 

Baggett v. Bullitt 136 

Bailey v. Mayor of City of New 

York 475 

Baker v. City of Santa Fe 478 

Baker v. City of Waco 472 

Baker v. Columbia Gulf 


Co 491, 492, 494, 495, 496, 497 

Baker v. Northwestern Natl. 

Cas. Co 402 

Baldwyn v. Iowa State Traveling 

Men's Assn 454 

Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co 399, 403 

Ballard v. Smith 277 

Banks v. Ogden 447 

Barren v. Commissioner 321 

Barrett v. Carter 579 

Barron v. City of Natchez 297, 476 

Bates v. City of McComb 476 

Bates v. Wilson 364 

Baum v. Greenwald 84 

Bayer v. Siskind 286 

Beasley v. Beasley 179 

Becker v. Beaudoin 481 

Beckmon v. Graves 434 

Beddingfield v. Estill 362 

Beers v. Arkansas 473 

Bell v. Smith 87 


[vol. xli 

Bella Hommel v. Commissioner 458 

Bennett v. Conrady 402 

Benton v. Friar 347, 349 

Benton v. Maryland 601, 602 

Bergen v. Koppenal . 481 

Berman v. Narragansett Racing 

Assn 385 

Berman v. United States 619 

Bernhard v. Bank of America 

Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn 499 

Berry v. Luckett 194, 200 

Birdsong v. City of Clarksdale 293 

Bishop v. Bailey 594 

Bishop v. City of Meridian 476 

Bishop v. Stewart 568 

Blacklidge v. City of Gulfport 158 

Blum v. Board of Zoning and Appeals 

of Town of North Hempstead .. 277 
Board of Levee Comm'rs for Yazoo- 
Mississippi Delta v. Brooks 584 

Board of Supervisors of Lee 

County v. Payne 270 

Boerger v. American Gen. Ins. Co.. . 403 

Boggess v. Milam 208 

Bolirtg v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. . . 404 
Bonnie View Country Club Inc. v. 

Glass 273 

Bonzo v. Nowlin 196 

Boston & Main R.R. v. Talbut 257 

Boudin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. . . . . 147 

Bovard v. State 101 

Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Assn. . . 404 

Bowes v. Chicago 447 

Boyd v. Applewhite 593 

Boyd v. Crosby Lumber Co. . . . 233, 234 
Boyer v. Iowa High School 

Athletic Assn 482 

Boyett v. Boyett 584 

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail 

Clerks Local 770 626-33 

Brackett v. Board of Appeals of 

City of Boston 288 

Bradley v. City of Jackson 477 

Bradshaw v. Rudder 234 

Bragalini v. Biblowitz 382 

Braham v. Hinds County 289 

Branden v. Much 276 

Brehmer v. City of Kerrville 282 

Breland v. Mack 382 

Brinkham v. City of Indianapolis.. 481 

Brinson v. Sandifer 179 

Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts 233 

Brooks v. Auburn Univ. . . 136, 139, 140 

Brooks v. City of Jackson 278 

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 

v. Chicago River and Indiana 

R.R 629, 630, 633 

Brown v. City of Meridian 298 

Brown v. City of Omaha 481 

Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co. . . 403, 405 

Brown v. L.A. Penn & Son 233, 234 

Brown v. Miss. C.R.R. 370 

Brown v. Smith.. 209, 215, 219, 221, 222 

Brummett v. City of Jackson 300, 476 

Brunche v. Board of Trustees of 

Incorporated Village of Great Neck 285 

Brundage v. Knox 444, 447 

Bryant v. Bryant 362 

Bryant v. Sevier 186 

Bryant v. Stringer 80 

Bryniarski v. Montgomery County 

Bd. of Appeals 285 

Buchanan v. Buchanan 179 

Burnett v. Smith 90 

Buckler v. State 100 

Building Insulators, Inc. v. Stuart . . 487 

Bullit v. Taylor 339 

Bullock v. Hans 581, 584 

Burchett v. City of Stanton 472 

Burstyn v. Wilson 611, 612, 615 

Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters 505 

Butler v. State 107, 108 

Byram v. Snowden 485 

Byrd v. State . . . 593 

Byrnes v. City of Jackson . . 291, 299, 476 
Caluori v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of 

Town of Johnston 281 

Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hosp., 

Inc 107 

Canning v. State 602 

Canuel v. Oskoian 381 

Carbolineum Wood Preserving 

Co. v. Meyer 591 

Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger . . 142 

Carradine v. Carradine 593 

Carraway v. State 104 

Carter v. Dabbs 179 

Carter v. State 98, 102 

Carter v. Witherspoon 584 

Carter County v. Street 495 

Cashin v. Murphy 14 

Gates v. State 102 

Cazeneuve v. 

Curell 579, 580, 581, 582, 589 




Chandler v. David 427 

Chapman v. Lott 340 

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. 

Courtney 161, 629, 630 

Chilcutt v. Keating 485 

Chisholm v. Commissioner 313 

Chrisman v. Bryant 347 

C.I.T. Corp. v. Turner 

Cities Service Gas Co. v. Christian 494 

Citizen's Natl. Bank v. Commissioner 461 

City of Ardmore v. Hendrix 474 

City of Biloxi v. Creel 586, 592 

City of Buffalo Cremation Co., In re 277 
City of Cleveland v. Threadgill 295, 296 

City of Columbia v. Wilks 300 

City of Columbus v. Mcllwain .... 298 

City of Corinth v. Gilmore 297 

City of Fairbanks v. Schaible 481 

City of Greenville v. Laury 295 

City of Greenville v. Middleton ... 292 

City of Gulfport v. Sheppard 298 

City of Hattiesburg v. Buckalen . . . 476 
City of Hattiesburg 

v. Geigor 290, 475, 476 

City of Hattiesburg v. Hillman . . . 476 
City of Hattiesburg v. Pittman ... 281 
City of Jackson v. Bridges .... 154, 155 

City of Jackson v. Clark 292 

City of Jackson v Cook 373 

City of Jackson v. Freeman- 
Howie, Inc 277 

City of Jackson v. McFadden 299 

City of Jackson v Reed 486 

City of Jackson v. Wilson 158, 159 

City of Laurel v. Hearn 294, 295 

City of Laurel v. Hutto 293 

City of Laurel v. Ingram 298 

City of Laurel v. Upton 294, 475 

City of Leland v. Leach 476 

City of Lexington v. Yank 481 

City of Louisville v. Chapman 481 

City of Lumberton v. Schrader 292 

City of Meridian v. Beeman ... 471, 476 

City of Meridian v. Bryant 295 

City of Meridian v. Peterson 293 

City of Meridian v. Raley 292 

City of Meridian v. Sullivan 372 

City of Meridian v. Tingle 353, 354 

City of Oxford v. Spears 353, 354 

City of Pass Christian v. 

Fernandez 298, 471, 474, 476 

City of Ruleville v. Grittman 292 

City of Vicksburg v. McLain . . 291, 476 
City of Vicksburg v. 

Richardson 300, 305 

City of West Point v. Berry 476 

City of West Point v. 

Meadows 298, 476 

City of West Point v. Womack ... 352 

Claiborne v. Holmes 340 

Clark v. American Marine Corp. . . . 382 
Clark v. County Bd. of Appeals 

of Montgomery County 287 

Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co 210 

Clark v. Lopez 89 

Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley 

Hosp 482 

Clark v. United States 619 

Clark v. Zurich Truck Lines 257 

Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster . . 472 
Clevenger v. Star Fish 8c Oyster 

Co., Inc 150 

Coahoma County Bank Sc Trust 

Co. v. Feinberg 263 

Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co. ... 499 

Coffman v. City of Pulaski 482 

Colagiovanni v. Zoning Bd. of 

Rev. of City of Providence 284 

Coleman v. Jahncke Service, Inc. . . 149 

Coleman v. Teague 253 

Colgrove v. Lampoc Model "T" Club 569 
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush 

Racing Assn 480 

Colson v. Sims 572 

Comfort v. Smith 183 

Commercial Pictures Corp. v. 

Regents 616 

Commissioner v. Culbertson ... 310, 311 

Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co... 334 
Commissioner v. John C. Moore 

Corp 464 

Commissioner v. Lehman 323, 325 

Commissioner v. Kaun's Estate .... 458 

Commissioner v. Shapiro 323 

Commissioner v. Smith 323 

Commissioner v. Whitney 323 

Commissioner v. Williams 311 

Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, 

Inc 614, 615 

Compton v. Fisher-McCall, Inc. . . . 230 

Community Synagogue v. Bates 283 

Conerly v. Lewis 88, 89, 91 

Conn v. Boutwell 87 

Connelly v. Nolte 488 


[vol. xli 

City of Vicksburg v. Harralson 476 

Conway v. Humbert 482 

Cooley v. Tullas 580 

Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison . . 270 
Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. 

v. Fields 406 

Couch v. Zoning Commission of 

Town of Washington 273 

Coulter v. Carter 178 

County of St. Clair v. 

Lovingston 446 

Cow Hollow Improvement Club 

v. Di Bene 281 

Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & 

Sur. Co 399 

Cox v. Esso Shipping Co 143 

Craig v. City of Vicksburg 52 

Cranston v. Freeman 382 

Crawford v. Town of D'Co 300 

Crisco v. Security Ins. Co 401 

Cuevas v. Cuevas 362 

Cunningham v. County Court 

of Wood County 482 

Curry v. Lucas 89, 91 

Cunningham v. State 100, 101, 102 

Cusack v. Teitel Film Corp 613 

Dahlberg v. Jones 107 

Dallapi v. Campbell 196 

Dal Maso v. Board of County 

Commissioners of Prince 

George County 273, 280 

Dan v. Yellow Cab Co 391, 393 

Daniels v. Morgan & Lindsay, Inc. . . 572 

Davies v. Maryland Cas. Co 489 

Davis v. Maryland Cas. Co. ... 403, 404 

Davy v. Public Natl. Ins. Co 402 

Dawson v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. 

of Town of Cumberland 284 

Day v. Hartman 580 

Decell v. Hazelhurst Oil Mill 

& Fertilizer Co 580 

Deemer Lumber Co. v. Hamilton . . 234 

Deering v. Commissioner 458 

Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons 224 

Dendy v. City of Pascagoula 300 

Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust 

Co. v. Mangum 82 

Devon Civic League, Inc. v. Marion 

County Board of Zoning 

Appeals 274 

Dickson v. Sitterson 136 

Dighton v. Coffman 435 

Dilworth v. Federal Reserve 

Bank 585, 590 

Dinsmore v. Harrison 580 

Dix v. Commissioner 461 

Dolgow v. Anderson 382, 391, 393 

Dore v. Link Belt Co. 170, 171 

Dorminey v. City of Montgomery. . 472 
Douglas v. United States 

Fidelity & Guar. Co 401 

Drew v. Lawrimore 440, 441, 442 

Dry v. Ford 566, 568 

Duff v. St. Louis Mining & 

Milling Corp 241 

Duke v. Durfee 452 

Duling v. Duling's Estate 181 

Dumas v. Hartford Accident 

& Indem. Co 399 

Dunagin v. First Natl. Bank 

of Laurel 587, 588 

Duncan v. Louisiana 599, 600, 602 

Durfee v. Duke 452, 453, 454, 455 

Durfee v. Keiffer 451 

Eagle Motor Lines, Inc. 

v. Mitchell 238 

Eastland v. State 98 

Eastman v. State 101 

East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. 

v. Peltz 495 

Edwards v. Owens 428, 429 

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 382 

Ellish v. Goldman 274 

Elliot v. Aetna Life Ins. Co 489 

Embassy Pictures Corp. v. 

Hudson 615 

Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. 

Chicago St. P., M. & O. Ry 399 

Engelburg v. Tonkel 581, 584, 598 

Ervin v. Bass 96 

Eslick v. State 99 

Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen 228 

Etheridge v. Webb 498 

Evans v. Miller 368, 369 

Evans v. Rothensis 458 

Evans v. Schneider Transp. Co 147 

Excelsior Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. State.. 107 

Fairchild Constr. Co. v. Owens 234 

Fairley v. State 108 

Fandel v. Board of Zoning 

Adjustment of Boston 273 

Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co. v. Violano 404 

Farmer v. Runnels 345 



Farmers Gin Co. v. St. Paul 

Mercury Indem. Co 407 

Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Henderson 403 

Fatheree v. Griffin 609 

Fay v. New York 599 

Fed. Land Bank of Houston v. 

U.S 224, 226, 228 

Feld v. Borodofski 80 

Ferris v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. . . 403 

Fette v. City of St. Louis 482 

Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist 482 

Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault 398 

Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb 406 

Field v. Borodofski 105 

Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. City 

of Seattle 615 

Finkbine Lumber Co. v. 

Cunningham 486 

First Natl. Bank of Chicago 

v. United Air Lines, Inc 503 

First Natl. Bank of Snyder v. 

Evans 224 

First Natl. Bank of Vicksburg 

v. Cutrer 572 

Fitzgerald v. Reed 87, 90 

Flagstad v. City of San Mateo 279 

Flick v. Galey 276 

Ford v. Jones 190 

Ford v. State 101, 102 

Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell 257 

Ford Motor Co. v. Dees 257 

Foremost Dairies v. Campbell 

Coal Co 399 

Forrester v. Southern Ry 389, 499 

Fortenberry v. Herrington 89, 92 

Fortenberry v. Wilkerson . . 584, 587, 591 
Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. 

v. Kelly 404 

Fowler v. City of Cleveland 478 

Frank and Willie, The 145 

Franks v. Goyer Co 238 

Frederick v. Merchants & Marine 

Bank 341 

Freedmon v. 

Maryland 613, 614, 615, 617, 618 

Freeman v. Bailey 584, 594 

Freeman v. Brown 440, 442 

Frierson v. Moorhead 82 

Fulford v. 

Forman . . .426, 427, 428, 430, 437, 439 

F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes 572 

Gaines v. Klein 349 

Galvin v. Murphy 274 

Gambrell v. State 102 

Gardner v. Boagni 230 

Garraway v. Retail Credit Co 499 

Garrett v. State 14 

Garvin v. Pettigrew 213, 219 

Gas Service Co. v. Coburn 382 

Gaunt v. Board of Appeals of 

Methuen 287 

Gelling v. Texas 615 

General Gas Co. v. Whipple 406 

General Tire and Rubber Co. v. 

Darnell 572 

Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills 

Prod. Co 398, 404, 406 

Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann 400 

Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. 

Mississippi Central 

Railroad Co 407 

Gholson v. Smith 362, 363 

Gibbs v. Kiesel 146 

Gibson v. Bellingham N. Ry 255 

Gibson v. Talbot County Bd. 

of Zoning Appeals 286 

Gidden v. Gidden 184, 347, 349 

Gilder v. First Natl. Bank 

of Greenville 184 

Gilford v. Commissioner 311 

Gill v. Hedgecock 444 

Gillis v. Smith 88 

Gillespie v. Commissioner 459 

Gilmer v. Gilmer 346, 347 

Ging v. American Liab. Ins. 

Co 403, 405 

Ginther v. Long 353 

Gladney v. Review Comm. 430, 436, 437 
Glover v. City of South Houston . . 472 
GoldbeTg v. Whitaker House 

Coop, Inc 411 

Goldstein v. Zoning Bd. of 

Rev. of City of Warwick 281 

Goodruch v. Selligman 273 

Gordon v. James 348, 349, 350 

Gossler v. City of Manchester 480 

Gothberg v. Nemerovski 489 

Goyer v. Wildberger 580 

Graham v. 

Graham 341, 342, 343, 344, 345 

Graham v. Lawrimore 435 

Granquist v. Crystal Springs 

Lumber Co 498 

Graves v. Massey 571 


[vol. xli 

Greene v. Greene 608 

Green v. United States 458 

Grenada Groc. Co. v. 

Tatum 580, 581, 584 

Grice v. McCarty-Holman Co 584 

Griffith v. Gulf Refining Co 207 

Grillen v. City of St. Louis 482 

Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile 

Co 175 

Grissom v. State 101 

Griswold v. Connecticut 137 

Grove Press, Inc. v. City of 

Philadelphia 614 

Gulfport & Miss. Traction Co. 

v. Manuel 292 

Gulfport Winn-Dixie, Inc. v. Taylor 572 

Gulf Refining Co. v. Stanford 192 

Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board 161 

Haag v. Barnes 395 

Hailey v. McLaurin's Estate 347 

Hald v. Pearson 178 

Haley v. Commissioner 311 

Hall v. Barnett 340 

Hall v. City of Jackson 476 

Hall v. Stakley 371 

Hamblin v. Marchant 360 

Hamer v. Rinnan 362 

Hamilton v. Transcontinental 

Gas Pipeline Corp. 492 

Hamilton Bros. Co. v. Narciese .... 80 

Hancock v. Dodge 580 

Haney v. City of Lexington 481 

Hanna v. Plumer 486 

Hanson v. Richey 569 

Hanson v. Ware 224 

Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa 

Beach 478, 479, 480, 482 

Hardie v. Chew Fish Yuen 210 

Harkreader v. Clayton 340, 343 

Harlee v. City of Gulfport 299 

Harris v. Griffith .... 190, 201, 231, 232 

Harrison v. Landrum 584 

Hart v. American Airlines, 

Inc 497, 498, 500, 501 

502, 503, 505, 507 
Hart v. First Natl, Bank of 

Jackson 186 

Hart v. Hassell 433 

Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co 399 

Harvey v. Illinois Central R.R 352 

Haskins v. Point Towing Co 149 

Hassie Hunt Trust v. Proctor 192 

Hastings v. Rose Courts, Inc 499 

Hattem v. Silver 287 

Hawie v. Hawie 100 

Hawie v. State 98, 100 

Hawkins v. City of Natchez . . . 295, 476 
Hawkins v. State Agriculture 

Stabilization and Conservation 

Comm 430, 438 

Hazebrigg v. American Fidelity 

& Cas. Co 404 

Hazell Machine Co. v. Shahan 373 

Health v. Mayor and City Council 

of Baltimore 273 

Heatherington v. Newenberg . . 347, 350 

Heaven v. Pender 562 

Hecht v. Monaghan 275 

Heddendorf v. Joyce 269 

Helvering v. Walb ridge 313 

Hemphill v. Smith 82, 83 

Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. 

Co 402, 404 

Henry B. Fiske, The 142 

Henry v. Toney 360, 363, 364 

Henson v. Richey 573 

Herbst v. Abel 387 

Herrin v. Daly 485 

Higgins v. Loup River Public 

Power Dist 606 

Highway Patrol v. Neal's 

Dependents 238 

Hildebrand v. United States 149 

Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co. . . . 403 

Estate of Hill v. Maloney 460 

Hill v. McLaurin 86 

Hill City Compress Co. 

v. West Kentucky Coal Co 453 

Hines v. Potts 86, 87 

Hodges v. City of Charlotte 472 

Hoffman v. Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore 283 

Holcomb v. City of Clarksdale 154 

Estate of Hollingsworth, In re 83 

Holmby Productions, Inc. 

v. Vaughn 616 

Holmes v. Mississippi Shipping 

Co 146 

Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 391 

Holytz v. City of Milwaukee 480 

Home Indem. Co. v. Snowden 403 

Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson 404, 407 
Home Ins. Co. v. Tate 

Mercantile Co 371 



Hornsby v. Fishmeal Co 151 

Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser 285 

Howell v. Ott 184, 347 

Howell v. Shannon 425 

Howie v. Autrey 157 

Hoye v. Newton Lumber & Mfg. Co. 609 

Hoyt v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 404 
Hudgins v. Lincoln Natl. Life 

Ins. Co 202, 224 

Hudson v. Newell 213 

Hughes v. Fetter 503 

Hull v. Townsend 584 

Humes v. Krause 91 

Hunter v. State 107 

Huntingdon v. Altrill 451 

Hurst v. Highway Dept 482 

Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc 148 

Hutchins v. Barlow 92 

Hutchinson's Estate, In re 182 

Hyson v. Montgomery County 285 

111. C. R.R. Co. v. Abrams 369 

111. C. R.R. Co. v. Butterfield 

Lumber Co 608 

Illinois Cent. R.R. v. LeBlanc 580 

Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Nelson 246 

Indermaur v. Dames 562 

Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. 

Trehern 486 

Ingraham v. Grigg 339 

International Order of Twelve of 

Knights and Daughters of Tabor 

in Miss. v. Barnes 483 

Interstate Circuit v. Dallas 615 

Interstate Commerce Comm'n 

v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. . . 286 

Iowa v. Illinois 448 

Irion v. Cole .. 580, 589 

Isom v. Canedy 90 

Jackson v. Bailey 233 

Jackson v. Banks 86, 90 

Jackson v. State 102 

Jacques v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 

of City of Pawtuckett 280 

Jacobellis v. Ohio 611, 612 

James v. United States 319 

Jophet v. McRae 206 

Jaquith v. Beckwith 98, 99, 103 

Jarrell v. Board of Adjustments 

of City of High Point 276, 285 

Jeffries v. East Omaha Land 

Co 444, 446, 447 

Jenkins v. Borodofsky 364 

Jenkins v. Houston County Hosp. 

Bd 483 

Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of 

Rev. of Town of East Providence 282 
Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge 

Community Assn 280 

Johnson v. Bacon 182 

Johnson v. Bagby 498, 499, 500, 505, 506 

Johnson v. City of East Moline . . . 472 

Johnson v. Grice 184 

Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. 404 

Johnson v. Johnson 92 

Johnson v. Lambotte 106 

Jones v. Approved Bancredit 

Corp 53, 54 

Jones v. City of Amory . . . 290, 305, 476 

Jones v. Culley 83 

Jones v. Goolsby 363 

Jones v. Hughes 431, 437 

Jones v. Omon 495 

Jones v. Parker 82 

June T. Inc. v. King 147 

Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc 381 

Karan v. Commissioner 319 

Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co 404 

Kaufman's, Inc. v. Commissioner . . 466 

Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 474 

Keel v. Greenville Mid-Stream 

Service, Inc 149 

Keeler v. State 101 

Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp. . . 147 
Kelly v. Sportsmen's 

Speedway 566, 568, 569 

Kelley v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of 

City of Providence 284 

Kennedy v. Little 487 

Kenny v. Trinidad Corp 152 

Kenoyer v. Magnolia Pet. Co 208 

Kent v. McCaslin 349 

Kentucky State Bar Assn. v. Lewis. . 15 

Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale . . 573 

Kilfozle v. Wright 196 

Kingsley International Pictures 

Corp. v. Regents 611, 616 

Killings v. Metropolitan Life 

Ins. Co 265 

Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co. 405 
King v. State ex rel. Murdock Accep- 
tance Corp 604, 607, 608, 610, 611 

Kinney v. United States 321, 322 

Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Mfg. Co. 395 

Knight v. Knight 179 


[vol. xli 

Knotts v. Bailey 349 

Kosoglad v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 

of City of Chicago 287 

Kreppendorf v. Hyde 384 

Krust v. Hill 273 

Kunkel v. United Sec. Ins. Co. 

of N.J 405 

Lacey v. Pelus 183 

Ladner v. Ladner 185 

Ladner v. Morgan 341 

Lambert v. Powell 88, 91 

Lamont v. Postmaster General 137 

Lamp v. Locke 224, 228, 230 

Lancaster v. Lancaster 485 

Lang v. State 103 

Langford v. Mercurio 566 

Langford v. United States 478 

Laurel Racing Co. v. Jones 584 

Laurel Light 8c Ry. Co. v. Jones ... 298 
Lawson & Nelson S. & D. Co. v. 

Associated Indem. Corp 404 

Leach v. Brown 215 

Leake County Cooperative v. 

Dependents of Barrett . .236, 237, 238 

241, 243 

LeBard v. Richfield Oil Corp. . 210 

Le Blanc v. Haynesville Mercantile 

Co 219 

Lee v. Deberry 429 

Lee v. Wiley Buntin Adjuster, Inc. . 498 

Lee County Gin Co. v. Middlebrooks 487 

Lepnick v. Gaddis 567 

Leverette v. Ainsworth 180 

Levin v. New England Cas. Co. . . . 403 

Lewis Estate, In re 180 

Lewis v. State 103, 104 

Liber v. Flor 480 

Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. 

Webb 389 

Lindeman's Estate v. Herbert 183 

Linden Methodist Episcopal 

Church v. City of Linden 155 

Lindsey Bros. v. Jones 430, 431, 435 

Lippian v. Ros 598 

Lipsett v. United States 381 

Littell v. Nakai 453 

Lloyd v. Commissioner 459 

Loffland Brother's Co. v. Roberts.. 172 

Logan v. City of Clarksdale . . . 293, 475 
London v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 

of City of Bridgeport 280 

Long v. Commissioner 323 

Long v. Union Indem. Co 399 

Lonquist v. J. C. Penney Co 385 

Louisiana v. Mississippi 448, 454 

Loutares v. Smith 429 

Love Petroleum Co. v. Jones 354 

Luke Const. Co. v. Jernigan ...... 487 

Lumb v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of 

Town of Bristol 274 

Lunt v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 

Town of Waterford 278 

Luvaul v. City of Eagle Pass 482 

Lyle Cashion Co. v. McRendrick . . 497 

Lynch v. Lynch 340, 343, 344, 345 

Lysick v. Walcom 401 

McAfoos v. Canadian Pacific S.S. 

Ltd 145 

McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum 

Co 145 

McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co. . . . 485 

McCall v. Nettles 224 

McClendon v. Mississippi State 

Highway Comm 595 

McClure v. Couch 444 

McComb v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. ... 403 

McComb City v. Hayman 292 

McComish v. DeSoi 257 

McCully v. McCully 87 

McDawell v. City of Natchez 372 

McGarrh v. State 102 

McGill v. City of Laurel 300 

McGinnis v. State 98, 99 

Mcintosh v. Mcintosh 96 

McKibben v. City of Jackson. . . 156, 286 

McLendon v. State 14 

McLoed v. Cities Service Gas Co 493 

McLoed v. Threlkeld 415 

McMillan v. Gibson 344 

McNabb v. United States 272 

McNeese v. Reuner 192, 198 

Estate of McNichol v. Commission . . 458 
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing 

Co 415 

Mackies v. Murray 389 

Maffei v. Incorporated Town of 

Kemmerer 474, 479 

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. 

Spears 353, 354 

Mahnich v. Southern S.S, Co 142 

Maier v. Hill 183 

Main v. Main 95 

Majure v. William H. Alsup 

& Associates 238 



Malone v. Mooring 346, 347, 348 

Mandle v. Kelley 503 

Marbury v. Madison 7, 484 

Marlon Investment Co. v. 

Conner 566, 567, 568 

Marsh v. Whittington 94 

Martin v. Adams 344 

Martin v. Snuggs 202 

Martin v. City of Canton 472 

Martinson v. City of 

Jackson 155, 157, 158 

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien 

Constr. Co 403 

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmire 

Coal Co 403 

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppard 489 

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wyoming 

Valley Paper Co 403, 404 

Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. 

Capitol Airlines, Inc 499 

Masonite Corp. v. Burnham 353, 354, 355 

Masonite Corp. v. Guy 358 

Masonite Corp. v. Local 15-443 

International Woodworkers ...160, 163 
164, 165, 168 

Massey v. Masonite Corp 358 

Mastin v. Commissioner 461, 465 

Mathews v. Sun Oil Co 221 

Matthews v. Thompson 596 

Maynard v. Ratliff 229 

Mayor & Aldermen of City of 

Vicksburg v. Harralson 293 

Merchants Co. v. Tracy 238 

Merrick v. United States Rubber 

Co 606, 610 

Merrill Eng. Co. v. Capital 

Natl. Bank 207, 211, 214, 215 

Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co 363 

Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp 143 

Metcalf v. Boston 295 

Metcalf v. Brandon 340 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 

v. McSwain 265 

Metzger v. Joseph 580, 582 

Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. 144 

Michigan v. Morton Salt Co 499 

Michigan v. Wisconsin 450 

Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer . . . 224 

Miles v. Amerada Petrol Corp 209 

Miller v. United States 432 

Milliken v. Meyer 503 

Mills v. Toppett 435 


Minchin v. Fields 218, 219 

Minter v. Hart 598 

Mississippi Assn. of Ins. Agents 

v. Seay's Dependents 239 

Miss. Baptist Hospital v. 

Holmes 301, 302, 303, 304 

306, 307, 308, 484 

Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Moore 483 

Mississippi Fire Assn. v. Stein 580 

Mississippi Ice & Util. Co. v. Pearce 486 

Mississippi Mills Co. v. Smith 352 

Mississippi Power & Light Co. 

v. Walters 568 

Mississippi State University 

v. Hattaway 238 

Missouri v. Nebraska 449 

Mitchell v. Craft 501 

Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co.. . . 415 

Mitchell v. Pidcock 416 

Mitchell v. State 104 

Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. ... 148 
Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning and 

Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town 

of Greenwich 273 

M'Naghten 100 

Molitor v. Kaneland Community 

Unit Dist. No. 302 480 

Montgomery v. Rittersbacher 224 

Moore v. General Motors 

Acceptance Corp 578, 584, 594 

Moore v. Hope Natural Gas Co. . . . 493 

Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. . . 572 

Morgan v. Hazlehurst Lodge 340, 343 

Morgan County v. Neff 495 

Morris v. City of Columbia 278 

Morriss v. First Natl. Bank of 

Mission 224 

Morris v. Huff 485 

Morrow v. Clayton 442 

Moss v. Jourdan 192 

Mounger v. Pittman 191, 199 

Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester. 475 
Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans 

Barge Lines, Inc 150 

Mulford v. Smith 443 

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 

&r Trust Co 388 

Mullins v. Merchandise Sales Co 77 

Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding 

& Ins. Co 403 

Murry Chevrolet Co. v. Cotten . . 568, 569 

Muse v. Muse 82 


[vol. xli 

Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist 480 

Musselwhite v. State 98, 103, 104 

Mutual Implement & Hardware 

Co. v. Pittman 233 

Myers v. Giroir 598 

Myers v. Laird 179, 180, 181 

Nasif v. Booth 373 

Naturalization of Fordiani, Inc., 

In re 285 

Nebraska v. Iowa 448, 449 

Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth. . . 482 
Nesbitt v. City of Greenville . . . 292, 293 

Nevarov v. Caldwell . . . 499 

Neville v. Kelso 83 

New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier. . 246 

New Jersey v. Delaware 448 

New Orleans v. United States 447 

New Orleans & C.R. v. Maryland 

Gas. Co 405 

New Orleans and Northeast R.R. 

v. Gable 505, 506 

NLRB v. George E. Light Boat 

Storage, Inc 161 

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. 

Grounde 382 

Norton, Re 364 

Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of 

Educ 389 

Norwood v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . 404, 405 

Nowell v. Harris 571, 572 

Noyes v. Zoning Bd. of Review 

of City of Providence 283 

Nugent v. Freeman 218, 219, 224 

Ocean Drilling and Exp. Co. v. 

Berry Bros. Oilfield Service... 172, 173 

O 'Conner v. Dickerson 362 

Odegard v. Connolly 488 

Odom v. State 595, 599 

Odom v. Walker 485 

Odstricil v. McGlaun 196, 228 

Offshore Co. v. Robinson 174 

Oliphant v. Skelton 347 

Oliver v. Commissioner 315 

Olsen v. State 99 

Olympia Fields Country Club v. 

Bankers Indem. Ins. Co 404 

Oshorn v. Ark. Terr. Oil & Gas 

Dev. Co 220 

Osceola, The 142 

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp. . . . 418 

Owens v. Owens 360 

Pace v. Barrett 498, 500 

Pace v. Methodist Hosp 483 

Pace v. Pace , 184 

Pace v. State 98, 99 

Paine v. Underwood 281 

Pacific Maritime Assn. v. 

International Longshoremens 

and Warehousemens 

Union 628, 629, 631, 632 

Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co. . . . 404 

Palmer v. Riggs 341 

Palmer v. Crews 190 

Pan American Petroleum Corp. 

v. Cain 196 

Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. 

v. Corporation Comm 220 

Panola County Bank v. Nessen 

Lumber Co 608 

Parkinson v. Mills 95, 96 

Parish v. Pitts 481 

Parker v. City of Hutchinson 482 

Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal 

Co. 565 

Parson v. Texas City 472 

Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals 

of City of New Haven 273 

Parsons v. City of New York 472 

Patterson v. Adan 489 

Patterson v. Sayers 571, 572 

Paul v. United States 425 

Paulsen v. Portland 388 

Pearson v. Yewdall 599 

Pederson v. The Bulklube 145 

Peebles v. Acker 350 

Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Nunnery 362, 363 

People ex rel. Fordham Manor 

Reformed Church v. Walsh 271 

People ex rel. Home of Hebrew 

Infants City of New York v. Walsh 274 
Perkins v. First Natl. Bank of 

Yazoo City 347, 350 

Perrier v. Board of Appeals of 

City of Pawtuckett 283 

Perry v. Strawbridge 360, 361 

Perry v. United States Fidelity 

& Guar. Co 402 

Peter v. United States 620 

Peterman v. Gary 485 

Peterson v. American Family Mut. 

Ins. Co 405 

Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. 

Anaconda Am. Brass Co 387, 394 




Phillips v. Ford 89, 90 

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson. . 208 
Phipps v. NV Neder, Amerik, 

Stoorm, Maats 150 

Phoenix Constr. Co. v. The 

Steamer Poughkeepsie 173 

Pickard v. City and County of 

Honolulu 574 

Pigford Bros. Constr. Co. v. Evans.. 233 

Pinchback v. Gulf Oil Corp 224 

Pipes v. Webb 89 

Poignant v. United States 149 

Portland v. Dravo Corp 381 

Potomac Ins. Co. v. Dilkins Co. . . . 403 

Powell v. City of Nashville 472 

Powell v. Commissioner 311 

Powell v. Masonite Corp 234 

Pray v. Hewitt 498 

Premier Petroleum Co. v. Box 493 

Price v. S. S. Yaracuy 147 

Prickett v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. 

Co 399 

Priester & Sons, Inc., v. Bynum . . . 242 
Prigden v. International Cushion 

Co 241 

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gleason 81 

Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes 171, 172 

Puryear v. Austin 88, 89 

Radcliffe v. Franklin Natl. Ins. 

Co 402, 405 

Radick v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of 

Town of East Providence 278 

Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln 

Mut. Ins. Co 403 

Ragan v. Cox 106 

Ragsdale v. Superior Oil Co 210 

Rains v. Thorp Finance Corp 609 

Rakestraw v. Winchester 435 

Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne 482 

Raynor v. Lindsey 246 

Ready-Mix Concrete Prod. Co. 

v. Perry 584 

Reddit v. Wall 290 

Reed v. Charping 590, 598 

Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co. . . 504 

Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster . . . 209 
Review Committee, Venue II v. 

Reynolds 428, 435 

Review Comm. Venue VII v. Willey 436 

Reynolds v. West 265 

Rhinehart Farms, Inc. v. United 

States 466 

Rich v. Doneghey 220 

Ricketts v. Jolliff 86, 89 

Riddle v. Proprietors of the 

Locks and Canals on Merrimack 

River 475 

Ridgewood Land Co. v. 

Simmons 157, 159 

Riegelhaupt v. Ostroffsky 348 

Riggs v. Palmer 360 

Ringold v. Goyer Co 589, 593 

Robey v. Schwab 287 

Roberi v. Southern Farm Bureau 

Gas. Ins. Co 404 

Robert Addie and Sons v. Dunbreck 565 

Roberts v. Spence 590 

Robichaux v. Kerr McKee Oil 

Indus., Inc 147 

Robinson v. Burritt 83 

Robinson v. Milam 229 

Robinson v. State 99 

Robinson v. Town Council of 

Narragansett 280 

Rodrique v. Aetna Cas. 

Co 169, 170, 173, 176 

Rogers v. Morgan 191, 231, 232 

Rogers v. State 101, 104 

Rohner v. Austral Oil 

Exploration Co 493 

Rota-Cone Oil Field Operating Co. 

v. Commissioner 310 

Roth v. Commissioner 323 

Roth v. United States 612 

Rowe v. City of Winona . . 474, 475, 479 

Rowland v. Christian 574, 575, 576 

Royal Transit v. Central Sur. & 

Ins. Corp 404, 405 

Rushing v. Water Valley Coca Cola 

Bottling Co 238 

Russell v. Men of Deron.. 289, 474, 479 

Russell v. Sohio Pipe Lines 238 

Russo v. Stevens 283 

Rutherford Food Corp. v. 

McComb 411, 412 

Sadler's Estate, In re 182 

Sage v. Northern Pa. R.R 257 

Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson 

Telephone Mfg. Co 285 

Sanderson v. City of Hattiesburg. . . 282 
San Diego Building Trades Council 

v. Garmon 161 

Sandmann v. Shechan 472 

Saunders v. Mitchell 82 


[vol. xli 

Saunders v. New York Cent. & 

H. R.R. 444 

Savery v. Gray 486 

Saxon v. Town of Houlka 291 

Scaling v. Beggs 224 

Scheele v. City of Anchorage 481 

Schlittler v. Smith 224 

Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. 

Travelers Ins. Co 398 

Scott v. Columbia Gulf 

Transmission Co 495 

Scott v. Francis Vandergriff Shoe 

Co. 593, 596 

Scott County Coop. v. Brown. . . 259, 485 

Seab v. Scab 345 

Sears v. City of Akron . . 388 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale . . 572 
Sears Shipping Co. v. Sieracki .... 143 
Selley v. McWilliams Realty Corp. . . 566 

Semple v. City of Vicksburg 476 

Semple v. Mayor & Aldermen of 

Vicksburg 295 

Sequios Tepeyec, S.A., Companies 

Mexicana de Sequros Generales 

v. Boston 402 

Sharp v. Learned 444, 446 

Shaughnessy v. United States 272 

Shearin v. Coleman 180 

Shearron v. Shearron 487 

Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Yeomans 380 

Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phillips 485 

Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Coston ... 493 
Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Srrcek ... 494 

Sheridan v. Commissioner 465 

Sherrill v. McShan 453 

Shipp v. State 98, 99, 103 

Shingleton v. Bussey 488, 489, 490 

Shively v. Bowlby 447 

Shows v. City of Hattiesburg 295 

Shulman v. Ritzenburg 393 

Shuptrine v. Herron 295 

Simonton v. Bacon 88, 90 

Simpson v. Laprade 428 

Simpson v. Poindexter 476 

Sinclair Crude Oil Co. v. Okla. 

Tax Comm. 213 

Sinclair Refining Co. v. 

Atkinson 165, 166, 167, 627, 628 

629, 630, 632, 633 

Sinclair v. State 100 

Singleton v. State 102 

Skinner v. State 99 

Sleeth v. Dairy Prods. Co 441 

Smith v. Abbate 381 

Smith v. Chicago Portrait Co 609 

Smith v. Commissioner 334 

Smith v. Evening News Associates. . 161 

Smith v. Greenburg 363 

Smith v. Muse 83 

Smith v. M/V Gisna 150 

Smith v. Smith 80, 92, 95, 96 

Smith v. State 102 

Smith v. Transit Cas. Co 403 

Smith's Administrator v. Smith.. 582, 593 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. . . 70 

Snowden v. Skipper 485 

Snyder v. Board of 

Trustees 135, 136, 139 

Snyder v. Harris .... 379, 382, 383, 384 

385, 386, 388, 391, 394, 395, 397 

Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Murdock. 284 

Southcote v. Stanley 563 

Southeastern Express Co. v. 

Namie 372, 374 

Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. 

Co. v. Mitchell 405 

Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. 

Noriss 398, 403 

Southern Pac. Lmbr. Co. v. Reynolds 122 
Southland Co. v. Aaron . . . .352, 353, 355 

Southland Co. v. McDonald 354 

Spanel v. Mounds View School 

Dist. No. 621 480 

Spicer v. New York Life Ins. Co. . . 363 
Spong Baking Co. v. Trinity 

Universal Ins. Co 403 

Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co 403 

Standard Oil Co. v. Decell 299 

Stankiewizx v. United Fruit S.S. 

Corp 147 

Stanley v. City of Macon 472 

Stanley v. Morgan Sc Lindsey, Inc. . . 572 
State v. Columbia Pictures Corp. . . 615 

State v. Gill 444 

State v. Marshall 593 

State Auto Ins. Co. v. Rowland 406 

State Farm Fire &: Cas. Co. v. 

Tashire 386 

State Farm Mut. Auto Co. v. 

Smoot 402, 404 

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 

Co. v. McKay 584 

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. White. 405 




State of Maryland v. Capital 

Airlines 391 

State of Michigan v. Morton Salt.. 390 

Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess . . 461 

Stephens v. Stephens 180 

Sterger v. Vansiclen 565 

Stewart v. Barksdale 180 

Stillwell v. Parsons 401 

St. Louis v. Rutz 447 

St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. 

Dyson 267 

St. Mary's Church of New 

Brunswick v. Board of Adjust- 
ment of City of New Brunswick.. 282 
Stone v. Arizona Highway 

Comm'n 481 

Stone v. Stone 384 

Stone v. Texoma Prod. Co 193 

Strand Enterprises v. Turner 571, 572 

Strange v. State Tax Comm 182 

Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort 

Gen. Ins. Co 405 

Stricka v. Netherlands Ministry 

of Traffic 145 

Stringer v. Consumers Credit 

Corp 368, 373 

Strode v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.. 405 

Stroud v. D-X Sunray Oil Co 219 

Stuart v. Robinson 349 

Stubbs v. Green Bros. Gravel Co. . . 234 
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department 

of Education 615 

Superior Oil Co. v. Griffin 494 

Superior Oil Co. v. Stanalind Oil 

and Gas Co 191 

Swaney v. White 81 

Sweezy v. New Hampshire 140 

Swiren v. Commissioner 323 

Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark 147 

Talbert v. Ellzey 87 

Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. 

McLeod Lumber Co 581, 582, 585 

594, 596 

Taliaferro v. Relndon 314 

Tanner v. Foreman 178 

Tanner v. Olds 210 

Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust 

Co. 208, 210 

Tapley v. McManus 178 

Taylor v. Helen Lykes 148 

Taylor v. New Jersey Highway 

Auth. 573 

Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour 

Co 163 

Teas v. Twentieth Century-Fox 

Film Corp 224, 228 

Technograph Printed Circuits, 

Ltd. v. United States 390 

Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack 614, 616 

Temple v. First Natl. Bank of 

Meridian 348, 349 

Terrill v. ICT Ins. Co 472 

Texaco v. Musgrove 88, 89 

Texas Gulf Prod. Co. v. 

Griffith 191, 194 

Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Cobb 493 

Textile Workers of America v. 

Lincoln Mills 162, 167, 396, 629 

630, 631, 632 

Thomas v. Bard 483 

Thomas v. Bedford 156 

Thomas v. Hempt Bros 416 

Thompson v. City of Philadelphia. 294 

Thompson v. City of Winona 295 

Thompson Methodist Church v. 

Zoning Bd. of Rev. of City of 

Pawtuckett 281 

Times Film Corp. v. 

Chicago 612, 613, 617 

Tippit v. Hunter 487 

Tips v. Bass 458 

Tomko v. Vissers 279 

Totten, In re 185 

Town of Durant v. Castleberry 298 

Town of Hazelhurst v. Cumberland 

Tel. & Tel. Co 368, 370 

Town of Somerset v. Montgomery 

County Bd. of Appeals 285 

Town of Woodville v. Jenks 580 

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line 

Corp. v. Hill 493 

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line 

v. Myrick 493 

Transport Indem. Co. v. 

Seib 605, 606, 610 

Trovato v. Chiaradio 284 

Tucker v. City of Okolona 471, 472 

473, 477, 479, 483, 484 

Tucker v. Gurley 265 

Tuite v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of 

City of Woonsocket 275 

Tungus v. SkovgaaTd 151 

Turner v. Turner 350 

Union Producing Co. v. Scott 224 


[vol. xli 

Union Producing Co. v. Simpson . . 238 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener 501, 504 
United States Air Force Texas 

Tower No. 4, In re 175 

United States v. Bendik 619 

United States v. Darby 417 

United States v. Dennis 2 

United States v. Frazell 315 

United States v. Jakobson 620 

United States v. Kauten 619 

United States v. Kissinger 433 

United States v. Kopf 431 

United States v. Rosenwasser 411 

United States v. Seeger . . . 618, 619, 620 
621, 622, 623, 626 

United States v. Shapiro 325 

United States v. Sisson 626 

United States v. United Air 

Lines, Inc 390, 501, 504, 505 

United States v. Woolsey 323 

United States Fidelity & 

Guar. Co. v. Canale 403 

United States Fidelity & 

Guar. Co. v. State 581, 584 

United Steelworkers of America 

v. American Mfg. Co 627, 632 

United Steelworkers of America 

v. Enterprise Wheel and Car 

Corp 627, 633 

United Steelworkers of America 

v. Warrier and Gulf Nav. Co.. . 627, 632 
Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. 

v. City of Chicago 616 

Uzce v. Bollinger 230 

Vaiden v. Hawkins 347 

Van Alstyne v. Tuffay 362 

Van Norman v. Meridian 

Water Works Co 298 

Vaughn v. Vaughn 181 

Veal v. Thomason .... 209, 214, 215, 219 

Vermeulen's Petition, In re 502 

Vickers v. City of Camdon 472 

Vickers v. Tumey 144, 147 

Village of Euclid v. Ambler 271 

Vines v. Southwestern Miss. 

Elec. Power Assn 292 

Voight v. City of Corpus Christi . . 472 
Wadell v. Board of Zoning Appeals 

of City of New York 285 

Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Cont. Oil Co. 224 
Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co 399 

Waldron v. Moore- McCormick 

Lines, Inc 147 

Wallace v. J. C. Penney Co 572 

Walley v. Williams 485 

Walling v. Haile Gold Mines, Inc... 417 
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. . . 411 

Walsh Constr. Co. v. Church 311 

Ward v. Dulaney 92, 95 

Ward v. Mitchell 485 

Ward v. Ward 88 

Ware's Estate, In re 180 

Waring v. Stinchcomb 447 

Warner v. Hogin 586 

Warren v. Amerado Petrol. Corp. . . 230 

Warren v. Chambers 446 

Warren v. City of Tupelo 297 

Warren v. Town of Booneville. .290, 476 
Washington v. Greenville Mfg. and 

Machine Works 237, 238, 239 

241, 243 

Watt v. Allgood 83 

Watts v. Watts 179 

Waycaster v. State 102 

Weihs v. State 107 

Weir v. United States 432 

Weisner v. Board of Educ. of 

Montgomery County 482 

Welsh v. United States .... 618, 622, 623 

624, 625, 626 
Westbrook v. Ball .... 190, 193, 198, 204 
Westerfield v. Shell Petroleum Corp. 255 
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fowler. . 403 

Western Maid, The 474 

Westminster v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. 

of City of Providence 284 

Wettengel v. Gormley 208 

Wheeler v. State 99, 104 

White v. Mississippi Power & 

Light Co 568 

White v. State 108 

White v. Williams 92 

White v. Willis 580 

Whitfield v. City of 

Meridian 291, 305, 476 

Whitney v. Hanover National 

Bank 589, 597 

Whitney v. Lott 360 

Wiggins v. Knox Glass, Inc 233 

Wilbourn v. 

Wilbourn . . . . 341, 342, 343, 344, 345 
Wilkerson v. Light, Heat & 

Water Co. of Jackson 298 




Williams v. Bailey 185 

Williams v. City of Detroit 480 

Williams v. Moran 171 

Williams v. Northern Natural 

Gas Co 493 

Williams v. State 99, 101 

Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co.. . 587 

Williamson v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 572 
Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co 399, 403 

Wilson v. Bridgeforth 179 

Wilson v. Holm 224 

Wilson v. Jourdan 184 

Wilson v. State 102, 103 

Wilson v. Wilson 92 

Winn-Dixie Super Markets v. 

Hughes 572 

Winterman v. McDonald 224 

Wirtz v. Crystal Lake Crushed 

Stone Co 416 

Wolf. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments 

of Borough of Park Ridge 276 

Wolfson v. Chelist 570 

Woodbury v. Zoning Bd. of Review 

of City of Warwick 273 

Woodmanser v. Garrett 246 

Woods v. Sturges 183 

Woods v. Town of Indianola 298 

Woolbert v. Lee Lmbr. Co.. .80, 86, 87, 90 
Worcester County Trust Co. v. 

United States 458 

Workman v. City of New York 478 

Wright v. Brush 224 

Wright v. Coffey 568, 570, 571 

Wroten v. Fenn 586 

W. T. Raleigh v. Rotenberry 608 

Yamauchi v. O'Neill 569 

Yancey v. Maestri 106 

Yates' Estate v. Ala.-Miss. 

Cbnf. Assn. of Seventh Day 

Adventists, Inc 184 

Yazoo Delta Mort. Co. v. 

Hutson 580, 596 

Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Mansfield .... 568 
Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. 

Wallace 369, 582, 594 

Yazoo City v. Loggins 487 

Young v. Elgin 340 

Young v. Martin 88, 89, 91, 92 

Young v. Young 106 

Younger v. Lumberman's Mut. 

Cas. Co 405 

Zachman v. Erwin 381 

Zdanok v. Glidden Co 499 

Ziamariano v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. 

of City of Providence 284 

Zinck v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 

of Framingham 287 

Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co 399 



Mississippi Constitution 

Article III, sec. 31 (1890) . . 247, 269, 582 

Article IV, sec. 50 (1890) 13 

Article IV, sec. 51 (1890) 13 

Article IV, sec. 81 (1890) 168 

Article IV, sec. 90 (1956) 80 

Article VI, sec. 147 (1890) 578 

Article VI, sec. 157 (1890) 578 

Article VI, sec. 159 (1890) 81 

Article VI, sec. 162 (1890) 578 

Article VI, sec. 165 (1890) 13 

Article XII, sec. 241 (1890) 105 

Mississippi Code Annotated 

Sec. 36 (Supp. 1968) 40 

Sec. 41 A: 1-101 et seq. (Spec. UCC 

Supp. 1967) as amended 36, 40 

Sec. 41A:3-302 (Spec. UCC Supp. 

1967) 52 

Sec. 41A:3-305 (2) (Spec. UCC 

Supp. 1967) 52 

Sec. 41A:9-206 (1) (Spec. UCC 

Supp. 1967) 52, 54 

Sec. 241 (1956) 80 

Sec. 275 (1956) 75 

Sec. 275 (Supp. 1968) 40 

Sec. 307 (Supp. 1968) 71 

Sec. 308 (1956) 182 

Sec. 308 (Supp. 1968) 182 

Sec. 399-450-01 (Supp. 1968) 82 

Sec. 431 (1956) 82 

Sec. 432 (1956) 81 

Sec. 437 (1956) 83 

Sec. 439 (1956) 82 

Sec. 440 (1956) 82 

Sec. 443 (1956) 81 

Sec. 447 (1956) 81 

Sec. 448 (1956) 80 

Sec. 461 (1956) 80 


[vol. xli 

Sec. 461 (f) (Supp. 1968) 92 

Sec. 479 (1956) 360, 361, 363, 364 

Sec. 539 (1956) 349 

Sec. 586 (1956) 349 

Sec. 657 (1956) 91 

Sec. 668 (1956) 182 

Sec. 671 (Thompson, Dilliard 

& Campbell 1892) 369 

Sec. 672 (1956) ...... 360, 361, 363, 364 

Sec. 735 (1956) 68 

Sec. 833 (1956) 194 

Sec. 1216.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1220.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1224.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1309 (1956) 84 

Sec. 1395.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1396.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1398.1 (Supp. 1968) 246 

Sec. 1421 (1956) 260 

Sec. 1453 (Supp. 1968) 296 

Sec. 1454 (1956) 246 

Sec. 1464 (1956) 368 

Sec. 1525 (1956) 256 

Sec. 1536 (Campbell 1880) 368 

Sec. 1538 (1956) 263, 269 

Sec. 1545 (1956) 67 

Sec. 1659 (1956) 257 

Sec. 1712 (1956) 257 

Sec. 1761.5 (Supp. 1968) 610 

Sec. 1762 (1956) 104 

Sec. 1766 (Supp, 1968) 104 

(1956). 247, 269 

Sec. 1801 
Sec. 2414 



Sec. 2415 (1956) 355 

Sec. 2415.5 (Supp. 1968) 355 

Sec. 2558 (1956) 103 

Sec. 2573 (1956) 100 

Sec. 2574 (1956) 100 

Sec. 2575 (1956) 100, 104 

Sec. 2575.5 (Supp. 1968) 99, 103 

Sec. 2735 92 

Sec. 2735 (1956) 80 

Sec. 2748-02 (Supp. 1968) 97 

Sec. 2749-82 (Supp. 1968) 

(eminent domain chapter) 490 

Sec. 2783 (1956) 70 

Sec. 3,130 (1956) 105 

Sec. 3235 (Supp. 1968) 105 

Sec. 3374-112 (Supp. 1968) 471 

Sec. 3590 (Supp. 1968) 154, 159 

Sec. 3593 (1956) 276 

Sec. 3594 (Supp. 1968) 154, 278 

Sec. 4054-01 (1956) 13 

Sec. 4054-02 (1956) 13 

Sec. 5205 (1942) 181 

Sec. 5205 (Supp. 1968) 180, 181 

Sec. 5590 (Supp. 1968) 40 

Sec. 5591-01 et seq. (Supp. 1968) . 40, 43 

Sec. 5591-09 (Supp. 1968) 77 

Sec. 5591-14 (a) (Supp. 1968) 50 

Sec. 5591-14 (b) (Supp. 1968) 67 

Sec. 5591-31 et seq. (Supp. 1968) . . 40 

Sec. 5591-35 (Supp. 1968) 77 

Sec. 5591-36 (Supp. 1968) 42, 77 

Sec. 5929-01-17 (1952) 357, 358 

Sec. 5948 (Supp. 1968) 168 

Sec. 6132-01-112 (Supp. 1968) 225 

Sec. 6336-19 (Supp. 1968) 291 

Sec. 6907 (1952) 80 

Sec. 6909-01 et seq. (1952) 84 

Sec. 6909-02 (1952) 81, 82, 84 

Sec. 6909-03 (1952) 84 

Sec. 6909-04 (Supp. 1968) 84 

Sec. 6909-05 (1952) 85 

Sec. 6909-06 (1952) 85 

Sec. 6909-07 (1952) 85 

Sec. 6909-08 (1952) 85 

Sec. 6911 (1952) 85 

Sec. 6957 et seq. (1952) 108 

Sec. 6958 (1952) . 108, 109 

Sec. 6959 (1952) 109 

Sec. 6960 (1952) 109 

Sec. 6962 (1952) 110 

Sec. 6963 (1952) 110 

Sec. 6998-01 (Supp. 1968) 242 

Sec. 6908-02 (3) (Supp. 1968) 244 

Sec. 6998-02 (19) (Supp. 1968) .... 233 

Sec. 6998-03 (Supp. 1968) 235 

Sec. 6998-07 (1952) 235 

Sec. 6998-07 (Supp. 1968) 235 

Sec. 6998-09 (1952) 235 

Sec. 6998-09 (Supp. 1968) 235 

Sec. 6998-13 (q) (Supp. 1968) 234 

Sec. 7106-111-136 (Supp. 1968) .... 358 

Sec. 8037 (1956) 294 

Sec. 8075-01 et seq. (Supp 1968) . . 40, 43 

Sec. 8075-13 (4) (Supp. 1968) .... 50 

Mississippi Laws 

Miss. Code of 1930 Sec. 1580 235 

Chapter 305, Laws of 1962, 

amending Miss. Code Ann. 

§ 1640 (1956) 509 

Miss. Gen. Laws ch. 312 (1968) .... 246 

1969-70] INDEX 

Federal 18 u.s.c. 891 et se <l- (Supp. iv, 

1969) 38, 39 

U.S. Constitution 28 U.S.C. 41 (8) (1940) 443 

28 U.S.C. 1331 (1964) 383, 443 

28 U.S.C. 1332 (1964) 383 

Article IV, Section 1 500, 502 28 U.S.C. 1332 (a) (1964) 383, 384 

28 U.S.C. 1333 384 

U.S. Code 28 u s c 1334 384 

K TT - Hrt 28 U.S.C. 1335 384 

5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. (Supp. IV, 28 U.S.C. 1335 (a) (1) (1964) .... 386 

Article III, Section 2 453, 455 

1968) 439 

28 U.S.C. 1336 384 

5 U.S.C. 703 (Supp. IV, 1968) .... 439 2 8 U.S.C. 1337 (1964) .... 164, 384, 443 

7 U.S.C, 701 (Supp. IV, 1968) .... 439 28 U.S.C. 1338 384 

7 U.S.C. 1281 et seq. (1964) 422 28 U.S.C. 1339 384 

7 U.S.C. 1341 (1964) 423 28 USC ' 134 ° 384 

, V ' 28 U.S.C. 1343 384 

7 U.S.C. 1341-50 (1964) 422 2 8 UAC. 1391 (c) (1964) 442 

7 U.S.C. 1342 (1964) 423 28 U.S.C. 1441 (1964) 255 

7 U.S.C. 1343 (1964) 423 28 U.S.C. 1441 (b) (1964) 164 

7 U.S.C. 1344 (a) (1964) 423 28 U.S.C. 1450 (1964) 166 

7 U.S.C. 1344 (b) (1964) 423 28 USC ' l732 < 1964 > 605 ' 6U 

„ TT o^ ,.^,\ , ' 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1964) 500,502 

7 U.S.C. 1344(e) (1964) 423 2 8 U.S.C. 2106 .....! 504 

7 U.S.C. 1344(f) (1964) 424 28 U.S.C. 2111 (1964) 504 

7 U.S.C. 1344 (f) (2) (1964) 424 28 U.S.C. 2201 (1964) 441 

7 U.S.C. 1344 (f) (3) (1964) 424 28 U.S.C. 2283 (1964) 396 

7 U.S.C. 1344(f) (6) (1964) 424 29 U.S.C. 104 (1964) 160,161,627 

7 U.S.C. 1344 (f) (8) (1964) 424 29 U.S.C. 141-531 (1964) 627 

7 U.S.C. 1361-68 (1964) 424 29 U.S.C. 185 (a) (1964) 160,627 

7 U.S.C. 1363 (1964) 425 29 U.S.C, 203 (e) (g) (u) (Supp. 

7 U.S.C. 1365 (1964) 432, 434 IV, 1969) . .410, 411, 412, 413, 418, 419 

7 U.S.C. 1366 (1964) 432, 435 29 U.S.C. 206 (a) (1) (Supp. IV, 

7 U.S.C. 1376 (1964) 440 1969) 71, 409, 412, 414, 418 

15 U.S.C. 1021 (1964) 74 29 U.S.C. 206 (a) (5) (Supp. IV, 

15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969) 409 

1969) 38 29 U.S.C. 212 (a) (1964) 419 

15 U.S.C. 1605 (Supp. IV, 1969) . . 44 29 U.S.C. 213 (a) (6) (Supp. IV, 

15 U.S.C. 1605 (a) (Supp. IV, 1969) 45 1969) 409, 410, 411, 413 

15 U.S.C. 1631-41 (Supp. IV, 414, 419, 420 

1969) 44 29 U.S.C. 213 (b) (12) (Supp. IV, 

15 U.S.C. 1633 (Supp. IV, 1969) . . 39, 45 1969) 409 

15 U.S.C. 1638 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969) 50 33 U.S.C. 466 (1948) 356 

15 U.S.CJ 1661 -et. seq. (Supp. IV, 33 U.S.C. 466g (b) (1948) 356 

1969) 38, 39 33 U.S.C. 466k (1948) 356 

15 U.S.C. 1662-64 (Supp. IV, 1969) 49 33 U.S.C. 466 (Supp, IV, 1965) 357 

15 U.S.C. 1671 et seq. (Supp. IV, 33 U.S.C. 466 (b) (Supp. IV, 1965) . 357 

1969) .. ... ....38,39 33 U.S.C. 466n (Supp. IV, 1905) ... 357 

15 U.S.C. 1672 (b) (Supp. IV, 39 U.S.C. 4008 (a) (1964) 137 

1969) 71 43 U.S.C. 1332 (1964) 169 

15 U.S.C. 1673(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 46 U.S.C. 688 (1964) 142, 169 

1969) 71 46 U.S.C. 740 (1964) 173 

15 U.S.C. 1674 (Supp. IV, 1969) . . 73 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq. (1964) 169 

15 U.S.C. 1677 (Supp. IV, 1969) .. 71 46 U.S.C. 761-67 (1964) 151 


[vol. xli 

Federal Legislature 

Higher Education Act of 1965, 

Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 

1219 (Nov. 8, 1965) 131 

Higher Education Act of 1965, as 

amended, Pub. L. No. 90-575, 

82 Stat. 1048-49 (Oct. 16, 1968) . . 131 

Fair Labor Standards Act 408, 410 

411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 418, 419, 421 

Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Ch. 1 
Sec. 23(f), 24(a) (27-3) 464 

Internal Revenue Code of 1939 

Sec. 113(a) (13) 314 

Sec. 3797 (a) (2) 310 

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 

Sec. 72 459 

Sec. 165(a) 464 

Sec. 165(c) 465 

Sec. 446 317 

Sec. 691 (a) 337 

Sec. 691 (c) 337 

Sec. 701 312 

Sec. 702 (a) , 703 (a) (1) 312 

Sec. 704 (c) (1) 315 

Sec. 704(d) 316 

Sec. 705 (a) 317 

Sec. 705 (b) 316, 317 

Sec. 706 (b) 318 

Sec. 706 (c) 319, 336, 337 

Sec. 708 (b) 318, 319, 320 

Sec. 721 313, 314 

Sec. 722 313, 315, 316, 322, 326 

Sec. 723 313, 315 

Sec. 731 331 

Sec. 731 (a) 330, 331, 332 

Sec. 734 (a) 326 

Sec. 734 (b) 331 

Sec. 735 325, 331 

Sec. 736 333 

Sec. 736 (a) 330, 335 

Sec. 736 (b) 334 

Sec. 741 316, 322, 323 

Sec. 742 316 

Sec. 743 (b) 326, 328 

Sec. 751 (a) 323 

Sec. 751 (b) 331, 333 

Sec. 751(c) 323, 332 

Sec. 751 (d) 324, 325, 332 

Sec. 752 (d) 322 

Sec. 761(a) (1), (2) 311 

Sec. 761 (a) 310 

Sec. 761 (c) 314 

Sec. 1001 (a) 322 

Sec. 1014(c) 337 

Sec. 1223 325, 326 

Military Selective Service Act 

of 1967 
50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) 621 

National Defense Act of 1917, 
ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78 618 

Norris-La Guardia Act 

29 U.S.C. § 104 (1969) 627, 628 

Norris-La Guardia Act § 4 631 

Norris-La Guardia Act § 7 633 

Norris-La Guardia Act § 301 630, 633 

Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 
625, § 6 (j) , 62 Stat. 612 619 

Selective Training and Service 

Act of 1940, 
50 U.S.C. § 456 (1964) 619 

Taft-Hartley Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) 627, 628 

Taft-Hartley Act § 301 629, 630 

H.R. 11656, 14832, 91st. Cong., 

1st. Sess. (1969) 385 

S. 1980, 91st. Cong., 1st. Sess. 

(1969) 385, 394 

S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th. Cong., 

2d Session 19 (1966) 412 

U.S.C.C. & A.N., 2, 89th. Cong., 

2d Sess., 3012 (1966) 412 

Statutes Pub. L. 

49 Stat. 1561 (1936) 605 

Other States 


Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2262 (B) (1956) 606 


Const, art. 6, § lb 10 

Const, art. 6, § 10b 10 

Const, art. 6, § 8 10 

Const, art. 8, § 18 10 


Stat. Ann. § 92.36 (Supp. 1970) .. 610 

Stat. § 222.11 (1956) 72 




Code Ann. § 9-401.1 (Supp. 1969) . . 121 


Ann. Stat. ch. 85 §§ 1-101 et seq. 

(Smith-Hurd 1966) 481 


Civ. Code Ann., art. 2315 (West 

1952) 170 


Ann. Code, art. 35, § 59 (1957) .... 610 

Ann. Code, art. 66A, §§ 1-26 (1957) 617 


Ann. Laws, ch. 152, § 7A (1965) . . 241 

Ann. Laws, ch. 233, § 78 (1956) .... 610 


Stat. Ann. § 3.996 (107) (Rev. 1969) 481 


Stat. Ann. § 466.02 (1963) 480 


Rev. Stat. § 25-1558 (1964) 72 

Rev. Stat. § 25-12109 (1964) 606 

New York 

Const, art. 6, § 22 10 

Civ. Prac. Law and Rules 

§ 4518 (McKinney 1963) 605 

Pers. Prop. Law § 48-a (McKinney 

1961) 72 

Workman's Comp. Law, § 21 

(McKinney 1965) 241 

New Mexico 

Stat. Ann. § 20-2-12 (1953) 610 


Rev. Code Ann. § 2715-30 (Page 

1953) 72 


Stat. Ann., ch. 1, app. 1 (Supp. 

1969) 122 


Stat. Tit. 42, § 886 (1966) 72 


Const, art. 16, § 28 72 


Code Ann., § 49-7-8 (Supp. 1969) .. 11 

Uniform Codes 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

13(a) 506 

23 379 

23(a) (3) 380 

23 (b) (1) (A) , 23 (b) (1) 

(B), (b) (2), (b) (3) . .383, 384 

23(b) (2), (b) (3) 381 

42 (a) 506 

81 (c) 255 

Model Probate Code 

Sec. 184(a) (1945) 351 

Uniform Business Records as 

Evidence Act 605, 606 

Uniform Commercial Code 

Sec. 1-102(2) (b) (1962) 37 

Sec. 1-102(3) (1962) 37 

Sec. 9-404(1) 62 

Uniform Commercial Credit Code 

Sec. 1.102(1) (f) 39 

Sec. 1.102(2) 36 

Sec. 1.103 40 

Sec. 1.301(6) 46 

Sec. 1,301(9) 46 

Sec. 1.301(16) 46 

Sec. 2.108 46 

Sec. 2.201 41, 42 

Sec. 2.201 (2) (b) 42 

Sec. 2.202 75 

Sec. 2.203 75 

Sec. 2.204 75 

Sec. 2.205 75 

Sec. 2.207 (3) 41 

Sec. 2.209 75 

Sec. 2.301 (2) (b) 39 

Sec. 2.302 (1) (a) 46 

Sec. 2.302 (1) (b) 46 

Sec. 2.306(2) 47, 48 

Sec. 2.310(1) 48 

Sec. 2.312 48, 49 

Sec. 2.313(1) 49 

Sec. 2.403 54 

Sec. 2.404 (1) 55 

Sec. 2.405 75 

Sec. 2.407 66 

Sec. 2.407 (1) 65, 66 

Sec. 2.408 66 

Sec. 2.410 68 

Sec. 2.413 75 

Sec. 2.414 75 

Sec. 2.501 60 

Sec. 2.502 60 


[vol. xli 

Sec. 2.503 (2) 61 

Sec. 2.504 62, 63 

Sec. 2.505 63 

Sec. 3.108 46 

Sec. 3.201 41, 42 

Sec. 3.202 75 

Sec. 3.203 75 

Sec. 3.204 75 

Sec. 3.205 75 

Sec. 3.209 75 

Sec. 3.301 (2) (b) 39 

Sec. 3.302 (1) (a) 46 

Sec. 3.302 (1) (b) 46 

Sec. 3.306 (2) 47, 48 

Sec. 3.309 (1) 48, 49 

Sec. 3.310 48 

Sec. 3.311 48, 49 

Sec. 3.312 (1) 49 

Sec. 3.402 75 

Sec. 3.404 75 

Sec. 3.405 75 

Sec. 3.503 41, 42 

Sec. 3.508 41, 42 

Sec. 3.508 (2) (b) 42 

Sec. 5.104 to 5.106 68 

Sec. 5.105(2) 71 

Sec. 5.107 76 

Sec. 5.108 76 

Sec. 5.301 76 

Sec. 5.302 76 

Sec. 6.101 et seq 41 

Uniform Rules of Evidence 

Rule 63 (13) and (14) 605 


Occupiers Liability Act, 5 and 6 

Eliz., 2, ch. 31 (England, 1957) . . 574 


Mississippi Supreme Court 

Rule 41 508 

A.B.A. Canon of Judicial Ethics 

No. 4 3 

No. 24 4 

No. 25 4 

No. 26 4, 5 

7 Code of Federal Regulations 

Sec. 711 (1969) 433 

Sec. 71L12 (1969) 427 

Sec. 711.13 (1969) 425 

Sec. 711.13 (1969) 426 

Sec. 711.2(d) (1969) 426 

Sec. 711.25 (1969) 430 

Sec. 780 (1969) 433 

Sec. 780.3 (1969) 441, 442 

Sec. 780.3 (1970) 433 

Treasury Regulations 

Sec. 1.1245-1 (e) (3), (4) 

(1965) 328 

Sec. 1.446-1 (c) (ii) (1961) .... 324 
Sec. 1.691-1 (a) (3), (b) (1) 

(1965) 337 

Sec. 1.705-1 (a) (1) (1956) .... 316 

Sec. 1.705-1 (a) (2) (i) (1956) . 317 

Sec. 1.705-1 (b) (1956) .... 316, 317 

Sec. 1.706-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1956) 318 

Sec. 1.706-1 (b) (1) (iii) (1956) 318 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (1) (1956) .... 319 
Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (2) (i) , (3) 

(i) (1956) 319 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (2) (ii) (1956) 337 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (3) (iv) (1956) 338 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (3) (v) (1956) 337 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (4) (1956) .... 337 

Sec. 1.706-1 (c) (5) (1956) .... 319 

Sec. 1.707-1 (a) (1956) 315 

Sec. 1.708-1 (a) (1956) ........ 320 

Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (1) (i) (1956) 320 
Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (1) (i) (a) 

(1956) 320 

Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1956) 320 

Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (1) (iv) (1956) 330 

Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (i) (b) (1956) 319 

Sec. 1.708-1 (b) (iii) (1956) 319, 320 

Sec. 1.721-1 (a) (1956) . 313, 314, 315 

Sec. 1.721-1 (b) (1) (1956) . 313, 315 

Sec. 1.723-1 (1956) 316 

Sec. 1.736-1 (a) (1) (i) (1965) 334 
Sec. 1.736-1 (a) (1) (ii) , (a) 

(6) (1956) 320 

Sec. 1.736-1 (a) (3), (4) (1965) 335 

Sec. 1.736-1 (a) (6) (1965) ... 338 

Sec. 1.736-1 (b) (2) (1965) ... 334 
Sec. 1.736-1 (b) (3) (1965) 334,335 

Sec. 1.736-1 (b) (5) (1965) ... 336 

Sec. 1.731-1 (a) (2) (1956) 331, 332 

Sec. 1.731-1 (c) (3) (1956) . 315, 320 

Sec. 1.732-1 (c) (1956) 329 

Sec. 1.732-1 (c) (2) (1956) ... 331 

Sec. 1.732-1 (d) (1) (iv) (1956) 329 

Sec. 1.732-1 (d) (1) (v) (1956) 329 

Sec. 1.732-1 (d) (2) (1956) ... 328 

Sec. 1.732-1 (d) (3) (1956) .... 328 

Sec. 1.7324(d) (4) (1956) ... . 329 

1969-70] INDEX 

Sec. 1.735-1 (b) (1965) 325 

Sec. 1.742-1 (1956) 316, 337 

Sec. 1.743-1 (b) (1956) • 327 

Sec. 1.743-1 (b) (1) (1956) .... 328 

Sec. 1.743-1 (b) (2) (i) (1956) 328 

Sec. 1.743-1 (b) (2) (iv) (1956) 327 

Sec. 1.743-1 (b) (3) (1956) .... 327 

Sec. 1.743-1 (c) (1956) 327 

Sec. 1.751-1 (1965) 333 

Sec. 1.751-1 (a) (1965) 323 

Sec. 1.751-1 (b) (2) (1965) .... 333 

Sec. 1.751-1 (c) (1) (1965) .... 


Sec. 1.751-1 (c) (2) (1965) . 324 


Sec. 1.751-1 (d) (2) (ii) (1965) 


Sec. 1.755-1 (1956) 


Sec. 1.761-1 (a) (1) (1957) .... 


Sec. 1.761-1 (a) (2) (ii) (1956) 


Sec. 1.761-1 (a) (2) (iii) (1956) 


Sec. 1.761-1 (a) (2) (iv) (b) 



Sec. 1.761-1 (c) (1956) 



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